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- Good morning everybody, we'll go ahead and get started.

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You can take your seats.

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Welcome to the third day of a terrific conference.

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For those who don't know me, Carol Pottenger,

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retired Vice Admiral, I've been on the SNA Board

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going into my second year and I have the honor

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of being your mistress of ceremonies this morning.

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So we have a great morning lined up,

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in fact all three of our speakers this morning

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are first timers to SNA in their current positions

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and I think it'll be packed full

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of great information and back and forth.

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So our first speaker, someone well known to all of us,

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but again the first time that

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he has spoken to us at SNA as the Commander

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of US Southern Command, Admiral Kurt Tidd.

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He took command a year ago, he was scheduled to be here

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as a speaker but there was a small conflict

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that was called his change of command,

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so for some reason he chose to take command

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over being here as a speaker with us last year,

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so we're delighted to have him this year,

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a year into his tour.

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US Southern Command, responsible for US military

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operations in Central and South America,

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with an AOR greater than 16 million square miles.

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And his constant theme, his constant emphasis

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is regional partnership, building relationships,

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and shared national security interests across the AOR.

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And of course this is a part of the world

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that isn't up on our radar, and so I think we're all

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really looking forward to learning more

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about what's going on down there

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and how the force structure, current and future,

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the Naval Service Force Structure,

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might help him do his mission better.

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I'm sure he'll have lots of interesting tidbits about that.

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Admiral Tidd's previous highlighted assignments

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include Assistant to the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff,

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Commander US Fourth Fleet, Commander Carrier Strike Group 8

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aboard the Ike, Commander Middle East Force and CTF 55.

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He is the true Renaissance man.

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He's a French linguist with a master's degree

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from the University of Bordeaux,

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and the Legion of Honor from the government of France.

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He was a fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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As my colleague Doug Crowder reminded me,

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he was an Olmsted Scholar.

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Father and brother both served as US Navy Flag Officers,

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a fine Navy family, and I love the pre little tidbits

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of information you pick up right before

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a speaker comes on stage, so apparently he was also

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Admiral Hogg's aide, Flag Aide long ago and far away

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and our SWO boss, Tom Rowden and he were in department

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at school together and I won't tell the rest of that story,

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I'll leave that for the cocktail hour. (laughing)

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So very important for our Surface Navy audience.

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Kurt is our very own old salt.

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So welcome, warm welcome to Admiral Kurt Tidd.

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(audience applauding)

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- Well it's such a delight to be here

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and again my belated apologies

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for not being able to be here last year.

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Carol gave the low down on it.

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We were trying to figure out is it possible,

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do the change of command, jump on an airplane,

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fly up here, we just finally said you know,

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that's probably stretching things a little bit,

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but I did commit at that point.

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I guess it's probably worth airing out

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the elephant in the room, I know you're asking yourself,

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why was I invited to come speak to this particular audience?

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Now I will acknowledge that I guess there's a certain

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amount of deference and professional courtesy that goes

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with being the old salt, that that probably earns you

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at least an opportunity to speak.

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So if that's the case, I'm perfectly happy

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to exploit and take advantage of it.

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But you're probably thinking wait a minute,

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US Southern Command,

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that's the region that has Fourth Fleet,

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and isn't that the fleet that doesn't have any ships?

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So why would you have somebody come up

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and speak to the Surface Navy Association

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that doesn't have any ships in his fleet?

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So this gives me the golden opportunity,

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and I want to take advantage of it right up front,

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to give an enormous shout out to our US Coast Guard.

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And our Coast Guard's men and women,

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they are absolutely rock solid

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foundational members of this proud organization.

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You need to understand because our Navy fleet

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is stretched thin with more global demands

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than we have forces available,

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for the most part, down in the US Southern Command region,

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our maritime forces have white hulls and orange stripes,

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and I'm very proud of that fact,

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and I'd just like to give a shout out

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and a thanks to the United States Coast Guard, so thank you.

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(applauding)

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You all know the Coast Guard is doing both

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the Department of Homeland Security mission

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as well as our Navy congressionally directed

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Title 10 mission of detection and monitoring.

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Without the Coast Guard doing this

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in the Western Hemisphere, we would just be out of luck.

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So with all of that said, you're still probably wondering

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what could I possibly have to say to this organization,

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and especially what can somebody from US Southern Command,

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a region of the world that is unique in that there is

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at this point at time no state on state conflict,

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no combat, no wars going on in our region.

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So what would I have to say about distributed lethality?

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It's a fair question.

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So let me see if someone with 36 years as a SWO,

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if that gives me enough insight

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maybe to be able to offer a few observations.

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Now over the past few days I understand

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that you've had some very passionate discussions

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about the merits of our new Surface Force strategy.

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This concept of returning to sea control

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hearkens back to the foundations of our Naval service.

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Within this construct, you've heard a lot about how

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distributed lethality promises increased offensive

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capability across our Surface Force

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with the ability to project that lethality across the globe.

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This renewed focus on improving the effectiveness

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of the Surface Force is an important element

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as we reembrace classic military principles

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that allow us to establish and maintain military superiority

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against a range of transnational and transregional threats

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that are capable of operating in multi-domain

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and multi-functional conflicts.

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For the next few minutes what I'd like to do

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is share a few thoughts on these issues,

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and then I'll be happy to take questions

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on either my remarks or anything else

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that you'd be interested in discussing.

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Now, whatever you call it, unrestricted, complex,

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hybrid, or some other trendy term,

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the type of competition and potential conflict

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our Navy is likely to face is increasingly comprised

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of compressed layers of state and non-state actors,

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all comprising a complex web or network.

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As a Navy, we've traditionally viewed unrestricted

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or hybrid conflicts as anomalies.

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And frankly, very land-centric.

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Based on what we see today, and how some powers,

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both state and non-state, have chosen to pursue their

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strategic aims, they are definitely no longer anomalies.

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Hybrid and complex threats are here to stay.

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On land, at sea, and in every other domain, everywhere.

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What this requires is a different way of thinking

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about how we control and dominate in the maritime domain.

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If we're going to be relevant, our thinking should be

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shaped by the realities of today's multi-polar world.

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And it should reflect today's

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transnational and transregional threats.

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The real challenge, of course, lies in the fact that

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our interests aren't challenged by

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just a single adversary, in just one region.

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Our interests are challenged by a range of actors

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in multiple regions across multiple domains,

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all happening, all at the same time.

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A few illustrative examples.

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On the state actor side, this involves for example,

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Iran routinely using fast boats and UAVs

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engaged in belligerent and harassing

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activities in international waters.

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China creates artificial islands then employs its navy,

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coast guard, and scores of fishing vessels

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to challenge international norms and rules.

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They use aggressive cyber operations to obtain

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US military and commercial intellectual property.

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We observe, as Russia's stakes a claim to Arctic territory

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through stepped up military activities while engaging in

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widespread and expansive disinformation campaigns

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to erode faith and confidence in global institutions.

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We see a whole host of non-state actors

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exploiting the maritime global commons to traffic in people,

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weapons, minerals, and of course illicit drugs.

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These maritime examples are part of broader campaigns

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and strategies of state and non-state actors,

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employing a full range of military

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and paramilitary activities, information operations,

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cyber, sea, air, space, political manipulation,

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all to achieve economic leverage and coercion

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and the exploitation of civil society.

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And all of this is happening all at the same time.

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It is so intermixed and often so subtle

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that some fail to recognize these activities

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in the grey zone as belligerent and frankly of any concern,

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yet they form layers of a coherent strategy,

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compressed and interwoven one upon the other.

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It all should be seen as multiple strands

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of a single woven tapestry.

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So let's think broadly about what sea control means

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in the context of complex, hybrid, unrestricted competition.

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On the non-state actor side, this involves threat networks

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that move people, weapons, and drugs in a range

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of ever evolving maritime conveyances, fishing vessels

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and go-fasts, semi submersibles and fully submersibles.

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Each illicit conveyance that reaches its destination,

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further erodes maritime and border security and sovereignty,

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not just of our partners, but of the United States as well.

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Now these may seem like unrelated issues,

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state and non-state actors operating independently

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within individual regions or theaters, and in the past,

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that's precisely the way that we

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as a military treated these challenges.

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TACOM focused on China, EUCOM on Russia,

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and CENTCOM of course on Iran.

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AFRICOM primarily focused on non-state actors

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and SOUTHCOM, well, we were those guys who just did drugs.

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(audience laughing)

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Right?

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But our recently signed national

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military strategy tells us differently.

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We now recognize these are all global network problem sets.

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Transnational, transregional,

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multi-domain, and multi-functional.

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And in this era of global competition with state actors,

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we're faced with a conflict, state and non-state,

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and it will be blended and compressed together.

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So we need to be thinking about how these competitors,

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both state and non-state, view,

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use, and exploit the maritime domain.

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The seams between maritime and the littorals

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and interactions between maritime and land transit routes.

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We need to assess the full hybrid warfare toolkit

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at their disposal and how they're able to work

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against our Navy and our nation.

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We need to think about how we might adapt

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and apply our own tools in this domain.

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And most importantly, we need to think about how

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these things are connected to one another

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and how different forms of distributed lethality

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inherent in our Naval forces can pressurize

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and attack these networks of our adversaries from the sea.

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When we look at the illicit worldwide flows of goods

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and people and the violence and the corruption

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that these flows fuel at home and abroad,

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we have to recognize these flows

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are merely the visible manifestations

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of the complex adaptive network threats.

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These illicit networks operate unrestrained by laws,

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unimpeded by morality, and fueled by enormous profits.

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They prey on weak institutions,

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transcend international borders,

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and exploit the interconnected nature

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of our modern financial, transportation,

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and technological systems and the seams

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in our organizational boundaries.

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And instead of just confining our gaze, for example,

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to Russia's efforts to expand influence within

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the Western Hemisphere, we need to step back and take a look

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at their power projection all around the world.

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We need to evaluate the sum of their activities by looking

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at them through the prism of Russia's global strategy.

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Russian activities in the military, political, diplomatic,

261
00:14:20,210 --> 00:14:23,717
and information arenas complement or perhaps

262
00:14:23,717 --> 00:14:25,793
are complemented by other types

263
00:14:25,793 --> 00:14:29,376
of unconventional power projection tactics.

264
00:14:29,437 --> 00:14:33,187
Our awareness of and actions in the gray zone

265
00:14:33,651 --> 00:14:36,568
will either contribute or constrain

266
00:14:36,823 --> 00:14:40,406
our strategies at the high end of conflict.

267
00:14:41,126 --> 00:14:42,495
So thinking about how everything

268
00:14:42,495 --> 00:14:46,495
is connected applies to us and to our community.

269
00:14:47,262 --> 00:14:48,736
We must think carefully about how

270
00:14:48,736 --> 00:14:52,319
our community's strategy nests and supports

271
00:14:52,936 --> 00:14:56,269
not only our overarching Naval strategy,

272
00:14:56,661 --> 00:14:58,705
we also need to think about how to connect

273
00:14:58,705 --> 00:15:02,224
our unique maritime capabilities, our placement,

274
00:15:02,224 --> 00:15:05,891
and our access into the broader blue network

275
00:15:06,062 --> 00:15:08,247
that includes our joint service partners,

276
00:15:08,247 --> 00:15:12,289
members of the intelligence community, law enforcement,

277
00:15:12,289 --> 00:15:16,253
diplomatic, interagency, and of course, our broader,

278
00:15:16,253 --> 00:15:19,170
multi-national allies and partners.

279
00:15:20,277 --> 00:15:22,742
When it comes to addressing global challenges,

280
00:15:22,742 --> 00:15:26,381
this is a crowded but a sloppy playing field.

281
00:15:26,381 --> 00:15:28,810
All the right players are talking to each other,

282
00:15:28,810 --> 00:15:31,170
but there doesn't seem to be a common awareness

283
00:15:31,170 --> 00:15:35,337
or a shared way of seeing and acting on these problems.

284
00:15:36,622 --> 00:15:40,404
We can all agree that we must impose costs on those who seek

285
00:15:40,404 --> 00:15:42,576
to cause chaos and to overturn

286
00:15:42,576 --> 00:15:45,104
the established international order.

287
00:15:45,104 --> 00:15:47,650
To be relevant, our surface forces

288
00:15:47,650 --> 00:15:50,150
must play an appropriate role.

289
00:15:51,612 --> 00:15:54,277
Being effective requires shifting from a mindset

290
00:15:54,277 --> 00:15:56,944
of capability, interoperability,

291
00:15:57,554 --> 00:16:00,804
to a mindset of capability integration.

292
00:16:02,573 --> 00:16:05,037
Instead of focusing on ensuring that our focuses

293
00:16:05,037 --> 00:16:08,782
can work together, in other words, interoperability,

294
00:16:08,782 --> 00:16:12,237
we need to think bigger, we need to dream bigger.

295
00:16:12,237 --> 00:16:14,684
We need to work towards having a shared

296
00:16:14,684 --> 00:16:18,851
common understanding of the tactical, operational,

297
00:16:18,916 --> 00:16:21,265
and the strategic environment,

298
00:16:21,265 --> 00:16:23,950
not just of the kinetic threats that we face,

299
00:16:23,950 --> 00:16:27,061
but also of the opportunities to participate

300
00:16:27,061 --> 00:16:30,978
as critical nodes in our friendly blue network.

301
00:16:32,390 --> 00:16:35,849
The totality of our integrated efforts against threats

302
00:16:35,849 --> 00:16:37,379
that will allow for more efficient

303
00:16:37,379 --> 00:16:41,546
and effective employment of our respective resources.

304
00:16:42,162 --> 00:16:46,329
Our Surface Force can and should play a very important role

305
00:16:46,752 --> 00:16:50,675
in enabling shared understanding amongst our sister services

306
00:16:50,675 --> 00:16:54,039
and interagency and multinational partners.

307
00:16:54,039 --> 00:16:57,498
Although it's not explicitly stated that the concept

308
00:16:57,498 --> 00:17:00,823
of distributed lethality can help us achieve

309
00:17:00,823 --> 00:17:04,587
shared understanding of the maritime environment.

310
00:17:04,587 --> 00:17:08,082
To this end, we must open the aperture of definitions

311
00:17:08,082 --> 00:17:12,082
of distributed lethality from primarily kinetic.

312
00:17:12,328 --> 00:17:15,175
Now don't get me wrong, kinetic is important.

313
00:17:15,175 --> 00:17:17,796
But it's not sufficient if we want to maximize

314
00:17:17,796 --> 00:17:21,963
our contribution and thus our relevance to the joint force.

315
00:17:23,647 --> 00:17:27,191
We need to think about how non kinetic effects can add value

316
00:17:27,191 --> 00:17:30,329
to the full range of joint force options

317
00:17:30,329 --> 00:17:33,412
available to the Combatant Commander.

318
00:17:33,598 --> 00:17:36,891
Our Surface Forces present unique advantages

319
00:17:36,891 --> 00:17:41,058
simply from their persistent posture in the maritime domain.

320
00:17:42,577 --> 00:17:45,994
How might we posture, equip, and optimize

321
00:17:46,086 --> 00:17:48,681
our Surface Forces to be effective?

322
00:17:48,681 --> 00:17:51,364
Not just in the maritime domain, but also to have

323
00:17:51,364 --> 00:17:55,531
relevance in the land, air, space, and cyber domains.

324
00:17:57,278 --> 00:18:01,445
What are the tailorable and scalable sensor packages

325
00:18:01,524 --> 00:18:04,335
that must be distributed throughout the Surface Force

326
00:18:04,335 --> 00:18:07,897
in order to provide unique insight to decision makers

327
00:18:07,897 --> 00:18:11,802
in the form of operations and intelligence fusion?

328
00:18:11,802 --> 00:18:15,220
How are our conventional Surface Forces postured

329
00:18:15,220 --> 00:18:18,247
to employ these adapted sensor packages to inform

330
00:18:18,247 --> 00:18:21,289
external commanders of emerging opportunities

331
00:18:21,289 --> 00:18:24,372
and increased access available during

332
00:18:24,742 --> 00:18:28,242
routine patrols, transits, and operations?

333
00:18:29,615 --> 00:18:31,868
How are we developing our next generation

334
00:18:31,868 --> 00:18:35,323
of officers and sailors, imbuing them with the skills

335
00:18:35,323 --> 00:18:37,500
and equipping them with the right tools

336
00:18:37,500 --> 00:18:40,833
to synthesize massive quantities of both

337
00:18:41,494 --> 00:18:44,621
classified and publicly available data

338
00:18:44,621 --> 00:18:46,636
in order to mitigate the threats

339
00:18:46,636 --> 00:18:50,219
and exploit these identified opportunities?

340
00:18:52,017 --> 00:18:54,107
Can the Surface Force dynamically harness

341
00:18:54,107 --> 00:18:56,879
emerging commercial technologies such as deep

342
00:18:56,879 --> 00:18:59,795
learning algorithms, neural networks,

343
00:18:59,795 --> 00:19:03,841
and the incorporation of unmanned micro, subsurface,

344
00:19:03,841 --> 00:19:06,758
surface, and aerial vehicle swarms.

345
00:19:07,803 --> 00:19:10,644
How do we cultivate a mindset of innovation

346
00:19:10,644 --> 00:19:14,143
throughout our force to develop new approaches and solutions

347
00:19:14,143 --> 00:19:18,064
that don't just make us smarter, they make us better?

348
00:19:18,064 --> 00:19:21,814
How can we grow and as important, incentivize

349
00:19:23,494 --> 00:19:26,828
innovative minded Junior Officers to challenge

350
00:19:26,828 --> 00:19:30,351
traditional Naval paradigms through mentally agile

351
00:19:30,351 --> 00:19:33,351
approaches and to emerging problems?

352
00:19:33,780 --> 00:19:36,297
How can the Surface Force enhance our capable

353
00:19:36,297 --> 00:19:39,189
professional partners in support of global,

354
00:19:39,189 --> 00:19:42,106
multinational coalition operations?

355
00:19:42,989 --> 00:19:44,351
Our surface community can and

356
00:19:44,351 --> 00:19:46,983
should facilitate this integration.

357
00:19:46,983 --> 00:19:49,250
We can start by building and distributing

358
00:19:49,250 --> 00:19:52,398
our shared understanding of the global environment

359
00:19:52,398 --> 00:19:56,073
to the joint force which builds and reinforces the bonds

360
00:19:56,073 --> 00:19:59,823
of trust across and between our own military,

361
00:19:59,957 --> 00:20:04,124
law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence communities.

362
00:20:05,504 --> 00:20:06,598
And because of the depth of our

363
00:20:06,598 --> 00:20:09,122
international maritime partnerships,

364
00:20:09,122 --> 00:20:11,533
we can play an important role in bringing

365
00:20:11,533 --> 00:20:15,366
our key partners into this integrated network.

366
00:20:16,100 --> 00:20:19,767
So in closing, a mindset of true integration

367
00:20:20,498 --> 00:20:23,430
and distributed lethality in terms of effects

368
00:20:23,430 --> 00:20:27,597
is how the Surface Force fully realizes sea control.

369
00:20:28,205 --> 00:20:32,372
That control is best achieved and sustained not through

370
00:20:33,126 --> 00:20:37,293
any single platform, capability, or any single service,

371
00:20:37,947 --> 00:20:41,802
but instead by an overwhelming application of integrated

372
00:20:41,802 --> 00:20:45,969
effects from multiple instruments of national power.

373
00:20:47,088 --> 00:20:50,977
We need to align and to sequence our maritime activities

374
00:20:50,977 --> 00:20:55,144
and operations in order to pressurize these threat networks.

375
00:20:56,557 --> 00:21:00,656
We need to be able to bring effects against both state

376
00:21:00,656 --> 00:21:04,323
and non-state actors across multiple fronts.

377
00:21:05,229 --> 00:21:09,061
Nothing we plan or execute should happen in isolation.

