1 00:00:07,727 --> 00:00:09,645 - Well, good afternoon, everybody. 2 00:00:09,645 --> 00:00:11,327 It's a pleasure to join you once again. 3 00:00:11,327 --> 00:00:14,243 And I just want to be on the record as saying this, 4 00:00:14,243 --> 00:00:17,122 I always look forward to these briefings with you. 5 00:00:17,122 --> 00:00:20,308 So this morning, I joined General Lori Robinson 6 00:00:20,308 --> 00:00:22,323 to update the Senate Armed Services Committee 7 00:00:22,323 --> 00:00:25,093 on our respective efforts to defend the homeland. 8 00:00:25,093 --> 00:00:27,399 Since I last spoke to the committee, 9 00:00:27,399 --> 00:00:29,546 SOUTHCOM has had a very eventful year. 10 00:00:29,546 --> 00:00:31,554 We're working closely with our partners 11 00:00:31,554 --> 00:00:33,228 across the United States government 12 00:00:33,228 --> 00:00:35,894 and the region to address threat networks. 13 00:00:35,894 --> 00:00:38,018 These threat networks undermine 14 00:00:38,018 --> 00:00:40,126 regional stability and security. 15 00:00:40,126 --> 00:00:43,108 At SOUTHCOM, we've made countering those threat networks 16 00:00:43,108 --> 00:00:46,260 our number one focus area and we've redoubled 17 00:00:46,260 --> 00:00:50,002 our cooperation with interagency and international partners 18 00:00:50,002 --> 00:00:52,835 to detect criminals or extremists. 19 00:00:53,095 --> 00:00:55,905 We're examining new capabilities and technologies 20 00:00:55,905 --> 00:00:58,320 to help law enforcement target their predatory 21 00:00:58,320 --> 00:01:00,543 and menacing activities in the places 22 00:01:00,543 --> 00:01:03,731 and in the spaces where those networks are present. 23 00:01:03,731 --> 00:01:06,585 Our second focus area, rapidly responding 24 00:01:06,585 --> 00:01:09,029 to crises or to contingencies, 25 00:01:09,029 --> 00:01:11,525 was tested by Hurricane Matthew in October, 26 00:01:11,525 --> 00:01:14,661 and more recently by the floods in Peru. 27 00:01:14,661 --> 00:01:16,799 And I believe you're aware today was the first flights 28 00:01:16,799 --> 00:01:20,966 provided by a pair of our C-130s flying out of Peru 29 00:01:21,146 --> 00:01:24,448 to help provide humanitarian supplies from Lima 30 00:01:24,448 --> 00:01:27,044 up to the hardest-hit areas in northern Peru. 31 00:01:27,044 --> 00:01:30,877 Today is also the day that a Navy P-8 aircraft 32 00:01:31,521 --> 00:01:34,638 deployed from Jacksonville, Florida down to Uruguay 33 00:01:34,638 --> 00:01:37,245 to join an international effort in search of 34 00:01:37,245 --> 00:01:41,245 the Republic of Korea vessel, the Stellar Daisy. 35 00:01:41,332 --> 00:01:44,370 Our third focus area, to be partner of choice 36 00:01:44,370 --> 00:01:47,522 in this region, reflects the importance 37 00:01:47,522 --> 00:01:49,749 that we place on security cooperation. 38 00:01:49,749 --> 00:01:52,469 It reflects the importance that we place on building trust 39 00:01:52,469 --> 00:01:56,636 and on developing strong ties with equal and respected 40 00:01:56,790 --> 00:01:59,904 partners who share our desire for a safe hemisphere, 41 00:01:59,904 --> 00:02:01,539 and our commitment to working 42 00:02:01,539 --> 00:02:04,311 collaboratively towards a common goal. 43 00:02:04,311 --> 00:02:07,698 We look to the future, and as we look to the future, 44 00:02:07,698 --> 00:02:10,500 we will continue to explore new and creative ideas 45 00:02:10,500 --> 00:02:13,115 to deepen our dialogue with partners 46 00:02:13,115 --> 00:02:17,054 and to learn from their expertise, from their experiences, 47 00:02:17,054 --> 00:02:19,119 and to gain their perspectives. 48 00:02:19,119 --> 00:02:21,387 We want this future to reflect the strength 49 00:02:21,387 --> 00:02:24,882 of our relationships with defense and security partners 50 00:02:24,882 --> 00:02:27,973 because that's the best approach for our command, 51 00:02:27,973 --> 00:02:30,947 for our country and for this important region. 52 00:02:30,947 --> 00:02:32,692 So what I'd like to do now is 53 00:02:32,692 --> 00:02:34,850 yield the rest of the time available, 54 00:02:34,850 --> 00:02:36,900 and I look forward to addressing your questions. 55 00:02:36,900 --> 00:02:37,733 Dina? 56 00:02:38,190 --> 00:02:39,023 Lita? 57 00:02:39,023 --> 00:02:40,024 I'm sorry, Lita. 58 00:02:40,024 --> 00:02:41,692 - Admiral, first, thank you. 59 00:02:41,692 --> 00:02:44,759 And if you could pass along how much you enjoy these 60 00:02:44,759 --> 00:02:47,288 to your other compatriots, we'd appreciate that. 61 00:02:47,288 --> 00:02:48,774 (laughing) 62 00:02:48,774 --> 00:02:50,382 I wanted to just follow up on some of your comments 63 00:02:50,382 --> 00:02:52,950 that you made to the AP earlier, 64 00:02:52,950 --> 00:02:56,867 and that you talked about this morning on ISIS. 65 00:02:57,037 --> 00:02:59,829 You talked about the threat on Trinidad-Tobago. 66 00:02:59,829 --> 00:03:03,829 Have you seen any movement back into the region? 67 00:03:03,964 --> 00:03:05,281 You talked about movement out. 68 00:03:05,281 --> 00:03:07,205 Have you seen any movement back into the region? 69 00:03:07,205 --> 00:03:09,731 And can you just discuss efforts 70 00:03:09,731 --> 00:03:11,681 of collecting intel in that area, 71 00:03:11,681 --> 00:03:13,612 with your already constrained resources? 72 00:03:13,612 --> 00:03:15,862 How does that look for you? 73 00:03:16,851 --> 00:03:18,399 - So, I know you'll appreciate, 74 00:03:18,399 --> 00:03:21,708 we won't discuss the way that we gather information 75 00:03:21,708 --> 00:03:23,261 and certainly any of the operations 76 00:03:23,261 --> 00:03:25,329 that we engage in from the podium. 77 00:03:25,329 --> 00:03:28,965 We are watching closely, and that is one of the risks 78 00:03:28,965 --> 00:03:32,548 that we are all mindful of, particularly as 79 00:03:33,892 --> 00:03:36,426 the coalition forces are enjoying greater 80 00:03:36,426 --> 00:03:38,332 and greater success in Iraq and Afghanistan, 81 00:03:38,332 --> 00:03:41,987 is to look for that backflow of ISIS individuals 82 00:03:41,987 --> 00:03:44,670 back to their home nations all around the world. 83 00:03:44,670 --> 00:03:46,253 So we're watching for it closely. 84 00:03:46,253 --> 00:03:49,976 The greater danger, frankly, is self-radicalization 85 00:03:49,976 --> 00:03:52,567 from this message from ISIS that 86 00:03:52,567 --> 00:03:56,423 is being transmitted back to, across this region. 87 00:03:56,423 --> 00:03:58,291 And as you know, as we've all seen, 88 00:03:58,291 --> 00:04:01,958 from the attacks that occurred in Europe to, 89 00:04:02,808 --> 00:04:04,391 or the attacks that occurred here in the United States 90 00:04:04,391 --> 00:04:06,085 in San Bernardino and in Orlando, 91 00:04:06,085 --> 00:04:07,347 it's that self-radicalization 92 00:04:07,347 --> 00:04:09,705 that poses a very worrisome threat. 93 00:04:09,705 --> 00:04:12,130 My counterparts across the region, 94 00:04:12,130 --> 00:04:13,430 we've had these discussions at 95 00:04:13,430 --> 00:04:15,350 our various security conferences. 96 00:04:15,350 --> 00:04:17,881 And all recognize that radicalization 97 00:04:17,881 --> 00:04:22,048 is a phenomena that can occur in any of their countries. 98 00:04:22,302 --> 00:04:25,077 - Just as a follow up, have you seen this move 99 00:04:25,077 --> 00:04:28,206 to any other of the islands in the region? 100 00:04:28,206 --> 00:04:31,092 And which ones (speaking quickly)? 