1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:01,929 Thank you , Senator . It's let me 2 00:00:01,929 --> 00:00:03,984 recognize Senator Warren via WebEx . 3 00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:07,340 Thank you very much , Mr Chairman . And 4 00:00:07,340 --> 00:00:09,620 thank you to Admiral Faller and General 5 00:00:09,620 --> 00:00:11,731 Van Herrick for being here today . We 6 00:00:11,731 --> 00:00:13,953 appreciate the work that you're doing . 7 00:00:13,953 --> 00:00:16,120 Uh , General Van Haren . Uh , covid 19 8 00:00:16,120 --> 00:00:18,330 vaccinations are well underway all 9 00:00:18,330 --> 00:00:20,441 across our country and the d o . D is 10 00:00:20,441 --> 00:00:24,200 helping people get vaccinated each day . 11 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:26,710 Miller . More Americans are receiving 12 00:00:26,710 --> 00:00:29,860 hope in the form of these vaccines as 13 00:00:29,860 --> 00:00:32,020 we move closer to defeating this 14 00:00:32,020 --> 00:00:34,140 pandemic . But the data show that the 15 00:00:34,140 --> 00:00:36,250 vaccines aren't reaching every 16 00:00:36,250 --> 00:00:39,350 community equally . Death rates for 17 00:00:39,350 --> 00:00:41,970 black Americans and Native Americans . 18 00:00:41,970 --> 00:00:45,020 Native Alaskans are nearly twice as 19 00:00:45,020 --> 00:00:47,490 high as the death rates in white 20 00:00:47,490 --> 00:00:50,000 communities . But the vaccines have 21 00:00:50,010 --> 00:00:52,230 disproportionately gone to white 22 00:00:52,230 --> 00:00:54,670 Americans . Although vaccine 23 00:00:54,670 --> 00:00:57,770 demographic data are incomplete at this 24 00:00:57,770 --> 00:01:01,380 point , it appears that only about 7% 25 00:01:01,390 --> 00:01:04,260 of the 65 million administered doses 26 00:01:04,640 --> 00:01:07,600 have gone to black Americans . So 27 00:01:07,610 --> 00:01:10,950 General Van Herrick can Several 1000 of 28 00:01:10,950 --> 00:01:13,120 the troops you command have been 29 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:15,200 deployed to assist the federal 30 00:01:15,200 --> 00:01:17,990 government's vaccination efforts . Can 31 00:01:17,990 --> 00:01:20,360 you explain how Northern Command made 32 00:01:20,360 --> 00:01:22,249 decisions about the deployment of 33 00:01:22,249 --> 00:01:24,680 vaccine teams to ensure that 34 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:26,736 communities of color are getting the 35 00:01:26,736 --> 00:01:28,860 vaccines that they desperately need . 36 00:01:30,040 --> 00:01:32,210 Senator . Absolutely United States . 37 00:01:32,210 --> 00:01:34,154 Northern Command does not make the 38 00:01:34,154 --> 00:01:36,720 decision where teams go . That's due , 39 00:01:36,730 --> 00:01:39,780 uh , through the FEMA process , and we 40 00:01:39,790 --> 00:01:42,920 answer to their mission assignment and 41 00:01:42,920 --> 00:01:44,920 go to the location is determined by 42 00:01:44,920 --> 00:01:47,730 that interagency process . Fair enough . 43 00:01:47,740 --> 00:01:50,430 Do you know if FEMA is prioritizing 44 00:01:50,430 --> 00:01:53,870 communities of color in my 45 00:01:53,870 --> 00:01:56,037 discussions with the acting director , 46 00:01:56,037 --> 00:01:58,630 Mr Fenton ? They do take all 47 00:01:58,630 --> 00:02:00,797 considerations in from state and local 48 00:02:00,797 --> 00:02:03,060 officials , governors that are asking 49 00:02:03,060 --> 00:02:05,680 for support and factoring in those 50 00:02:05,680 --> 00:02:08,510 specifics and based on the need of 51 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:10,576 where the transmission rates are the 52 00:02:10,576 --> 00:02:12,687 highest they do take all that in from 53 00:02:12,687 --> 00:02:15,560 my discussions . Well , it's hard to 54 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:17,750 explain why we're down at 7% 55 00:02:18,140 --> 00:02:21,470 vaccination rate for black 56 00:02:21,480 --> 00:02:24,130 Americans . Can I ask you to commit 57 00:02:24,130 --> 00:02:26,297 that in future discussions ? As you're 58 00:02:26,297 --> 00:02:28,519 talking about how to deploy these teams 59 00:02:28,740 --> 00:02:31,930 that you will support making sure that 60 00:02:31,930 --> 00:02:34,320 we're making adequate vaccination 61 00:02:34,330 --> 00:02:36,660 efforts in communities of color ? 62 00:02:38,040 --> 00:02:39,984 Senator , I commit to you that I'm 63 00:02:39,984 --> 00:02:42,890 agnostic with regards to where we 64 00:02:42,890 --> 00:02:45,112 provide support , and I'll work closely 65 00:02:45,112 --> 00:02:47,300 with the FEMA team to make sure we do 66 00:02:47,300 --> 00:02:50,200 that . Well , I want to hear that 67 00:02:50,200 --> 00:02:52,311 you're not agnostic , but that you're 68 00:02:52,311 --> 00:02:54,500 really committed helping in the 69 00:02:54,500 --> 00:02:56,722 communities of color that are being hit 70 00:02:56,722 --> 00:02:58,667 hardest and where we're seeing the 71 00:02:58,667 --> 00:03:02,470 highest death rates . I'm I'm sorry . I 72 00:03:02,480 --> 00:03:04,760 apologize . I am fully committed . I 73 00:03:04,760 --> 00:03:06,982 thought I said that . The second part ? 74 00:03:06,982 --> 00:03:10,520 Absolutely . I hope so . Um , I'm also 75 00:03:10,520 --> 00:03:12,464 concerned about reports of Russian 76 00:03:12,464 --> 00:03:14,800 misinformation campaigns against the 77 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:16,967 vaccine that are aimed at reducing the 78 00:03:16,967 --> 00:03:18,911 number of Americans willing to get 79 00:03:18,911 --> 00:03:20,967 vaccinated . Can you just say a word 80 00:03:20,967 --> 00:03:23,470 about what strategies is Northern 81 00:03:23,470 --> 00:03:25,360 Command using to combat this 82 00:03:25,360 --> 00:03:28,970 misinformation , Senator ? It's an 83 00:03:28,970 --> 00:03:31,990 information and education campaign , uh , 84 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:34,300 primarily within our our own forces . 85 00:03:34,300 --> 00:03:36,522 I'm happy to report to you that we have 86 00:03:36,522 --> 00:03:38,411 approximately 85% acceptance rate 87 00:03:38,411 --> 00:03:41,260 acceptance rate within the command . Uh , 88 00:03:41,270 --> 00:03:43,326 in my discussions with the Secretary 89 00:03:43,326 --> 00:03:45,326 defense , Uh , and within the inter 90 00:03:45,326 --> 00:03:47,381 agency , we've talked and shared the 91 00:03:47,381 --> 00:03:49,437 lessons learned about how to educate 92 00:03:49,437 --> 00:03:52,370 and also exploit or expose the 93 00:03:52,380 --> 00:03:54,324 disinformation . So I think that's 94 00:03:54,324 --> 00:03:56,436 crucial to combine both the education 95 00:03:56,436 --> 00:03:58,860 aspect and exposing the disinformation . 96 00:03:59,940 --> 00:04:02,400 Oh , thank you . This pandemic hasn't 97 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:04,567 affected all Americans Equally . Black 98 00:04:04,567 --> 00:04:06,370 and brown communities have 99 00:04:06,380 --> 00:04:08,650 disproportionately suffered from covid 100 00:04:08,650 --> 00:04:11,550 19 and its effects will likely be felt 101 00:04:11,550 --> 00:04:14,530 for years . Northern Command and the 102 00:04:14,530 --> 00:04:16,363 federal government's vaccination 103 00:04:16,363 --> 00:04:19,180 efforts must prioritize the hardest hit 104 00:04:19,180 --> 00:04:21,630 communities . And I hope that you will 105 00:04:21,630 --> 00:04:24,590 continue to work hard to ensure that 106 00:04:24,590 --> 00:04:26,701 the vaccine goes to those who need it 107 00:04:26,701 --> 00:04:28,868 most . Thank you very much . And thank 108 00:04:28,868 --> 00:04:31,090 you , Mr Chairman . Thank you . Senator 109 00:04:31,090 --> 00:04:33,034 Warren . Senator Tillis , please . 