378
00:21:09,061 --> 00:21:13,144
After all, everything is connected to everything.

379
00:21:14,442 --> 00:21:18,192
That should apply to our own efforts as well.

380
00:21:18,602 --> 00:21:21,548
So thank you and I look forward to your questions.

381
00:21:21,548 --> 00:21:24,715
(audience applauding)

382
00:21:34,092 --> 00:21:36,844
And do I get to call them or does, sir?

383
00:21:36,844 --> 00:21:39,348
- [David] Yes sir, David Isbey, Air International.

384
00:21:39,348 --> 00:21:42,753
Sir, the military to military relationship

385
00:21:42,753 --> 00:21:45,450
with the countries in your region,

386
00:21:45,450 --> 00:21:48,602
how has that been progressing in recent years?

387
00:21:48,602 --> 00:21:50,072
And what value do you see both

388
00:21:50,072 --> 00:21:53,072
to those countries and to US forces?

389
00:21:54,706 --> 00:21:58,873
- It is probably not as well recognized as it could be

390
00:21:59,109 --> 00:22:03,276
or should be, we have enormously strong partnerships

391
00:22:03,626 --> 00:22:07,793
that go back decades with partners across Latin America,

392
00:22:08,898 --> 00:22:11,163
Central America, South America and the Caribbean.

393
00:22:11,163 --> 00:22:15,163
We have partners who have enormous capabilities.

394
00:22:15,503 --> 00:22:18,586
They are well trained, well equipped,

395
00:22:19,143 --> 00:22:21,550
understand how to operate with us,

396
00:22:21,550 --> 00:22:24,191
they simply are looking for the opportunity.

397
00:22:24,191 --> 00:22:26,967
And one of the challenge that we have is creating

398
00:22:26,967 --> 00:22:30,119
those opportunities, and that's one of the problems

399
00:22:30,119 --> 00:22:34,119
that as our forces have been required to operate

400
00:22:34,147 --> 00:22:38,314
in higher threat regions with higher priority missions,

401
00:22:39,399 --> 00:22:41,560
that's provided less and less opportunity

402
00:22:41,560 --> 00:22:44,766
for us to work closely, so when those opportunities do arise

403
00:22:44,766 --> 00:22:48,798
for instance, as Admiral Franchetti had the opportunity

404
00:22:48,798 --> 00:22:51,821
with the transit of the USS George Washington battle group,

405
00:22:51,821 --> 00:22:55,336
that strike group was able to conduct significant operations

406
00:22:55,336 --> 00:22:59,394
with our most capable partners across the region.

407
00:22:59,394 --> 00:23:01,306
I'd particularly like to highlight the efforts

408
00:23:01,306 --> 00:23:05,321
that they were able to have with armed forces of Brazil,

409
00:23:05,321 --> 00:23:09,135
but also with armed forces across and around the (mumbling)

410
00:23:09,135 --> 00:23:13,135
from Chile, Peru, Colombia, and other countries.

411
00:23:14,314 --> 00:23:18,481
So we've got great partners, strong relationships,

412
00:23:18,563 --> 00:23:22,373
well trained and frankly officers who have trained

413
00:23:22,373 --> 00:23:25,291
at our war colleges, at our training schools,

414
00:23:25,291 --> 00:23:28,402
we just need the effort to be able to engage them.

415
00:23:28,402 --> 00:23:32,236
It's an open door that we just simply have to walk through.

416
00:23:32,236 --> 00:23:33,069
Sir.

417
00:23:33,069 --> 00:23:35,271
- [Cal] Hi Admiral, Cal Biesecker here with Defense Daily,

418
00:23:35,271 --> 00:23:36,789
a couple questions if I may.

419
00:23:36,789 --> 00:23:39,732
First, are you seeing any links between Middle East

420
00:23:39,732 --> 00:23:43,493
terrorist groups and drug cartels or other entities

421
00:23:43,493 --> 00:23:46,076
in your area of responsibility?

422
00:23:46,887 --> 00:23:49,405
And the nature of those, if you are seeing that.

423
00:23:49,405 --> 00:23:50,273
- Interesting, yeah my--

424
00:23:50,273 --> 00:23:51,600
- [Cal] Your predecessor talked about it.

425
00:23:51,600 --> 00:23:53,276
- Well my predecessor got in big trouble

426
00:23:53,276 --> 00:23:54,996
when he talked about, in fact,

427
00:23:54,996 --> 00:23:55,829
(audience laughing)

428
00:23:55,829 --> 00:23:58,329
when he identified some links.

429
00:23:59,688 --> 00:24:03,002
And he's paying the price as a result of it, I think.

430
00:24:03,002 --> 00:24:06,752
No, seriously, I think it is safe to say that

431
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:14,367
these networks that we see operating throughout a region

432
00:24:14,416 --> 00:24:17,507
that frankly are connected to east and west,

433
00:24:17,507 --> 00:24:19,597
north and south, these networks,

434
00:24:19,597 --> 00:24:22,854
some of them are purely criminally motivated,

435
00:24:22,854 --> 00:24:25,263
economically motivated, some of them are purely

436
00:24:25,263 --> 00:24:28,562
ideologically motivated terrorist networks.

437
00:24:28,562 --> 00:24:30,252
What we're seeing more and more though

438
00:24:30,252 --> 00:24:33,436
is a blurring of the lines between the two of them.

439
00:24:33,436 --> 00:24:36,037
And while there has long been, I think,

440
00:24:36,037 --> 00:24:38,849
the conventional wisdom was that criminals

441
00:24:38,849 --> 00:24:42,016
and terrorists would not mix together,

442
00:24:42,635 --> 00:24:45,076
I think what we're in fact seeing are criminal networks

443
00:24:45,076 --> 00:24:48,743
that either knowingly or unknowingly support

444
00:24:48,874 --> 00:24:51,420
terrorist activities and terrorist networks that engage

445
00:24:51,420 --> 00:24:53,022
in criminal activities to fund their behavior.

446
00:24:53,022 --> 00:24:57,189
So I'm not allowed to use the nexus word so I won't,

447
00:24:59,683 --> 00:25:02,242
but I think what we're seeing is these networks occupy

448
00:25:02,242 --> 00:25:05,325
that same dark, quasi-illicit network

449
00:25:07,269 --> 00:25:09,747
of money laundering and document forgery,

450
00:25:09,747 --> 00:25:13,363
transportation and movement of all manner of goods,

451
00:25:13,363 --> 00:25:16,301
and so we shouldn't be surprised when we do find

452
00:25:16,301 --> 00:25:18,033
that there are in fact connections.

453
00:25:18,033 --> 00:25:21,284
Are there terrorist networks in the region?

454
00:25:21,284 --> 00:25:23,416
Yes there are, there have been foreign fighters

455
00:25:23,416 --> 00:25:25,738
that have gone from countries in this region

456
00:25:25,738 --> 00:25:28,698
to fight with ISIL in Syria and Iraq.

457
00:25:28,698 --> 00:25:31,418
The biggest concern of course is if they return

458
00:25:31,418 --> 00:25:35,585
to the region and the impact that they could have.

459
00:25:35,632 --> 00:25:39,799
All of our partners I think, have been awakened to

460
00:25:40,540 --> 00:25:43,373
the danger of self-radicalization.

461
00:25:44,231 --> 00:25:46,153
They understand how quickly it can occur

462
00:25:46,153 --> 00:25:50,058
and how it can happen without a lot of outward signs,

463
00:25:50,058 --> 00:25:52,564
and it's a threat that we have experienced

464
00:25:52,564 --> 00:25:54,937
the scourge of here in our own country

465
00:25:54,937 --> 00:25:57,091
on multiple instances and so none of us

466
00:25:57,091 --> 00:25:58,402
should be surprised if it happens

467
00:25:58,402 --> 00:26:00,073
in any of the countries in the region.

468
00:26:00,073 --> 00:26:02,780
- [Cal] Just one other if I may, just the--

469
00:26:02,780 --> 00:26:06,062
- Don't upset the SWO boss, it's his conference.

470
00:26:06,062 --> 00:26:07,798
(audience laughing)

471
00:26:07,798 --> 00:26:08,809
- [Cal] Just real quick,

472
00:26:08,809 --> 00:26:11,719
it was either Admiral Zukunft or maybe it was

473
00:26:11,719 --> 00:26:14,349
his predecessor Bob Papp that talked about

474
00:26:14,349 --> 00:26:16,366
a lot of good intelligence down in your area

475
00:26:16,366 --> 00:26:20,533
of responsibility in terms of targeting drug boats,

476
00:26:21,515 --> 00:26:23,564
things that are coming towards the United States

477
00:26:23,564 --> 00:26:26,787
or elsewhere to land, but a lot of difficulty

478
00:26:26,787 --> 00:26:29,680
in intercepting them, just didn't have the assets.

479
00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:33,078
And so in your year down there, how is that percentage?

480
00:26:33,078 --> 00:26:36,487
What are you seeing in terms of the ability to target--

481
00:26:36,487 --> 00:26:38,029
- The challenge has not gotten any better,

482
00:26:38,029 --> 00:26:41,132
and frankly we're facing exactly the same problems,

483
00:26:41,132 --> 00:26:44,799
having better understanding of the networks,

484
00:26:45,943 --> 00:26:49,198
and as we focus on the networks themselves,

485
00:26:49,198 --> 00:26:52,063
I think that gives us the opportunity,

486
00:26:52,063 --> 00:26:56,230
rather than focusing exclusively on the commodities

487
00:26:56,600 --> 00:26:59,925
that the networks move, we focus on the networks,

488
00:26:59,925 --> 00:27:02,282
and we're able to apply the unique characteristics,

489
00:27:02,282 --> 00:27:05,056
not just that the military has to bear

490
00:27:05,056 --> 00:27:06,655
but of course the intelligence community,

491
00:27:06,655 --> 00:27:08,549
law enforcement community, diplomatic,

492
00:27:08,549 --> 00:27:09,769
and of course working closely

493
00:27:09,769 --> 00:27:12,432
with border nations to build that picture.

494
00:27:12,432 --> 00:27:16,210
The more fidelity you have in the picture that you build,

495
00:27:16,210 --> 00:27:19,670
the more the challenge of being able to act on it.

496
00:27:19,670 --> 00:27:23,337
Now the reality is in the USSOUTHCOM region,

497
00:27:27,436 --> 00:27:31,603
we talk about the lexicon of counter network approach,

498
00:27:32,209 --> 00:27:36,376
we talk either identify, illuminate, and disrupt networks,

499
00:27:36,601 --> 00:27:39,925
or sometimes the find, fix, finish piece of it,

500
00:27:39,925 --> 00:27:42,758
that third level, that end game is

501
00:27:45,231 --> 00:27:48,060
99 and 44 100ths percent of the time

502
00:27:48,060 --> 00:27:50,075
will not be a US military end game,

503
00:27:50,075 --> 00:27:51,949
and it's difficult for me to imagine a situation,

504
00:27:51,949 --> 00:27:54,751
it will ideally, it will be a partner nation,

505
00:27:54,751 --> 00:27:57,615
law enforcement end game, in some instances where

506
00:27:57,615 --> 00:27:59,738
the partner nation militaries are supporting

507
00:27:59,738 --> 00:28:01,108
their law enforcement it'll be

508
00:28:01,108 --> 00:28:03,357
a partner nation military end game.

509
00:28:03,357 --> 00:28:06,163
In some instances it'll be US law enforcement end game

510
00:28:06,163 --> 00:28:08,104
where they have unique authorities to be able to act

511
00:28:08,104 --> 00:28:10,303
and that specifically is the case with the Coast Guard

512
00:28:10,303 --> 00:28:12,067
and the good work that they're doing.

513
00:28:12,067 --> 00:28:16,234
But what's important is that we build the picture,

514
00:28:16,584 --> 00:28:19,282
we share that picture effectively with the partners

515
00:28:19,282 --> 00:28:22,395
who are able to act on it and then empower them,

516
00:28:22,395 --> 00:28:25,711
and so a lot of the work that we do in training

517
00:28:25,711 --> 00:28:29,086
and equipping of partners is to help them

518
00:28:29,086 --> 00:28:31,251
be able to conduct that end game for themselves,

519
00:28:31,251 --> 00:28:33,898
and that occupies a lot of our efforts.

520
00:28:33,898 --> 00:28:34,893
- [Cal] Thanks.

521
00:28:34,893 --> 00:28:35,726
- Tom.

522
00:28:35,726 --> 00:28:39,893
- [Tom] Yes sir, (speaking quickly),

523
00:28:40,697 --> 00:28:43,290
first of all, thanks a lot for coming up.

524
00:28:43,290 --> 00:28:44,978
It's always great to see you.

525
00:28:44,978 --> 00:28:47,021
Second of all, thanks for your leadership down there.

526
00:28:47,021 --> 00:28:48,648
Thirdly, thanks for all those taskers

527
00:28:48,648 --> 00:28:51,033
that you gave me in your speech.

528
00:28:51,033 --> 00:28:51,866
(audience laughing)

529
00:28:51,866 --> 00:28:53,121
If I could get a copy of it I'd appreciate it

530
00:28:53,121 --> 00:28:55,273
because I was writing as fast as I could,

531
00:28:55,273 --> 00:28:59,440
but I don't think the team, if we didn't get 'em all,

532
00:28:59,764 --> 00:29:00,889
perhaps we can just, we'll--

533
00:29:00,889 --> 00:29:02,300
- You got it.
- And I do appreciate

534
00:29:02,300 --> 00:29:05,100
the opportunity to take a look at that stuff,

535
00:29:05,100 --> 00:29:07,122
because I think we need to expand upon it.

536
00:29:07,122 --> 00:29:09,496
I'd like to talk a little bit about integration,

537
00:29:09,496 --> 00:29:13,079
and when I was back running DESRON 60, we--

538
00:29:14,738 --> 00:29:16,793
- The second best Destroyer Squadron

539
00:29:16,793 --> 00:29:18,610
in the entire United States Navy.

540
00:29:18,610 --> 00:29:20,811
(audience laughing)

541
00:29:20,811 --> 00:29:21,644
- [Cal] Um yes, yes sir.

542
00:29:21,644 --> 00:29:23,894
(laughing)

543
00:29:25,579 --> 00:29:27,447
Different times, different times.

544
00:29:27,447 --> 00:29:31,614
But I had two outfits that I interacted with pretty heavily,

545
00:29:32,895 --> 00:29:35,527
Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and 2.

546
00:29:35,527 --> 00:29:39,694
And while we have a construct to bring those ships together

547
00:29:40,937 --> 00:29:43,862
and to go operate those ships and see to them,

548
00:29:43,862 --> 00:29:46,594
I was wondering what your thoughts might be on,

549
00:29:46,594 --> 00:29:49,908
although there's not perhaps the same type of construct,

550
00:29:49,908 --> 00:29:53,825
the opportunity or a thought about establishing

551
00:29:55,581 --> 00:29:59,331
a Maritime Group, establishing a C2 structure

552
00:30:02,474 --> 00:30:05,170
where we could start to bring the partner nations together,

553
00:30:05,170 --> 00:30:07,421
perhaps US Coast Guard and US Navy ship

554
00:30:07,421 --> 00:30:10,171
and develop something like that in order to enhance that

555
00:30:10,171 --> 00:30:11,740
or build or work on that integration

556
00:30:11,740 --> 00:30:14,581
and if you had any thoughts about how we might go about

557
00:30:14,581 --> 00:30:16,831
- Sure.
- trying to do that.

558
00:30:17,986 --> 00:30:19,912
- There's a natural affinity for naval forces

559
00:30:19,912 --> 00:30:23,101
from all around the world to, when they come together,

560
00:30:23,101 --> 00:30:25,675
find ways to work together, find ways to operate together,

561
00:30:25,675 --> 00:30:27,961
and just work together well.

562
00:30:27,961 --> 00:30:30,672
And we see it, and it doesn't matter what part

563
00:30:30,672 --> 00:30:33,059
of the world they come from, when they come together,

564
00:30:33,059 --> 00:30:35,498
whether it's from the Western Pacific into the Middle East,

565
00:30:35,498 --> 00:30:38,248
from South America out to RIMPAC,

566
00:30:40,273 --> 00:30:41,866
it doesn't matter, they come together,

567
00:30:41,866 --> 00:30:43,762
and they work together, and they operate.

568
00:30:43,762 --> 00:30:46,845
Would we be interested in formalizing

569
00:30:47,454 --> 00:30:50,537
a multinational standing naval group?

570
00:30:50,674 --> 00:30:53,029
We had a wonderful tradition,

571
00:30:53,029 --> 00:30:55,337
and the world's longest running

572
00:30:55,337 --> 00:30:58,920
maritime exercise with the UNITAS Exercise.

573
00:30:59,096 --> 00:31:03,036
Sadly over the years as our commitments have prevented us

574
00:31:03,036 --> 00:31:05,893
from providing the kind of dedicated forces

575
00:31:05,893 --> 00:31:09,976
that can go down and do a six to seven month long

576
00:31:10,454 --> 00:31:13,836
UNITAS continuous cruise, we're no longer able to do that.

577
00:31:13,836 --> 00:31:15,617
We would pick it up in a heartbeat and I can say

578
00:31:15,617 --> 00:31:17,705
with a high degree of confidence that our partners

579
00:31:17,705 --> 00:31:21,438
from around the region would welcome the opportunity

580
00:31:21,438 --> 00:31:24,430
to be able to resurrect that and to work together closely.

581
00:31:24,430 --> 00:31:28,097
So I say the opportunity is more than there.

582
00:31:28,793 --> 00:31:31,178
I don't think there'd be any problems.

583
00:31:31,178 --> 00:31:34,224
In the operational realm as opposed to the exercise realm,

584
00:31:34,224 --> 00:31:37,097
the terrific work that is being conducted by our

585
00:31:37,097 --> 00:31:38,885
Joint Interagency Task Force South,

586
00:31:38,885 --> 00:31:40,534
headquartered down in Key West,

587
00:31:40,534 --> 00:31:44,701
operates a multinational naval force on a day to day basis

588
00:31:45,321 --> 00:31:47,749
and it's a force that's engaged in this

589
00:31:47,749 --> 00:31:51,916
combating illicit trafficking that's taking place.

590
00:31:52,269 --> 00:31:56,102
It is with some chagrin when I look down there

591
00:31:56,911 --> 00:31:59,807
and I see that, in one instance we had last year,

592
00:31:59,807 --> 00:32:01,151
there were more Canadian ships

593
00:32:01,151 --> 00:32:03,784
participating than US Navy ships.

594
00:32:03,784 --> 00:32:06,845
Now don't get me wrong, the Canadian Navy is terrific,

595
00:32:06,845 --> 00:32:10,474
professional, great partners, and bring great capability,

596
00:32:10,474 --> 00:32:14,641
we can too, but again, the irony that I find myself

597
00:32:17,012 --> 00:32:18,688
in the position in a previous assignment

598
00:32:18,688 --> 00:32:22,427
as the Director of Operations, the DJ-3 and the Joint Staff,

599
00:32:22,427 --> 00:32:24,483
I was singularly responsible with ensuring

600
00:32:24,483 --> 00:32:27,317
that USSOUTHCOM had no Naval forces.

601
00:32:27,317 --> 00:32:29,623
(audience laughing)

602
00:32:29,623 --> 00:32:31,644
So proof positive that assignment officers have

603
00:32:31,644 --> 00:32:35,111
a sense of humor, I'm now living with the results of that.

604
00:32:35,111 --> 00:32:38,626
But the reality is, and don't get me wrong,

605
00:32:38,626 --> 00:32:41,043
I don't for a second question

606
00:32:41,201 --> 00:32:44,044
the prioritization where our forces are going.

607
00:32:44,044 --> 00:32:47,303
The challenge that we have is we run out of forces

608
00:32:47,303 --> 00:32:48,960
before we run out of critical missions

609
00:32:48,960 --> 00:32:50,271
that we need to be engaged in.