101 00:04:31,092 --> 00:04:32,925 - I would say, the answer is yes we have 102 00:04:32,925 --> 00:04:35,247 to a number of them, and I'd prefer not to discuss 103 00:04:35,247 --> 00:04:37,914 the specific ones in this forum. 104 00:04:39,681 --> 00:04:40,842 - If I could ask you about Venezuela 105 00:04:40,842 --> 00:04:42,572 and the political instability there. 106 00:04:42,572 --> 00:04:43,958 How concerned are you about that? 107 00:04:43,958 --> 00:04:46,707 And how is that affecting your AOR generally? 108 00:04:46,707 --> 00:04:48,715 - Well, the entire region obviously 109 00:04:48,715 --> 00:04:50,433 is watching very closely. 110 00:04:50,433 --> 00:04:52,216 You've seen from the recent activities 111 00:04:52,216 --> 00:04:53,815 by the Organization of American States, 112 00:04:53,815 --> 00:04:57,565 the degree of interest that's been expressed. 113 00:04:57,873 --> 00:05:01,954 The other, I think, challenge that we have obviously 114 00:05:01,954 --> 00:05:04,615 is we watch as the economic situation 115 00:05:04,615 --> 00:05:07,603 continues to grow worse and worse and worse. 116 00:05:07,603 --> 00:05:10,270 And so, it is, it's an item that 117 00:05:10,451 --> 00:05:12,631 I think worries the entire region. 118 00:05:12,631 --> 00:05:14,965 The other challenge that we have, obviously, 119 00:05:14,965 --> 00:05:17,651 and you all are very, very aware, any time I open my mouth 120 00:05:17,651 --> 00:05:20,068 and utter the word Venezuela, 121 00:05:21,130 --> 00:05:22,777 tomorrow morning there will be stories 122 00:05:22,777 --> 00:05:25,495 in the Caracas newspapers that will talk about how 123 00:05:25,495 --> 00:05:28,745 I'm planning the invasion of Venezuela. 124 00:05:29,402 --> 00:05:30,819 That is not true. 125 00:05:31,779 --> 00:05:34,805 - The level of concern that you have, you specifically? 126 00:05:34,805 --> 00:05:36,376 - Just that we watch it closely because it's, 127 00:05:36,376 --> 00:05:39,543 it is of concern to the entire region. 128 00:05:40,170 --> 00:05:42,337 - Can I follow up on that? 129 00:05:42,363 --> 00:05:43,764 You said this morning in your testimony 130 00:05:43,764 --> 00:05:46,918 that the deteriorating situation in Venezuela 131 00:05:46,918 --> 00:05:49,412 may necessitate a regional response. 132 00:05:49,412 --> 00:05:51,214 What do you mean by that? 133 00:05:51,214 --> 00:05:53,573 - That, I would leave that to, again, 134 00:05:53,573 --> 00:05:55,897 this is the activities that the OAS, the discussions, 135 00:05:55,897 --> 00:06:00,064 the diplomatic activities that they're engaged in. 136 00:06:02,385 --> 00:06:05,243 Diplomatic activities that the OAS are engaged in, yes sir. 137 00:06:05,243 --> 00:06:08,161 - Just a quick question on counter narcotics. 138 00:06:08,161 --> 00:06:10,368 A couple weeks ago it seems there was a large seizure 139 00:06:10,368 --> 00:06:13,285 of cocaine coming from some of the, 140 00:06:13,612 --> 00:06:15,090 some of the organizations in Colombia 141 00:06:15,090 --> 00:06:18,383 on route to Eastern Europe moving through 142 00:06:18,383 --> 00:06:21,573 trafficking lines through western and northern Africa. 143 00:06:21,573 --> 00:06:22,740 It seems that there has been an uptick 144 00:06:22,740 --> 00:06:26,104 in that sort of movement into European markets 145 00:06:26,104 --> 00:06:29,854 from organizations in Colombia and elsewhere. 146 00:06:30,263 --> 00:06:33,074 One Colombian official mentioned that there is 147 00:06:33,074 --> 00:06:36,824 cooperation between SOUTHCOM, his government, 148 00:06:37,179 --> 00:06:39,157 and other regional governments to sort of track 149 00:06:39,157 --> 00:06:43,324 what is moving from your AOR into Europe and vice versa. 150 00:06:44,522 --> 00:06:46,451 Can you comment on that at all as far as 151 00:06:46,451 --> 00:06:48,298 what sort of activities you've seen? 152 00:06:48,298 --> 00:06:49,936 - I know some of you have had the opportunity 153 00:06:49,936 --> 00:06:51,470 to go to Key West, Florida to visit 154 00:06:51,470 --> 00:06:53,718 our Joint Interagency Taskforce South 155 00:06:53,718 --> 00:06:56,464 and it's at that headquarters that 156 00:06:56,464 --> 00:07:00,047 frankly is made up of the full interagency. 157 00:07:00,083 --> 00:07:04,062 It's a joint taskforce that is under SOUTHCOM command 158 00:07:04,062 --> 00:07:08,088 but there's, it's a Coast Guard two star, a Navy one star, 159 00:07:08,088 --> 00:07:11,255 a senior FBI officer, a senior customs 160 00:07:12,189 --> 00:07:15,387 and border protection officer as the senior leadership. 161 00:07:15,387 --> 00:07:17,421 But literally all federal law enforcement agencies, 162 00:07:17,421 --> 00:07:21,588 intelligence community, diplomatic as well as multinational, 163 00:07:21,810 --> 00:07:24,348 we've got both military and law enforcement 164 00:07:24,348 --> 00:07:27,266 from not just Central America, South America, 165 00:07:27,266 --> 00:07:29,572 Latin America but we have partners now 166 00:07:29,572 --> 00:07:32,739 from Europe as well as from Australia. 167 00:07:34,918 --> 00:07:38,276 So we recognize these networks, these threat networks 168 00:07:38,276 --> 00:07:40,885 that I spoke about are global in nature. 169 00:07:40,885 --> 00:07:44,116 And they connect and so Joint Interagency Taskforce South 170 00:07:44,116 --> 00:07:45,876 has been working very closely with counterparts 171 00:07:45,876 --> 00:07:48,392 over in Europe and in Africa to try to build 172 00:07:48,392 --> 00:07:51,396 greater awareness and understanding of where 173 00:07:51,396 --> 00:07:54,116 those networks operate and then to share the information 174 00:07:54,116 --> 00:07:57,607 that we are able to develop with the appropriate agencies 175 00:07:57,607 --> 00:07:59,021 whether it's law enforcement agencies 176 00:07:59,021 --> 00:08:01,419 or governments that have the authority 177 00:08:01,419 --> 00:08:04,669 to be able to disrupt those activities. 178 00:08:04,957 --> 00:08:06,211 - Follow up outside of narcotics, though, 179 00:08:06,211 --> 00:08:08,236 is there any concern that men, material, 180 00:08:08,236 --> 00:08:11,287 messaging moving through Northern and Western Africa 181 00:08:11,287 --> 00:08:14,120 back into your AOR can play into this sort of 182 00:08:14,120 --> 00:08:17,572 self-radicalization threat that you've been talking about? 183 00:08:17,572 --> 00:08:20,777 - You know, one of the reasons why we have shifted 184 00:08:20,777 --> 00:08:24,610 our focus from just looking at one of a number 185 00:08:24,686 --> 00:08:27,167 of illicit commodities in the case of drugs 186 00:08:27,167 --> 00:08:30,022 to a counter-threat network approach, 187 00:08:30,022 --> 00:08:32,781 it lets us look more strategically at the networks at large. 188 00:08:32,781 --> 00:08:34,772 And it's in doing that that we've been able 189 00:08:34,772 --> 00:08:38,939 to recognize there are networks that are engaged in 190 00:08:39,581 --> 00:08:43,316 smuggling people that are moving from the Middle East 191 00:08:43,316 --> 00:08:45,529 and Africa into South America and up through 192 00:08:45,529 --> 00:08:47,476 Central America and heading towards our border. 193 00:08:47,476 --> 00:08:49,727 So understanding what those flows are, 194 00:08:49,727 --> 00:08:51,960 how those flows operate and again, 195 00:08:51,960 --> 00:08:53,753 sharing that information with partner nations 196 00:08:53,753 --> 00:08:57,553 so that they can take advantage of opportunities to, 197 00:08:57,553 --> 00:09:00,099 if nothing else, to be able to send them home. 198 00:09:00,099 --> 00:09:02,228 - And one last question on Peace Colombia, sorry. 