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SPEECH | Oct. 18, 2016

Adm. Tidd Prepared Remarks for CSIS Maritime Security Dialogue

Opening Remarks of SOUTHCOM commander, Navy Adm. Kurt W. Tidd,

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC

October 18, 2016

Good morning.  Pete, thanks for the invitation to come to CSIS.  It’s great to be here, and I look forward to our discussion today.  

To help frame our discussion, I’d like give you a quick rundown of how SOUTHCOM is looking at maritime security challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean.

If I were talking to you in 1986…or 1996…or even 2006, I’d be telling you that drug trafficking is the most significant security challenge in this part of the world.  Back then, everything from the FARC in Colombia to violence in Central America seemed to be connected in some way to the drug trade.  It was pretty clear cut: narco-traffickers moved narcotics from South America to the US in the maritime domain.  We knew what the threat was, and where it was, and how to best combat it.

But somewhere along the line, something changed…and in 2016, drugs alone are no longer the main thing we have to worry about.  Neither are the millions of people who are trafficked through the region, nor the thousands more who are smuggled on the high seas in hopes of reaching our shores.  The myriad illicit commodities that move through our hemisphere as part of a global flow of illicit goods and services isn’t the main challenge, either.

Instead, it’s the amorphous, adaptable, and networked threats enabling these illicit flows that keep me up at night.  Transregional and transnational threat networks—and not the commodities they move—are the real threat to our nation’s security and the region’s stability.

The threat lies in the ability of these networks to connect people and groups, dangerous in their own right, much more so when empowered by others.  These networks, as a whole and in their parts, are woven into the fabric of our environment and societies.  And I would argue that these networks are pressing problems that we—as a whole of government—don’t fully understand, especially as it relates to the world we live in today…a world in which these networks, and the growing illegal economies that support them, undercut our national interests in multiple nations, multiple continents, and multiple regions and domains.  

Wherever they exist, in whatever form they take—be it extremist, criminal, or even state-sponsored—threat networks are a significant challenge facing every nation in the western hemisphere. 

In the maritime realm, their sophisticated operations pose a threat to the safety of navigation, human life, maritime trade, and the social and economic well-being of coastal and land-locked states. ii

There are as many different networks as there are disparate goals and creative methods for conducting illegal activity.  Some networks—like violent extremist ones—are ideologically or politically motivated.  They focus on spreading their influence and moving money, weapons, and people while criminal networks are focused on accumulating wealth and power by satisfying a market demand for an illicit service. 

Some networks smuggle desperate people from all over the world into our country, where they go on to find jobs or refuge from conflict…while other networks specialize at moving individuals with questionable backgrounds, worrisome intentions, and possible ties to terrorism into the united states via a long and circuitous route, sometimes starting in South America, up through Central America and Mexico, and into the united states.

Some networks have cornered the market on cocaine trafficking, and some dabble in poly-crime activities.  Some networks engage in small arms smuggling via maritime conveyances.  Some networks possess the highly coveted expertise to build semi and fully submersibles that are capable of reaching our shores unassisted and undetected, over long distances. 

And whether their crimes are committed at sea or on land, the effects of these different networks are felt across our communities, and, in some cases, across countries and continents.

So what does all this mean for the maritime security of the Western Hemisphere?

Well, for one thing, it means that we require a different way of thinking about this challenge, and how we can help combat it.

Thinking differently involves challenging our assumptions.  We’d all do well to remember that near things are important, too.  While we must pay attention to the seas and oceans around the world, we shouldn’t lose sight of what’s going on in the waters around our home, either.

It also means challenging ourselves.  And so at SOUTHCOM, we’re lifting our sights from an exclusive focus on a single illicit commodity – drugs –and instead challenging ourselves to take a networked view of the environment.  That means thinking and acting in multiple domains…embracing cross-functional teams…tearing down stove-pipes…developing the staff to embrace complexity and alternative viewpoints…and constantly learning, adapting, and applying new approaches and ideas.

Part of this shift comes from a candid recognition that for years we’ve been triaging the symptoms of the problem, rather than addressing the root problem itself.  And in that time, that problem has adapted and grown in complexity…while our efforts to address it have lagged behind.

Thinking differently also applies to those of us that make up the ‘friendly network,’ collectively, we would all benefit from a better understanding of ourselves.  While we are integrated well in certain areas, we can always do better.  Different players have different pieces of the puzzle, but it’s not always clear how those pieces all fit together, or how the ‘not-so-friendly’ networks operate and interact. 

Each of us has glimpses of financial flows…a partial understanding of the centrality of particular routes and nodes…an expanding knowledge base about how various types of networks come together and interact with one another…a recognition that corruption is a huge part of the problem…and a nagging sense that we’re using 20th century approaches to fight 21st century threats. 