610
00:32:50,271 --> 00:32:52,997
We have opportunities and we're missing the opportunities

611
00:32:52,997 --> 00:32:54,785
to be able to engage in them.

612
00:32:54,785 --> 00:32:58,868
Naval forces are terrific and I've been on record

613
00:32:59,591 --> 00:33:03,174
with CNO saying, you know, send me the LCS,

614
00:33:05,055 --> 00:33:07,063
I would love to have it, it's the perfect platform

615
00:33:07,063 --> 00:33:10,428
for the full range of naval missions that we have

616
00:33:10,428 --> 00:33:14,595
in the SOUTHCOM region, I'm eager, I know they're coming,

617
00:33:15,769 --> 00:33:19,936
the first one's to be based in Mayport is coming later

618
00:33:20,362 --> 00:33:22,650
this year and I'm just eager to get them into the mix

619
00:33:22,650 --> 00:33:26,030
and I think that'll give us some great capability.

620
00:33:26,030 --> 00:33:26,863
Thanks.

621
00:33:27,779 --> 00:33:29,154
- [Robbie] Admiral, Robbie Harris here.

622
00:33:29,154 --> 00:33:33,194
- Sir, one of my mentors, and bosses, my very first in fact.

623
00:33:33,194 --> 00:33:34,175
- [Robbie] It is great to see you,

624
00:33:34,175 --> 00:33:36,400
thank you for being here and for your words today.

625
00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:39,661
A long time ago when I was the commodore of DESRON 32

626
00:33:39,661 --> 00:33:42,111
which was the best DESRON, as to that.

627
00:33:42,111 --> 00:33:44,382
(audience laughing)

628
00:33:44,382 --> 00:33:46,855
And I was the commodore--
- A different era.

629
00:33:46,855 --> 00:33:50,037
- [Cal] The commodore who did UNITAS 32.

630
00:33:50,037 --> 00:33:53,370
And that was back in the 1991 timeframe,

631
00:33:53,932 --> 00:33:57,099
when we circumnavigated the continent,

632
00:33:58,140 --> 00:34:00,723
operating serially or bilat for

633
00:34:01,413 --> 00:34:03,913
each of the navies down there.

634
00:34:04,349 --> 00:34:07,572
And at that time, if my memory is correct,

635
00:34:07,572 --> 00:34:11,739
those navies down there spent 90% of their operational funds

636
00:34:12,949 --> 00:34:16,699
for the entire year for that UNITAS operation

637
00:34:16,910 --> 00:34:19,925
with the US Navy, 90% of all the money they had

638
00:34:19,925 --> 00:34:23,282
for the whole year went to the UNITAS operation.

639
00:34:23,282 --> 00:34:26,717
So my question is given that we don't do UNITAS

640
00:34:26,717 --> 00:34:30,152
the way we used to, and I understand why we don't,

641
00:34:30,152 --> 00:34:34,319
how are they training their navies today after the US Navy?

642
00:34:34,691 --> 00:34:38,274
- It's a terrific question and I think the,

643
00:34:40,395 --> 00:34:41,935
to speak in generalizations which is

644
00:34:41,935 --> 00:34:44,503
always dangerous and will get me in trouble,

645
00:34:44,503 --> 00:34:47,836
some are training them, and some aren't.

646
00:34:48,675 --> 00:34:51,845
I think one of the great examples that we see,

647
00:34:51,845 --> 00:34:55,070
some of the navies are taking advantage of exercises

648
00:34:55,070 --> 00:34:57,688
like RIMPAC and prepare their navies

649
00:34:57,688 --> 00:35:01,105
and go and engage in the RIMPAC exercise.

650
00:35:02,352 --> 00:35:05,352
Now for instance, the navy of Chile,

651
00:35:06,524 --> 00:35:09,205
who is the Deputy Maritime Component Commander

652
00:35:09,205 --> 00:35:12,622
in the last RIMPAC and I have great hopes

653
00:35:12,838 --> 00:35:15,416
that we will see Chile leading as the

654
00:35:15,416 --> 00:35:18,568
Maritime Component Commander in a future RIMPAC exercise.

655
00:35:18,568 --> 00:35:19,984
That's the level of capability

656
00:35:19,984 --> 00:35:21,992
that's present within our navies.

657
00:35:21,992 --> 00:35:24,142
Colombia has provided ships that have engaged

658
00:35:24,142 --> 00:35:26,320
in a number of our Pacific exercises,

659
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:30,487
Brazil routinely deploys ships and has had a standing

660
00:35:30,853 --> 00:35:34,421
presence in the UNIFIL mission off of Beirut, Lebanon

661
00:35:34,421 --> 00:35:38,588
since 2006, I believe, since the very beginning of UNIFIL.

662
00:35:39,283 --> 00:35:43,450
And so we see serious partners take on the responsibilities,

663
00:35:44,803 --> 00:35:47,324
train, and prepare their ships, and deploy them

664
00:35:47,324 --> 00:35:49,714
and use them operationally in a wide variety of missions.

665
00:35:49,714 --> 00:35:52,705
They engage in supporting Joint Interagency

666
00:35:52,705 --> 00:35:56,705
Task Force South, operations up in the Caribbean

667
00:35:56,979 --> 00:36:00,783
and Eastern Pacific so they are taking advantage

668
00:36:00,783 --> 00:36:02,691
of the opportunities where they present themselves.

669
00:36:02,691 --> 00:36:04,774
I think we could do more.

670
00:36:05,665 --> 00:36:06,498
Sir.

671
00:36:07,053 --> 00:36:10,132
- [Hope] Hi, Hope Seck with military.com.

672
00:36:10,132 --> 00:36:11,466
- Hello, good to see you again.

673
00:36:11,466 --> 00:36:12,960
- [Hope] Good to see you too.

674
00:36:12,960 --> 00:36:16,805
I believe you spoke briefly about swarm technology,

675
00:36:16,805 --> 00:36:18,632
I was wondering if you could go into more detail

676
00:36:18,632 --> 00:36:22,799
about the opportunities you see there for your theater,

677
00:36:23,076 --> 00:36:25,451
any other developing technologies

678
00:36:25,451 --> 00:36:27,954
that you think present opportunities.

679
00:36:27,954 --> 00:36:30,121
- So let me differentiate.

680
00:36:31,752 --> 00:36:35,084
One of the things that we would like folks to take away

681
00:36:35,084 --> 00:36:38,684
is this notion that if you have new technologies

682
00:36:38,684 --> 00:36:41,828
that you are interested in testing out,

683
00:36:41,828 --> 00:36:44,652
perhaps they're being developed for a different mission

684
00:36:44,652 --> 00:36:47,404
in a different theater and you need some run time,

685
00:36:47,404 --> 00:36:51,071
you need some operationally meaningful data.

686
00:36:53,379 --> 00:36:56,796
We would encourage you, look to SOUTHCOM,

687
00:36:56,834 --> 00:37:00,488
one, we're close, we're relatively inexpensive.

688
00:37:00,488 --> 00:37:03,745
I can promise you that the bureaucratic impediments

689
00:37:03,745 --> 00:37:05,351
to being able to operate in our theaters,

690
00:37:05,351 --> 00:37:08,480
we will remove in order to bring them down there.

691
00:37:08,480 --> 00:37:10,620
We recognize that some of these capabilities

692
00:37:10,620 --> 00:37:13,324
may not yet be ready for prime time,

693
00:37:13,324 --> 00:37:16,991
but we think we can give you meaningful data

694
00:37:17,734 --> 00:37:20,484
on what works, what doesn't work,

695
00:37:21,134 --> 00:37:23,204
what might need improvement, at the same time,

696
00:37:23,204 --> 00:37:25,832
we will make good use of it and find a good way

697
00:37:25,832 --> 00:37:28,224
to incorporate it into the scheme of maneuver

698
00:37:28,224 --> 00:37:29,868
of the activities that we have going on.

699
00:37:29,868 --> 00:37:32,763
It's a little bit of taking advantage

700
00:37:32,763 --> 00:37:35,483
of opportunities that are available.

701
00:37:35,483 --> 00:37:37,223
How might some of these new technologies

702
00:37:37,223 --> 00:37:40,623
actually apply on a sustained basis in our theater?

703
00:37:40,623 --> 00:37:43,956
Probably best left undiscussed in detail

704
00:37:44,135 --> 00:37:45,758
because we think it could provide us

705
00:37:45,758 --> 00:37:48,003
some competitive advantages in areas that we need.

706
00:37:48,003 --> 00:37:49,471
But we're eager, we're interested,

707
00:37:49,471 --> 00:37:52,217
and we would like to try things out.

708
00:37:52,217 --> 00:37:56,384
There have been a range, many of you have been involved

709
00:37:56,478 --> 00:37:58,079
in trying out some wares for things

710
00:37:58,079 --> 00:37:59,665
that have ultimately been deployed

711
00:37:59,665 --> 00:38:01,643
into other theaters, and we welcome that

712
00:38:01,643 --> 00:38:04,076
and we look for additional opportunities.

713
00:38:04,076 --> 00:38:08,070
For those of you who do not know, within USSOUTHCOM,

714
00:38:08,070 --> 00:38:12,237
the J7 is the focal point for science and technology

715
00:38:13,274 --> 00:38:15,648
and for integrating some of these new ideas,

716
00:38:15,648 --> 00:38:18,648
our J7 is Admiral Brian Hendrickson,

717
00:38:19,189 --> 00:38:23,356
Brian's a reserve two star Seal that we poached away

718
00:38:24,288 --> 00:38:27,898
from DIUX and so has a, you probably already have him

719
00:38:27,898 --> 00:38:29,576
on your Rolodex and I would just say reach out,

720
00:38:29,576 --> 00:38:33,547
talk to him, we're eager, we're interested to talk.

721
00:38:33,547 --> 00:38:34,880
So, thanks Hope.

722
00:38:35,530 --> 00:38:36,363
Sink.

723
00:38:36,431 --> 00:38:38,143
- [Sink] Morning sir, thank you for coming,

724
00:38:38,143 --> 00:38:41,252
and it's always amusing to hear all the DESRON commanders

725
00:38:41,252 --> 00:38:45,050
kinda one up themselves when we all know that it's

726
00:38:45,050 --> 00:38:47,905
the PHIBRONs that are the greatest of the squadrons

727
00:38:47,905 --> 00:38:50,839
that the world has even known and seen deployed,

728
00:38:50,839 --> 00:38:52,101
including PHIBRON 4.

729
00:38:52,101 --> 00:38:54,074
- Okay, so your timing, you blew it because

730
00:38:54,074 --> 00:38:56,602
General Bob Neller is coming in behind me and you

731
00:38:56,602 --> 00:38:58,912
would be able to score big points with him if he heard that.

732
00:38:58,912 --> 00:38:59,921
(audience laughing)

733
00:38:59,921 --> 00:39:01,428
- [Sink] Sir, this is a preparation of the battle space.

734
00:39:01,428 --> 00:39:02,261
- Okay.

735
00:39:02,261 --> 00:39:03,380
(audience laughing)

736
00:39:03,380 --> 00:39:04,822
- [Sink] You'd understand it if you were a PHIBRON guy.

737
00:39:04,822 --> 00:39:05,655
- Sink.

738
00:39:05,655 --> 00:39:08,655
(audience laughing)

739
00:39:09,171 --> 00:39:11,671
- [Sink] With all due respect.

740
00:39:11,818 --> 00:39:14,465
- Sink is a fellow former Fourth Fleet Commander

741
00:39:14,465 --> 00:39:18,505
so he's also accustomed to doing a lot with a little.

742
00:39:18,505 --> 00:39:20,505
- [Sink] So my question.

743
00:39:20,937 --> 00:39:23,634
During my time in Fourth Fleet I saw the Chinese,

744
00:39:23,634 --> 00:39:27,801
the Russians, make frequent and interesting visits to,

745
00:39:29,952 --> 00:39:31,753
see, General Neller's here, so he heard

746
00:39:31,753 --> 00:39:33,891
my remarks about PHIBRONs, he heard it.

747
00:39:33,891 --> 00:39:34,790
- [Robert] You're the man.

748
00:39:34,790 --> 00:39:35,673
- [Sink] No sir, you're the man.

749
00:39:35,673 --> 00:39:36,953
(audience laughing)

750
00:39:36,953 --> 00:39:37,786
Sir.

751
00:39:37,786 --> 00:39:41,453
But we saw the Russians and the Chinese have

752
00:39:42,315 --> 00:39:45,982
more frequent visits to some of our partners

753
00:39:48,081 --> 00:39:49,917
or could be partners or even countries

754
00:39:49,917 --> 00:39:54,000
that we had difficulty working with in that area.

755
00:39:54,161 --> 00:39:56,727
Can you talk to, has that continued?

756
00:39:56,727 --> 00:39:59,909
Number one, and number two, what has the impact

757
00:39:59,909 --> 00:40:03,909
of that been on the trust, the interoperability,

758
00:40:04,050 --> 00:40:07,883
the relationship that we have with the nations

759
00:40:08,280 --> 00:40:12,447
that we want to do more with to enable sea control,

760
00:40:12,806 --> 00:40:16,456
not only in the SOUTHCOM AOR but other places?

761
00:40:16,456 --> 00:40:19,643
- Thanks Sink, no that's a good question.

762
00:40:19,643 --> 00:40:20,893
The reality is,

763
00:40:24,460 --> 00:40:26,259
the partners that we work with and have worked with

764
00:40:26,259 --> 00:40:30,176
habitually express over and over and over again

765
00:40:30,884 --> 00:40:34,933
we are the partner that they would prefer to work with.

766
00:40:34,933 --> 00:40:38,202
I think it's because we have a shared cultural heritage,

767
00:40:38,202 --> 00:40:41,820
we have a shared sense of values, and frankly,

768
00:40:41,820 --> 00:40:45,987
we have a shared home that we are all interested in

769
00:40:47,786 --> 00:40:49,592
improving the safety, the security,

770
00:40:49,592 --> 00:40:53,277
and the economic prosperity for all of our countries,

771
00:40:53,277 --> 00:40:55,117
and we recognize that no single of one us

772
00:40:55,117 --> 00:40:57,148
can do it on our own, but we're all interested

773
00:40:57,148 --> 00:41:00,047
in working together to be able to facilitate that.

774
00:41:00,047 --> 00:41:04,130
Now, the countries also ultimately have to pursue

775
00:41:04,816 --> 00:41:07,899
their interests and if we are absent,

776
00:41:09,245 --> 00:41:11,601
they are going to have to make decisions

777
00:41:11,601 --> 00:41:14,157
and sometimes it's unattractive decisions,

778
00:41:14,157 --> 00:41:16,225
but they have to hedge, and so they will

779
00:41:16,225 --> 00:41:19,142
work with partners who are present.

780
00:41:20,517 --> 00:41:23,850
We've said over and over and over again,

781
00:41:24,996 --> 00:41:28,516
if we as a nation think it's important to pay attention

782
00:41:28,516 --> 00:41:31,007
to what China is doing in the South China Sea,

783
00:41:31,007 --> 00:41:34,151
we can't afford to overlook their presence,

784
00:41:34,151 --> 00:41:36,873
their activities right here much closer to home.

785
00:41:36,873 --> 00:41:39,738
If we are focused and concerned about Russia's activities

786
00:41:39,738 --> 00:41:43,071
on a global scale but in Eastern Europe,

787
00:41:43,277 --> 00:41:47,444
we can't afford not to pay attention to their efforts

788
00:41:47,524 --> 00:41:51,191
to frankly undermine and destabilize support

789
00:41:51,952 --> 00:41:53,827
for the United States and the partnerships

790
00:41:53,827 --> 00:41:56,390
that are longstanding that we have developed.

791
00:41:56,390 --> 00:41:58,215
So we have to pay attention.

792
00:41:58,215 --> 00:42:01,798
They are competing for influence, directly.

793
00:42:01,861 --> 00:42:04,528
We can choose to compete or not.

794
00:42:04,783 --> 00:42:06,747
That fundamentally is a choice.

795
00:42:06,747 --> 00:42:10,914
But if, you have to be present if you're going to make

796
00:42:12,168 --> 00:42:15,886
that choice and so ultimately it does not require

797
00:42:15,886 --> 00:42:19,361
a significant investment on our part but it does require

798
00:42:19,361 --> 00:42:23,345
paying attention and recognizing that the simple fact

799
00:42:23,345 --> 00:42:26,686
that there is not large state on state conflict

800
00:42:26,686 --> 00:42:28,867
does not mean that we don't have vital interest

801
00:42:28,867 --> 00:42:30,894
in this part of the world, we have opportunities,

802
00:42:30,894 --> 00:42:33,634
enormous opportunities and great friends and partners.

803
00:42:33,634 --> 00:42:36,618
All we have to do is take advantage of those partnerships.

804
00:42:36,618 --> 00:42:37,614
Thanks, Sink.

805
00:42:37,614 --> 00:42:40,305
(person speaking off mic)

806
00:42:40,305 --> 00:42:42,088
And I wanna just amend one one thing.

807
00:42:42,088 --> 00:42:43,667
When I said that I was the one responsible

808
00:42:43,667 --> 00:42:45,710
for ensuring that there were no US forces

809
00:42:45,710 --> 00:42:47,476
assigned to USSOUTHCOM, actually,

810
00:42:47,476 --> 00:42:50,693
it was in my capacity as the vice J3 working

811
00:42:50,693 --> 00:42:53,340
for General Neller as the J3, he was the one

812
00:42:53,340 --> 00:42:55,666
who ensured there were no military forces in SOUTHCOM.

813
00:42:55,666 --> 00:42:56,871
(audience laughing)

814
00:42:56,871 --> 00:42:59,207
So with that, shipmate, I look forward to you following.

815
00:42:59,207 --> 00:43:00,614
(audience laughing)

816
00:43:00,614 --> 00:43:01,447
Thanks very much.

817
00:43:01,447 --> 00:43:02,376
(audience applauding)

818
00:43:02,376 --> 00:43:03,209
(Carol speaking off mic)

819
00:43:03,209 --> 00:43:04,042
Thank you.
- Thanks so much.

820
00:43:04,042 --> 00:43:07,209
(audience applauding)

821
00:43:12,096 --> 00:43:14,656
Thank you, Admiral Tidd, that was fabulous.

822
00:43:14,656 --> 00:43:17,580
So moving right on to our next speaker,

823
00:43:17,580 --> 00:43:20,171
the first time in many years that we've had

824
00:43:20,171 --> 00:43:23,520
the distinct pleasure of the Commandant of the Marine Corps

825
00:43:23,520 --> 00:43:27,687
coming to address SNA so we're really thrilled about that.

826
00:43:28,699 --> 00:43:30,216
The Commandant's a very humble man,

827
00:43:30,216 --> 00:43:33,701
so his staff told me that his introductory

828
00:43:33,701 --> 00:43:37,618
preference is very short, his title, that's it.

829
00:43:37,789 --> 00:43:41,876
So I decided if I'm not going to tell you anything

830
00:43:41,876 --> 00:43:44,691
about his story background, instead I will spend

831
00:43:44,691 --> 00:43:48,858
a very few moments on speaking about one of his Marines.

832
00:43:49,753 --> 00:43:51,913
And the Marine that I'm going to talk about

833
00:43:51,913 --> 00:43:55,996
is Sergeant Alex Kropelnicki who served in Korea,

834
00:43:57,070 --> 00:44:01,203
is around 90 years old and for the past many years

835
00:44:01,203 --> 00:44:03,870
had not stepped away from his wheelchair

836
00:44:03,870 --> 00:44:08,037
or out of his house, let alone traveled on an airplane.