199 00:09:02,228 --> 00:09:03,478 Really quickly. 200 00:09:03,903 --> 00:09:04,875 - [Admiral Tidd] It's your colleagues that are the ones 201 00:09:04,875 --> 00:09:06,942 that are going to be upset, not me. 202 00:09:06,942 --> 00:09:08,652 - Really quickly, it's, from my understanding, 203 00:09:08,652 --> 00:09:10,197 it's a three to five year program to build upon 204 00:09:10,197 --> 00:09:12,481 the peace deal that's being reached with the FARC. 205 00:09:12,481 --> 00:09:14,631 Where does that stand, what kind of efforts 206 00:09:14,631 --> 00:09:15,552 are your organization making 207 00:09:15,552 --> 00:09:17,183 towards kind of getting that off the ground? 208 00:09:17,183 --> 00:09:18,277 - Early days, obviously. 209 00:09:18,277 --> 00:09:20,959 I mean, you know, the critical element of signing 210 00:09:20,959 --> 00:09:23,403 the peace deal that the government, 211 00:09:23,403 --> 00:09:24,944 FARC secured is the first step. 212 00:09:24,944 --> 00:09:26,961 And so now it's the implementation 213 00:09:26,961 --> 00:09:28,501 of the peace deal that we're, 214 00:09:28,501 --> 00:09:30,610 there's going to be significant hard work ahead. 215 00:09:30,610 --> 00:09:33,491 We will continue to stand with our partners, 216 00:09:33,491 --> 00:09:36,370 the men and women who make up the Colombian armed forces 217 00:09:36,370 --> 00:09:39,716 and the national police who will be engaged in 218 00:09:39,716 --> 00:09:43,560 the difficult business of ensuring that that peace extends 219 00:09:43,560 --> 00:09:45,838 to all the people of Colombia as they, 220 00:09:45,838 --> 00:09:47,897 the government gets into parts of the country that 221 00:09:47,897 --> 00:09:51,954 they've not had a presence in for many, many years. 222 00:09:51,954 --> 00:09:54,260 - Admiral, you spoke to this somewhat this morning, 223 00:09:54,260 --> 00:09:56,177 the Coast Guard budget. 224 00:09:56,424 --> 00:10:00,424 Originally there was a proposal for a major cut. 225 00:10:00,644 --> 00:10:03,796 General Kelly said last week, perhaps earlier, 226 00:10:03,796 --> 00:10:06,796 that probably that would not happen. 227 00:10:06,996 --> 00:10:09,645 But there it is up in the air, Coast Guard budget. 228 00:10:09,645 --> 00:10:10,728 It's in flux. 229 00:10:10,939 --> 00:10:13,583 What are the implications for SOUTHCOM 230 00:10:13,583 --> 00:10:16,700 of a significant cut of Coast Guard budget 231 00:10:16,700 --> 00:10:20,117 and particularly in terms of your efforts 232 00:10:20,387 --> 00:10:22,804 at interdicting drug running? 233 00:10:23,747 --> 00:10:26,454 - So I'm not going to comment on any department 234 00:10:26,454 --> 00:10:28,885 or agency's budget at this point. 235 00:10:28,885 --> 00:10:31,175 But what I will say, and as I said this morning, 236 00:10:31,175 --> 00:10:35,117 the Coast Guard plays an absolutely critical role 237 00:10:35,117 --> 00:10:37,590 in US SOUTHCOM's ability to execute 238 00:10:37,590 --> 00:10:39,302 the missions that we've been assigned. 239 00:10:39,302 --> 00:10:42,302 So as I mentioned, because the Navy, 240 00:10:42,805 --> 00:10:46,972 the US Navy has been tasked to meet demand signals, 241 00:10:47,267 --> 00:10:49,535 higher priority demand signals in other parts of the world, 242 00:10:49,535 --> 00:10:53,000 the US Coast Guard is shouldering the burden there. 243 00:10:53,000 --> 00:10:55,982 And the Coast Guard has doubled the number 244 00:10:55,982 --> 00:10:59,962 of cutters that they provide to SOUTHCOM over the last year, 245 00:10:59,962 --> 00:11:02,387 for which we are enormously appreciative 246 00:11:02,387 --> 00:11:04,230 and I can't think the commandant enough 247 00:11:04,230 --> 00:11:06,980 for meeting that particular need. 248 00:11:07,749 --> 00:11:11,106 So we would be very, very challenged to be able to execute 249 00:11:11,106 --> 00:11:13,484 that piece of the mission without the Coast Guard. 250 00:11:13,484 --> 00:11:15,226 - How many cutters do you have now? 251 00:11:15,226 --> 00:11:18,558 - Right now, on average, going and coming 252 00:11:18,558 --> 00:11:21,005 probably six to seven large cutters, 253 00:11:21,005 --> 00:11:24,922 the medium endurance or high endurance cutters. 254 00:11:26,100 --> 00:11:27,100 In the back. 255 00:11:28,343 --> 00:11:29,512 - Gordon Lubold from the Wall Street Journal. 256 00:11:29,512 --> 00:11:31,319 I have a Gitmo question. 257 00:11:31,319 --> 00:11:35,486 As the steward of the infrastructure and the facility there, 258 00:11:36,135 --> 00:11:39,852 as I understand it, can you give us, kind of update us 259 00:11:39,852 --> 00:11:44,005 on your assessment of it, the physical infrastructure 260 00:11:44,005 --> 00:11:47,088 and if the president who has signaled 261 00:11:47,136 --> 00:11:48,611 that he would like to fill it up, 262 00:11:48,611 --> 00:11:51,611 if that kind of continues, like how, 263 00:11:54,468 --> 00:11:57,901 what position is the facility in, in terms of absorbing more 264 00:11:57,901 --> 00:11:59,764 and what improvements would then be made? 265 00:11:59,764 --> 00:12:03,764 - The detention facilities are state of the art, 266 00:12:04,327 --> 00:12:07,160 frankly and are in good condition. 267 00:12:08,703 --> 00:12:12,620 What became clear was, and it was obvious to me 268 00:12:12,828 --> 00:12:15,059 when I went through there right after Hurricane Matthew 269 00:12:15,059 --> 00:12:19,142 brushed by eastern Cuba, that the accommodations, 270 00:12:20,636 --> 00:12:22,671 the temporary accommodations for this temporary mission 271 00:12:22,671 --> 00:12:24,411 where the men and women who are charged 272 00:12:24,411 --> 00:12:27,161 with guarding the detainees were, 273 00:12:28,730 --> 00:12:30,697 the deteriorated shape that they were in 274 00:12:30,697 --> 00:12:32,441 and just recognizing that they were not designed 275 00:12:32,441 --> 00:12:36,608 to withstand hurricane force winds and frankly are long past 276 00:12:39,975 --> 00:12:42,577 the date that we expected that we would be using them. 277 00:12:42,577 --> 00:12:46,052 And so we have, the time has come for us now I think 278 00:12:46,052 --> 00:12:49,345 to provide barracks, adequate barracks facilities 279 00:12:49,345 --> 00:12:51,772 for the men and women who are charged with that mission. 280 00:12:51,772 --> 00:12:53,739 And so that's what we're focusing on right now, 281 00:12:53,739 --> 00:12:57,156 is given that this mission is continuing, 282 00:13:01,680 --> 00:13:03,419 we think it's time that we make the investments 283 00:13:03,419 --> 00:13:06,502 that frankly we've, for 15 years now, 284 00:13:06,548 --> 00:13:09,272 we basically have avoided making. 285 00:13:09,272 --> 00:13:10,615 - Can you characterize roughly 286 00:13:10,615 --> 00:13:12,459 what kind of a financial (mumbling)? 287 00:13:12,459 --> 00:13:16,244 - Not right now because it's in a budget that is, 288 00:13:16,244 --> 00:13:18,669 that has not yet been submitted. 289 00:13:18,669 --> 00:13:21,050 Right now we've, there's a small amount of money 290 00:13:21,050 --> 00:13:24,898 in the FY '17 supplemental request for the planning 291 00:13:24,898 --> 00:13:26,944 and so as we get that planning figure, 292 00:13:26,944 --> 00:13:28,405 we'll have a better sense but basically 293 00:13:28,405 --> 00:13:30,663 it's to provide adequate barracks 294 00:13:30,663 --> 00:13:33,320 and some of the other support infrastructure for 295 00:13:33,320 --> 00:13:36,056 the joint task force that's engaged in the mission. 