110 00:04:33,034 --> 00:04:35,146 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Gentlemen , 111 00:04:35,146 --> 00:04:37,368 thank you for your decades of service , 112 00:04:37,368 --> 00:04:39,479 General Van Herck . I want to go back 113 00:04:39,479 --> 00:04:39,080 and just finished . Or make sure I 114 00:04:39,080 --> 00:04:42,560 understood with respect two 115 00:04:43,340 --> 00:04:45,390 any D o . D . Resources supporting 116 00:04:45,390 --> 00:04:47,790 local mission objectives around vaccine 117 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:49,850 dissemination . You're there to 118 00:04:49,850 --> 00:04:52,540 basically provide personnel support 119 00:04:52,550 --> 00:04:54,494 after the decisions about where to 120 00:04:54,494 --> 00:04:56,272 administer the vaccines , Which 121 00:04:56,272 --> 00:04:58,217 population should be prioritized ? 122 00:04:58,217 --> 00:05:00,272 You're not actively involved in that 123 00:05:00,272 --> 00:05:02,106 prioritization process , is that 124 00:05:02,106 --> 00:05:04,106 correct , Senator ? That is exactly 125 00:05:04,106 --> 00:05:06,328 correct . Okay , Thank you . Abba had , 126 00:05:06,328 --> 00:05:08,272 uh , just maybe an addendum to the 127 00:05:08,272 --> 00:05:11,020 request that , uh , Senator Wicker made 128 00:05:11,020 --> 00:05:13,850 following on to Senator Shaheen's 129 00:05:13,850 --> 00:05:15,961 comments . This this one graphic that 130 00:05:15,961 --> 00:05:19,020 shows China influence , I think what 131 00:05:19,020 --> 00:05:21,187 would be helpful when there is just to 132 00:05:21,187 --> 00:05:23,298 show American influence , but also to 133 00:05:23,298 --> 00:05:25,242 show the trend lines . My guess is 134 00:05:25,242 --> 00:05:27,409 based on a comment that you made their 135 00:05:27,409 --> 00:05:29,576 trending in the wrong direction . So I 136 00:05:29,576 --> 00:05:29,210 think it would just be helpful when you 137 00:05:29,210 --> 00:05:31,550 provide that graphic to , uh , show us 138 00:05:31,550 --> 00:05:34,310 the areas the , uh , huts of the heat 139 00:05:34,310 --> 00:05:36,460 map on where we really need to muster 140 00:05:36,470 --> 00:05:39,660 more resources on the TCO 141 00:05:39,660 --> 00:05:43,480 graphic . You all summarize the 142 00:05:43,490 --> 00:05:46,050 disruption in terms of narcotics . I 143 00:05:46,050 --> 00:05:49,480 think 303 metric tons in 144 00:05:49,490 --> 00:05:53,480 FY 20 . How does that compare to FY 19 ? 145 00:05:53,480 --> 00:05:55,647 And what are the trend lines for FY 21 146 00:05:57,640 --> 00:06:00,380 in overall amounts center ? It's , uh , 147 00:06:00,390 --> 00:06:02,001 it's comparable . But what's 148 00:06:02,001 --> 00:06:04,360 significant about FY 20 is the impact 149 00:06:04,360 --> 00:06:06,960 of global pandemic . So we know that 150 00:06:07,340 --> 00:06:11,320 for a time the narco traffickers went 151 00:06:11,320 --> 00:06:13,320 to ground and didn't didn't push as 152 00:06:13,320 --> 00:06:15,820 much of their products . And so and 153 00:06:15,820 --> 00:06:17,931 then when they did , because of a lot 154 00:06:17,931 --> 00:06:20,190 of border controls were tighter and the 155 00:06:20,190 --> 00:06:22,590 methods of delivery or harder because 156 00:06:22,600 --> 00:06:24,830 economies had shut down and they ride 157 00:06:24,830 --> 00:06:26,719 their traffic on the backs of the 158 00:06:26,719 --> 00:06:28,386 economy . So they were having 159 00:06:28,386 --> 00:06:30,552 difficulty getting precursor chemicals 160 00:06:30,552 --> 00:06:32,886 and so on . When they did start pushing , 161 00:06:32,886 --> 00:06:35,650 it was in smaller loads in different 162 00:06:35,650 --> 00:06:38,610 routes . What's significant about the 163 00:06:38,620 --> 00:06:41,260 duties , performance and , as part of 164 00:06:41,270 --> 00:06:43,640 the whole nation effort , really are . 165 00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:45,862 What we do is we detect and monitor and 166 00:06:45,862 --> 00:06:48,029 pass it off to law enforcement is that 167 00:06:48,029 --> 00:06:49,862 we never we never step back . We 168 00:06:49,862 --> 00:06:52,930 stepped up in the face of pandemic and 169 00:06:52,930 --> 00:06:55,280 we accounted for a significant increase 170 00:06:55,290 --> 00:06:57,290 of the amount that we targeted . So 171 00:06:57,290 --> 00:06:59,401 while the total amount was the same , 172 00:06:59,401 --> 00:07:01,300 our percentage of getting that 173 00:07:01,300 --> 00:07:03,540 effective targets was up . And that was 174 00:07:03,540 --> 00:07:06,220 because we did have a modest increase 175 00:07:06,220 --> 00:07:08,331 in resources throughout the year . We 176 00:07:08,331 --> 00:07:10,442 had the United States Navy stepped up 177 00:07:10,530 --> 00:07:12,697 at the direction of the SEC def . With 178 00:07:12,697 --> 00:07:16,410 Navy ships additional pH and the Coast 179 00:07:16,410 --> 00:07:18,243 Guard sustained . They're always 180 00:07:18,243 --> 00:07:20,410 excellent support , and what we saw is 181 00:07:20,410 --> 00:07:22,577 when the U . S . Stayed on the field , 182 00:07:22,577 --> 00:07:24,688 our partners stayed on the field . So 183 00:07:24,688 --> 00:07:26,910 overall we held the line as part of the 184 00:07:26,910 --> 00:07:29,021 effort , will never interdict our way 185 00:07:29,021 --> 00:07:31,243 out . But we've got to keep pressure on 186 00:07:31,243 --> 00:07:33,243 that part of the supply chain . The 187 00:07:33,243 --> 00:07:35,410 Colombians did their part . They had a 188 00:07:35,410 --> 00:07:37,632 record eradication year . Where we need 189 00:07:37,632 --> 00:07:40,220 to go next , is in the finances into 190 00:07:40,220 --> 00:07:43,130 their data into that source of their 191 00:07:43,130 --> 00:07:45,870 power and really break the center of 192 00:07:45,870 --> 00:07:48,100 gravity of these organizations . And I 193 00:07:48,100 --> 00:07:50,211 think we can do that more effectively 194 00:07:50,211 --> 00:07:52,940 with a better effective targeting and 195 00:07:52,940 --> 00:07:55,051 whole government approach here in the 196 00:07:55,051 --> 00:07:57,218 US and training our partners to do the 197 00:07:57,218 --> 00:07:59,384 same . Thank you . Something that will 198 00:07:59,384 --> 00:08:01,162 be helpful if you don't have it 199 00:08:01,162 --> 00:08:03,384 available . I'd also be interested in a 200 00:08:03,384 --> 00:08:06,130 similar update on human trafficking 201 00:08:06,140 --> 00:08:08,670 disruption . If we could just get that 202 00:08:08,670 --> 00:08:10,614 submitted for the record , I would 203 00:08:10,614 --> 00:08:14,070 appreciate it at the the southern tip 204 00:08:14,070 --> 00:08:16,020 of your area of responsibility . 