837
00:44:08,904 --> 00:44:11,335
Last spring the US Navy Memorial Foundation,

838
00:44:11,335 --> 00:44:13,421
of which I'm also a board member,

839
00:44:13,421 --> 00:44:15,543
invited Sergeant Kroplenicki

840
00:44:15,543 --> 00:44:18,121
and we hold all of your Marines in our hearts

841
00:44:18,121 --> 00:44:21,239
and prayers as they go forward every day

842
00:44:21,239 --> 00:44:23,914
in the defense of our great nation.

843
00:44:23,914 --> 00:44:26,561
Ladies and gentlemen, a warm welcome for the 37th

844
00:44:26,561 --> 00:44:29,412
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller.

845
00:44:29,412 --> 00:44:32,579
(audience applauding)

846
00:44:41,596 --> 00:44:44,744
- Just truth in lending, it was the Vice Director

847
00:44:44,744 --> 00:44:46,668
of the Joint Staff that signed all of the diplo--

848
00:44:46,668 --> 00:44:48,465
(audience laughing)

849
00:44:48,465 --> 00:44:50,839
I was just a mere pawn sitting in the office,

850
00:44:50,839 --> 00:44:53,756
but uh, see if this thing's on, so,

851
00:44:56,161 --> 00:45:00,121
why am I the first Commandant to come here in a while?

852
00:45:00,121 --> 00:45:03,454
Well because I think the game's changed.

853
00:45:05,409 --> 00:45:08,773
The game's changed, I mean, Admiral Harrison,

854
00:45:08,773 --> 00:45:11,202
he had the most beautiful ship that sails across

855
00:45:11,202 --> 00:45:13,813
the great oceans of the world or amphibs.

856
00:45:13,813 --> 00:45:16,366
(audience chattering)

857
00:45:16,366 --> 00:45:19,948
And they're the most, they're the universal donor.

858
00:45:19,948 --> 00:45:21,408
As soon as Admiral Rowden fills

859
00:45:21,408 --> 00:45:24,307
them VLS cells on those LPD 17 hull forms.

860
00:45:24,307 --> 00:45:27,255
(audience laughing)

861
00:45:27,255 --> 00:45:30,505
Now think about this, think about this.

862
00:45:31,261 --> 00:45:32,492
When you wake up tomorrow morning,

863
00:45:32,492 --> 00:45:36,224
there was gonna be 10 F-35s in Iwakuni, Japan.

864
00:45:36,224 --> 00:45:39,557
In a year, they're gonna be on 31st MEU.

865
00:45:41,585 --> 00:45:45,585
If that LPD hull form with that 31st MEU has VLS

866
00:45:47,056 --> 00:45:51,223
and you gotta big deck amphib with F-35s and MV-22 Ospreys,

867
00:45:55,212 --> 00:45:56,918
I can go pretty much everywhere I wanna go

868
00:45:56,918 --> 00:46:00,168
and do pretty much whatever I wanna do.

869
00:46:00,274 --> 00:46:01,796
And it's gonna change the game,

870
00:46:01,796 --> 00:46:05,608
and I think the surface fleet commander who's here

871
00:46:05,608 --> 00:46:08,758
understands that because we've talked about it.

872
00:46:08,758 --> 00:46:10,741
And it kinda goes to the quote up here.

873
00:46:10,741 --> 00:46:13,745
So many you know General John Tuner recently retired,

874
00:46:13,745 --> 00:46:15,835
he's like many of us in our younger days,

875
00:46:15,835 --> 00:46:17,875
a big rugby player and he says

876
00:46:17,875 --> 00:46:19,972
hey, you need to read this book.

877
00:46:19,972 --> 00:46:22,303
And it's called Legacy by this guy Kerr.

878
00:46:22,303 --> 00:46:26,470
And I'm not, it's a really easy read, but it's really,

879
00:46:27,507 --> 00:46:30,094
the book is about the New Zealand National Rugby Team

880
00:46:30,094 --> 00:46:34,177
known as the All Blacks, and they're always good.

881
00:46:34,794 --> 00:46:37,363
But their standard is that if they don't win the World Cup,

882
00:46:37,363 --> 00:46:39,456
they have not been successful.

883
00:46:39,456 --> 00:46:41,039
It's kinda like us.

884
00:46:41,738 --> 00:46:42,740
How'd you do at war?

885
00:46:42,740 --> 00:46:44,740
Well, we came in fourth.

886
00:46:45,807 --> 00:46:47,955
No, we're not gonna say that.

887
00:46:47,955 --> 00:46:52,122
And they realized that they were not winning the gold medal

888
00:46:52,680 --> 00:46:54,893
and they had to do some very, they were coming in,

889
00:46:54,893 --> 00:46:57,356
they're second, they're third, they're fourth.

890
00:46:57,356 --> 00:46:59,523
But they weren't the best.

891
00:47:00,060 --> 00:47:02,866
And so they realized they had to make some changes,

892
00:47:02,866 --> 00:47:04,467
and we all know change is hard.

893
00:47:04,467 --> 00:47:06,884
So this book is about change.

894
00:47:08,572 --> 00:47:10,521
And this quote I think is very telling.

895
00:47:10,521 --> 00:47:14,422
I mean you don't change when things are really bad,

896
00:47:14,422 --> 00:47:18,195
because then you're just trying to get back to okay.

897
00:47:18,195 --> 00:47:19,445
And we're okay.

898
00:47:20,921 --> 00:47:24,966
Our Marine Corps is okay, some days we're better than okay.

899
00:47:24,966 --> 00:47:27,133
But okay's not good enough

900
00:47:27,702 --> 00:47:31,869
for the United States or for the United States Navy.

901
00:47:31,976 --> 00:47:33,908
So we've gotta talk about some of the things

902
00:47:33,908 --> 00:47:35,618
that are gonna happen and are gonna change

903
00:47:35,618 --> 00:47:38,409
and we gotta figure out how to leverage those things.

904
00:47:38,409 --> 00:47:41,650
So what I'm gonna do, I got about an hour.

905
00:47:41,650 --> 00:47:44,233
I'll talk for about 30 minutes.

906
00:47:45,191 --> 00:47:47,679
Admiral Pottenger, if you just give me the high sign

907
00:47:47,679 --> 00:47:50,633
'cause I'll tend to run off on time.

908
00:47:50,633 --> 00:47:52,805
And then I'll show you a little video at the end

909
00:47:52,805 --> 00:47:54,461
that some young Marines put together

910
00:47:54,461 --> 00:47:56,856
to capture what we're trying to do as far as change

911
00:47:56,856 --> 00:47:59,442
and then I'll take your questions, next slide.

912
00:47:59,442 --> 00:48:02,692
So here's where everybody is right now.

913
00:48:03,204 --> 00:48:05,350
Okay, the Marine Corps, counting all the mobs

914
00:48:05,350 --> 00:48:08,267
and active reserves, about 186,000.

915
00:48:10,933 --> 00:48:14,658
We were coming down to 182, in the NDAA it says,

916
00:48:14,658 --> 00:48:17,241
President said go to 185, okay.

917
00:48:19,751 --> 00:48:22,630
Gotta see the money but as General Milley says,

918
00:48:22,630 --> 00:48:24,963
I'm following my last order.

919
00:48:25,107 --> 00:48:28,524
Go to the force, you can see the majority

920
00:48:29,392 --> 00:48:32,669
of the deployed forces are in the Pacific,

921
00:48:32,669 --> 00:48:35,566
although most of the ships are not there.

922
00:48:35,566 --> 00:48:37,345
11th MEU currently in the CENTCOM AOR

923
00:48:37,345 --> 00:48:40,762
just relieved 22nd MEU who just got home.

924
00:48:41,755 --> 00:48:43,788
22nd MEU is kind of a study in

925
00:48:43,788 --> 00:48:46,455
my mind of future force posture.

926
00:48:47,292 --> 00:48:51,243
They were assigned to go to CENTCOM for their deploy time,

927
00:48:51,243 --> 00:48:54,504
provide a 1.0, and we define 1.0 as three ships

928
00:48:54,504 --> 00:48:57,813
for that many of days, I would challenge that,

929
00:48:57,813 --> 00:49:00,652
I say that's a self imposed definition.

930
00:49:00,652 --> 00:49:03,319
Does 1.0 have to be three ships?

931
00:49:03,590 --> 00:49:04,423
No.

932
00:49:05,437 --> 00:49:07,677
And that's what happened, the Wasp pretty much spent

933
00:49:07,677 --> 00:49:11,196
the bulk of their deployment off the coast of Libya

934
00:49:11,196 --> 00:49:14,779
supporting operations against ISIL in Cert.

935
00:49:15,575 --> 00:49:17,457
And then toward the end they swapped out

936
00:49:17,457 --> 00:49:21,290
and San Antonio came in and took the position,

937
00:49:21,376 --> 00:49:23,622
and then big deck went into the Red Sea,

938
00:49:23,622 --> 00:49:26,455
and they all sailed home together.

939
00:49:26,790 --> 00:49:30,707
Right now Makin Island ARG is split up all over

940
00:49:32,071 --> 00:49:35,321
CENTCOM but they're all in CENTCOM AOR.

941
00:49:36,115 --> 00:49:37,431
But that doesn't have to be that way.

942
00:49:37,431 --> 00:49:38,594
And we work through chain of command

943
00:49:38,594 --> 00:49:41,278
and command of control things to make that better.

944
00:49:41,278 --> 00:49:42,628
But that's kinda the way I think

945
00:49:42,628 --> 00:49:44,300
it's gonna be in the future.

946
00:49:44,300 --> 00:49:46,212
Now the ARG MEU is always gonna train together,

947
00:49:46,212 --> 00:49:48,823
be able to operate as a single entity.

948
00:49:48,823 --> 00:49:51,062
But you know and I know that when they deploy,

949
00:49:51,062 --> 00:49:53,059
like most Naval task groups, they never end up

950
00:49:53,059 --> 00:49:54,786
staying together because they end up getting

951
00:49:54,786 --> 00:49:58,065
assigned different tasks and different missions.

952
00:49:58,065 --> 00:50:00,790
Which means that every ship that we get under way

953
00:50:00,790 --> 00:50:04,449
has gotta be able to have some ability to operate,

954
00:50:04,449 --> 00:50:07,270
I don't wanna say independently because I don't think

955
00:50:07,270 --> 00:50:09,216
anybody can operate independently,

956
00:50:09,216 --> 00:50:11,032
we need the aggregate capability,

957
00:50:11,032 --> 00:50:14,490
that they have to be able to operate separately,

958
00:50:14,490 --> 00:50:16,240
and that's different.

959
00:50:16,445 --> 00:50:18,858
You know we've got two special purpose MAGTFs,

960
00:50:18,858 --> 00:50:21,864
one is the CENTCOM AOR, the one that supports AFRICOM

961
00:50:21,864 --> 00:50:26,031
that also has Marines and sailors in Sig and Romania.

962
00:50:26,999 --> 00:50:28,030
And by the end of this month,

963
00:50:28,030 --> 00:50:31,113
part of that force will be in Norway.

964
00:50:31,262 --> 00:50:32,583
It's a land based force but we have

965
00:50:32,583 --> 00:50:35,787
prepositioned gear up there in the caves.

966
00:50:35,787 --> 00:50:38,373
Those Special Forces MAGTFs exist because of threats

967
00:50:38,373 --> 00:50:41,523
to our embassies and American interests

968
00:50:41,523 --> 00:50:45,690
and quite frankly if we had more amphibious shipping,

969
00:50:45,724 --> 00:50:47,745
we probably wouldn't have to land base those forces

970
00:50:47,745 --> 00:50:51,912
because you're stuck with the host nation where you live,

971
00:50:52,260 --> 00:50:54,618
with the authorities and agreements you have with them

972
00:50:54,618 --> 00:50:57,535
as opposed to when you're underway,

973
00:50:57,770 --> 00:50:59,498
the sovereignty of the sea allows you to go where

974
00:50:59,498 --> 00:51:02,989
you wanna go, do what you wanna do, when you wanna do it.

975
00:51:02,989 --> 00:51:06,359
So, there's other things we can talk about

976
00:51:06,359 --> 00:51:10,526
but the only other thing up here is we continue to work

977
00:51:11,407 --> 00:51:14,106
primarily with Fleet Forces Command but all

978
00:51:14,106 --> 00:51:17,281
the numbered fleets and all the MEFs and all the MARFORRES

979
00:51:17,281 --> 00:51:19,453
to further develop and get back

980
00:51:19,453 --> 00:51:23,620
the amphibious training requirements that we have.

981
00:51:25,929 --> 00:51:27,080
Admiral Harvey started this when he was

982
00:51:27,080 --> 00:51:28,862
at Fleet Forces Command with Bold Alligator

983
00:51:28,862 --> 00:51:31,772
and now you've got a series of exercise which now include

984
00:51:31,772 --> 00:51:34,451
NATO exercises like Trident Juncture and BALTOPS

985
00:51:34,451 --> 00:51:38,618
and Bold Alligator again and Dawn Blitz and RIMPAC

986
00:51:39,097 --> 00:51:42,930
and Ssangyong and Korea, we're gonna get after

987
00:51:42,980 --> 00:51:45,274
and are have been getting after for a number of years,

988
00:51:45,274 --> 00:51:48,008
our ability to project power from the sea

989
00:51:48,008 --> 00:51:51,841
through the use of Marines and Naval aviation.

990
00:51:53,114 --> 00:51:57,197
So, it's a great time to be in the Naval service.

991
00:51:58,107 --> 00:52:02,101
And at the same time though we'll still find ourselves

992
00:52:02,101 --> 00:52:05,534
tied to certain commitments, you may not be interested

993
00:52:05,534 --> 00:52:08,873
in the Middle East, but it's fascinated in us.

994
00:52:08,873 --> 00:52:09,790
Next slide.

995
00:52:11,256 --> 00:52:12,922
So what's the future?

996
00:52:12,922 --> 00:52:15,255
That's what we're doing now.

997
00:52:17,521 --> 00:52:19,013
We're trying to divine the future which is

998
00:52:19,013 --> 00:52:21,915
a very dangerous thing to do but I think

999
00:52:21,915 --> 00:52:25,252
there's a certain confluence of thinking and thoughts

1000
00:52:25,252 --> 00:52:27,613
on what the future looks like and what it's gonna be.

1001
00:52:27,613 --> 00:52:29,951
And it may, and we talk about peer adversaries,

1002
00:52:29,951 --> 00:52:32,758
but it may not be peer adversary where we're gonna fight

1003
00:52:32,758 --> 00:52:34,825
the Battle of the Atlantic or we're gonna have

1004
00:52:34,825 --> 00:52:38,075
the Fulda Gap, it's gonna be different.

1005
00:52:38,373 --> 00:52:42,540
But it's gonna be not against a Taliban, ISIL, Boko Haram,

1006
00:52:43,497 --> 00:52:47,664
Al-Shabaab, adversary who are albeit brave and cunning

1007
00:52:48,886 --> 00:52:52,585
and adaptive, are pretty much a bunch of guys

1008
00:52:52,585 --> 00:52:55,585
running around with AK-47s and IEDs.

1009
00:52:56,260 --> 00:52:58,009
They've got no air force, they've got no air defense,

1010
00:52:58,009 --> 00:52:59,394
they've got no nuclear weapons,

1011
00:52:59,394 --> 00:53:02,719
they got no NDC, they got no precision fires,

1012
00:53:02,719 --> 00:53:05,802
they can't really affect our network.

1013
00:53:05,885 --> 00:53:07,385
They can't jam us.

1014
00:53:08,605 --> 00:53:12,056
They can't sink us, they have no submarines.

1015
00:53:12,056 --> 00:53:14,723
All these other people, they do.

1016
00:53:16,900 --> 00:53:18,648
They do, how they'll employ them,

1017
00:53:18,648 --> 00:53:21,816
and what they'll do with them remains to be seen.

1018
00:53:21,816 --> 00:53:25,362
Capability and intent combine to create a threat,

1019
00:53:25,362 --> 00:53:28,385
so there's a lot of capability out there.

1020
00:53:28,385 --> 00:53:29,689
The terrorists have intent,

1021
00:53:29,689 --> 00:53:32,039
but they don't have much capability.

1022
00:53:32,039 --> 00:53:33,618
But if you look at these five areas

1023
00:53:33,618 --> 00:53:34,995
in the future operating environment,

1024
00:53:34,995 --> 00:53:36,221
those are the things that we have to start

1025
00:53:36,221 --> 00:53:39,387
to look at the force and figure out what we're gonna do.

1026
00:53:39,387 --> 00:53:41,622
In battle of the signatures.

1027
00:53:41,622 --> 00:53:43,687
I talked to Admiral Davidson one day and he goes,

1028
00:53:43,687 --> 00:53:46,082
you know we realized, we're sailing out there,

1029
00:53:46,082 --> 00:53:48,045
trying to go EMCON and then some sailor's out

1030
00:53:48,045 --> 00:53:52,128
on the weather deck checking their Facebook page.

1031
00:53:52,820 --> 00:53:54,237
So much for that.

1032
00:53:56,419 --> 00:54:00,243
We used, many of the more, I'm looking at the crowd here,

1033
00:54:00,243 --> 00:54:02,046
very experienced, I'm being polite,

1034
00:54:02,046 --> 00:54:03,631
very experienced crowd, you all remember,

1035
00:54:03,631 --> 00:54:06,104
I mean we're back to the future.

1036
00:54:06,104 --> 00:54:08,187
We're back to the future.

1037
00:54:09,836 --> 00:54:11,599
Shoot the stars, (speaking quickly),

1038
00:54:11,599 --> 00:54:14,099
Morse code, run silent, black,

1039
00:54:15,358 --> 00:54:19,525
how do you master signature in today's digital world?

1040
00:54:19,622 --> 00:54:23,515
We had one MEF did a big CPX exercise and they did

1041
00:54:23,515 --> 00:54:27,006
a signature test of the MEF headquarters area.

1042
00:54:27,006 --> 00:54:31,173
Guess what area had the largest digital signature?

1043
00:54:32,064 --> 00:54:33,917
The billeting area, 'cause that's where

1044
00:54:33,917 --> 00:54:36,649
everybody's checking their stuff.

1045
00:54:36,649 --> 00:54:38,361
Says okay, we're gonna go to the field

1046
00:54:38,361 --> 00:54:40,278
and not take our phone.

1047
00:54:41,356 --> 00:54:42,189
Whoa.

1048
00:54:42,351 --> 00:54:45,351
(audience laughing)

1049
00:54:46,012 --> 00:54:47,845
Well think about that.

1050
00:54:48,168 --> 00:54:51,668
It would make mail become important again.

1051
00:54:52,972 --> 00:54:55,605
How do you master signature, how do you make your adversary

1052
00:54:55,605 --> 00:54:58,571
raise their signature, and how do you find that signature

1053
00:54:58,571 --> 00:55:00,249
and target that signature?

1054
00:55:00,249 --> 00:55:01,866
'Cause if your signature's there and it can be seen,

1055
00:55:01,866 --> 00:55:04,676
you can be found and you can be killed.

1056
00:55:04,676 --> 00:55:06,247
So what are we gonna do about that?

1057
00:55:06,247 --> 00:55:08,460
And part of it's right away is the training.

1058
00:55:08,460 --> 00:55:12,627
Contested domains, we used to talk about air, land, and sea,

1059
00:55:12,781 --> 00:55:15,149
now we talk about space, now we talk about cyber,

1060
00:55:15,149 --> 00:55:17,926
what about information, what about the information domain?

1061
00:55:17,926 --> 00:55:20,187
Is that a contested domain, false news and all?

1062
00:55:20,187 --> 00:55:21,104
Absolutely.

1063
00:55:21,433 --> 00:55:24,256
So I really think there's six domains.

1064
00:55:24,256 --> 00:55:26,709
And how are we gonna fight in those and operate in those?

1065
00:55:26,709 --> 00:55:30,214
'Cause the latter three, cyberspace and information,

1066
00:55:30,214 --> 00:55:32,481
they're gonna start before the first round is fired.