296 00:13:36,056 --> 00:13:37,051 - One final thing. 297 00:13:37,051 --> 00:13:38,461 Would you need more personnel do you think? 298 00:13:38,461 --> 00:13:41,294 Or do you see more personnel need? 299 00:13:42,303 --> 00:13:43,941 - That's kind of a, it's a little bit speculative 300 00:13:43,941 --> 00:13:47,137 at this point because right now, we have the people 301 00:13:47,137 --> 00:13:48,669 that we need for the size of the population 302 00:13:48,669 --> 00:13:52,419 that we're charged with I guess guarding, so. 303 00:13:55,367 --> 00:13:56,607 - Caroline Houck, Defense One. 304 00:13:56,607 --> 00:14:00,312 I would ask about the executive order with one of them 305 00:14:00,312 --> 00:14:02,691 that the president signed back in February, 306 00:14:02,691 --> 00:14:04,688 creating a working ground to study 307 00:14:04,688 --> 00:14:07,084 the threat from transnational organizations. 308 00:14:07,084 --> 00:14:09,853 I know their report isn't due out, say, 309 00:14:09,853 --> 00:14:11,579 for another month or so, or a little more. 310 00:14:11,579 --> 00:14:14,278 But do you have a sense of the progress? 311 00:14:14,278 --> 00:14:15,680 Have you interacted at all with them? 312 00:14:15,680 --> 00:14:17,909 - No, and that, the work on that, 313 00:14:17,909 --> 00:14:20,481 I'm familiar that there is a study going on. 314 00:14:20,481 --> 00:14:21,838 We're not part of that study. 315 00:14:21,838 --> 00:14:25,088 We're kind of at the operational level. 316 00:14:25,365 --> 00:14:28,152 So, we look forward to reading what comes out of this study. 317 00:14:28,152 --> 00:14:30,599 - Are there anything specific that you would like to, 318 00:14:30,599 --> 00:14:34,182 that you would like to have come out of it? 319 00:14:34,730 --> 00:14:37,753 - I think that I'll just let the people engaged in the study 320 00:14:37,753 --> 00:14:41,503 have a free feel to be able to work that one. 321 00:14:42,001 --> 00:14:43,001 But, thanks. 322 00:14:44,481 --> 00:14:45,367 - [Carla] Carla Babb, VOA. 323 00:14:45,367 --> 00:14:46,718 Good to see you, again. 324 00:14:46,718 --> 00:14:47,758 Going back to Lita's-- 325 00:14:47,758 --> 00:14:50,025 - Okay, I just have to acknowledge 326 00:14:50,025 --> 00:14:52,236 Tar Heel and excellent job. 327 00:14:52,236 --> 00:14:53,474 So, we got that behind us. 328 00:14:53,474 --> 00:14:56,155 We don't have to say anything more about the Final Four. 329 00:14:56,155 --> 00:14:56,988 Right, we're good? 330 00:14:56,988 --> 00:14:57,838 - Oh, never. - Okay-- 331 00:14:57,838 --> 00:14:58,671 (speaking quickly) 332 00:14:58,671 --> 00:14:59,504 Alright, thanks. 333 00:14:59,504 --> 00:15:01,408 - But going back to Lita's question 334 00:15:01,408 --> 00:15:03,867 on extremist groups in the area, 335 00:15:03,867 --> 00:15:06,728 can you give us a little more understanding 336 00:15:06,728 --> 00:15:08,186 into the size of this threat? 337 00:15:08,186 --> 00:15:10,744 You said a number of countries in the region. 338 00:15:10,744 --> 00:15:12,786 Can you get more specific on the number of countries 339 00:15:12,786 --> 00:15:15,225 we're looking at and the size of some of these cells? 340 00:15:15,225 --> 00:15:16,648 - Yeah, I would prefer not. 341 00:15:16,648 --> 00:15:18,859 At this point, right now, that's one of the things 342 00:15:18,859 --> 00:15:21,290 that we're trying to do is gain better insight 343 00:15:21,290 --> 00:15:23,917 and understanding in terms of the size. 344 00:15:23,917 --> 00:15:25,730 So, right now, I think what's important 345 00:15:25,730 --> 00:15:29,007 is to recognize they're there, whereas in the past, 346 00:15:29,007 --> 00:15:31,424 I think there was a, we just, 347 00:15:33,145 --> 00:15:34,891 we were not aware that they were there. 348 00:15:34,891 --> 00:15:37,661 But as we look, as we determine, as we talk to our partners, 349 00:15:37,661 --> 00:15:39,894 we begin to gain a greater understanding. 350 00:15:39,894 --> 00:15:42,487 So, the important work is we're at the front end 351 00:15:42,487 --> 00:15:44,561 of that important work of trying to understand. 352 00:15:44,561 --> 00:15:48,681 And of course in terms of size, it does not compare at all 353 00:15:48,681 --> 00:15:52,724 with the size of cells in other parts of the world 354 00:15:52,724 --> 00:15:55,614 that we have much greater understanding of. 355 00:15:55,614 --> 00:15:57,498 But we've been watching those and looking at those 356 00:15:57,498 --> 00:15:58,705 for a much longer period of time. 357 00:15:58,705 --> 00:16:00,220 That's what we're asking to do, 358 00:16:00,220 --> 00:16:01,734 is what we want to be able to is have 359 00:16:01,734 --> 00:16:04,791 greater understanding and to work this problem. 360 00:16:04,791 --> 00:16:07,993 So, you know, I think we'll, we will get to the point 361 00:16:07,993 --> 00:16:09,382 where we got that understanding 362 00:16:09,382 --> 00:16:12,034 and be able to share with our leadership. 363 00:16:12,034 --> 00:16:13,464 - Can you give us a little ballpark? 364 00:16:13,464 --> 00:16:15,097 Or are you looking at five countries? 365 00:16:15,097 --> 00:16:18,013 Are you looking at a dozen countries? 366 00:16:18,013 --> 00:16:20,319 - (laughing) Let me just say right now there are 367 00:16:20,319 --> 00:16:22,088 a number of countries that we're looking at. 368 00:16:22,088 --> 00:16:24,921 It's, part of this is a matter of, 369 00:16:26,134 --> 00:16:29,124 as you begin to look, it just takes time 370 00:16:29,124 --> 00:16:31,192 to develop this understanding. 371 00:16:31,192 --> 00:16:32,359 So, over here? 372 00:16:32,379 --> 00:16:33,873 - (speaking quickly), sir. 373 00:16:33,873 --> 00:16:34,874 Thank you for doing this. 374 00:16:34,874 --> 00:16:36,352 Can you talk about any trends that 375 00:16:36,352 --> 00:16:37,725 you've been seeing with this problem? 376 00:16:37,725 --> 00:16:39,540 I mean, it's something that you identified last summer. 377 00:16:39,540 --> 00:16:41,667 Your predecessor talked about it as well. 378 00:16:41,667 --> 00:16:45,214 Are you seeing it increase, decrease, that kind of thing? 379 00:16:45,214 --> 00:16:48,308 And also, you talked about how it's self-radicalization 380 00:16:48,308 --> 00:16:50,252 and people perhaps returning home, 381 00:16:50,252 --> 00:16:52,679 having tried to get into the war zone. 382 00:16:52,679 --> 00:16:56,846 Do you see any indication that ISIS headquarters is actually 383 00:16:57,089 --> 00:17:01,256 deploying people either from there originally or not? 384 00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:05,337 - Well, you've read the articles in Dabiq 385 00:17:06,407 --> 00:17:08,271 that basically directs people now, 386 00:17:08,271 --> 00:17:12,438 stop trying to come to the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, 387 00:17:13,872 --> 00:17:16,254 stay home and conduct attacks there. 388 00:17:16,254 --> 00:17:19,921 So, I would call that operational direction 389 00:17:20,392 --> 00:17:23,725 to individuals who might be radicalized. 390 00:17:24,062 --> 00:17:26,089 In terms of trends, you know, two years ago, 391 00:17:26,089 --> 00:17:28,470 what we were looking at were people who were trying 392 00:17:28,470 --> 00:17:32,637 to leave and actually go and engage in the ongoing fight. 393 00:17:32,833 --> 00:17:37,000 That flow globally, that flow I think you've heard 394 00:17:37,972 --> 00:17:39,107 some other leaders have talked 395 00:17:39,107 --> 00:17:40,938 about has declined dramatically. 