205 00:08:16,030 --> 00:08:18,650 General Van Hurt . And , uh , and 206 00:08:18,650 --> 00:08:20,817 Admiral the Northern , Uh , what's the 207 00:08:20,817 --> 00:08:22,928 What's the change in posture ? What's 208 00:08:22,928 --> 00:08:25,150 the environment like now as compared to 209 00:08:25,150 --> 00:08:27,490 say , this time last year , I mean 210 00:08:27,500 --> 00:08:29,556 military presence , I know . Even at 211 00:08:29,556 --> 00:08:31,611 the southern border of the Southwest 212 00:08:31,611 --> 00:08:33,556 board , the United States , we had 213 00:08:33,556 --> 00:08:35,722 stepped up Mexican military presence . 214 00:08:35,722 --> 00:08:37,889 What is that ? How would you summarize 215 00:08:37,889 --> 00:08:39,778 that today and then also southern 216 00:08:39,778 --> 00:08:41,667 Mexico border and border states ? 217 00:08:41,667 --> 00:08:43,778 What's their posture ? They're trying 218 00:08:43,778 --> 00:08:45,778 to manage flow of immigrants moving 219 00:08:45,778 --> 00:08:47,889 across those borders . Now , compared 220 00:08:47,889 --> 00:08:51,790 to a year ago , I'll go first from the 221 00:08:51,800 --> 00:08:53,710 from Mexicans perspective , their 222 00:08:53,710 --> 00:08:55,488 tremendous partners . We have a 223 00:08:55,488 --> 00:08:57,654 fantastic military , but they maintain 224 00:08:57,654 --> 00:08:59,710 in the same sort of operations tempo 225 00:08:59,710 --> 00:09:01,877 that they have for the past year or so 226 00:09:01,877 --> 00:09:04,154 they are . They've been great partners . 227 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,190 The same for Guatemala . They've 228 00:09:06,200 --> 00:09:08,311 They're committed . They're committed 229 00:09:08,311 --> 00:09:10,144 doing the right thing here . But 230 00:09:10,144 --> 00:09:12,144 they're stressed with covid and the 231 00:09:12,144 --> 00:09:13,867 other insecurity , uh , by the 232 00:09:13,867 --> 00:09:15,811 transnational criminalization . So 233 00:09:15,811 --> 00:09:18,450 their ability to to surge more in the 234 00:09:18,450 --> 00:09:21,530 migrant problem says is limited . Thank 235 00:09:21,530 --> 00:09:23,830 you . As we move forward with funding 236 00:09:23,830 --> 00:09:25,886 and in India this year , I'd also be 237 00:09:25,886 --> 00:09:28,052 interested in maybe you submitting for 238 00:09:28,052 --> 00:09:30,670 the record key funding flows that are 239 00:09:30,670 --> 00:09:32,892 trending in the wrong direction that we 240 00:09:32,892 --> 00:09:34,960 should focus on when we get back to 241 00:09:35,340 --> 00:09:37,750 appropriations discussions in any sort 242 00:09:37,750 --> 00:09:40,028 of authorities you may need in the NBA . 243 00:09:40,028 --> 00:09:42,083 Thank you very much . Thank you , Mr 244 00:09:42,083 --> 00:09:44,250 Chair . Thank you , Senator Tillis and 245 00:09:44,250 --> 00:09:46,194 let me recognize Senator Mansion . 246 00:09:48,140 --> 00:09:50,470 Thank you , Mr Chairman , And thank 247 00:09:50,480 --> 00:09:53,110 both of our Panelists for their service 248 00:09:53,110 --> 00:09:55,332 to our country . And we appreciate very 249 00:09:55,332 --> 00:09:57,610 much your being here today . Uh , fall . 250 00:09:57,610 --> 00:09:59,832 I don't think it's possible . Overstate 251 00:09:59,832 --> 00:10:02,054 the threats our adversaries are posting 252 00:10:02,054 --> 00:10:03,999 in your area of responsibility and 253 00:10:03,999 --> 00:10:05,943 africom because they know whatever 254 00:10:05,943 --> 00:10:08,110 investments they make in South America 255 00:10:08,110 --> 00:10:09,943 in Africa are cheap and will pay 256 00:10:09,943 --> 00:10:12,054 dividends in the future . Um , at the 257 00:10:12,054 --> 00:10:13,888 end of February , U S Army south 258 00:10:13,888 --> 00:10:15,943 finished pre deployment training for 259 00:10:15,943 --> 00:10:18,380 Operation Alamo Shield to prepare first 260 00:10:18,380 --> 00:10:20,213 security force assistant brigade 261 00:10:20,213 --> 00:10:22,047 personnel for future missions in 262 00:10:22,047 --> 00:10:24,600 Colombia , Honduras and Panama in 263 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:26,489 addition to our state partnership 264 00:10:26,489 --> 00:10:28,267 programs . Ongoing training and 265 00:10:28,267 --> 00:10:30,450 advising operations like this one on a 266 00:10:30,450 --> 00:10:32,830 crucial for promoting inter operability 267 00:10:32,830 --> 00:10:34,997 and relationship building your area of 268 00:10:34,997 --> 00:10:37,108 responsibility . So my question would 269 00:10:37,108 --> 00:10:39,330 be what specific training programmes in 270 00:10:39,330 --> 00:10:41,552 South , um going to develop to increase 271 00:10:41,552 --> 00:10:43,774 the capabilities of the capacity and to 272 00:10:43,774 --> 00:10:45,941 further combat the growing concern for 273 00:10:45,941 --> 00:10:45,750 corruption within the ranks of our 274 00:10:45,750 --> 00:10:47,694 partners , and especially with the 275 00:10:47,694 --> 00:10:49,806 migration that we have going on right 276 00:10:49,806 --> 00:10:51,806 now , Can't they play a bigger role 277 00:10:51,806 --> 00:10:54,850 that , Sir Senator , I'd like to 278 00:10:54,850 --> 00:10:57,072 commend the West Virginia Guard , which 279 00:10:57,072 --> 00:10:58,906 does fantastic works whose state 280 00:10:58,906 --> 00:11:01,183 partnership program with Peru and , uh , 281 00:11:01,183 --> 00:11:03,550 and has been a active participant in 282 00:11:03,550 --> 00:11:06,050 our exercise program . You cited the 283 00:11:06,050 --> 00:11:08,106 Security Force assistance Teams that 284 00:11:08,106 --> 00:11:10,272 the United States Army has developed . 285 00:11:10,272 --> 00:11:13,220 That is exactly the right capability . 286 00:11:13,290 --> 00:11:15,670 It's small . It's small teams that 287 00:11:15,670 --> 00:11:17,781 focus on training . You think four or 288 00:11:17,781 --> 00:11:21,470 five people and our partners want to 289 00:11:21,470 --> 00:11:23,637 emulate the professionalism the United 290 00:11:23,637 --> 00:11:25,692 States Army , United States , Navy , 291 00:11:25,692 --> 00:11:27,803 Coast Guard , Air Force Marines , and 292 00:11:27,803 --> 00:11:29,914 that's the way for staying engaged on 293 00:11:29,914 --> 00:11:31,970 the team on the field with the small 294 00:11:31,970 --> 00:11:35,470 teams that train our partners trainers 295 00:11:35,480 --> 00:11:38,020 in the professional use of force that 296 00:11:38,020 --> 00:11:39,853 involve women peace and security 297 00:11:39,853 --> 00:11:41,853 training that involves human rights 298 00:11:41,853 --> 00:11:43,909 training . Uh , this is , uh this is 299 00:11:43,909 --> 00:11:45,798 way to go , and we're continue to 300 00:11:45,798 --> 00:11:48,131 emphasize and strengthen those programs , 301 00:11:48,131 --> 00:11:51,610 Senator . Thank you , sir . And two , 302 00:11:51,610 --> 00:11:54,560 General Van Herck . Our current major 303 00:11:54,560 --> 00:11:56,782 ballistic missile defense ss around the 304 00:11:56,782 --> 00:11:59,070 globe include the G , B , M , B and D 305 00:11:59,110 --> 00:12:01,277 that batteries , ages , systems impact 306 00:12:01,277 --> 00:12:04,880 three a missile capability . As China 307 00:12:04,880 --> 00:12:07,047 and Russia continued to increase their 308 00:12:07,047 --> 00:12:09,213 influence abroad , I am concerned that 309 00:12:09,213 --> 00:12:11,380 their objectives provide them with the 310 00:12:11,380 --> 00:12:13,547 ability to die as access , break apart 311 00:12:13,547 --> 00:12:15,547 our relationships , further corrupt 312 00:12:15,547 --> 00:12:17,436 governments and ultimately placed 313 00:12:17,436 --> 00:12:19,830 threats closer to the U . S . However , 314 00:12:19,840 --> 00:12:21,673 as we began to think in terms of 315 00:12:21,673 --> 00:12:23,562 hypersonic threats , geographical 316 00:12:23,562 --> 00:12:25,618 location doesn't mean much anymore . 