1067
00:55:32,481 --> 00:55:34,622
In fact they're going on right now.

1068
00:55:34,622 --> 00:55:37,539
You talk to Admiral Rogers, he's at war every day.

1069
00:55:37,539 --> 00:55:40,198
He's at war right now and everybody out there

1070
00:55:40,198 --> 00:55:43,193
defending our networks is at war every day.

1071
00:55:43,193 --> 00:55:45,258
Complex terrain, we used to talk about

1072
00:55:45,258 --> 00:55:49,175
the mountains or the jungle, what about cities?

1073
00:55:49,460 --> 00:55:52,793
The most complex terrain is in the city.

1074
00:55:54,861 --> 00:55:57,175
Because how do you master signature there?

1075
00:55:57,175 --> 00:55:59,909
How do you get your signature to work in there?

1076
00:55:59,909 --> 00:56:04,076
How do you understand all the demographics of that terrain?

1077
00:56:04,228 --> 00:56:06,584
Because the world has become more and more

1078
00:56:06,584 --> 00:56:09,001
a urban society near the sea.

1079
00:56:12,397 --> 00:56:14,065
So that's where everybody is,

1080
00:56:14,065 --> 00:56:15,624
that's where the problems are gonna be,

1081
00:56:15,624 --> 00:56:17,728
and if that's where the problems are gonna be,

1082
00:56:17,728 --> 00:56:19,707
that's where we're gonna be.

1083
00:56:19,707 --> 00:56:23,457
Technology, we struggle every day to keep up.

1084
00:56:26,816 --> 00:56:28,615
We need to be able to come up with a way,

1085
00:56:28,615 --> 00:56:31,654
I heard Admiral Tidd talk about DIUX and all that

1086
00:56:31,654 --> 00:56:34,372
and the things that Secretary Carter that I think are valid

1087
00:56:34,372 --> 00:56:37,455
but we've gotta be able to go faster.

1088
00:56:39,415 --> 00:56:41,748
And the rules set right now,

1089
00:56:41,897 --> 00:56:45,314
I mean somehow we did it in World War II.

1090
00:56:47,942 --> 00:56:49,889
But we've gotta figure out how to go faster

1091
00:56:49,889 --> 00:56:51,901
because our adversaries are not encumbered

1092
00:56:51,901 --> 00:56:53,345
by some of the rules that we have

1093
00:56:53,345 --> 00:56:55,845
that allow them to outpace us.

1094
00:56:56,529 --> 00:56:58,867
And then I mentioned information as a weapon.

1095
00:56:58,867 --> 00:56:59,784
Next slide.

1096
00:57:00,721 --> 00:57:03,130
So the Marine Corps has developed,

1097
00:57:03,130 --> 00:57:06,352
we had Expeditionary Force 21, the update to that,

1098
00:57:06,352 --> 00:57:10,519
we changed the name to call it the Marine Operating Concept.

1099
00:57:11,124 --> 00:57:13,022
It's a pretty good document, I read the thing

1100
00:57:13,022 --> 00:57:17,189
a number of times, I made them cut it down, it was too long,

1101
00:57:18,283 --> 00:57:22,188
for all the grunts out there, I put more pictures in it.

1102
00:57:22,188 --> 00:57:23,341
And actually to start it off,

1103
00:57:23,341 --> 00:57:25,661
I always enjoyed the Tom Clancy books.

1104
00:57:25,661 --> 00:57:28,078
Think about Red Storm Rising.

1105
00:57:31,262 --> 00:57:35,081
I always liked the vignette to describe and articulate

1106
00:57:35,081 --> 00:57:37,629
the capabilities we think we need and the training

1107
00:57:37,629 --> 00:57:40,423
that we need to have to employ those capabilities,

1108
00:57:40,423 --> 00:57:42,707
so the thing starts off with a number of vignettes.

1109
00:57:42,707 --> 00:57:44,633
Talks to the MEU Commander, talks to the ground,

1110
00:57:44,633 --> 00:57:46,075
(speaking quickly) commander,

1111
00:57:46,075 --> 00:57:48,318
talks to the logistician, talks to the aviators,

1112
00:57:48,318 --> 00:57:50,927
probably ought to talk to the PHIBRON,

1113
00:57:50,927 --> 00:57:53,594
that's one thing that we didn't,

1114
00:57:55,744 --> 00:57:58,678
we'll iterate this thing, but I think as we get more

1115
00:57:58,678 --> 00:58:01,595
and more a part of the Naval force,

1116
00:58:03,112 --> 00:58:07,195
we just haven't had to do that the last 15 years.

1117
00:58:07,560 --> 00:58:10,562
And we don't have a choice, not that we don't want to.

1118
00:58:10,562 --> 00:58:12,895
We've got to fight together.

1119
00:58:12,993 --> 00:58:17,076
So we're gonna refocus after 15 years of counter,

1120
00:58:17,348 --> 00:58:20,098
of COIN and stability ops to meet

1121
00:58:20,288 --> 00:58:23,038
a high end, near peer competitor.

1122
00:58:23,951 --> 00:58:27,071
The MAGTF remains the way we're gonna organize to fight.

1123
00:58:27,071 --> 00:58:31,238
But it focuses on capabilities in those areas you see there.

1124
00:58:31,951 --> 00:58:34,479
And we've got those capabilities but we have not invested

1125
00:58:34,479 --> 00:58:38,062
in them and I think we've invested in them,

1126
00:58:38,317 --> 00:58:41,433
but I went out to MARFORRES Cyber the other day,

1127
00:58:41,433 --> 00:58:42,996
there's about 1,000 people out there

1128
00:58:42,996 --> 00:58:45,996
including civilians and contractors.

1129
00:58:46,054 --> 00:58:47,583
But I'm talking to all these Marines and most of them

1130
00:58:47,583 --> 00:58:50,898
are SIGINT Marines or data Marines or network Marines

1131
00:58:50,898 --> 00:58:55,065
or cyber protection Marines, but there's no cyber MOS.

1132
00:58:57,018 --> 00:58:59,928
So what are we gonna do, how am I gonna keep them?

1133
00:58:59,928 --> 00:59:03,221
We spend a lot of money training these folks.

1134
00:59:03,221 --> 00:59:05,597
If I wanna go out with an aviation guarantee

1135
00:59:05,597 --> 00:59:08,927
to a college graduate from a major institution,

1136
00:59:08,927 --> 00:59:12,056
we're gonna get three Naval Academy midshipmen

1137
00:59:12,056 --> 00:59:13,785
this year that are joining the Marine Corps,

1138
00:59:13,785 --> 00:59:16,035
they have degrees in cyber.

1139
00:59:17,060 --> 00:59:20,560
So shouldn't we, if they can make the cut,

1140
00:59:20,806 --> 00:59:22,809
whether they wanna do it or not, I'm assuming

1141
00:59:22,809 --> 00:59:26,223
they're interested because that's what their degrees are.

1142
00:59:26,223 --> 00:59:30,390
Should we not figure out some way to have a cyber guarantee?

1143
00:59:30,942 --> 00:59:34,192
And that becomes an occupational field.

1144
00:59:35,584 --> 00:59:39,251
And we're behind on figuring that stuff out.

1145
00:59:39,398 --> 00:59:41,148
But robotics, artificial intelligence,

1146
00:59:41,148 --> 00:59:44,815
adding and manufacturing, unmanned anything,

1147
00:59:47,545 --> 00:59:50,045
deception, where's the Klingon

1148
00:59:50,915 --> 00:59:53,665
cloaking device for amphib ships?

1149
00:59:53,762 --> 00:59:54,595
Or the equivalent?

1150
00:59:54,595 --> 00:59:57,345
I'm serious, simulation training,

1151
01:00:00,355 --> 01:00:04,355
it's not pie in the sky stuff, it's right there,

1152
01:00:04,411 --> 01:00:05,887
we just gotta figure out what

1153
01:00:05,887 --> 01:00:08,742
the requirement is and we gotta close on it.

1154
01:00:08,742 --> 01:00:10,620
But this is our first thing out

1155
01:00:10,620 --> 01:00:13,453
the box to try to get us there and

1156
01:00:15,779 --> 01:00:17,091
there's a lot of tasks in here

1157
01:00:17,091 --> 01:00:21,258
and we're brought in on it down there at Quantico.

1158
01:00:21,691 --> 01:00:22,608
Next slide.

1159
01:00:24,404 --> 01:00:26,298
So this is where we wanna go,

1160
01:00:26,298 --> 01:00:28,582
we talk about fifth generation aircraft,

1161
01:00:28,582 --> 01:00:30,833
we want a fifth generation Marine Corps.

1162
01:00:30,833 --> 01:00:34,416
What's a fifth generation Marine look like?

1163
01:00:36,905 --> 01:00:38,787
And I don't think they're all the same.

1164
01:00:38,787 --> 01:00:41,125
I don't think they all look the same.

1165
01:00:41,125 --> 01:00:42,637
For example, every Marine is a rifleman,

1166
01:00:42,637 --> 01:00:45,125
but every Marine is not in the infantry.

1167
01:00:45,125 --> 01:00:46,504
Every Marine's a rifleman,

1168
01:00:46,504 --> 01:00:49,337
not every Marine's a cyber Marine.

1169
01:00:50,884 --> 01:00:54,551
So how do we recruit and retain those folks?

1170
01:00:56,169 --> 01:00:57,438
But you see number one is integrate

1171
01:00:57,438 --> 01:01:01,188
the Naval force to fight at and from the sea.

1172
01:01:02,146 --> 01:01:04,072
I remember the very first ESG that went out

1173
01:01:04,072 --> 01:01:06,806
and there was a certain amount of contention

1174
01:01:06,806 --> 01:01:10,889
about what the Marine Expeditionary Unit would do

1175
01:01:11,628 --> 01:01:15,128
in support of the ARG to move from A to B.

1176
01:01:18,309 --> 01:01:19,769
I don't think we have those discussions anymore,

1177
01:01:19,769 --> 01:01:23,763
because it's kind of like I have equity in that.

1178
01:01:23,763 --> 01:01:26,244
Just like I know I'm not gonna get to where I want to go

1179
01:01:26,244 --> 01:01:27,894
and put the force where I want to put it

1180
01:01:27,894 --> 01:01:29,735
if the carrier strike group is not there to help shape

1181
01:01:29,735 --> 01:01:32,506
and set the conditions for me to do that.

1182
01:01:32,506 --> 01:01:34,256
So it's a team sport.

1183
01:01:34,937 --> 01:01:38,137
And we just gotta finally get our collective heads up

1184
01:01:38,137 --> 01:01:39,926
in there and go yeah, you're right,

1185
01:01:39,926 --> 01:01:42,096
yeah I can help you with that.

1186
01:01:42,096 --> 01:01:45,846
And quite frankly you go to my F-35B example,

1187
01:01:45,880 --> 01:01:48,953
if I were the carrier strike group commander

1188
01:01:48,953 --> 01:01:51,253
and there was an amphib out there with F-35Bs

1189
01:01:51,253 --> 01:01:53,365
and I had a certain target I had to hold at risk,

1190
01:01:53,365 --> 01:01:56,717
I'd be really interested in where that ship was.

1191
01:01:56,717 --> 01:01:58,373
Now the question is can I talk to it?

1192
01:01:58,373 --> 01:01:59,627
Does it have Link 16?

1193
01:01:59,627 --> 01:02:00,654
Can I communicate?

1194
01:02:00,654 --> 01:02:02,365
Are we all networked?

1195
01:02:02,365 --> 01:02:04,814
How am I gonna protect that ship?

1196
01:02:04,814 --> 01:02:06,124
When am I gonna get up to protect that ship

1197
01:02:06,124 --> 01:02:07,725
or am I gonna bring that ship into the envelope

1198
01:02:07,725 --> 01:02:11,642
of the protection for the carrier strike group?

1199
01:02:14,855 --> 01:02:16,565
We haven't really had these conversations,

1200
01:02:16,565 --> 01:02:20,250
but it's not something we can wait to talk about,

1201
01:02:20,250 --> 01:02:23,250
we have to talk about it now because

1202
01:02:23,438 --> 01:02:27,406
these capabilities are there and they're gonna change it.

1203
01:02:27,406 --> 01:02:28,922
Evolving the MAGTF involves all

1204
01:02:28,922 --> 01:02:31,589
the capabilities I talked about.

1205
01:02:32,021 --> 01:02:36,188
We're still gonna be a ground combat oriented force

1206
01:02:36,241 --> 01:02:37,952
but the capability to set the conditions

1207
01:02:37,952 --> 01:02:41,340
for the success of that ground combat element are changed.

1208
01:02:41,340 --> 01:02:44,758
I was in Afghanistan over Christmas and I had a chance

1209
01:02:44,758 --> 01:02:48,508
to talk to the special ops guys out there and

1210
01:02:50,278 --> 01:02:53,482
talking to one commander and I go, how many guys you got?

1211
01:02:53,482 --> 01:02:54,922
He goes, oh, I got a thousand.

1212
01:02:54,922 --> 01:02:56,919
I go, well how big are your companies?

1213
01:02:56,919 --> 01:02:58,322
He told me like about 120.

1214
01:02:58,322 --> 01:02:59,538
I said what the heck's everybody else doing?

1215
01:02:59,538 --> 01:03:00,705
He goes intel.

1216
01:03:02,445 --> 01:03:05,612
Intel collection, in messaging, in IO,

1217
01:03:06,789 --> 01:03:07,956
and deception.

1218
01:03:08,828 --> 01:03:12,797
So we get over half the force setting up the other half

1219
01:03:12,797 --> 01:03:15,715
of the force to locate, close within due,

1220
01:03:15,715 --> 01:03:17,055
it's traditional actions.

1221
01:03:17,055 --> 01:03:21,222
Now that may be a little heavy based on a CT technician but

1222
01:03:25,028 --> 01:03:26,361
I'm not so sure.

1223
01:03:30,742 --> 01:03:34,593
There's always risk when you change, the bigger risk is not.

1224
01:03:34,593 --> 01:03:36,987
And I'm not willing to take that risk.

1225
01:03:36,987 --> 01:03:38,574
If I'm wrong, it's on me, if I'm right,

1226
01:03:38,574 --> 01:03:41,657
then everybody else will be a genius.

1227
01:03:41,684 --> 01:03:43,376
We mentioned the network.

1228
01:03:43,376 --> 01:03:45,375
I'm really, really concerned about this

1229
01:03:45,375 --> 01:03:46,833
and somebody said it the other day,

1230
01:03:46,833 --> 01:03:49,750
and I think it's in the next fight,

1231
01:03:50,122 --> 01:03:53,253
whoever can defend and maintain some level of resiliency

1232
01:03:53,253 --> 01:03:56,222
in their network and deny the adversaries there,

1233
01:03:56,222 --> 01:03:58,632
they're the winner, hands down.

1234
01:03:58,632 --> 01:04:01,882
It might be over before it even starts.

1235
01:04:03,892 --> 01:04:07,613
So there's gotta be some investment in those capabilities

1236
01:04:07,613 --> 01:04:11,780
to protect and deny, to mask and elevate, to find and hide.

1237
01:04:16,556 --> 01:04:19,040
And that all enhances our maneuver.

1238
01:04:19,040 --> 01:04:20,479
Because I can't maneuver, I can maneuver great

1239
01:04:20,479 --> 01:04:24,409
if no one can see me, whether it's in the air, in the sea,

1240
01:04:24,409 --> 01:04:28,075
on the land, under the sea, I gotta put my force

1241
01:04:28,075 --> 01:04:30,866
in a position of advantage and if I can do that

1242
01:04:30,866 --> 01:04:34,616
without being found and at the same time know

1243
01:04:34,635 --> 01:04:38,615
where the adversary is, there won't be much of a fight,

1244
01:04:38,615 --> 01:04:41,115
which is exactly what we want.

1245
01:04:41,417 --> 01:04:44,834
And then the last thing is I believe that

1246
01:04:45,952 --> 01:04:49,120
the Marines we have, I had an email the other day,

1247
01:04:49,120 --> 01:04:51,386
I get a lot of these, I didn't ask for it but,

1248
01:04:51,386 --> 01:04:54,869
the Sergeant sends me, it's this 30 page tome

1249
01:04:54,869 --> 01:04:56,946
about everything that's screwed up in the Marine Corps.

1250
01:04:56,946 --> 01:04:59,347
(audience laughing)

1251
01:04:59,347 --> 01:05:01,544
No actually it was, he started with the Department

1252
01:05:01,544 --> 01:05:03,315
of Defense and worked his way down to (mumbling).

1253
01:05:03,315 --> 01:05:06,033
(audience laughing)

1254
01:05:06,033 --> 01:05:08,893
It was great, and I read it and I'm like,

1255
01:05:08,893 --> 01:05:11,668
yeah, yeah, okay, ah, that's bullshit, no,

1256
01:05:11,668 --> 01:05:15,375
that's a really good idea, well I dunno, maybe not.

1257
01:05:15,375 --> 01:05:17,303
So I called him on the phone.

1258
01:05:17,303 --> 01:05:20,303
(audience laughing)

1259
01:05:20,463 --> 01:05:22,741
I said I need to talk to you.

1260
01:05:22,741 --> 01:05:23,908
Says you got some really good stuff in here,

1261
01:05:23,908 --> 01:05:25,961
some of this is, I mean, and he goes,

1262
01:05:25,961 --> 01:05:27,966
no, I understand, I only know what I know.

1263
01:05:27,966 --> 01:05:30,636
I said but think about that, this guy's actually being

1264
01:05:30,636 --> 01:05:32,259
med-boarded out of the Marine Corps,

1265
01:05:32,259 --> 01:05:36,092
he's an infantry sergeant and he cares so much

1266
01:05:37,226 --> 01:05:40,393
that he took, it's a 30 page document.

1267
01:05:40,756 --> 01:05:43,839
Very well written, very well written.

1268
01:05:44,580 --> 01:05:46,890
So I had a VTC with him for two hours

1269
01:05:46,890 --> 01:05:50,057
we went through this thing, two hours.

1270
01:05:51,711 --> 01:05:54,128
And I went down line by line.

1271
01:05:55,491 --> 01:05:57,478
So I asked him, I said can I send this,

1272
01:05:57,478 --> 01:05:58,912
if I take your name off of this,

1273
01:05:58,912 --> 01:06:01,327
can I send this out to all the other generals?

1274
01:06:01,327 --> 01:06:03,321
He goes if you take my name off, yes sir, yeah.

1275
01:06:03,321 --> 01:06:06,013
(audience laughing)

1276
01:06:06,013 --> 01:06:06,846
So I did.

1277
01:06:08,086 --> 01:06:10,229
I mean some of the stuff is like,

1278
01:06:10,229 --> 01:06:14,396
my point is, we got really good people working for us.

1279
01:06:16,654 --> 01:06:20,821
And we get really busy and it's hard to listen to everybody.

1280
01:06:22,666 --> 01:06:24,859
But you don't have to listen to everybody

1281
01:06:24,859 --> 01:06:27,934
if people between you and them are listening to them

1282
01:06:27,934 --> 01:06:31,989
and taking, you don't have to agree with everything.

1283
01:06:31,989 --> 01:06:36,156
But these young men and women are very, very smart

1284
01:06:36,724 --> 01:06:39,307
and if they didn't give a darn,

1285
01:06:39,381 --> 01:06:42,048
I'd say yeah, okay, but they do.

1286
01:06:42,353 --> 01:06:44,186
Who doesn't wanna win?

1287
01:06:46,417 --> 01:06:49,584
So, the whole capability of the force,

1288
01:06:51,045 --> 01:06:52,735
I think of all the things that we've done

1289
01:06:52,735 --> 01:06:54,841
in the Marine Corps to change since I've been a Marine

1290
01:06:54,841 --> 01:06:58,510
since 1975, and we've made a lot of progress.