396 00:17:40,938 --> 00:17:43,569 And so, now, it's the what's next 397 00:17:43,569 --> 00:17:46,178 and the being prepared for what's next, 398 00:17:46,178 --> 00:17:47,811 and trying to look beyond. 399 00:17:47,811 --> 00:17:51,452 And so, it's the understanding of there may be some 400 00:17:51,452 --> 00:17:54,905 who try to go, didn't make it far, came back home again. 401 00:17:54,905 --> 00:17:58,319 They've obviously expressed a clear intent. 402 00:17:58,319 --> 00:18:00,393 And so, they are troubling. 403 00:18:00,393 --> 00:18:03,492 And so, part of it, the challenge is to work with 404 00:18:03,492 --> 00:18:07,659 our partners and to help them develop their capability 405 00:18:07,700 --> 00:18:11,033 to be able to identify those individuals 406 00:18:11,641 --> 00:18:13,442 and then to be able to keep track of them 407 00:18:13,442 --> 00:18:15,675 because it's a very difficult challenge. 408 00:18:15,675 --> 00:18:16,677 - And then separately, sir, 409 00:18:16,677 --> 00:18:19,217 I've heard quite a bit of concern about a sense 410 00:18:19,217 --> 00:18:22,496 under this new administration of emphasizing 411 00:18:22,496 --> 00:18:26,183 limited resources both financially and practically, 412 00:18:26,183 --> 00:18:30,017 more on, sort of, building walls metaphorically 413 00:18:30,017 --> 00:18:33,521 and actually, and less on actually going forward 414 00:18:33,521 --> 00:18:35,112 in addressing these threats before 415 00:18:35,112 --> 00:18:37,161 they get to the US border. 416 00:18:37,161 --> 00:18:40,515 I wonder if that's a trend that you've observed as well, 417 00:18:40,515 --> 00:18:43,180 in the few beats under this new administration? 418 00:18:43,180 --> 00:18:46,073 And could you talk about the importance of that difference? 419 00:18:46,073 --> 00:18:47,366 - Yeah, I think I would kind of 420 00:18:47,366 --> 00:18:48,965 challenge the premise a little bit. 421 00:18:48,965 --> 00:18:52,103 The role of all of the geographic combat and commanders 422 00:18:52,103 --> 00:18:55,103 is to work within the areas that we're responsible for 423 00:18:55,103 --> 00:18:58,686 to extend the defense of the United States. 424 00:19:01,621 --> 00:19:03,622 I mean, the goal has always been, 425 00:19:03,622 --> 00:19:05,865 you know, we never want to fight a home game. 426 00:19:05,865 --> 00:19:08,694 We're always interested in is trying to deal with 427 00:19:08,694 --> 00:19:11,300 security challenges as far away from home as possible. 428 00:19:11,300 --> 00:19:12,770 And so, that really is the role 429 00:19:12,770 --> 00:19:15,169 of the geographic combat and commanders is 430 00:19:15,169 --> 00:19:18,752 to provide the means to be able to do that. 431 00:19:19,187 --> 00:19:21,455 One down here, and then I'll-- 432 00:19:21,455 --> 00:19:24,562 - Can you speak to the challenges and your AO 433 00:19:24,562 --> 00:19:28,729 of continuing to operate under a continuing resolution? 434 00:19:29,018 --> 00:19:32,828 Any specifics on what, you know, what SOUTHCOM looks like, 435 00:19:32,828 --> 00:19:35,661 what the intended funding of the-- 436 00:19:35,910 --> 00:19:37,723 - Let me describe it this way. 437 00:19:37,723 --> 00:19:41,034 You know, in the prioritization for resources, 438 00:19:41,034 --> 00:19:45,034 SOUTHCOM has always been at the end of the line. 439 00:19:46,217 --> 00:19:48,428 Because of the nature of the threats 440 00:19:48,428 --> 00:19:50,221 in other parts of the world, we understand that. 441 00:19:50,221 --> 00:19:52,537 And so, our challenge is to do the very best 442 00:19:52,537 --> 00:19:56,014 we can with the resources that are available. 443 00:19:56,014 --> 00:19:58,037 A continuing resolution, you know, 444 00:19:58,037 --> 00:19:59,877 you heard the service chiefs all talk yesterday 445 00:19:59,877 --> 00:20:01,706 at great lengths about the impact 446 00:20:01,706 --> 00:20:03,509 that it would have on them. 447 00:20:03,509 --> 00:20:06,441 We depend on the services to provide forces. 448 00:20:06,441 --> 00:20:10,255 We have no assigned forces in in US Southern Command. 449 00:20:10,255 --> 00:20:13,352 And so, anything that makes it more difficult 450 00:20:13,352 --> 00:20:16,435 for them to allocate forces anywhere, 451 00:20:16,547 --> 00:20:18,788 but especially to US SOUTHCOM, 452 00:20:18,788 --> 00:20:21,096 is going to have a negative impact on us. 453 00:20:21,096 --> 00:20:24,763 So, that's why the ability to have a budget, 454 00:20:25,479 --> 00:20:27,642 to provide the predictability for the services 455 00:20:27,642 --> 00:20:30,552 so that they can begin to plan to meet some of 456 00:20:30,552 --> 00:20:32,155 the unmet demands of the various 457 00:20:32,155 --> 00:20:34,784 combat and commands is critically important. 458 00:20:34,784 --> 00:20:37,282 - Do you have any thoughts on like, I don't know, 459 00:20:37,282 --> 00:20:39,911 without that, what are the first missions, 460 00:20:39,911 --> 00:20:41,989 you know, to really be degraded-- 461 00:20:41,989 --> 00:20:45,412 - A million, but I probably won't discuss 'em here. 462 00:20:45,412 --> 00:20:46,579 So, thank you. 463 00:20:48,225 --> 00:20:50,843 - Just going back to some of the influence 464 00:20:50,843 --> 00:20:52,592 that you're seeing from the extremist groups, 465 00:20:52,592 --> 00:20:55,594 your area, your predecessors have testified 466 00:20:55,594 --> 00:20:58,641 before Congress before that there has been a presence 467 00:20:58,641 --> 00:21:00,899 of groups like Hamas, Hezbollah 468 00:21:00,899 --> 00:21:03,221 in Central and South America. 469 00:21:03,221 --> 00:21:05,414 But mostly for fundraising purposes. 470 00:21:05,414 --> 00:21:07,406 Now, the groups that you're talking about, 471 00:21:07,406 --> 00:21:08,840 the presence you're talking about now, 472 00:21:08,840 --> 00:21:10,340 does that fall along the same line? 473 00:21:10,340 --> 00:21:12,393 Or are we looking at something different where it's more of 474 00:21:12,393 --> 00:21:13,636 an operational-type tactics, 475 00:21:13,636 --> 00:21:15,930 cells that you're tracking or looking at? 476 00:21:15,930 --> 00:21:18,836 - Sure, I think when my predecessors talked about 477 00:21:18,836 --> 00:21:21,600 the Hezbollah being very, very active, as you well know, 478 00:21:21,600 --> 00:21:23,778 they've been here for decades in this theater. 479 00:21:23,778 --> 00:21:27,021 They have in fact been, were responsible for the two attacks 480 00:21:27,021 --> 00:21:31,188 that occurred in Argentina a couple of decades ago. 481 00:21:31,655 --> 00:21:34,944 What I'm talking about now are ISIS or ISIS-inspired, 482 00:21:34,944 --> 00:21:39,111 ISIS-affiliated but extremist Islamist individuals 483 00:21:40,860 --> 00:21:43,610 that follow that, the Sunni path. 484 00:21:45,322 --> 00:21:49,250 So, that's the group that I'm talking about that's new. 485 00:21:49,250 --> 00:21:51,850 And what's worrisome is that the direction 486 00:21:51,850 --> 00:21:54,540 to them is for them to conduct attacks. 487 00:21:54,540 --> 00:21:57,707 They've not yet and so it's obviously, 488 00:21:58,317 --> 00:22:01,734 all of our responsibilities working again 489 00:22:02,027 --> 00:22:05,944 in very close cooperation with our US partners, 490 00:22:06,182 --> 00:22:08,181 but more importantly with our international partners 491 00:22:08,181 --> 00:22:11,420 in the region, to share that information that we have 492 00:22:11,420 --> 00:22:14,727 so that they can take the opportunity to take action 493 00:22:14,727 --> 00:22:17,382 before they're able to conduct an attack. 