317 00:12:25,618 --> 00:12:28,020 And the importance of early detection 318 00:12:28,020 --> 00:12:30,020 and coordination between the Combat 319 00:12:30,020 --> 00:12:32,020 commandments , uh , becomes an even 320 00:12:32,020 --> 00:12:34,920 more crucial concern . So our question 321 00:12:34,920 --> 00:12:37,142 is , as we continue develop space space 322 00:12:37,142 --> 00:12:39,198 center layers . What role do you see 323 00:12:39,198 --> 00:12:41,142 for North common NORAD in tracking 324 00:12:41,142 --> 00:12:43,253 threats in North America , as well as 325 00:12:43,253 --> 00:12:45,087 interfacing with other combatant 326 00:12:45,087 --> 00:12:47,142 government commands to track threats 327 00:12:47,142 --> 00:12:50,620 such as such as hyper Sonics senator , 328 00:12:50,620 --> 00:12:53,000 my NORAD had were directly responsible 329 00:12:53,000 --> 00:12:54,889 for integrated threat warning and 330 00:12:54,889 --> 00:12:57,111 attack assessment . So that's crucial . 331 00:12:57,111 --> 00:12:59,444 We will continue to play a crucial role , 332 00:12:59,444 --> 00:13:02,040 uh , for assessment of threats to the 333 00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:03,984 homeland specifically from missile 334 00:13:03,984 --> 00:13:06,180 threats . I am concerned about the 335 00:13:06,180 --> 00:13:08,124 ability going forward to track and 336 00:13:08,124 --> 00:13:10,600 assess hyper sonics so we must go to 337 00:13:10,600 --> 00:13:12,767 space . And in my recent discussions , 338 00:13:12,767 --> 00:13:14,822 just this Friday , talking with John 339 00:13:14,822 --> 00:13:16,878 Hill at the Missile Defense Agency , 340 00:13:16,878 --> 00:13:18,822 they're moving out what we have to 341 00:13:18,822 --> 00:13:20,767 provide a space capability , space 342 00:13:20,767 --> 00:13:23,044 based capabilities to track hypersonic , 343 00:13:23,044 --> 00:13:25,370 especially as a maneuver . And those 344 00:13:25,370 --> 00:13:27,203 space based capabilities have to 345 00:13:27,203 --> 00:13:30,210 provide fire control capability data to 346 00:13:30,210 --> 00:13:32,210 systems that will be able to engage 347 00:13:32,210 --> 00:13:34,377 hyper sonics . That's crucial for that 348 00:13:34,377 --> 00:13:37,030 deterrence by denial aspect that I 349 00:13:37,040 --> 00:13:39,370 mentioned earlier that also contributes 350 00:13:39,370 --> 00:13:42,890 to overarching deterrence . Uh , is 351 00:13:42,890 --> 00:13:45,001 there a requirement for less and sell 352 00:13:45,001 --> 00:13:47,680 last and sell , uh , to , uh , at each 353 00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:49,347 of our combatant command that 354 00:13:49,347 --> 00:13:51,513 represents the other commands in order 355 00:13:51,513 --> 00:13:53,347 to build situational wellness to 356 00:13:53,347 --> 00:13:56,620 coordinate the efforts , Senator , I 357 00:13:56,620 --> 00:13:58,953 believe homeland defense starts forward , 358 00:13:58,953 --> 00:14:01,064 and that means all combatant commands 359 00:14:01,064 --> 00:14:03,420 must be engaged and part of the overall 360 00:14:03,430 --> 00:14:05,720 arching solution for homeland defense 361 00:14:05,730 --> 00:14:08,640 and missile defense . Thank you , 362 00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:10,529 Senator . Thank you . Thank you , 363 00:14:10,529 --> 00:14:12,529 General . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 364 00:14:12,529 --> 00:14:14,696 Thank you . Senator mentioned . Let me 365 00:14:14,696 --> 00:14:16,862 now recognize Senator Sullivan . Thank 366 00:14:16,862 --> 00:14:18,973 you , Mr Chairman . Gentlemen , thank 367 00:14:18,973 --> 00:14:21,196 you for your service . Good to see both 368 00:14:21,196 --> 00:14:23,251 of you again , Admiral . It's been a 369 00:14:23,251 --> 00:14:25,307 while . Thank you for all your doing 370 00:14:25,307 --> 00:14:27,529 down South General . I want to focus on 371 00:14:27,529 --> 00:14:29,584 some issues . I know they've already 372 00:14:29,584 --> 00:14:31,918 been mentioned first on missile defense . 373 00:14:31,918 --> 00:14:34,084 11 I think . Good news . Story doesn't 374 00:14:34,084 --> 00:14:36,196 doesn't make a lot of press . But the 375 00:14:36,196 --> 00:14:38,029 last few years has been a strong 376 00:14:38,029 --> 00:14:41,150 bipartisan support in this committee in 377 00:14:41,150 --> 00:14:42,983 this Congress on building up our 378 00:14:42,983 --> 00:14:45,080 missile defenses . I think , in part 379 00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:48,230 because of the threat from North Korea , 380 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:50,990 however , there has been challenges . 381 00:14:51,000 --> 00:14:53,010 Right ? Right now we have 20 empty 382 00:14:53,010 --> 00:14:55,760 silos at Fort Greely . 383 00:14:57,240 --> 00:14:59,420 It makes no sense . Some estimates are 384 00:14:59,420 --> 00:15:01,587 is going to be 10 years before we have 385 00:15:01,587 --> 00:15:03,930 missiles in there . Can you talk to me 386 00:15:03,930 --> 00:15:06,400 about that ? And why ? And why in the 387 00:15:06,400 --> 00:15:09,350 world aren't we , fella ? No silos as 388 00:15:09,350 --> 00:15:10,406 soon as possible , 389 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:14,984 Senator , My goal would be to have 390 00:15:14,984 --> 00:15:17,096 additional capability and capacity as 391 00:15:17,096 --> 00:15:19,207 soon as possible . I continue to work 392 00:15:19,207 --> 00:15:21,207 close with John Hill at the Missile 393 00:15:21,207 --> 00:15:23,373 Defense Agency . My top priority is to 394 00:15:23,373 --> 00:15:25,429 stay on timeline to field additional 395 00:15:25,429 --> 00:15:27,970 capabilities against ballistic missiles 396 00:15:28,000 --> 00:15:30,056 that could attack our homeland . And 397 00:15:30,056 --> 00:15:32,660 isn't that in part because there's 398 00:15:33,340 --> 00:15:35,340 Intel that , given the rate of what 399 00:15:35,340 --> 00:15:37,396 North Korea is producing in terms of 400 00:15:37,396 --> 00:15:39,562 nukes and intercontinental ballistic , 401 00:15:39,562 --> 00:15:41,540 is that their capability could 402 00:15:41,540 --> 00:15:44,230 overwhelm our capabilities as early as 403 00:15:44,230 --> 00:15:47,120 2025 ? Senator , I'd like to have that 404 00:15:47,120 --> 00:15:48,731 conversation in a classified 405 00:15:48,731 --> 00:15:50,564 environment . I remain extremely 406 00:15:50,564 --> 00:15:52,800 concerned about the capacity of the 407 00:15:52,800 --> 00:15:55,610 ballistic missile defense system going 408 00:15:55,610 --> 00:15:58,430 forward and would quickly fielding the 409 00:15:58,430 --> 00:16:00,590 N . G . I help with addressing that 410 00:16:00,590 --> 00:16:02,646 challenge . The center . We can feel 411 00:16:02,646 --> 00:16:04,368 the N G I . The the better for 412 00:16:04,368 --> 00:16:06,479 addressing that challenge . There was 413 00:16:06,479 --> 00:16:09,040 an article in a defense media news 414 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,600 source recently saying that the N G 415 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:13,950 decision is on the deputy secretary of 416 00:16:13,950 --> 00:16:15,950 Defense's desk , and yet it's being 417 00:16:15,950 --> 00:16:18,040 delayed . Some are thinking that she 418 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:21,400 might kind of use this as a budget 419 00:16:21,400 --> 00:16:23,622 cutting tool to say Maybe we don't need 420 00:16:23,622 --> 00:16:25,789 it . Is that a good idea to delay this 421 00:16:25,789 --> 00:16:27,789 and , uh , have the Pentagon say we 422 00:16:27,789 --> 00:16:29,956 don't need N G I right now ? senator . 