1291
01:06:58,510 --> 01:07:01,843
I love this Marine Corps much more than,

1292
01:07:01,846 --> 01:07:03,788
the Marine Corps I joined is very different

1293
01:07:03,788 --> 01:07:06,705
than the Marine Corps I'm in today.

1294
01:07:06,754 --> 01:07:09,995
That was a good Marine Corps, I love this one.

1295
01:07:09,995 --> 01:07:13,215
But I still think that one untapped resource

1296
01:07:13,215 --> 01:07:17,382
we have out there is our enlisted Marines, I really do.

1297
01:07:18,023 --> 01:07:21,851
So with that let me just show you a quick video

1298
01:07:21,851 --> 01:07:24,637
and then I will take your questions.

1299
01:07:24,637 --> 01:07:26,138
If this thing will work.

1300
01:07:26,138 --> 01:07:27,473
So this was done by a bunch of Marines

1301
01:07:27,473 --> 01:07:30,118
that work in our social media section.

1302
01:07:30,118 --> 01:07:32,833
I think the most senior one is a Sergeant.

1303
01:07:32,833 --> 01:07:35,500
I didn't even ask them to do it.

1304
01:07:35,983 --> 01:07:37,816
So they went out and--

1305
01:07:37,942 --> 01:07:40,525
(gentle music)

1306
01:07:40,627 --> 01:07:43,210
I like this Marine Corps a lot.

1307
01:07:43,520 --> 01:07:45,792
We have our Marine Corps that's very experienced,

1308
01:07:45,792 --> 01:07:48,360
been in combat for the last 15 years.

1309
01:07:48,360 --> 01:07:49,553
The quality of the Marine,

1310
01:07:49,553 --> 01:07:52,720
even to get in the door, is very high.

1311
01:07:53,168 --> 01:07:54,498
They didn't join the Marine Corps to sit

1312
01:07:54,498 --> 01:07:57,523
on their sea bag back at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune.

1313
01:07:57,523 --> 01:08:00,669
They wanna go somewhere and do something.

1314
01:08:00,669 --> 01:08:03,286
We have an incredibly capable Marine Corps.

1315
01:08:03,286 --> 01:08:04,489
Can we get better?

1316
01:08:04,489 --> 01:08:06,131
Yes, must we get better?

1317
01:08:06,131 --> 01:08:08,131
Yes, will we get better?

1318
01:08:08,441 --> 01:08:09,274
Yes.

1319
01:08:09,274 --> 01:08:10,719
(muffled voices on radio)

1320
01:08:10,719 --> 01:08:13,495
The Marine Corps doesn't give anybody anything.

1321
01:08:13,495 --> 01:08:15,828
You earn everything you got.

1322
01:08:15,906 --> 01:08:17,232
It's not the machine that matters,

1323
01:08:17,232 --> 01:08:18,357
it's the Marine that matters,

1324
01:08:18,357 --> 01:08:19,371
we equip the Marine, not the machine.

1325
01:08:19,371 --> 01:08:21,349
(drone buzzing)

1326
01:08:21,349 --> 01:08:22,968
We're gonna continue to innovate and adapt

1327
01:08:22,968 --> 01:08:25,149
like Marines have done throughout our history,

1328
01:08:25,149 --> 01:08:28,585
innovate, adapt, win, where we recognize we as Marines,

1329
01:08:28,585 --> 01:08:30,205
we're a war fighting organization,

1330
01:08:30,205 --> 01:08:31,592
every Marine is a rifleman.

1331
01:08:31,592 --> 01:08:33,048
(rapid gun firing)

1332
01:08:33,048 --> 01:08:34,885
That every Marine has to be fit, disciplined,

1333
01:08:34,885 --> 01:08:37,946
and every Marine has to study to get better.

1334
01:08:37,946 --> 01:08:39,559
All those basic things that we're gonna work

1335
01:08:39,559 --> 01:08:41,177
with Special Operations Command

1336
01:08:41,177 --> 01:08:42,838
that we're gonna leverage the F-35,

1337
01:08:42,838 --> 01:08:45,239
that we're gonna continue to innovate and adapt

1338
01:08:45,239 --> 01:08:47,301
like Marines have done throughout our history.

1339
01:08:47,301 --> 01:08:50,634
(epic orchestral music)

1340
01:08:53,512 --> 01:08:55,845
And what we do is not a job.

1341
01:08:57,844 --> 01:08:59,143
Not everybody can do this.

1342
01:08:59,143 --> 01:09:02,476
(epic orchestral music)

1343
01:09:04,558 --> 01:09:06,240
The first call when something bad happens

1344
01:09:06,240 --> 01:09:07,962
is gonna be the Marines, and they're gonna call us

1345
01:09:07,962 --> 01:09:11,421
because every time they have called us, we got it done.

1346
01:09:11,421 --> 01:09:14,754
(epic orchestral music)

1347
01:09:34,589 --> 01:09:36,336
We'll continue to get better and if we get called

1348
01:09:36,336 --> 01:09:38,133
to go somewhere and do what we have to do,

1349
01:09:38,133 --> 01:09:40,716
we have to win, we have to win.

1350
01:09:43,354 --> 01:09:46,521
(audience applauding)

1351
01:09:53,387 --> 01:09:55,735
I hate it when they take what you said and put it on video.

1352
01:09:55,735 --> 01:09:57,828
(audience laughing)

1353
01:09:57,828 --> 01:10:01,578
Okay, you got about 30 minutes for questions.

1354
01:10:02,792 --> 01:10:04,036
Sir, go ahead, please.

1355
01:10:04,036 --> 01:10:04,977
- [John] Thank you, General,

1356
01:10:04,977 --> 01:10:07,045
John Harper with National Defense Magazine.

1357
01:10:07,045 --> 01:10:09,856
There are signs that the Naval fleet might increase

1358
01:10:09,856 --> 01:10:11,422
significantly in the coming years,

1359
01:10:11,422 --> 01:10:15,172
perhaps as much as 350, up to 350 plus ships.

1360
01:10:16,205 --> 01:10:18,618
If that happens, what would be the number one asset

1361
01:10:18,618 --> 01:10:20,922
that you would like to see acquired,

1362
01:10:20,922 --> 01:10:23,465
would it be big deck amphibs or other type of vessels

1363
01:10:23,465 --> 01:10:24,957
that you would like to see increase

1364
01:10:24,957 --> 01:10:27,874
beyond the previously planned buys?

1365
01:10:27,966 --> 01:10:31,133
- Well obviously the Marine Corps has,

1366
01:10:31,362 --> 01:10:35,529
we've got a stated requirement of 38 amphibious ships.

1367
01:10:37,968 --> 01:10:40,145
And we've got enough Marines in even our current size

1368
01:10:40,145 --> 01:10:42,786
that we could man those, those special purpose MAGTFs

1369
01:10:42,786 --> 01:10:44,282
probably wouldn't have to be land based

1370
01:10:44,282 --> 01:10:45,847
if we had more amphibious ships,

1371
01:10:45,847 --> 01:10:48,895
and Admiral Tidd wouldn't have to come up here

1372
01:10:48,895 --> 01:10:50,982
with his tin cup in hand and say

1373
01:10:50,982 --> 01:10:52,642
help me, help me, I'm from SOUTHCOM.

1374
01:10:52,642 --> 01:10:55,642
(audience laughing)

1375
01:10:55,762 --> 01:10:58,345
Because all the things he says,

1376
01:11:00,008 --> 01:11:02,508
we need to be down there more.

1377
01:11:04,060 --> 01:11:06,110
He had a special purpose MAGTF for six months

1378
01:11:06,110 --> 01:11:09,797
that was formed normally out of or was primarily sourced

1379
01:11:09,797 --> 01:11:12,171
out of the Marine Corps Reserve,

1380
01:11:12,171 --> 01:11:14,077
and they were there for six months,

1381
01:11:14,077 --> 01:11:15,775
did a lot of good stuff for him,

1382
01:11:15,775 --> 01:11:17,554
and then when Hurricane Matthew came though,

1383
01:11:17,554 --> 01:11:21,126
they were the first ones on the deck in Haiti.

1384
01:11:21,126 --> 01:11:23,283
And that's why they were there, because that time of year.

1385
01:11:23,283 --> 01:11:25,175
But that's just a small snapshot.

1386
01:11:25,175 --> 01:11:29,342
So I don't think we realize how big that place is.

1387
01:11:29,425 --> 01:11:33,591
And it's one thing to focus on those that may do you harm,

1388
01:11:33,591 --> 01:11:37,758
but it's just as important to focus on your friends.

1389
01:11:37,811 --> 01:11:41,978
So that said, I think, I'll defer to the CNO and everybody,

1390
01:11:43,569 --> 01:11:44,833
but I think the capabilities

1391
01:11:44,833 --> 01:11:47,276
have gotta be balanced across the board.

1392
01:11:47,276 --> 01:11:49,350
There are certain adversaries clearly

1393
01:11:49,350 --> 01:11:52,850
that we would need more attack submarines.

1394
01:11:52,982 --> 01:11:56,407
The answer isn't like 100 amphibs, that's not the answer,

1395
01:11:56,407 --> 01:11:58,181
because amphibs have to be protected,

1396
01:11:58,181 --> 01:12:01,226
the conditions for them to land have to be shaped,

1397
01:12:01,226 --> 01:12:04,792
so you need every model type series of ship out there

1398
01:12:04,792 --> 01:12:07,459
so you've gotta have small ships

1399
01:12:07,958 --> 01:12:11,110
to go out and provide, to posture the force

1400
01:12:11,110 --> 01:12:13,693
and create that daily presence.

1401
01:12:14,252 --> 01:12:18,419
So I think it'll all come out, but I think it's, yeah,

1402
01:12:20,349 --> 01:12:23,022
we would clearly like to see a number of amphibs,

1403
01:12:23,022 --> 01:12:25,213
that would be our first priority,

1404
01:12:25,213 --> 01:12:28,130
but it's gotta be a balanced fleet.

1405
01:12:28,801 --> 01:12:29,776
- [Hope] General, Hope Seck with Military.com

1406
01:12:29,776 --> 01:12:31,182
- Hey, how are you?

1407
01:12:31,182 --> 01:12:33,648
- [Hope] Good, thank you, I wanted to ask about

1408
01:12:33,648 --> 01:12:36,131
this new mission the Marines are picking up

1409
01:12:36,131 --> 01:12:39,120
going back to Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

1410
01:12:39,120 --> 01:12:42,806
I had a really special opportunity to go to Afghanistan,

1411
01:12:42,806 --> 01:12:46,973
Helmand Province, in early 2014 and at the time there were

1412
01:12:48,471 --> 01:12:51,971
teams of Colonels advising Afghan leaders,

1413
01:12:52,761 --> 01:12:54,520
the police force and the army

1414
01:12:54,520 --> 01:12:58,047
and having lunch with these guys and it was really neat.

1415
01:12:58,047 --> 01:13:02,214
For the most part those Afghan leaders are long gone and

1416
01:13:02,962 --> 01:13:05,187
the advisors, the Marine advisors have been gone

1417
01:13:05,187 --> 01:13:08,298
for two years, so I'm wondering first of all

1418
01:13:08,298 --> 01:13:12,465
why it's the right time to bring the Marines back,

1419
01:13:14,298 --> 01:13:18,048
how having Marines there can change the game.

1420
01:13:21,207 --> 01:13:25,374
I guess how to regain those two years of being absent,

1421
01:13:25,575 --> 01:13:27,899
how to make up for that time.

1422
01:13:27,899 --> 01:13:31,982
- Well there's been an Army unit there at Bastion

1423
01:13:32,519 --> 01:13:36,186
and Leatherneck with the 215th Afghan Corps.

1424
01:13:36,391 --> 01:13:38,923
They were a period of time when they weren't there

1425
01:13:38,923 --> 01:13:41,246
day to day but they've been there day to day

1426
01:13:41,246 --> 01:13:43,461
and so the simple reason is why are we going back

1427
01:13:43,461 --> 01:13:47,509
is because somebody asked us if we could go do this.

1428
01:13:47,509 --> 01:13:48,759
And I said yes.

1429
01:13:49,615 --> 01:13:52,448
So are they gonna change the game?

1430
01:13:53,177 --> 01:13:55,177
I dunno, we'll find out.

1431
01:13:55,681 --> 01:13:57,431
It's gonna be a very,

1432
01:14:01,106 --> 01:14:03,731
it'll be a challenging mission, we all know Helmand

1433
01:14:03,731 --> 01:14:07,206
and the Helmand River Valley and that whole area

1434
01:14:07,206 --> 01:14:09,520
is right smack dab in the middle

1435
01:14:09,520 --> 01:14:13,360
of the Taliban heartland, and all the other things.

1436
01:14:13,360 --> 01:14:17,527
So we were asked to put a general officer in charge,

1437
01:14:18,852 --> 01:14:21,819
which we did and General Roger Turner

1438
01:14:21,819 --> 01:14:23,614
and they're gonna form this group up

1439
01:14:23,614 --> 01:14:27,561
and train 'em up and my responsibility is to make sure

1440
01:14:27,561 --> 01:14:29,410
they're as well trained and well prepared

1441
01:14:29,410 --> 01:14:32,631
as they could possibly be to do the mission set.

1442
01:14:32,631 --> 01:14:34,990
I've got great trust in General Turner

1443
01:14:34,990 --> 01:14:38,566
and we'll make sure that the force protection

1444
01:14:38,566 --> 01:14:42,437
is good and solid for them and then they'll go out

1445
01:14:42,437 --> 01:14:44,770
and do what they have to do.

1446
01:14:46,073 --> 01:14:49,740
So, it's nothing more complicated than that.

1447
01:14:51,077 --> 01:14:53,756
Someone asked hey, would you be able to do this,

1448
01:14:53,756 --> 01:14:56,256
and the answer was yes we can.

1449
01:14:57,550 --> 01:15:00,086
But no delusions about the difficulty

1450
01:15:00,086 --> 01:15:03,221
and the challenges that they're gonna face.

1451
01:15:03,221 --> 01:15:05,578
We're going there to facilitate the capabilities

1452
01:15:05,578 --> 01:15:08,978
of the Afghan 215th Corps and the Afghan police

1453
01:15:08,978 --> 01:15:11,395
at Helmand and at Lashkar Gah

1454
01:15:12,439 --> 01:15:13,590
so that they can be more effective

1455
01:15:13,590 --> 01:15:17,757
to protect the security of the people that live there.

1456
01:15:19,471 --> 01:15:20,304
Sir.

1457
01:15:20,328 --> 01:15:23,583
- [Sydney] General, Sydney Freedberg from Breaking Defense.

1458
01:15:23,583 --> 01:15:26,480
To pull in some of the threads you've mentioned

1459
01:15:26,480 --> 01:15:29,418
in this conversation and other times,

1460
01:15:29,418 --> 01:15:31,576
as you go into 2017 with the prospect

1461
01:15:31,576 --> 01:15:34,326
of budget and strength increases,

1462
01:15:34,649 --> 01:15:38,232
what are the priority gaps or opportunities

1463
01:15:39,637 --> 01:15:41,924
where you really wanna put additional personnel,

1464
01:15:41,924 --> 01:15:44,363
additional funds if you have them?

1465
01:15:44,363 --> 01:15:47,475
You mentioned cyber EW, information warfare a lot,

1466
01:15:47,475 --> 01:15:48,624
I imagine it's very high up there,

1467
01:15:48,624 --> 01:15:50,120
but I imagine there are other areas

1468
01:15:50,120 --> 01:15:51,701
where you're thinking yeah,

1469
01:15:51,701 --> 01:15:52,963
I need a little bit more of that,

1470
01:15:52,963 --> 01:15:56,546
be it the manpower, the equipment, or both.

1471
01:15:57,096 --> 01:16:01,007
- We've been working on what we call Force 2025

1472
01:16:01,007 --> 01:16:05,162
for a little over a year now and then our assessment,

1473
01:16:05,162 --> 01:16:06,620
as we've iterated this thing

1474
01:16:06,620 --> 01:16:09,537
through a number of different COAs.

1475
01:16:10,170 --> 01:16:12,886
Pretty much everybody agreed that the capability sets

1476
01:16:12,886 --> 01:16:14,539
that we thought we were deficient

1477
01:16:14,539 --> 01:16:17,095
were in those areas and there were some things

1478
01:16:17,095 --> 01:16:20,090
at the MEF Headquarters Group and what their mission was

1479
01:16:20,090 --> 01:16:21,953
and their ability to support the MEF,

1480
01:16:21,953 --> 01:16:23,393
whether it's so its communications

1481
01:16:23,393 --> 01:16:26,797
and intelligence collection, intelligence analysis,

1482
01:16:26,797 --> 01:16:30,964
cyber protection, further growth in the cyber enterprise,

1483
01:16:33,519 --> 01:16:36,102
UAVs, air defense, engineering,

1484
01:16:40,382 --> 01:16:43,549
electronic warfare, electronic warfare

1485
01:16:43,663 --> 01:16:47,830
protection and attack, so those are all capability sets

1486
01:16:48,186 --> 01:16:51,019
that we had in some size and scope

1487
01:16:51,174 --> 01:16:54,086
but we thought we needed to grow them out.

1488
01:16:54,086 --> 01:16:57,669
And we were gonna do that whether we got in

1489
01:16:58,299 --> 01:17:02,466
at top end strength or not and take it out of areas that,

1490
01:17:03,150 --> 01:17:05,507
not that we thought we were grossly overinvested

1491
01:17:05,507 --> 01:17:09,674
that we could have take some risks but if the appropriations

1492
01:17:09,779 --> 01:17:11,328
come with the end strength increase,

1493
01:17:11,328 --> 01:17:14,096
which we hope that it will, then we won't have to make

1494
01:17:14,096 --> 01:17:16,490
some of the changes that we were

1495
01:17:16,490 --> 01:17:18,994
thinking we might be forced to do.

1496
01:17:18,994 --> 01:17:22,358
So if, depending on what the funding situation is

1497
01:17:22,358 --> 01:17:25,593
and what it becomes, we've got plans that could grow

1498
01:17:25,593 --> 01:17:28,593
this thing even bigger but you can't

1499
01:17:28,708 --> 01:17:31,190
do that without the resources.

1500
01:17:31,190 --> 01:17:34,616
And at the same time, we just went up to 202K

1501
01:17:34,616 --> 01:17:36,373
but that was a very different bill,

1502
01:17:36,373 --> 01:17:38,499
that was just building more of like model

1503
01:17:38,499 --> 01:17:40,821
series organizations and groups.

1504
01:17:40,821 --> 01:17:43,723
This is different, this is building out capabilities,

1505
01:17:43,723 --> 01:17:45,697
it's a different kind of Marine.

1506
01:17:45,697 --> 01:17:48,890
A guy can make an infantry or artillery or an armor Marine

1507
01:17:48,890 --> 01:17:50,550
in a pretty short period of time,

1508
01:17:50,550 --> 01:17:51,804
how long is it gonna take to grow somebody

1509
01:17:51,804 --> 01:17:54,596
to be an electronic warfare or information ops

1510
01:17:54,596 --> 01:17:57,263
specialist or intel and analyst?

1511
01:18:00,815 --> 01:18:03,495
And at the same time maintain the quality?

1512
01:18:03,495 --> 01:18:05,815
So we're trying to find that knee in the curve

1513
01:18:05,815 --> 01:18:08,982
between grow the force, age the force,

1514
01:18:09,083 --> 01:18:11,437
different kind of force, and maintain

1515
01:18:11,437 --> 01:18:14,520
the overall quality across the force.

1516
01:18:16,917 --> 01:18:17,750
Yes sir.

1517
01:18:17,750 --> 01:18:19,948
- [Man] Good morning sir and certainly

1518
01:18:19,948 --> 01:18:22,130
a privilege to have you here.