494 00:22:17,382 --> 00:22:18,478 - (mumbling) fundraisers there. 495 00:22:18,478 --> 00:22:20,514 They're actually looking for money. 496 00:22:20,514 --> 00:22:24,075 - We know that there was some fundraisers that supported 497 00:22:24,075 --> 00:22:26,347 some of the foreign fighters that traveled over. 498 00:22:26,347 --> 00:22:28,949 Some of that has happened, but what's of concern now 499 00:22:28,949 --> 00:22:32,259 are individuals who may in fact be radicalized 500 00:22:32,259 --> 00:22:33,904 to the point of conducting attacks. 501 00:22:33,904 --> 00:22:35,404 That's the danger. 502 00:22:36,535 --> 00:22:38,651 - Just to follow up on that, and how, 503 00:22:38,651 --> 00:22:41,026 is there, as far as you're able to tell, 504 00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:44,432 constant communication with them and Raqqah? 505 00:22:44,432 --> 00:22:47,113 Or did they sort of, was it fire-and-forget? 506 00:22:47,113 --> 00:22:49,324 And what is the sophistication level 507 00:22:49,324 --> 00:22:51,305 of the cells and their technical expertise? 508 00:22:51,305 --> 00:22:54,354 Are you looking at simple chemical weapons attacks 509 00:22:54,354 --> 00:22:56,995 from them or are they bomb-makers? 510 00:22:56,995 --> 00:23:00,000 - And again, you know, you're asking me to get into 511 00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:04,167 some of the details that I think is premature to discuss. 512 00:23:04,658 --> 00:23:07,628 At this point, I think it's, we're looking at 513 00:23:07,628 --> 00:23:10,711 aspirational efforts and no specifics 514 00:23:12,011 --> 00:23:15,594 on any of the means that would be employed. 515 00:23:15,944 --> 00:23:18,095 Right now, we're trying, what we're trying to do 516 00:23:18,095 --> 00:23:20,154 is identify the individuals themselves so that 517 00:23:20,154 --> 00:23:23,296 the countries can begin to try to pay attention 518 00:23:23,296 --> 00:23:25,481 to them and see what else they might be up to. 519 00:23:25,481 --> 00:23:26,314 Okay? 520 00:23:28,017 --> 00:23:28,850 - Okay. 521 00:23:28,850 --> 00:23:30,323 Thanks for taking my question. 522 00:23:30,323 --> 00:23:32,265 I'm Kanwal Adibi from Metro One News. 523 00:23:32,265 --> 00:23:35,348 My first question is on January 27th, 524 00:23:35,362 --> 00:23:37,757 President Trump signed an executive order 525 00:23:37,757 --> 00:23:39,556 on military readiness to include 526 00:23:39,556 --> 00:23:41,222 new ships, planes and weapons. 527 00:23:41,222 --> 00:23:43,296 So what are your plans for your region? 528 00:23:43,296 --> 00:23:45,852 Secondly, has secretary of defense carried out 529 00:23:45,852 --> 00:23:49,793 the 30-day review on military readiness and one on ISIS. 530 00:23:49,793 --> 00:23:51,663 A lot of females are joining ISIS, 531 00:23:51,663 --> 00:23:53,756 and they call themselves jihadi brides, 532 00:23:53,756 --> 00:23:56,794 and they are being recruited like through internet. 533 00:23:56,794 --> 00:23:59,378 So what are your counter-strategies on it? 534 00:23:59,378 --> 00:24:00,211 And-- 535 00:24:00,211 --> 00:24:02,341 - Can I answer a couple of those first, 536 00:24:02,341 --> 00:24:04,194 because my memory is not that good so, 537 00:24:04,194 --> 00:24:07,194 obviously, the services are the ones 538 00:24:08,651 --> 00:24:12,234 who are charged with developing the forces. 539 00:24:13,785 --> 00:24:16,085 We put in a request for forces. 540 00:24:16,085 --> 00:24:19,835 And the way the process then works is there's 541 00:24:20,818 --> 00:24:23,249 an allocation of forces and we get 542 00:24:23,249 --> 00:24:25,498 some portion of what we have asked for. 543 00:24:25,498 --> 00:24:29,248 And so we will be in the receive mode for any 544 00:24:32,307 --> 00:24:36,157 additional forces that the services are able to generate. 545 00:24:36,157 --> 00:24:39,309 And with regard to readiness, we too, obviously, 546 00:24:39,309 --> 00:24:43,476 are interested in what will come out of that report 547 00:24:43,664 --> 00:24:47,171 because readiness is a key to being able to provide forces 548 00:24:47,171 --> 00:24:49,964 to meet the request from the component 549 00:24:49,964 --> 00:24:52,447 or from the combatant commands. 550 00:24:52,447 --> 00:24:55,530 Now, with regard to female jihadists, 551 00:24:59,624 --> 00:25:03,791 we know in the case of, and has already been reported, 552 00:25:04,266 --> 00:25:07,936 of some of the individuals who left Trinidad-Tobago, 553 00:25:07,936 --> 00:25:09,608 they left as whole families. 554 00:25:09,608 --> 00:25:13,026 And so, and we know that some of the children 555 00:25:13,026 --> 00:25:16,592 of those families have been on film engaged in 556 00:25:16,592 --> 00:25:19,592 terrorist acts and have some pretty, 557 00:25:19,831 --> 00:25:23,748 as the individuals committing murders in Syria. 558 00:25:26,100 --> 00:25:29,335 So we know that that radicalization is taking place. 559 00:25:29,335 --> 00:25:32,769 Now, the scope if it beyond that remains to be seen. 560 00:25:32,769 --> 00:25:34,896 But I think, again, we all have to be very mindful 561 00:25:34,896 --> 00:25:39,063 as we watch the various other self-radicalized events 562 00:25:39,144 --> 00:25:41,532 that have occurred in other countries around the world, 563 00:25:41,532 --> 00:25:44,953 including our own, that this is not a phenomenon 564 00:25:44,953 --> 00:25:46,917 that is exclusive to one gender. 565 00:25:46,917 --> 00:25:51,084 It is, it has a way of being found in men and women. 566 00:25:55,816 --> 00:25:57,206 - [Kanwal] Okay, thank you. 567 00:25:57,206 --> 00:25:59,110 - One more question, and then-- 568 00:25:59,110 --> 00:26:00,298 - Okay. - I think I'm not supposed 569 00:26:00,298 --> 00:26:01,281 to do five parts. 570 00:26:01,281 --> 00:26:03,357 That was the one rule that I remember from my training. 571 00:26:03,357 --> 00:26:04,190 But-- 572 00:26:04,291 --> 00:26:07,352 - The current figure of US troops in Afghanistan, 573 00:26:07,352 --> 00:26:10,427 and a quick question, son-in-law Jared Kushner 574 00:26:10,427 --> 00:26:12,594 just recently went to Iraq. 575 00:26:12,594 --> 00:26:14,242 So is there any readout of them 576 00:26:14,242 --> 00:26:16,889 of his meeting with US ambassador there? 577 00:26:16,889 --> 00:26:18,235 - You know, I apologize. 578 00:26:18,235 --> 00:26:20,055 My responsibilities are for Latin America. 579 00:26:20,055 --> 00:26:22,322 So Central America, South America and the Caribbean, 580 00:26:22,322 --> 00:26:24,321 so I'd have to have you talk to 581 00:26:24,321 --> 00:26:26,988 some other folks about that one. 582 00:26:27,474 --> 00:26:29,505 And then I'll come back to you. 583 00:26:29,505 --> 00:26:30,985 - A year ago, the Air Force started coordinating 584 00:26:30,985 --> 00:26:32,839 with Southern Command on their training flights 585 00:26:32,839 --> 00:26:36,528 from B-1s, B-52s, to other flights in the Gulf, 586 00:26:36,528 --> 00:26:39,563 to coordinate with in interdiction of drug trafficking. 587 00:26:39,563 --> 00:26:41,024 How often has that been happening? 588 00:26:41,024 --> 00:26:43,336 Has that shown to be very effective? 589 00:26:43,336 --> 00:26:45,672 - Periodically, and we work with the Air Force 590 00:26:45,672 --> 00:26:48,422 to try to put together a package. 