423 00:16:29,956 --> 00:16:32,067 I'll stay all of the policy aspect of 424 00:16:32,067 --> 00:16:33,956 that . Well , you kind of already 425 00:16:33,956 --> 00:16:35,956 dumped into it . So let me get your 426 00:16:35,956 --> 00:16:38,011 personal opinion on that . Is that a 427 00:16:38,011 --> 00:16:40,122 good idea for the deputy secretary or 428 00:16:40,122 --> 00:16:42,344 the secretary to say I'm going to cut ? 429 00:16:42,344 --> 00:16:44,233 Let's figure out where we cut the 430 00:16:44,233 --> 00:16:46,289 budget . Let's cut the budget on the 431 00:16:46,289 --> 00:16:48,456 system that protects the entire United 432 00:16:48,456 --> 00:16:50,400 States of America from a clear and 433 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:52,567 growing threat . Is that a good idea ? 434 00:16:52,567 --> 00:16:54,678 Again ? That's a policy decision . My 435 00:16:54,678 --> 00:16:57,140 perspective is about the risk , and I 436 00:16:57,140 --> 00:16:59,970 remain very concerned about the risk of 437 00:16:59,970 --> 00:17:02,260 having a capable ballistic missile 438 00:17:02,260 --> 00:17:04,730 defense system against future capacity 439 00:17:04,730 --> 00:17:07,020 changes and capability changes by 440 00:17:07,020 --> 00:17:09,076 threats with the risk increase if we 441 00:17:09,076 --> 00:17:11,550 cut the N g I programme , 442 00:17:12,540 --> 00:17:15,890 uh , my personal opinion in my , uh , 443 00:17:15,900 --> 00:17:18,190 in my opinion , cutting that would 444 00:17:18,190 --> 00:17:20,830 reduce our capability to defend against 445 00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:23,270 increased capacity and capability of 446 00:17:23,270 --> 00:17:25,492 any threats . Mr . Chairman , this is a 447 00:17:25,492 --> 00:17:27,326 huge issue , and I think we as a 448 00:17:27,326 --> 00:17:29,548 committee has been very bipartisan need 449 00:17:29,548 --> 00:17:31,714 to send a message to the Pentagon like 450 00:17:31,714 --> 00:17:35,160 hey , fund nous Now , um , it's clear 451 00:17:35,170 --> 00:17:37,392 it would be a risk to the country . Let 452 00:17:37,392 --> 00:17:39,503 me , uh , let me turn to the Arctic . 453 00:17:39,503 --> 00:17:41,559 Um , I know there's been a number of 454 00:17:41,559 --> 00:17:43,559 discussions already . Uh , the good 455 00:17:43,559 --> 00:17:45,670 news is in his confirmation hearing , 456 00:17:45,670 --> 00:17:47,781 General Secretary Austin , the deputy 457 00:17:47,781 --> 00:17:49,890 secretary , Dr Hicks both said they 458 00:17:49,890 --> 00:17:51,890 were committed to this committee to 459 00:17:51,890 --> 00:17:54,740 fully fund the new , um , Arctic 460 00:17:54,740 --> 00:17:56,851 strategies here . I think the Army is 461 00:17:56,851 --> 00:17:58,851 going to introduce its today , um , 462 00:17:58,851 --> 00:18:00,684 with regard to fully funding the 463 00:18:00,684 --> 00:18:03,360 different service oriented strategies . 464 00:18:03,840 --> 00:18:06,880 Um , Senator Wicker talked about 465 00:18:06,880 --> 00:18:09,270 icebreakers . It's good . We're finally 466 00:18:09,270 --> 00:18:11,437 building them . It's taking too long . 467 00:18:11,437 --> 00:18:13,548 There is this leasing option that the 468 00:18:13,548 --> 00:18:15,714 Trump Administration was looking at at 469 00:18:15,714 --> 00:18:17,937 the end of the administration . And now 470 00:18:17,937 --> 00:18:20,103 the Biden administration is looking at 471 00:18:20,103 --> 00:18:22,270 hard . Do you think that's a good idea 472 00:18:22,270 --> 00:18:24,490 to close this icebreaker gap with the 473 00:18:24,500 --> 00:18:26,950 opportunity to lease icebreakers ? Get 474 00:18:26,950 --> 00:18:29,117 them home ported in America's Arctic , 475 00:18:29,117 --> 00:18:31,228 which is Alaska ? What's your thought 476 00:18:31,228 --> 00:18:33,330 on that Senator ? That's a policy 477 00:18:33,330 --> 00:18:35,330 decision . I have a requirement for 478 00:18:35,330 --> 00:18:37,219 capability . I'm agnostic to what 479 00:18:37,219 --> 00:18:39,610 provides that capability . But you 480 00:18:39,620 --> 00:18:41,342 think we need the capability . 481 00:18:41,342 --> 00:18:43,460 Absolutely good . So do I . So does 482 00:18:43,460 --> 00:18:45,780 this committee , By the way , Um , let 483 00:18:45,780 --> 00:18:47,947 me ask one final thing . There's going 484 00:18:47,947 --> 00:18:49,891 to be a meeting high level meeting 485 00:18:49,891 --> 00:18:51,860 between our diplomats and Chinese 486 00:18:51,860 --> 00:18:54,480 diplomats in Anchorage Thursday and 487 00:18:54,480 --> 00:18:57,300 Friday . We talk about Alaska in terms 488 00:18:57,300 --> 00:18:59,189 of the Arctic . But as you know , 489 00:18:59,189 --> 00:19:02,460 General Alaska also is critical for the 490 00:19:02,460 --> 00:19:04,627 Asia Pacific , particularly as we look 491 00:19:04,627 --> 00:19:06,738 at dispersing of our forces . We have 492 00:19:06,738 --> 00:19:08,793 the pay com commander here last week 493 00:19:08,793 --> 00:19:11,016 talking about challenges perhaps in the 494 00:19:11,016 --> 00:19:13,280 Taiwan Strait as early as 5 to 6 years 495 00:19:13,280 --> 00:19:15,502 from now . How important is it ? Do you 496 00:19:15,502 --> 00:19:17,724 think that the Chinese , when they come 497 00:19:17,724 --> 00:19:19,947 to Alaska , see that there's within the 498 00:19:19,947 --> 00:19:22,169 end of this year going to be over 105th 499 00:19:22,169 --> 00:19:25,060 generation fighters based in Alaska 500 00:19:25,640 --> 00:19:27,640 that can get to the Taiwan Strait ? 501 00:19:27,640 --> 00:19:30,570 Probably in six hours . Senator , 502 00:19:30,580 --> 00:19:33,210 Alaska is a strategic location . It's a 503 00:19:33,210 --> 00:19:35,543 strategic location for homeland defense . 504 00:19:35,543 --> 00:19:37,543 Something that we must preserve and 505 00:19:37,543 --> 00:19:39,766 preserve that capability . I think it's 506 00:19:39,766 --> 00:19:41,321 important that they see our 507 00:19:41,321 --> 00:19:43,099 capabilities . It's part of our 508 00:19:43,099 --> 00:19:45,266 overarching deterrence . Great . Thank 509 00:19:45,266 --> 00:19:45,130 you . Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank 510 00:19:45,130 --> 00:19:46,852 you , Senator . Sell Beloved . 511 00:19:46,852 --> 00:19:48,852 Recognize Senator Peters , please . 512 00:19:48,940 --> 00:19:51,273 Thank you , Mr Chairman . And gentlemen , 513 00:19:51,273 --> 00:19:53,607 thank you for your testimony here today . 514 00:19:53,607 --> 00:19:55,440 And for your service every day . 