1519
01:18:22,130 --> 01:18:24,482
Sir, again one of the greatest privileges,

1520
01:18:24,482 --> 01:18:27,957
certainly of my professional life is being out at Okinawa

1521
01:18:27,957 --> 01:18:31,588
there with you as Chief of Staff with Admiral Pottenger,

1522
01:18:31,588 --> 01:18:35,755
but most importantly stewardship of two amphibious ships,

1523
01:18:37,030 --> 01:18:39,182
ensuring that they were worthy

1524
01:18:39,182 --> 01:18:41,006
of being the last piece of America

1525
01:18:41,006 --> 01:18:42,950
that any Marine or Corpsman might stand on

1526
01:18:42,950 --> 01:18:45,825
before giving their last full measure of devotion.

1527
01:18:45,825 --> 01:18:48,370
And I also had the opportunity to be part of

1528
01:18:48,370 --> 01:18:51,413
the Amphibious Capability Working Group back in 2011

1529
01:18:51,413 --> 01:18:54,830
and among the things that were shaped out

1530
01:18:55,339 --> 01:18:58,506
and were accepted by the Marine Corps,

1531
01:18:59,432 --> 01:19:03,037
but regrettably a lexicon piece that hasn't quite made it

1532
01:19:03,037 --> 01:19:07,204
to surface warfare at large was the single naval battle,

1533
01:19:07,504 --> 01:19:10,754
and reminded of that when Admiral Tidd,

1534
01:19:11,659 --> 01:19:14,753
when he says everything is connected to everything,

1535
01:19:14,753 --> 01:19:18,086
and wondering if the single naval battle

1536
01:19:19,455 --> 01:19:23,622
is still part of conversation and if you believe that

1537
01:19:24,223 --> 01:19:27,859
that is something that one, the Marine Corps can continue

1538
01:19:27,859 --> 01:19:29,984
to be behind and is it something that the Navy

1539
01:19:29,984 --> 01:19:34,151
should perhaps emphasize in a different or better way?

1540
01:19:38,412 --> 01:19:42,437
- Well yeah, I do, I would say the more current term

1541
01:19:42,437 --> 01:19:46,604
is multi-domain battle which could be a joint term.

1542
01:19:47,065 --> 01:19:48,846
And I heard Admiral Tidd talk about this,

1543
01:19:48,846 --> 01:19:52,484
I think the days where everything was focused,

1544
01:19:52,484 --> 01:19:54,709
COCOMs were focused on their region and paid

1545
01:19:54,709 --> 01:19:57,627
some attention but not great attention

1546
01:19:57,627 --> 01:20:01,294
to what's happening across COCOM boundaries.

1547
01:20:01,659 --> 01:20:04,693
I think because of space, cyber, and information,

1548
01:20:04,693 --> 01:20:08,860
those days are gone, so how we shape the battle space

1549
01:20:08,860 --> 01:20:11,257
and create conditions for us to be successful,

1550
01:20:11,257 --> 01:20:15,180
whether it's within a region or across, transregional,

1551
01:20:15,180 --> 01:20:17,484
I think we're in a different place now.

1552
01:20:17,484 --> 01:20:20,396
So the term single naval battle means single battle,

1553
01:20:20,396 --> 01:20:23,041
that's an old term, so whether single naval battle,

1554
01:20:23,041 --> 01:20:27,208
multi-domain battle, everything that we do has gotta be,

1555
01:20:27,418 --> 01:20:29,462
you can't say I'm gonna go do this on my own

1556
01:20:29,462 --> 01:20:31,972
'cause it's just not gonna happen.

1557
01:20:31,972 --> 01:20:34,296
We probably need to have more of a discussion

1558
01:20:34,296 --> 01:20:36,381
of if you study your history in World War II,

1559
01:20:36,381 --> 01:20:40,464
I mean it's not like we haven't done this before.

1560
01:20:40,538 --> 01:20:43,121
Land based aviation is critical

1561
01:20:44,137 --> 01:20:48,304
'cause you're not gonna get enough aviation on a ship.

1562
01:20:48,865 --> 01:20:49,782
You're not.

1563
01:20:51,206 --> 01:20:55,373
And so our ability to operate as part of the joint force,

1564
01:20:55,413 --> 01:20:57,808
within the context of a naval campaign,

1565
01:20:57,808 --> 01:20:59,270
is the things we're trying to get at,

1566
01:20:59,270 --> 01:21:01,123
and I know Admiral Davidson's working on that,

1567
01:21:01,123 --> 01:21:04,209
I know that Admiral Swift's working on that,

1568
01:21:04,209 --> 01:21:06,456
and everybody's looking and broadening their view.

1569
01:21:06,456 --> 01:21:10,436
So I think single naval battle is still a valid term

1570
01:21:10,436 --> 01:21:14,353
but I would suggest that we need to expand that

1571
01:21:14,821 --> 01:21:16,467
to within the single joint fight

1572
01:21:16,467 --> 01:21:20,550
as part of a maritime campaign or naval campaign.

1573
01:21:22,784 --> 01:21:23,617
Alright?

1574
01:21:27,186 --> 01:21:28,780
- [Jeff] Thank you General, Jeff Schogol,

1575
01:21:28,780 --> 01:21:31,073
Marine Corps Times, you had mentioned the NDAA

1576
01:21:31,073 --> 01:21:34,990
authorizes the Marine Corps to grow to 185,000,

1577
01:21:35,376 --> 01:21:36,882
and yet there has been no funding yet

1578
01:21:36,882 --> 01:21:39,307
because there's been no appropriations bill.

1579
01:21:39,307 --> 01:21:42,557
Where does that leave the Marine Corps?

1580
01:21:44,642 --> 01:21:46,352
- Well that's a really good question, Jeff.

1581
01:21:46,352 --> 01:21:48,185
(audience laughing)

1582
01:21:48,185 --> 01:21:49,187
- [Jeff] Thank you.

1583
01:21:49,187 --> 01:21:52,187
(audience laughing)

1584
01:21:54,592 --> 01:21:58,336
- It puts us in a position where we have to make

1585
01:21:58,336 --> 01:22:02,503
an assumption one way or the other and so right now

1586
01:22:04,090 --> 01:22:05,974
we're gonna operate the assumption

1587
01:22:05,974 --> 01:22:08,518
and follow your last order signed by the President

1588
01:22:08,518 --> 01:22:11,111
of the United States that this is gonna happen.

1589
01:22:11,111 --> 01:22:15,278
And there's a risk there, there's certain risk but,

1590
01:22:18,044 --> 01:22:21,544
if it doesn't work out, and I know that's,

1591
01:22:25,380 --> 01:22:28,368
there's no decision without any risk.

1592
01:22:28,368 --> 01:22:30,044
So if it doesn't work out we'll adjust

1593
01:22:30,044 --> 01:22:33,369
and we'll go back to, we have another plan

1594
01:22:33,369 --> 01:22:37,536
to get at the same capability sets that we talked about.

1595
01:22:38,191 --> 01:22:40,497
- [Jeff] And does that plan involve repurposing Marines

1596
01:22:40,497 --> 01:22:44,115
into different MOSs from say, infantry to intelligence,

1597
01:22:44,115 --> 01:22:45,234
cyber and electronic warfare?

1598
01:22:45,234 --> 01:22:48,234
- If that's what we have to do, yes.

1599
01:22:49,675 --> 01:22:51,258
- [Jeff] Thank you.

1600
01:22:52,629 --> 01:22:55,175
- [Megan] Good morning sir, Megan Eckstein with USNI News.

1601
01:22:55,175 --> 01:22:57,547
Earlier in the conference, General Owens brought up

1602
01:22:57,547 --> 01:23:00,284
the idea of the expeditionary advanced base operations

1603
01:23:00,284 --> 01:23:02,475
and how that could change the supported,

1604
01:23:02,475 --> 01:23:05,289
supporting nature between the Navy and Marine Corps.

1605
01:23:05,289 --> 01:23:06,598
So I was wondering from your perspective

1606
01:23:06,598 --> 01:23:08,217
what the Marine Corps needs to start doing

1607
01:23:08,217 --> 01:23:11,690
to support the expeditionary advanced base operations idea

1608
01:23:11,690 --> 01:23:13,075
and also what you've asked the Navy

1609
01:23:13,075 --> 01:23:15,706
to do to try to help support that.

1610
01:23:15,706 --> 01:23:18,335
- I mean that idea again is not a new idea,

1611
01:23:18,335 --> 01:23:20,132
that's part of our mission set,

1612
01:23:20,132 --> 01:23:22,397
to seize and secure advanced naval bases

1613
01:23:22,397 --> 01:23:24,909
for the prosecution of the naval campaign.

1614
01:23:24,909 --> 01:23:27,667
So if we, whether it's establishing

1615
01:23:27,667 --> 01:23:31,084
a Forward Army Refueling Point for Marine

1616
01:23:31,282 --> 01:23:34,282
or Naval aviation or joint aviation,

1617
01:23:34,629 --> 01:23:38,379
whether it's to secure a piece of key terrain

1618
01:23:38,443 --> 01:23:41,432
to deny access to a sea line of communication

1619
01:23:41,432 --> 01:23:43,932
or a geographical choke point,

1620
01:23:45,464 --> 01:23:48,810
I think this idea is not a new one but it's not one

1621
01:23:48,810 --> 01:23:52,977
that we've had the discussion about here in the recent past.

1622
01:23:53,329 --> 01:23:55,910
So in our exercises and in our training

1623
01:23:55,910 --> 01:23:59,193
and in our discussions with our shipmates,

1624
01:23:59,193 --> 01:24:01,444
I'm pretty confident that the Marine commanders

1625
01:24:01,444 --> 01:24:04,544
and the Navy commanders are having this discussion.

1626
01:24:04,544 --> 01:24:08,711
There's some capabilities that would be beneficial for that,

1627
01:24:11,711 --> 01:24:14,191
surface launch, precision fires,

1628
01:24:14,191 --> 01:24:15,330
and things like that that probably

1629
01:24:15,330 --> 01:24:18,062
would need to be expanded a little bit,

1630
01:24:18,062 --> 01:24:20,759
but I'm not gonna say anymore about that

1631
01:24:20,759 --> 01:24:22,847
because there's a lot of work going on about that

1632
01:24:22,847 --> 01:24:25,389
and we'll see how it all plays out.

1633
01:24:25,389 --> 01:24:27,332
I'm confident that, as far as understanding

1634
01:24:27,332 --> 01:24:31,499
what the mission is, that's what we do, that's what we do.

1635
01:24:31,877 --> 01:24:32,870
At least that's what I thought

1636
01:24:32,870 --> 01:24:35,111
we did for the last 241 years.

1637
01:24:35,111 --> 01:24:38,957
Go there, take that land, hold it, don't let anybody get it.

1638
01:24:38,957 --> 01:24:40,787
- Thank you.
- Got it, roger that.

1639
01:24:40,787 --> 01:24:42,190
(audience laughing)

1640
01:24:42,190 --> 01:24:43,115
Alright, Admiral Tidd,

1641
01:24:43,115 --> 01:24:44,627
give me a ride over there to go do that.

1642
01:24:44,627 --> 01:24:46,733
(audience laughing)

1643
01:24:46,733 --> 01:24:47,735
And make sure there's nobody

1644
01:24:47,735 --> 01:24:50,380
left standing when I hit the beach.

1645
01:24:50,380 --> 01:24:51,636
Okay?
- Thank you.

1646
01:24:51,636 --> 01:24:52,469
- Yep.

1647
01:24:53,801 --> 01:24:54,900
- Good morning sir--
- You guys gonna let all

1648
01:24:54,900 --> 01:24:57,036
these reporters come up here and ask all these questions?

1649
01:24:57,036 --> 01:24:58,507
(audience laughing)

1650
01:24:58,507 --> 01:24:59,588
Where's Admiral Harris?

1651
01:24:59,588 --> 01:25:02,289
You're leaving me up here, come on man.

1652
01:25:02,289 --> 01:25:03,122
- [Otto] Good morning sir,

1653
01:25:03,122 --> 01:25:04,781
Otto Kreisher for Seapower Magazine.

1654
01:25:04,781 --> 01:25:08,948
As always in your proposed changes there can be conflicts.

1655
01:25:11,695 --> 01:25:14,825
We need more network connections to operate

1656
01:25:14,825 --> 01:25:17,575
dispersed and interservice joint,

1657
01:25:19,282 --> 01:25:21,809
but at the same time you're working on,

1658
01:25:21,809 --> 01:25:25,976
you want EMCON conditions and reduce your signatures.

1659
01:25:26,851 --> 01:25:29,509
How do you resolve that conflict with the need

1660
01:25:29,509 --> 01:25:32,509
to be connected, not just regionally but globally,

1661
01:25:32,509 --> 01:25:36,092
with your need to go into EMCON conditions?

1662
01:25:36,240 --> 01:25:39,566
- Well, it depends on what your adversaries know

1663
01:25:39,566 --> 01:25:41,637
and what capabilities they have.

1664
01:25:41,637 --> 01:25:44,424
So remember when I said the ultimate end state

1665
01:25:44,424 --> 01:25:48,591
is your network is protected, your network is resilient,

1666
01:25:48,979 --> 01:25:51,315
you have access to those capabilities you need

1667
01:25:51,315 --> 01:25:55,482
to give you precision and navigation and high end bandwidth

1668
01:25:56,387 --> 01:25:59,722
and communications, and your adversary does not.

1669
01:25:59,722 --> 01:26:03,889
It's not gonna, that's the fight, that's the fight.

1670
01:26:04,296 --> 01:26:07,296
So it's never gonna be 100 over 100.

1671
01:26:08,837 --> 01:26:12,879
Think back, we're back to HF radio and stuff like it is,

1672
01:26:12,879 --> 01:26:15,120
we've got capabilities that can do this,

1673
01:26:15,120 --> 01:26:18,559
we just haven't done it 'cause we haven't had to do it.

1674
01:26:18,559 --> 01:26:21,386
So my epiphany is I'm in Afghanistan

1675
01:26:21,386 --> 01:26:24,784
and I'm visiting this unit out in the middle of nowhere

1676
01:26:24,784 --> 01:26:27,597
and they come out to meet us at the LZ

1677
01:26:27,597 --> 01:26:31,207
and then the pilots say hey, the weather's getting bad,

1678
01:26:31,207 --> 01:26:34,524
unless you wanna spend the night here, we probably gotta go.

1679
01:26:34,524 --> 01:26:35,784
Said alright, I got it, alright,

1680
01:26:35,784 --> 01:26:38,296
so the lieutenant shows up to get us in the truck

1681
01:26:38,296 --> 01:26:41,268
to take us into town, I go hey, we don't have time,

1682
01:26:41,268 --> 01:26:43,069
can you just brief me, take your map out

1683
01:26:43,069 --> 01:26:44,745
and lay it on the hood of the truck

1684
01:26:44,745 --> 01:26:46,901
and just show me where everybody is.

1685
01:26:46,901 --> 01:26:51,068
And he goes, I can show you on my Blue Force Tracker.

1686
01:26:51,748 --> 01:26:52,747
I said where's your map?

1687
01:26:52,747 --> 01:26:54,330
Oh, it's on my pad.

1688
01:26:55,032 --> 01:26:56,449
I'm like, really?

1689
01:26:57,760 --> 01:26:58,593
Yes sir.

1690
01:26:58,593 --> 01:27:01,498
I mean he was not the least bit bothered by it.

1691
01:27:01,498 --> 01:27:03,612
I was pretty bothered by it.

1692
01:27:03,612 --> 01:27:06,612
(audience laughing)

1693
01:27:06,632 --> 01:27:09,299
Because you always got a back up

1694
01:27:10,004 --> 01:27:12,504
to the back up to the back up.

1695
01:27:12,662 --> 01:27:16,466
But these guys have been operating in an environment

1696
01:27:16,466 --> 01:27:18,786
where to them the ability to not have access

1697
01:27:18,786 --> 01:27:21,953
to the network was, how could that be?

1698
01:27:23,230 --> 01:27:27,009
It's like what do you mean, my phone doesn't work?

1699
01:27:27,009 --> 01:27:30,842
What do you mean I can't get my Facebook page?

1700
01:27:32,171 --> 01:27:35,088
You mean I can't FaceTime with you?

1701
01:27:36,918 --> 01:27:39,490
Yeah, that's what I'm talking about.

1702
01:27:39,490 --> 01:27:41,469
You're not gonna be able to do that.

1703
01:27:41,469 --> 01:27:44,302
So I don't see it as an either or,

1704
01:27:46,269 --> 01:27:49,602
I think we've created a way of fighting,

1705
01:27:51,159 --> 01:27:54,991
we're invested in this, so now we gotta figure out

1706
01:27:54,991 --> 01:27:58,305
how to protect it, make it as resilient as we can,

1707
01:27:58,305 --> 01:28:02,325
but at the same time have other, more, enough redundancy

1708
01:28:02,325 --> 01:28:05,000
in the network that it's still gonna work for us.

1709
01:28:05,000 --> 01:28:06,480
I think everybody's aware of that,

1710
01:28:06,480 --> 01:28:09,291
just as our potential adversaries are aware of it

1711
01:28:09,291 --> 01:28:12,791
and they're looking for ways that they can

1712
01:28:13,636 --> 01:28:15,636
do the same thing to us.

1713
01:28:16,594 --> 01:28:18,209
So that's part of the training piece,

1714
01:28:18,209 --> 01:28:20,079
that's part of the discussion piece,

1715
01:28:20,079 --> 01:28:22,496
but for the last 15 years we just,

1716
01:28:22,496 --> 01:28:25,819
if you walked into any ground operations center

1717
01:28:25,819 --> 01:28:29,902
anywhere in the world and you got big screen TVs,

1718
01:28:29,908 --> 01:28:32,246
you got streaming video, you've got multiple

1719
01:28:32,246 --> 01:28:35,212
MIRC chat channels, com is burned in,

1720
01:28:35,212 --> 01:28:38,293
it's all fiber optic cable laid across the country,

1721
01:28:38,293 --> 01:28:40,293
no one's moved in years.

1722
01:28:45,241 --> 01:28:49,158
Okay so what happens when we're moving on foot?

1723
01:28:51,389 --> 01:28:53,102
Like I learned from the Vietnam guys

1724
01:28:53,102 --> 01:28:55,914
that raised and trained me, you stop,

1725
01:28:55,914 --> 01:28:59,997
wait for it to get dark, and then you move again.

1726
01:29:00,154 --> 01:29:02,103
'Cause they saw where you stopped 'cause it was still light,

1727
01:29:02,103 --> 01:29:03,756
and then you move again in the dark

1728
01:29:03,756 --> 01:29:06,506
so they don't know where you are.

1729
01:29:06,610 --> 01:29:08,617
That's the way I was raised.

1730
01:29:08,617 --> 01:29:10,700
Nobody does that anymore.

1731
01:29:11,852 --> 01:29:14,102
We used to lay wire, right?

1732
01:29:15,615 --> 01:29:18,782
We'd lay wire and turn the radios off.

1733
01:29:18,914 --> 01:29:20,976
Not just to conserve batteries

1734
01:29:20,976 --> 01:29:22,601
but because we didn't want to have a signature,

1735
01:29:22,601 --> 01:29:26,184
and we talk on the telephone, no signature.

1736
01:29:27,239 --> 01:29:28,481
Plus it was easy to find your way around

1737
01:29:28,481 --> 01:29:29,650
at night because you just followed

1738
01:29:29,650 --> 01:29:31,303
the wire from position to position.

1739
01:29:31,303 --> 01:29:33,066
(audience laughing)

1740
01:29:33,066 --> 01:29:33,899
It was.

1741
01:29:34,479 --> 01:29:37,373
And then in the morning, got up, the captain had the radio

1742
01:29:37,373 --> 01:29:39,503
on 'cause they had to talk to battalion.