591 00:26:49,689 --> 00:26:51,974 And actually, it's our 12th Air Force, 592 00:26:51,974 --> 00:26:55,213 our Air Component Command out in Tucson that is, 593 00:26:55,213 --> 00:26:58,431 has been very, very successful in working with 594 00:26:58,431 --> 00:27:00,382 the larger Air Force to coordinate packages 595 00:27:00,382 --> 00:27:03,632 of reconnaissance aircraft and aircraft 596 00:27:04,135 --> 00:27:07,468 that are capable of doing the, you know, 597 00:27:07,990 --> 00:27:12,157 we talk about the detect, illuminate and disrupt piece. 598 00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:14,978 So a package of different types of aircraft 599 00:27:14,978 --> 00:27:17,615 that may be available, generate them in a coordinated 600 00:27:17,615 --> 00:27:20,803 sortie over a period of a number of days. 601 00:27:20,803 --> 00:27:23,246 And so, we've been able to do that a couple of times now. 602 00:27:23,246 --> 00:27:25,625 We're always, we're looking for ways that we might be able 603 00:27:25,625 --> 00:27:29,708 to continue those sorts of training opportunities 604 00:27:29,948 --> 00:27:33,531 because the Air Force gets training benefit 605 00:27:34,021 --> 00:27:37,115 in conducting those types of activities. 606 00:27:37,115 --> 00:27:38,736 The coordination that's required 607 00:27:38,736 --> 00:27:40,610 is beneficial for the training. 608 00:27:40,610 --> 00:27:43,200 The ability to identify very difficult 609 00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:45,617 to detect targets out at sea, 610 00:27:45,641 --> 00:27:48,808 and then be able to conduct intercepts 611 00:27:48,815 --> 00:27:51,953 on those vessels is all very, very helpful. 612 00:27:51,953 --> 00:27:55,008 The biggest challenge that we have, and you're right, 613 00:27:55,008 --> 00:27:58,135 occasionally, a low-pass from a B-1 bomber can have 614 00:27:58,135 --> 00:28:02,302 a clarifying effect in the mind of a potential smuggler. 615 00:28:02,725 --> 00:28:06,892 But for the most part, the finished piece needs to be 616 00:28:08,115 --> 00:28:10,985 an interception platform that can put a boarding team 617 00:28:10,985 --> 00:28:13,253 on board of individuals with law enforcement credentials, 618 00:28:13,253 --> 00:28:17,420 that can conduct an arrest so that we are able to take 619 00:28:19,871 --> 00:28:23,504 those individuals and take them into our court system 620 00:28:23,504 --> 00:28:25,610 and be able to gain information from them 621 00:28:25,610 --> 00:28:27,789 that helps us further clarify 622 00:28:27,789 --> 00:28:30,848 and understand what the network is up to. 623 00:28:30,848 --> 00:28:35,015 So, it's important pieces, but it's not the entire chain 624 00:28:36,067 --> 00:28:37,727 that we require in order to be able 625 00:28:37,727 --> 00:28:41,394 to get from detect to illuminate to disrupt. 626 00:28:42,764 --> 00:28:45,844 - Yes, Admiral, what are the, what would be the effects 627 00:28:45,844 --> 00:28:50,011 for SOUTHCOM of the border wall if and when it happens, 628 00:28:52,123 --> 00:28:54,534 if it ever gets funded, wall, 629 00:28:54,534 --> 00:28:57,021 system of sensors, whatever it's going to be? 630 00:28:57,021 --> 00:28:59,586 What does this, what are the pluses 631 00:28:59,586 --> 00:29:02,344 and minuses for SOUTHCOM as you see it? 632 00:29:02,344 --> 00:29:04,942 Do you coordinate with General Robinson 633 00:29:04,942 --> 00:29:07,214 on how you're going to be deal with this thing? 634 00:29:07,214 --> 00:29:10,012 - So, you know, I should let her talk to, you know, 635 00:29:10,012 --> 00:29:12,730 the actual physics of the land border because 636 00:29:12,730 --> 00:29:15,563 that's her area of responsibility. 637 00:29:15,967 --> 00:29:18,345 The piece that we focus on, obviously, and we try to, 638 00:29:18,345 --> 00:29:21,168 you know, remind folks there is a maritime border 639 00:29:21,168 --> 00:29:23,258 as well through the Caribbean. 640 00:29:23,258 --> 00:29:27,125 And so we need to make sure that we have the means in place 641 00:29:27,125 --> 00:29:29,624 to be able to detect movement of, you know, 642 00:29:29,624 --> 00:29:31,942 in the vicinity of all of these borders 643 00:29:31,942 --> 00:29:35,657 and to be able to apply technology and the means to be able 644 00:29:35,657 --> 00:29:38,819 to deter individuals from coming to the United States. 645 00:29:38,819 --> 00:29:41,125 I mean, those of you will recall 646 00:29:41,125 --> 00:29:45,292 that for the movement of drugs, initially the main path 647 00:29:45,500 --> 00:29:47,338 for the movement of drugs was through the Caribbean, 648 00:29:47,338 --> 00:29:51,505 up the Caribbean Island chain and into Southern Florida. 649 00:29:52,499 --> 00:29:56,295 Enormous effort was put in place to choke that down 650 00:29:56,295 --> 00:29:58,567 and that squeezed it over into Central America 651 00:29:58,567 --> 00:30:00,971 and moving up through the Isthmus. 652 00:30:00,971 --> 00:30:04,430 Efforts have been put in place in the Caribbean 653 00:30:04,430 --> 00:30:08,597 and now the majority of the cocaine movement coming out of 654 00:30:11,038 --> 00:30:14,449 South America goes well out to see in the Eastern Pacific 655 00:30:14,449 --> 00:30:18,616 and then comes north and makes landfall in Mexico, 656 00:30:18,983 --> 00:30:23,150 Guatemala and sometimes further to east, in that vicinity. 657 00:30:23,486 --> 00:30:26,170 So this is one of those, when we talk about 658 00:30:26,170 --> 00:30:29,477 taking a network approach, we've got to have the means 659 00:30:29,477 --> 00:30:31,640 to be able to apply pressure across the length 660 00:30:31,640 --> 00:30:33,889 and the breadth of these networks. 661 00:30:33,889 --> 00:30:37,128 Otherwise, you squeeze in one place and that balloon effect, 662 00:30:37,128 --> 00:30:39,052 it just pops out in a different area. 663 00:30:39,052 --> 00:30:41,519 So it'll take a holistic approach, 664 00:30:41,519 --> 00:30:44,419 it will take the efforts of Department of Homeland Security, 665 00:30:44,419 --> 00:30:46,119 obviously US Northern Command, 666 00:30:46,119 --> 00:30:48,033 but also our partners in US Pacific Command, 667 00:30:48,033 --> 00:30:50,337 because that's part of the area that 668 00:30:50,337 --> 00:30:51,849 some of these networks run through, 669 00:30:51,849 --> 00:30:54,240 SOUTHCOM obviously plays a role and that, 670 00:30:54,240 --> 00:30:56,152 we will continue to work with others. 671 00:30:56,152 --> 00:30:57,319 - Do you see the wall as a plus? 672 00:30:57,319 --> 00:31:01,006 - I'm not going to comment on how the wall will play out. 673 00:31:01,006 --> 00:31:04,608 My job is to make sure that I work as far away from 674 00:31:04,608 --> 00:31:07,946 the land borders of the United States as we possibly can. 675 00:31:07,946 --> 00:31:08,953 - Well, then can you talk to, 676 00:31:08,953 --> 00:31:11,338 I believe you've expressed this in the past, 677 00:31:11,338 --> 00:31:14,338 the need for SOUTHCOM to become more involved with, 678 00:31:14,338 --> 00:31:16,491 particularly the countries in Central America, 679 00:31:16,491 --> 00:31:17,725 Honduras, Guatemala-- - Right. 680 00:31:17,725 --> 00:31:19,774 - Improving the situations there 681 00:31:19,774 --> 00:31:21,612 so that you don't have the flow. 682 00:31:21,612 --> 00:31:24,759 - And that's, you know that is a program 683 00:31:24,759 --> 00:31:26,861 that SOUTHCOM partners with primarily 684 00:31:26,861 --> 00:31:29,516 with US Department of State, USAID, 685 00:31:29,516 --> 00:31:33,183 in order to work at the developmental issues 686 00:31:34,225 --> 00:31:37,127 and the governance issues to help those countries 687 00:31:37,127 --> 00:31:39,410 as they attempt to extend governance 688 00:31:39,410 --> 00:31:43,577 across their country so that security is established. 