515 00:19:55,440 --> 00:19:57,660 General Uh , and Herc , a seldom 516 00:19:57,660 --> 00:20:00,250 discussed area of the civil support 517 00:20:00,250 --> 00:20:02,083 mission is chemical biological , 518 00:20:02,083 --> 00:20:04,360 radiological and nuclear response . And 519 00:20:04,740 --> 00:20:07,280 this is good considering the subject 520 00:20:07,290 --> 00:20:10,040 matter . But as long as supporting 521 00:20:10,040 --> 00:20:12,830 units are resourced appropriately , we 522 00:20:12,830 --> 00:20:15,680 can be more assured . So my question is 523 00:20:15,690 --> 00:20:17,857 to you , sir , is that the command and 524 00:20:17,857 --> 00:20:20,120 control CBRN response Element B has 525 00:20:20,130 --> 00:20:23,190 experienced a cumulative 25% decrease 526 00:20:23,190 --> 00:20:26,160 in funding over the past three years , 527 00:20:26,340 --> 00:20:28,340 and I understand these are title 32 528 00:20:28,340 --> 00:20:30,229 funds , and I know that you don't 529 00:20:30,229 --> 00:20:32,284 control those funds . But the effect 530 00:20:32,284 --> 00:20:34,340 should at least be of concern to you 531 00:20:34,340 --> 00:20:37,280 because of the unit augments Northern 532 00:20:37,280 --> 00:20:40,000 Command for CBRN and DSC A . More 533 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:41,889 broadly so . My question to you , 534 00:20:41,889 --> 00:20:44,056 general , is does the decrease for the 535 00:20:44,056 --> 00:20:46,278 Guard and Reserve C two element reflect 536 00:20:46,278 --> 00:20:48,790 your priorities or those of the Army 537 00:20:48,800 --> 00:20:51,140 North and Joint Task Force Civil 538 00:20:51,140 --> 00:20:55,110 support . First , I would say I 539 00:20:55,110 --> 00:20:57,240 remain confident in my ability to 540 00:20:57,240 --> 00:21:00,130 provide support in case there's an 541 00:21:00,130 --> 00:21:02,090 incident chemical , biological , 542 00:21:02,100 --> 00:21:04,420 radiological in the continental United 543 00:21:04,420 --> 00:21:07,190 States with regards to the specific 544 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:09,720 prioritization , I would say that I 545 00:21:09,720 --> 00:21:11,831 need to get further detail on the cut 546 00:21:11,831 --> 00:21:13,998 for Title 32 . I'm not tracking that , 547 00:21:13,998 --> 00:21:16,350 but we're will , uh , well integrated 548 00:21:16,350 --> 00:21:18,940 with the state and local authorities 549 00:21:18,940 --> 00:21:21,150 and have our capability ready to go . 550 00:21:21,150 --> 00:21:24,240 Some of it on hours , notice others on 551 00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:26,129 days notice . I'm confident in my 552 00:21:26,129 --> 00:21:28,840 ability to perform that mission . Well , 553 00:21:28,840 --> 00:21:31,007 I appreciate that . And you're willing 554 00:21:31,007 --> 00:21:33,173 to take a look at that and get back to 555 00:21:33,173 --> 00:21:35,229 us ? We could follow up with you . I 556 00:21:35,229 --> 00:21:35,130 will . I appreciate that . Thank you . 557 00:21:35,130 --> 00:21:37,550 Thank you . Admiral Faller . The 558 00:21:37,550 --> 00:21:40,380 Southern Command takes a nontraditional 559 00:21:40,390 --> 00:21:42,770 approach to intelligence , integrating 560 00:21:42,770 --> 00:21:45,320 public information with advanced 561 00:21:45,320 --> 00:21:47,790 analytics , artificial intelligence and 562 00:21:47,790 --> 00:21:50,640 machine learning . A question is is 563 00:21:50,640 --> 00:21:53,920 this in house R d t Any effort unique 564 00:21:53,930 --> 00:21:57,850 to the Southern Command ? Mhm . 565 00:21:58,240 --> 00:22:01,010 The non traditional efforts that you 566 00:22:01,010 --> 00:22:03,540 speak of through our special operations 567 00:22:03,540 --> 00:22:05,860 force looks at big data and what the 568 00:22:05,860 --> 00:22:07,527 enemy is doing in Big Daddy's 569 00:22:07,527 --> 00:22:09,360 commercial available information 570 00:22:09,360 --> 00:22:10,916 machine learning artificial 571 00:22:10,916 --> 00:22:13,150 intelligence . It's , uh it is a unique 572 00:22:13,150 --> 00:22:15,261 effort that is now being replicated . 573 00:22:15,261 --> 00:22:18,040 And it is a key area that we need to 574 00:22:18,040 --> 00:22:20,900 emphasize in our intelligence efforts 575 00:22:20,900 --> 00:22:23,260 going forward , appropriately , working 576 00:22:23,260 --> 00:22:25,590 within the US whole government , this 577 00:22:25,590 --> 00:22:27,900 data , it's data that my shipmate 578 00:22:27,910 --> 00:22:30,520 General Van Hurt talks about and 579 00:22:30,530 --> 00:22:32,820 stovepipes in that data that we create 580 00:22:32,830 --> 00:22:35,200 with our own policies have to be broken 581 00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:37,120 down so we can leverage that to 582 00:22:37,130 --> 00:22:39,420 understand what the threats doing and 583 00:22:39,420 --> 00:22:42,660 certainly are line actors that are 584 00:22:42,660 --> 00:22:44,660 working this hemisphere , China and 585 00:22:44,660 --> 00:22:46,771 Russia , they don't respect laws when 586 00:22:46,771 --> 00:22:48,827 they look at exploiting that type of 587 00:22:48,827 --> 00:22:51,160 data for their own benefit . You 588 00:22:51,160 --> 00:22:53,382 mentioned someone is being replicated . 589 00:22:53,382 --> 00:22:55,549 Are you are Are you aware some similar 590 00:22:55,549 --> 00:22:57,771 successful methods with other combatant 591 00:22:57,771 --> 00:23:00,049 commands or the intelligence community ? 592 00:23:00,049 --> 00:23:02,060 We have another pilot program that 593 00:23:02,060 --> 00:23:05,640 we've worked to look at Cryptocurrency 594 00:23:06,030 --> 00:23:08,290 in this hemisphere . With only 8% of 595 00:23:08,290 --> 00:23:10,720 the world's population , 60% of the 596 00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:13,250 Cryptocurrency is being leveraged . And 597 00:23:13,250 --> 00:23:15,139 that's because of the plethora of 598 00:23:15,139 --> 00:23:17,194 transnational criminal organizations 599 00:23:17,194 --> 00:23:19,250 that are wreaking violence in in the 600 00:23:19,250 --> 00:23:21,650 hemisphere . So that's a concern . So 601 00:23:21,650 --> 00:23:25,290 how do we get at that center of gravity 602 00:23:25,300 --> 00:23:27,411 to break the backs of these threats ? 603 00:23:27,411 --> 00:23:29,411 Are working with Treasury and other 604 00:23:29,411 --> 00:23:31,470 partners in support of we're not 605 00:23:31,480 --> 00:23:33,591 looking to take the lead here . We're 606 00:23:33,591 --> 00:23:35,758 looking to play the appropriate role . 607 00:23:35,758 --> 00:23:37,591 So there are efforts , and those 608 00:23:37,591 --> 00:23:39,702 efforts are frankly funded every year 609 00:23:39,702 --> 00:23:43,680 on unfunded requests or through 610 00:23:43,690 --> 00:23:45,880 additional support from Congress . So 611 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:47,991 we need to appropriately sustain that 612 00:23:47,991 --> 00:23:51,150 going forward . Thank you . On Thursday , 613 00:23:51,150 --> 00:23:53,372 North com will begin global information 614 00:23:53,372 --> 00:23:55,180 dominance exercise . Uh , and I 615 00:23:55,180 --> 00:23:57,010 understand that nine of the 11 616 00:23:57,020 --> 00:23:58,964 combatant commands are planning to 617 00:23:58,964 --> 00:24:01,240 participate in this exercise , which is 618 00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:03,407 meant to prototype and test a set of , 619 00:24:03,407 --> 00:24:05,770 uh , ai tools . And I know that there 620 00:24:05,770 --> 00:24:07,826 was some discussion about Pathfinder 621 00:24:07,826 --> 00:24:10,340 earlier , but the intent is to support 622 00:24:10,350 --> 00:24:12,406 joint all demand command and control 623 00:24:12,406 --> 00:24:14,739 implementation . So my question for you , 624 00:24:14,739 --> 00:24:16,906 general , is can you explain why these 625 00:24:16,906 --> 00:24:18,739 types of exercise are absolutely 626 00:24:18,739 --> 00:24:20,628 critical to our modernization and 627 00:24:20,628 --> 00:24:22,794 readiness efforts and why north com is 628 00:24:22,794 --> 00:24:24,961 leading this initiative ? Absolutely . 