1743
01:29:39,503 --> 01:29:40,847
And you'd talk to patrols, but that was it,

1744
01:29:40,847 --> 01:29:42,656
it was all (mimicking switch),

1745
01:29:42,656 --> 01:29:44,489
remember, click click?

1746
01:29:45,677 --> 01:29:48,455
Nobody's like yeah well you know, how you feeling today?

1747
01:29:48,455 --> 01:29:51,455
(audience laughing)

1748
01:29:54,362 --> 01:29:57,529
Hey I'm gonna send you this video, no.

1749
01:29:59,253 --> 01:30:03,420
The world, whatever we've been doing is not right or wrong,

1750
01:30:04,315 --> 01:30:06,169
it's just different, and it's different now,

1751
01:30:06,169 --> 01:30:07,974
so it's up the responsibility of all of us,

1752
01:30:07,974 --> 01:30:09,638
it's like wait, this is how we're gonna train,

1753
01:30:09,638 --> 01:30:10,752
and this is what you're gonna do,

1754
01:30:10,752 --> 01:30:12,992
this is how you're gonna operate.

1755
01:30:12,992 --> 01:30:15,172
We know you can do the other thing,

1756
01:30:15,172 --> 01:30:16,606
now I'm gonna make it harder.

1757
01:30:16,606 --> 01:30:17,439
Yes sir.

1758
01:30:18,490 --> 01:30:20,281
- [Sink] Reporting as ordered.

1759
01:30:20,281 --> 01:30:21,999
(audience laughing)

1760
01:30:21,999 --> 01:30:26,166
So sir, the America is a horse of a different color.

1761
01:30:26,932 --> 01:30:30,432
We're gonna have two of 'em, no well deck.

1762
01:30:31,199 --> 01:30:34,981
So when we say the America ARG, those who have had

1763
01:30:34,981 --> 01:30:37,981
to figure out the five fingerprints of lift,

1764
01:30:37,981 --> 01:30:41,129
raise your hand if you know what that means.

1765
01:30:41,129 --> 01:30:43,379
Okay, a few people in here.

1766
01:30:44,248 --> 01:30:47,669
When you start looking at that map, it does have to work.

1767
01:30:47,669 --> 01:30:50,887
But as you said when you're at the top of your game,

1768
01:30:50,887 --> 01:30:54,137
change your game, I think you also said

1769
01:30:55,994 --> 01:30:57,663
there's risk when you change but

1770
01:30:57,663 --> 01:30:59,786
there's even more when you don't.

1771
01:30:59,786 --> 01:31:03,390
So what is your vision and what do you want to see

1772
01:31:03,390 --> 01:31:06,807
out of an America ARG, be it three ships,

1773
01:31:07,379 --> 01:31:10,037
some might get ready to catch the swell, boss,

1774
01:31:10,037 --> 01:31:11,611
or a four ship ARG,

1775
01:31:11,611 --> 01:31:14,014
(audience laughing)

1776
01:31:14,014 --> 01:31:17,181
what do you wanna see out of that ARG?

1777
01:31:18,252 --> 01:31:19,676
- Well when the first one deploys,

1778
01:31:19,676 --> 01:31:22,093
I think we're gonna find out.

1779
01:31:23,114 --> 01:31:25,827
I haven't quite frankly, and you've piqued

1780
01:31:25,827 --> 01:31:27,771
my interest now, I'm probably gonna start,

1781
01:31:27,771 --> 01:31:29,031
I'll tell the staff to blame you

1782
01:31:29,031 --> 01:31:30,802
for all my questions now, 'cause Admiral Harris said,

1783
01:31:30,802 --> 01:31:32,008
(audience laughing)

1784
01:31:32,008 --> 01:31:33,703
what the load out's gonna be, I mean clearly--

1785
01:31:33,703 --> 01:31:34,978
- [Sink] None of my business.

1786
01:31:34,978 --> 01:31:35,857
(audience laughing)

1787
01:31:35,857 --> 01:31:39,524
- Clearly the load out's gonna be different.

1788
01:31:39,705 --> 01:31:43,429
Losing the well back off the LHD is a big deal.

1789
01:31:43,429 --> 01:31:45,096
But okay, so how do,

1790
01:31:45,848 --> 01:31:47,779
are we gonna try to compensate for that?

1791
01:31:47,779 --> 01:31:51,029
Are we gonna use other innovative ways?

1792
01:31:51,197 --> 01:31:54,123
Do we put stuff on a black hole and follow it around?

1793
01:31:54,123 --> 01:31:58,290
We gave the leverage HSBs, do we put a fourth amphib?

1794
01:31:58,767 --> 01:32:00,263
Do we realize we just can't get there?

1795
01:32:00,263 --> 01:32:02,763
Or do we accept the fact, hey,

1796
01:32:02,965 --> 01:32:05,632
with this organization of ships,

1797
01:32:05,650 --> 01:32:07,211
you're gonna have these capabilities

1798
01:32:07,211 --> 01:32:10,109
are gonna be magnified or improved or increased

1799
01:32:10,109 --> 01:32:12,075
and these other ones are not.

1800
01:32:12,075 --> 01:32:16,075
Every ARG that goes out, there's no MEU ARG team

1801
01:32:17,109 --> 01:32:20,688
that gets everything they want on their ship.

1802
01:32:20,688 --> 01:32:23,771
You know that, there's always trades.

1803
01:32:23,905 --> 01:32:26,859
So this is a different kind of trade.

1804
01:32:26,859 --> 01:32:30,442
So okay, so maybe we're gonna need more 53s

1805
01:32:31,291 --> 01:32:33,676
'cause we're gonna have a heavier hauling capability to move

1806
01:32:33,676 --> 01:32:36,609
stuff that otherwise would have come out the well deck.

1807
01:32:36,609 --> 01:32:37,928
Or what's the configuration, what's it gonna

1808
01:32:37,928 --> 01:32:40,428
look inside there, LPD or LSD?

1809
01:32:43,939 --> 01:32:46,275
This may take care of itself, if we end up with LXR

1810
01:32:46,275 --> 01:32:49,775
or continuation of the LPD like hull form,

1811
01:32:51,087 --> 01:32:53,297
some of that will get mitigated.

1812
01:32:53,297 --> 01:32:55,208
But I don't think it's the end of the world,

1813
01:32:55,208 --> 01:32:57,582
but I think it's up to us to say okay,

1814
01:32:57,582 --> 01:32:58,749
here's what it's gonna look like,

1815
01:32:58,749 --> 01:33:00,011
here's what we're gonna take,

1816
01:33:00,011 --> 01:33:02,644
and then understand that the Marine Component Commander

1817
01:33:02,644 --> 01:33:04,814
and the Fleet Commander and the Combatant Commander

1818
01:33:04,814 --> 01:33:08,005
understand okay, this ARG's a little bit different,

1819
01:33:08,005 --> 01:33:11,062
they're gonna have this capability as opposed to this.

1820
01:33:11,062 --> 01:33:15,229
But we got the ships, the ships, in certain environments,

1821
01:33:15,873 --> 01:33:19,456
I could see huge advantage, huge advantage.

1822
01:33:20,618 --> 01:33:24,507
So the goal will be like with any of the capabilities,

1823
01:33:24,507 --> 01:33:27,324
try to maximize the positive aspects of it and figure out

1824
01:33:27,324 --> 01:33:31,157
a way to mitigate whatever we think is a risk.

1825
01:33:32,354 --> 01:33:35,978
But I'll tell General (speaking quickly)

1826
01:33:35,978 --> 01:33:37,666
that I'm calling because you reminded me of all this stuff

1827
01:33:37,666 --> 01:33:39,380
and so he can get ahead of me,

1828
01:33:39,380 --> 01:33:40,968
I can get ahead of him on this.

1829
01:33:40,968 --> 01:33:43,125
(people mumbling off mic)

1830
01:33:43,125 --> 01:33:43,958
- [Carol] We're running just a little bit

1831
01:33:43,958 --> 01:33:45,832
over which is great, so maybe one more--

1832
01:33:45,832 --> 01:33:46,665
- One more question.

1833
01:33:46,665 --> 01:33:48,059
(man speaking off mic)
Yes sir, hey.

1834
01:33:48,059 --> 01:33:49,480
- Can I have--
- My hero!

1835
01:33:49,480 --> 01:33:50,990
(audience laughing)

1836
01:33:50,990 --> 01:33:52,832
- [Man] Sir, first of all thanks for being here.

1837
01:33:52,832 --> 01:33:55,582
Second, I just wanna let you know

1838
01:33:55,977 --> 01:33:58,641
that I am all over the readiness of our amphibious force

1839
01:33:58,641 --> 01:33:59,937
and making sure that we can do everything

1840
01:33:59,937 --> 01:34:01,447
for our United States Marine Corps

1841
01:34:01,447 --> 01:34:04,054
so that we can get our Marines to the fight

1842
01:34:04,054 --> 01:34:07,254
and support that Navy Marine Corps team.

1843
01:34:07,254 --> 01:34:11,395
To that end for example, we're shifting the command

1844
01:34:11,395 --> 01:34:14,373
of our PHIBRONs to sequential command.

1845
01:34:14,373 --> 01:34:16,214
I'm looking hard at the PHIBRONs to make sure that

1846
01:34:16,214 --> 01:34:20,381
they can properly support and integrate with the MEUs.

1847
01:34:20,784 --> 01:34:22,773
And I gotta tell you sir, I am really excited

1848
01:34:22,773 --> 01:34:25,903
about the pending deployment of the F-35B

1849
01:34:25,903 --> 01:34:29,628
and all the opportunities that those aircraft bring

1850
01:34:29,628 --> 01:34:33,211
and also the opportunities as you mentioned

1851
01:34:33,833 --> 01:34:35,650
to look at up gunning those ships,

1852
01:34:35,650 --> 01:34:38,963
looking at the installation of Mark 41 into the LPD-17s

1853
01:34:38,963 --> 01:34:42,541
and I'm really interested in trying to get after that.

1854
01:34:42,541 --> 01:34:44,233
But my question is this sir,

1855
01:34:44,233 --> 01:34:47,064
as we look at bringing all of these new capabilities

1856
01:34:47,064 --> 01:34:50,231
to our amphibious forces and yesterday

1857
01:34:50,692 --> 01:34:54,859
or a couple days ago I talked about the sea control aspect

1858
01:34:55,013 --> 01:34:59,064
and understanding that we have to control the sea

1859
01:34:59,064 --> 01:35:02,147
prior to projecting that force ashore

1860
01:35:03,330 --> 01:35:04,848
or control the sea in order to enable

1861
01:35:04,848 --> 01:35:06,205
all the other things that we do,

1862
01:35:06,205 --> 01:35:08,511
including power projection of that Marine Corps.

1863
01:35:08,511 --> 01:35:11,461
As we do that and understanding again,

1864
01:35:11,461 --> 01:35:14,074
that I am all over Operational Maneuver from the Sea,

1865
01:35:14,074 --> 01:35:15,850
and fully supporting that,

1866
01:35:15,850 --> 01:35:17,369
especially with our aviation assets,

1867
01:35:17,369 --> 01:35:20,754
but as I look ahead I think there's some adjustment

1868
01:35:20,754 --> 01:35:23,151
that we have to make to the training and preparation

1869
01:35:23,151 --> 01:35:26,553
as we look at possibly deploying up gunned ESGs,

1870
01:35:26,553 --> 01:35:30,220
as we look at other ways to change the game,

1871
01:35:30,246 --> 01:35:33,071
and I was wondering if you could comment on how you think,

1872
01:35:33,071 --> 01:35:37,238
or the opportunities to significantly adjust the training

1873
01:35:37,238 --> 01:35:40,488
and preparation of the MEU PHIBRON team

1874
01:35:41,625 --> 01:35:44,694
with the ARG MEU team in order to be able to get after

1875
01:35:44,694 --> 01:35:48,861
not only surely executing Operational Maneuver from the Sea

1876
01:35:49,788 --> 01:35:52,371
but as an expanded mission set,

1877
01:35:52,419 --> 01:35:53,641
getting after the sea control piece

1878
01:35:53,641 --> 01:35:55,030
that I think we can execute with

1879
01:35:55,030 --> 01:35:56,026
these amphibious readiness groups,

1880
01:35:56,026 --> 01:35:58,473
your up gunned ESGs prior to going forward.

1881
01:35:58,473 --> 01:35:59,723
Thank you, sir.

1882
01:36:01,808 --> 01:36:05,725
- If you'd asked me that probably 15 years ago,

1883
01:36:06,030 --> 01:36:07,733
I'd say well that's not my job.

1884
01:36:07,733 --> 01:36:08,957
Your job's to get me to the fight,

1885
01:36:08,957 --> 01:36:10,508
and I'm just supposed to go along.

1886
01:36:10,508 --> 01:36:13,905
I don't think we see it that way anymore.

1887
01:36:13,905 --> 01:36:18,072
That's kind of a narrow view, if anybody held that at all.

1888
01:36:18,561 --> 01:36:21,115
But I think it's a sign of the maturity of our relationship

1889
01:36:21,115 --> 01:36:22,995
and the fact that we're doing a better job talking

1890
01:36:22,995 --> 01:36:27,162
to each other about the Naval campaign that we realize,

1891
01:36:28,354 --> 01:36:32,452
the green side realized hey look, you wanna get from A to B,

1892
01:36:32,452 --> 01:36:34,090
but you ain't gonna get from A to B

1893
01:36:34,090 --> 01:36:36,489
if you don't help and become part of

1894
01:36:36,489 --> 01:36:40,378
the process to get from A to B, to set those conditions.

1895
01:36:40,378 --> 01:36:41,959
It's just not gonna happen.

1896
01:36:41,959 --> 01:36:46,007
So whether it's outpost and security or air defense

1897
01:36:46,007 --> 01:36:49,910
as you go through a choke point or a transit area,

1898
01:36:49,910 --> 01:36:54,077
whether it's stuff in port, whether it's being more involved

1899
01:36:54,471 --> 01:36:56,575
with using Marine aviation to protect

1900
01:36:56,575 --> 01:37:00,408
or to defend the overall taskforce or the ARG,

1901
01:37:01,685 --> 01:37:02,620
whatever it is, in other words,

1902
01:37:02,620 --> 01:37:04,582
at the end of the day, whatever it takes.

1903
01:37:04,582 --> 01:37:05,754
Whatever it takes.

1904
01:37:05,754 --> 01:37:09,921
So it's totally a team game and I think that the people

1905
01:37:10,036 --> 01:37:12,738
that were ARG, PHIBRONs, and MEU commanders,

1906
01:37:12,738 --> 01:37:14,694
they realized this for years but I don't think

1907
01:37:14,694 --> 01:37:15,829
the rest of us were really paying

1908
01:37:15,829 --> 01:37:18,531
enough attention to what they were doing.

1909
01:37:18,531 --> 01:37:20,011
And we just gotta get after that.

1910
01:37:20,011 --> 01:37:22,926
So I think as we look at the capability,

1911
01:37:22,926 --> 01:37:26,700
and it's a lot easier to do that if all the amphibs

1912
01:37:26,700 --> 01:37:30,867
have similar capabilities, air defense, communications,

1913
01:37:32,421 --> 01:37:33,919
ability to link this whole network

1914
01:37:33,919 --> 01:37:35,460
that Admiral Tidd talked about,

1915
01:37:35,460 --> 01:37:38,212
it's a lot easier for us to be more involved

1916
01:37:38,212 --> 01:37:41,528
in the sea control piece if we've got similar,

1917
01:37:41,528 --> 01:37:43,646
there's no way that we're gonna have exactly the same,

1918
01:37:43,646 --> 01:37:45,624
nor do I think we need to have exactly the same.

1919
01:37:45,624 --> 01:37:47,707
But we gotta have enough.

1920
01:37:48,793 --> 01:37:50,210
Now what is that?

1921
01:37:50,214 --> 01:37:53,265
I don't know, we could all probably sit in a room,

1922
01:37:53,265 --> 01:37:54,594
and I think in probably an hour

1923
01:37:54,594 --> 01:37:55,816
you could (mumbling) and knock that out,

1924
01:37:55,816 --> 01:37:56,933
but then the question is okay,

1925
01:37:56,933 --> 01:37:59,212
how are you gonna pay for that?

1926
01:37:59,212 --> 01:38:01,423
So, and the com piece is always hard when you're

1927
01:38:01,423 --> 01:38:03,837
building a ship because the minute you write it all down,

1928
01:38:03,837 --> 01:38:06,321
because of the time it takes, when you lay the keel

1929
01:38:06,321 --> 01:38:09,344
to get that thing underway, every com piece and gear net

1930
01:38:09,344 --> 01:38:13,177
thing other than HF radio's probably obsolete.

1931
01:38:14,816 --> 01:38:16,649
So how do you do that?

1932
01:38:16,792 --> 01:38:19,997
So that's why we're always in all the stuff

1933
01:38:19,997 --> 01:38:22,200
that we're doing with the communications and the network

1934
01:38:22,200 --> 01:38:25,368
so that we get part of the Naval integrated fire control

1935
01:38:25,368 --> 01:38:28,471
and air defense and strike and all that stuff.

1936
01:38:28,471 --> 01:38:31,104
So I just think where we used to have this kinda,

1937
01:38:31,104 --> 01:38:33,105
oh, those are the amphibs kinda sailing along,

1938
01:38:33,105 --> 01:38:34,426
chugging along, doing their own thing,

1939
01:38:34,426 --> 01:38:35,950
no, we can't do that anymore.

1940
01:38:35,950 --> 01:38:39,457
Those are warships and they gotta be networked

1941
01:38:39,457 --> 01:38:40,683
with the rest of the warships

1942
01:38:40,683 --> 01:38:43,683
so that they can support each other,

1943
01:38:43,958 --> 01:38:47,893
not just one support the other, not just one support one,

1944
01:38:47,893 --> 01:38:51,693
but they support each other in the naval campaign.

1945
01:38:51,693 --> 01:38:53,458
So I'm not sure if I got at what you're talking about

1946
01:38:53,458 --> 01:38:57,618
but your efforts to raise this have gone a long way

1947
01:38:57,618 --> 01:39:01,785
and I appreciate that but we've still got work to do.

1948
01:39:02,096 --> 01:39:04,468
And then once we figure out what the requirement is,

1949
01:39:04,468 --> 01:39:07,659
we gotta field it and then we gotta go out and train.

1950
01:39:07,659 --> 01:39:10,665
We gotta train, and I think we're getting after that too.

1951
01:39:10,665 --> 01:39:11,498
Thanks.
- Thanks Commandant.

1952
01:39:11,498 --> 01:39:12,331
- Alright.

1953
01:39:12,473 --> 01:39:13,306
- [Carol] Thank you very much.

1954
01:39:13,306 --> 01:39:14,842
(applauding)

1955
01:39:14,842 --> 01:39:16,237
- Alright, thanks Carol.

1956
01:39:16,237 --> 01:39:17,070
See you later.

1957
01:39:17,070 --> 01:39:17,903
- [Carol] Hope you come back next year.

1958
01:39:17,903 --> 01:39:18,736
- [Robert] Yes ma'am.

1959
01:39:18,736 --> 01:39:21,903
(audience applauding)

1960
01:39:24,931 --> 01:39:26,094
- Alright we're running a little over,

1961
01:39:26,094 --> 01:39:28,432
which as I said was great, standing room only crowd

1962
01:39:28,432 --> 01:39:30,306
for the Commandant, we're really glad that he was able

1963
01:39:30,306 --> 01:39:32,163
to come share time with us this morning.

1964
01:39:32,163 --> 01:39:33,480
So we'll take a 10 minute break,

1965
01:39:33,480 --> 01:39:36,658
be back at 20 after for our first NAVSEA panel of the day.

1966
01:39:36,658 --> 01:39:39,491
(crowd murmuring)

1967
01:39:44,811 --> 01:39:46,309
(upbeat rock music)