689 00:31:44,452 --> 00:31:46,612 They've got some very, very, very difficult challenges. 690 00:31:46,612 --> 00:31:49,528 My predecessor and the current Secretary 691 00:31:49,528 --> 00:31:52,748 of Homeland Security has commented on that at some length. 692 00:31:52,748 --> 00:31:55,829 But we recognize that dealing with the security, 693 00:31:55,829 --> 00:31:57,982 or the insecurity problems in Central America 694 00:31:57,982 --> 00:32:01,927 will be a key component in reducing the push factors 695 00:32:01,927 --> 00:32:04,594 that cause people to flow north. 696 00:32:07,971 --> 00:32:10,616 - I think I remember reading an article relatively recently 697 00:32:10,616 --> 00:32:13,857 about US Army looking to put their maybe QSATS 698 00:32:13,857 --> 00:32:17,080 and possibly dispatching them to SOUTHCOM 699 00:32:17,080 --> 00:32:20,934 to help meet ISR needs there or maybe exploring 700 00:32:20,934 --> 00:32:23,777 using commercial companies who already have them deployed. 701 00:32:23,777 --> 00:32:25,790 Can you talk a little bit about-- 702 00:32:25,790 --> 00:32:26,623 - Sure. 703 00:32:27,062 --> 00:32:29,802 One of things that we also attempt to do 704 00:32:29,802 --> 00:32:33,635 is advertise ourselves as very much interested 705 00:32:34,238 --> 00:32:38,359 in new technologies and the motto, try it here first. 706 00:32:38,359 --> 00:32:40,523 So we've been working very closely 707 00:32:40,523 --> 00:32:44,273 with a number of our partners in the services 708 00:32:44,717 --> 00:32:48,616 and in the intelligence community to be able to look at 709 00:32:48,616 --> 00:32:51,616 how can we take advantage of some of 710 00:32:51,744 --> 00:32:53,149 these new technologies that are out there. 711 00:32:53,149 --> 00:32:55,871 The small satellites that you've talked about 712 00:32:55,871 --> 00:32:57,684 to give us better situational awareness 713 00:32:57,684 --> 00:33:01,303 on a broader scale are one of the mechanisms. 714 00:33:01,303 --> 00:33:03,263 Using publicly available information, 715 00:33:03,263 --> 00:33:05,680 I will give you an example of 716 00:33:06,378 --> 00:33:08,961 a particularly useful instance. 717 00:33:10,425 --> 00:33:13,508 In the response to Hurricane Matthew, 718 00:33:14,451 --> 00:33:16,914 we had a very difficult time having a good understanding 719 00:33:16,914 --> 00:33:19,666 of the extent of the damage in the immediate passage 720 00:33:19,666 --> 00:33:23,833 of the hurricane as it passed the Southwest corner of Haiti. 721 00:33:25,722 --> 00:33:26,893 And so trying to understand, 722 00:33:26,893 --> 00:33:29,136 what would be the most important, 723 00:33:29,136 --> 00:33:31,886 unique military capabilities that 724 00:33:32,191 --> 00:33:34,136 we might be able to offer to help deal with 725 00:33:34,136 --> 00:33:36,165 the immediate aftermath of the crisis. 726 00:33:36,165 --> 00:33:38,238 So taking advantage of some of this 727 00:33:38,238 --> 00:33:40,905 publicly available imagery that, 728 00:33:41,947 --> 00:33:44,467 be able to see just exactly where were the areas 729 00:33:44,467 --> 00:33:46,394 that looked like there might be a problem 730 00:33:46,394 --> 00:33:50,561 and then laying over that images that were generated 731 00:33:50,819 --> 00:33:53,517 from individuals taking pictures of washed out bridges, 732 00:33:53,517 --> 00:33:55,982 you know, that were geotagged to a particular area. 733 00:33:55,982 --> 00:33:58,224 Being able to build out a picture and see, 734 00:33:58,224 --> 00:34:02,391 from both an overhead and from a ground-based level 735 00:34:02,571 --> 00:34:05,563 where the real immediate demands and then understanding 736 00:34:05,563 --> 00:34:08,043 that was along one of the major thoroughfares 737 00:34:08,043 --> 00:34:10,635 to be able to move humanitarian supplies 738 00:34:10,635 --> 00:34:13,440 from storehouses up in Port-au-Prince out to 739 00:34:13,440 --> 00:34:15,546 the hardest hit areas at the southwest tip. 740 00:34:15,546 --> 00:34:18,261 Having that information available immediately allowed us 741 00:34:18,261 --> 00:34:21,250 when the basically the day after the hurricane passed, 742 00:34:21,250 --> 00:34:23,699 we had already begun moving helicopters 743 00:34:23,699 --> 00:34:27,282 from our Joint Taskforce Bravo in Honduras. 744 00:34:30,865 --> 00:34:33,240 Army helicopters as well as Marine helicopters 745 00:34:33,240 --> 00:34:36,567 from the seasonal special purpose MAGTF that was there, 746 00:34:36,567 --> 00:34:40,150 move them to the Port-au-Prince right away. 747 00:34:41,164 --> 00:34:44,298 By the time they landed and got themselves organized 748 00:34:44,298 --> 00:34:46,236 and ready to go, we already had a pretty good idea 749 00:34:46,236 --> 00:34:49,642 of where we were going to need to deliver 750 00:34:49,642 --> 00:34:52,254 humanitarian supplies, where we were going to have to supply 751 00:34:52,254 --> 00:34:54,382 the Haitian national police force 752 00:34:54,382 --> 00:34:56,340 that was providing some of the initial security, 753 00:34:56,340 --> 00:34:58,733 so we were able to move much more quickly than if 754 00:34:58,733 --> 00:35:01,152 we waited on getting the helicopters there, 755 00:35:01,152 --> 00:35:03,882 sending the helicopters out on traditional road 756 00:35:03,882 --> 00:35:05,553 reconnaissance flights that you would do, 757 00:35:05,553 --> 00:35:07,141 and then come back and figure out 758 00:35:07,141 --> 00:35:08,431 how you would execute the mission. 759 00:35:08,431 --> 00:35:10,504 We already had a kind of a leg-up on the problem. 760 00:35:10,504 --> 00:35:12,033 So, you know, try it here first. 761 00:35:12,033 --> 00:35:14,807 I mean we're very much interested in trying to leverage 762 00:35:14,807 --> 00:35:16,766 some of these new capabilities, new ideas, 763 00:35:16,766 --> 00:35:20,622 and as I said previously, the commitment that I provided 764 00:35:20,622 --> 00:35:23,872 is we will in turn provide a meaningful 765 00:35:24,721 --> 00:35:28,178 operational environment and meaningful feedback 766 00:35:28,178 --> 00:35:31,828 on how some of these capabilities work, what's the pros, 767 00:35:31,828 --> 00:35:34,437 what's the cons, and at the same time, you know, 768 00:35:34,437 --> 00:35:36,313 my commitment as a commander is that I'm going to do 769 00:35:36,313 --> 00:35:39,414 everything I can to eliminate the bureaucratic impediments 770 00:35:39,414 --> 00:35:40,791 to being able to bring it down 771 00:35:40,791 --> 00:35:42,215 and operate it in its theater. 772 00:35:42,215 --> 00:35:44,394 Because we gain something out of it 773 00:35:44,394 --> 00:35:46,106 and hopefully the person who's developing 774 00:35:46,106 --> 00:35:48,523 this new capability will too. 775 00:35:50,396 --> 00:35:51,563 Okay, alright? 776 00:35:53,875 --> 00:35:54,875 Over to you. 777 00:35:55,915 --> 00:35:56,922 Thank you all very much. 778 00:35:56,922 --> 00:35:59,173 I appreciate your time today, I know it's a busy day, 779 00:35:59,173 --> 00:36:01,893 lots going on that is not part of Latin America 780 00:36:01,893 --> 00:36:04,179 but thanks very much for the time that you spend looking out 781 00:36:04,179 --> 00:36:06,582 to what goes on in SOUTHCOM, we appreciate it. 782 00:36:06,582 --> 00:36:07,415 Thanks.