Broadly speaking, everyone in the ‘friendly network’ knows what needs to be done…we need to increase regional maritime cooperation, real-time information sharing, and multinational operations…we need to continue building and reinforcing bonds of trust across and between our own military, law enforcement, diplomatic and intelligence communities, fusing these bonds bilaterally and multilaterally with our key partners. 

We need to explore innovative technologies that don’t just make us smarter, but better.   We need to support more operations like homeland security investigations’ operation citadel—which is fast becoming the model for DoD support to countering threat networks in the Western Hemisphere. 

Thinking differently about networks also means we need to think differently about our requirements.  We need to be more effective in using what we have, more discriminating in how we use it, and more adaptive and creative in seeking alternative ways to fill capability gaps.

The good news is we’ve got a solid foundation to build on.   Every year, our joint interagency task force south and its extensive international and interagency network supports hundreds of maritime interdiction operations…those operations net hundreds of arrested drug traffickers, each one a node in an illicit network. Law enforcement leverages the evidence and testimony from these lower level traffickers to further investigate and indict their superiors and ultimately dismantle the larger threat networks.

The task force’s counter threat finance cell is supporting money laundering investigations through network analysis and the targeting of bulk cash smuggling that is the financial lifeblood of threat networks.  Their cyber/container initiative uses advanced analytics to fuse commercially available data, processed reporting, and open source intelligence to identify how individuals or organizations exploit cyberspace to move illicit commodities via commercial conveyances.  We’d like to find ways to do more of this kind of work, because it’s exactly what’s needed in a counter-network approach. 

Our coast guard partners are also leaning forward.  Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Zukunft has committed to maintaining an increased presence in cutters, as well as a commensurate plus-up in MPA aircraft hours, to get after threat networks in the western hemisphere. 

This support is especially critical as the Navy decommissions its frigates and awaits the full deployment of its new line of littoral combat ships.  In essence, the coast guard is enabling us to meet our title 10 statutory obligations and deterring human smuggling operations on the high seas.  There’s a reason why we call them ‘SOUTHCOM’s Navy!’

Speaking of the LCS, when it comes to Navy requirements, SOUTHCOM has historically done a lot with very little.  We don’t need a carrier strike group…and given competing global priorities, we probably wouldn’t get one, anyway.  That means we have to be realistic and creative in finding sourcing solutions. 

We’d like to pursue opportunities to meet this demand by leveraging Navy ships transiting our AOR and other unconventional solutions.  Navy ships have to travel between the east and west coasts of the United States on a regular basis. 

While en-route, why not stop for 3-7 days to conduct port visits, bilateral exchanges, and short duration exercises?  If we could bring this kind of thinking into the future concept design for ship transits, we could provide low-cost training opportunities and visible, consistent us Navy presence in a part of the world where it has been in short supply.

Additionally, integrating ships from Navy bases in the southern United States could provide underway training, bilateral engagement opportunities, and show the United States’ continued commitment to the region. 

Given the non-kinetic, low threat environment in our AOR, ships in early phases of training could be employed in viable, critical mission sets against threat networks operating in the dark, asymmetric maritime domain.

For example, while LCS ships are in their early phases of commissioned service and crew integration, we could leverage the ship, its crew, and available berthing for regional training teams and network mapping experts for a short deployment to Latin America or the Caribbean.  We see this kind of creative application of sea power as a ‘win-win’ for the Navy and for SOUTHCOM…the Navy gets a great, target-rich training environment…while we get some much needed help filling our capability gaps.

However we get them, the presence of Navy or Coast Guard ships is critical to our counter threat network approach. Both services have unique capabilities to engage threat networks where they are most vulnerable to disruption—in the maritime domain. 

A grey hull (or a white one with an orange stripe) is still a powerful deterrent.  It also sends a clear message to our adversaries, and a reassuring one to our friends.  The Navy and Coast Guard have important roles to play in supporting counterdrug operations.  Detection and monitoring and capacity-building efforts are both integral parts of a counter-network approach.  Both efforts are also the foundation for enduring and cooperative maritime security.  That will not change. 

I guess you could say what’s really changing is our goal.  Until now, we’ve focused on what we can diminish or degrade…how many metric tons of cocaine we can disrupt…or how many coca or marijuana plants we can help eradicate.

And while that remains important…it’s time we start building something, too.  What we’re driving towards is better integration, better understanding, and better support to law enforcement efforts. 

Ultimately, we want to help our partners—in the US government and across the region—build a network that is stronger, more adaptive, and more interconnected than any threat network can ever hope to be.

With that, I’ll stop talking so we can begin our discussion!


References
 
i David Luna, “Fighting Networks with Networks.” Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization.  Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, 2013.
 
ii Moseley, Aleeza. The Implementation of International Maritime Security Instruments In CARICOM States. Division For Ocean Affairs And The Law Of The Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, The United Nations.  New York, 2009

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