629 00:24:24,961 --> 00:24:27,017 Senator from the North Command NORAD 630 00:24:27,017 --> 00:24:28,739 perspective . We view data and 631 00:24:28,739 --> 00:24:30,906 information as a strategic asset . And 632 00:24:30,906 --> 00:24:33,072 so we're conducting these exercises to 633 00:24:33,072 --> 00:24:35,330 bring everybody together to show the 634 00:24:35,330 --> 00:24:38,160 true value of the importance at the 635 00:24:38,160 --> 00:24:40,360 strategic ability that we can utilize 636 00:24:40,370 --> 00:24:42,950 information and data . And so we look 637 00:24:42,950 --> 00:24:45,061 forward to continuing to partner with 638 00:24:45,061 --> 00:24:47,394 the combatant commands of services . Uh , 639 00:24:47,394 --> 00:24:49,561 and bringing them together demonstrate 640 00:24:49,561 --> 00:24:52,320 capabilities that can not only help us 641 00:24:52,320 --> 00:24:54,376 in conflict , but more importantly , 642 00:24:54,376 --> 00:24:56,860 help us de escalating crisis and to 643 00:24:56,860 --> 00:24:58,970 deter in competition . All right . 644 00:24:58,980 --> 00:25:00,920 Thank you , General . Thank you . 645 00:25:00,920 --> 00:25:03,142 Senator Peter . Senator Cramer Police . 646 00:25:03,142 --> 00:25:05,364 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank both of 647 00:25:05,364 --> 00:25:07,031 you for being here . Generals 648 00:25:07,031 --> 00:25:09,370 appreciate your service , admiral . And , 649 00:25:09,380 --> 00:25:11,840 uh , in general , I'm gonna start with 650 00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:15,240 you , Admiral . Because early on , in a 651 00:25:15,250 --> 00:25:17,250 response to a question from Senator 652 00:25:17,250 --> 00:25:19,470 Inhofe , you had , um cited the fact 653 00:25:19,470 --> 00:25:21,850 that you only get 1% of the I S . R . 654 00:25:22,340 --> 00:25:24,396 And that was fairly stunning to me . 655 00:25:24,396 --> 00:25:26,618 Especially since the Air Force has been 656 00:25:26,618 --> 00:25:29,700 trying to , um , to retire the RQ Fours 657 00:25:29,700 --> 00:25:31,940 and cut the production of the MQ 92 658 00:25:31,940 --> 00:25:34,162 systems that were very familiar with in 659 00:25:34,162 --> 00:25:36,107 North Dakota . Of course , they're 660 00:25:36,107 --> 00:25:38,218 operated quite effectively out of out 661 00:25:38,218 --> 00:25:40,384 of our state , one by the Air Force in 662 00:25:40,384 --> 00:25:42,496 ground Force , the other by our guard 663 00:25:42,496 --> 00:25:45,130 in Fargo and one of the reasons that 664 00:25:45,130 --> 00:25:47,297 they use for wanting to cut production 665 00:25:47,297 --> 00:25:49,620 or retire . Um , and realizing some of 666 00:25:49,620 --> 00:25:51,676 it , they want to save money for new 667 00:25:51,676 --> 00:25:53,898 systems , and that's that's noble . And 668 00:25:53,898 --> 00:25:56,120 we we need to make some tough decisions 669 00:25:56,120 --> 00:25:57,953 about that . Um , but one of the 670 00:25:57,953 --> 00:26:00,176 reasons they use these platforms aren't 671 00:26:00,176 --> 00:26:01,787 survivable . And Europe your 672 00:26:01,787 --> 00:26:03,787 competition . So my questions you , 673 00:26:03,787 --> 00:26:05,898 admiral , is could you use our Q four 674 00:26:05,898 --> 00:26:08,009 is an empty nines in your theater and 675 00:26:08,009 --> 00:26:07,290 is there a significant threat to the 676 00:26:07,290 --> 00:26:09,568 survival of the these platforms itself . 677 00:26:09,568 --> 00:26:13,190 Calm As you mentioned , Senator , we 678 00:26:13,190 --> 00:26:15,960 received less than 1% of the D o d I S 679 00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:18,460 r and and it's a prioritization . And 680 00:26:18,460 --> 00:26:20,349 there's global challenges . And I 681 00:26:20,349 --> 00:26:23,030 recognize , uh , how that that plays 682 00:26:23,030 --> 00:26:26,540 out . This is a good environment in 683 00:26:26,540 --> 00:26:29,670 South Com for unmanned . We have had , 684 00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:31,736 for the first time ever , an MQ nine 685 00:26:31,736 --> 00:26:33,736 through the past year . And we have 686 00:26:33,736 --> 00:26:35,958 customs and Border Protection , mq nine 687 00:26:35,958 --> 00:26:37,902 as well . And they've proven their 688 00:26:37,902 --> 00:26:39,736 utility because they can stay on 689 00:26:39,736 --> 00:26:41,850 station for a long time and stare at 690 00:26:41,850 --> 00:26:44,430 the threats . They can also learn , in 691 00:26:44,430 --> 00:26:46,597 general , about the environment beyond 692 00:26:46,597 --> 00:26:48,819 the transnational criminal organization 693 00:26:48,819 --> 00:26:50,986 threats . So we have the understanding 694 00:26:50,986 --> 00:26:52,874 that we need to ensure that we're 695 00:26:52,874 --> 00:26:55,208 appropriately postured . Moving forward . 696 00:26:55,208 --> 00:26:57,720 Thank you , General . Thank you for our 697 00:26:57,720 --> 00:26:59,720 discussion last week . I enjoyed it 698 00:26:59,720 --> 00:27:01,942 very much . Found it very interesting . 699 00:27:01,942 --> 00:27:04,109 Learned a lot , as is often the case . 700 00:27:04,109 --> 00:27:06,331 Um , and one of the things that you and 701 00:27:06,331 --> 00:27:08,387 I talked about , of course , was the 702 00:27:08,387 --> 00:27:09,998 fact that NORAD North , um , 703 00:27:09,998 --> 00:27:11,776 participated with the Air Force 704 00:27:11,776 --> 00:27:13,609 Research Laboratory and over the 705 00:27:13,609 --> 00:27:15,720 horizon study that included some 706 00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:17,950 testing at Camp Craft in North Dakota 707 00:27:17,950 --> 00:27:20,510 are National Guard Camp as part of the 708 00:27:20,520 --> 00:27:22,670 OSD Coalition warfare program funded 709 00:27:22,670 --> 00:27:26,500 Arctic HF surveillance program . And we 710 00:27:26,500 --> 00:27:28,333 were told , of course , that the 711 00:27:28,333 --> 00:27:31,830 results exceeded expectations . My 712 00:27:31,830 --> 00:27:34,052 question to you is do you still see the 713 00:27:34,052 --> 00:27:35,997 need for an over the horizon radar 714 00:27:35,997 --> 00:27:37,941 system and capability ? And do you 715 00:27:37,941 --> 00:27:39,997 expect further more advanced testing 716 00:27:39,997 --> 00:27:43,150 anytime soon ? Senator , my , uh , 717 00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:45,130 focus in top priorities domain 718 00:27:45,130 --> 00:27:47,186 awareness and over the horizon radar 719 00:27:47,186 --> 00:27:49,241 would certainly contribute to domain 720 00:27:49,241 --> 00:27:51,352 awareness . My understanding is right 721 00:27:51,352 --> 00:27:53,890 now with regards to the , uh , test 722 00:27:53,890 --> 00:27:56,223 that you're talking about , the current , 723 00:27:56,223 --> 00:27:58,168 uh , northern strategic approaches 724 00:27:58,168 --> 00:28:00,168 study is with the Air Force . We're 725 00:28:00,168 --> 00:28:02,390 waiting for that to come out . I talked 726 00:28:02,390 --> 00:28:04,501 to General Brown on Friday About that 727 00:28:04,501 --> 00:28:06,834 once that report comes out will be , uh , 728 00:28:06,834 --> 00:28:09,001 in a better position to see on the way 729 00:28:09,001 --> 00:28:10,946 forward with the research lab . Or 730 00:28:10,946 --> 00:28:10,660 however , we're going to pursue that . 731 00:28:10,940 --> 00:28:13,051 But domain awareness is at the top of 732 00:28:13,051 --> 00:28:15,440 my integrated priority list . Thank you 733 00:28:15,440 --> 00:28:17,662 for that . And thanks . Thanks for that 734 00:28:17,662 --> 00:28:19,718 answer . And thanks for following up 735 00:28:19,718 --> 00:28:21,718 with General Brown . Um , one other 736 00:28:21,718 --> 00:28:23,884 question for you , General Van Herck . 737 00:28:23,884 --> 00:28:25,996 There's a lot less military president 738 00:28:25,996 --> 00:28:28,107 presence between Michigan and Montana 739 00:28:28,107 --> 00:28:30,273 in the northern . You know , obviously 740 00:28:30,273 --> 00:28:32,329 along the northern border than there 741 00:28:32,329 --> 00:28:34,690 used to be during the Cold War . Even 742 00:28:34,690 --> 00:28:36,746 though I mean , one could argue that 743 00:28:36,746 --> 00:28:38,857 there's there are more threats in the 744 00:28:38,857 --> 00:28:40,857 Arctic and and from missiles coming 745 00:28:40,857 --> 00:28:42,857 over the Arctic even than they were 746 00:28:42,857 --> 00:28:44,912 during the Cold War . If there was a 747 00:28:44,912 --> 00:28:46,912 threat coming over the pole through 748 00:28:46,912 --> 00:28:49,134 Saskatchewan , say , do you have enough 749 00:28:49,134 --> 00:28:51,190 fighters , tankers , missile warning 750 00:28:51,190 --> 00:28:53,246 missile defense systems to meet that 751 00:28:53,246 --> 00:28:56,440 threat ? Senator Day today , I'm 752 00:28:56,440 --> 00:28:58,329 confident in my ability to defend 753 00:28:58,329 --> 00:29:00,890 against the threat that we have day to 754 00:29:00,890 --> 00:29:03,057 day . I'm postured primarily against a 755 00:29:03,057 --> 00:29:05,340 9 11 type of response . If indications 756 00:29:05,340 --> 00:29:07,562 and warning or crisis evolved , I would 757 00:29:07,562 --> 00:29:10,400 go ahead and have a ask for additional 758 00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:12,530 forces at that time . If I was 759 00:29:12,530 --> 00:29:14,586 allocated additional forces or not , 760 00:29:14,586 --> 00:29:16,697 I'd have to make a broader assessment 761 00:29:16,697 --> 00:29:18,808 in my ability to defend when , as you 762 00:29:18,808 --> 00:29:20,530 mentioned , obviously , domain 763 00:29:20,530 --> 00:29:23,320 awareness is you know , the critical 764 00:29:23,320 --> 00:29:26,360 aspect of being prepared is the radar 765 00:29:26,360 --> 00:29:28,527 coverage for that area . Modern enough 766 00:29:28,527 --> 00:29:30,830 to track , um , any threat reliably . 767 00:29:30,830 --> 00:29:34,290 Do you believe Senator I remain 768 00:29:34,290 --> 00:29:36,512 concerned about domain awareness in the 769 00:29:36,512 --> 00:29:38,512 North with the Legacy North Warning 770 00:29:38,512 --> 00:29:40,679 system ? Uh , if we apply capabilities 771 00:29:40,679 --> 00:29:42,901 such as Pathfinder . That will increase 772 00:29:42,901 --> 00:29:45,012 my capability . But more broadly , we 773 00:29:45,012 --> 00:29:47,068 need to get after with more . Modern 774 00:29:47,068 --> 00:29:49,068 system system is not designed to go 775 00:29:49,068 --> 00:29:50,957 after a stovepipe single domain , 776 00:29:50,957 --> 00:29:53,290 single threat . We need systems capable 777 00:29:53,290 --> 00:29:55,346 of going after everything from small 778 00:29:55,346 --> 00:29:57,670 counter US two ballistic missiles that 779 00:29:57,670 --> 00:29:59,837 are able to be efficient , effective . 780 00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:02,240 Excellent . Thank you . You're both 781 00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:04,240 awesome . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 782 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:06,407 Thank you , Senator Cramer . Now , I'd 783 00:30:06,407 --> 00:30:08,407 like to recognize Senator Rosen via 784 00:30:08,407 --> 00:30:11,590 WebEx . Thank you , Chairman Green . 785 00:30:11,590 --> 00:30:13,701 And I want to thank the witnesses for 786 00:30:13,701 --> 00:30:15,870 being here and for your great service 787 00:30:15,870 --> 00:30:18,060 to our nation . Uh , I'd like to speak 788 00:30:18,060 --> 00:30:20,060 a little bit about Hezbollah in the 789 00:30:20,060 --> 00:30:21,893 Western Hemisphere , because for 790 00:30:21,893 --> 00:30:24,110 decades , Iran's proxy , Hezbollah has 791 00:30:24,110 --> 00:30:26,166 maintained an active presence in the 792 00:30:26,166 --> 00:30:28,100 Western Hemisphere , engaging in 793 00:30:28,100 --> 00:30:30,530 terrorist activities , drug trafficking 794 00:30:30,540 --> 00:30:34,270 and money laundering . In 1994 Iran and 795 00:30:34,270 --> 00:30:36,270 Hezbollah bombed a Jewish community 796 00:30:36,270 --> 00:30:38,270 center in Argentina , killing 85 797 00:30:38,270 --> 00:30:41,460 civilians and injuring more than 300 . 798 00:30:41,940 --> 00:30:43,996 The Treasury Department is sanctions 799 00:30:43,996 --> 00:30:46,051 numerous Hezbollah linked operatives 800 00:30:46,051 --> 00:30:48,218 and entities in the Western Hemisphere 801 00:30:48,218 --> 00:30:50,273 for links to transnational organized 802 00:30:50,273 --> 00:30:52,960 crime . So , Admiral Faller , in your 803 00:30:52,960 --> 00:30:54,960 written testimony , you stated that 804 00:30:54,960 --> 00:30:57,260 Hezbollah's external operations arm is 805 00:30:57,260 --> 00:30:59,260 responsible for at least three high 806 00:30:59,260 --> 00:31:01,482 profile attacks in the region and three 807 00:31:01,490 --> 00:31:03,434 other planned operations that were 808 00:31:03,434 --> 00:31:05,490 disrupted . Can you elaborate on the 809 00:31:05,490 --> 00:31:07,379 threat that Hezbollah poses to US 810 00:31:07,379 --> 00:31:09,490 interests in the Western Hemisphere ? 811 00:31:09,490 --> 00:31:11,657 And if its presence is growing , where 812 00:31:11,657 --> 00:31:15,250 do you see it growing center ? These 813 00:31:15,250 --> 00:31:17,490 threats go right back to Iran . The 814 00:31:17,500 --> 00:31:20,230 single largest state sponsor of terror 815 00:31:20,230 --> 00:31:22,119 in the world , in the long arm of 816 00:31:22,119 --> 00:31:24,760 Iranian malfeasance is felt globally , 817 00:31:25,140 --> 00:31:27,490 and in this hemisphere , significant 818 00:31:27,490 --> 00:31:30,650 Lebanese diaspora . They receive 819 00:31:30,660 --> 00:31:32,660 Lebanese Hezbollah receives funding 820 00:31:32,660 --> 00:31:35,780 support and , uh , their intertwined 821 00:31:35,780 --> 00:31:38,002 with Iranian state sponsored terrorists 822 00:31:38,002 --> 00:31:40,620 in ways that undermine global security 823 00:31:40,620 --> 00:31:42,787 and security . In this hemisphere , we 824 00:31:42,787 --> 00:31:44,842 have seen an increase in presence of 825 00:31:45,040 --> 00:31:48,250 ran activities in Venezuela to support 826 00:31:48,250 --> 00:31:50,350 the illegitimate Maduro regime , 827 00:31:50,740 --> 00:31:52,740 increasing the readiness of some of 828 00:31:52,740 --> 00:31:55,180 their defense systems . And we have , 829 00:31:55,190 --> 00:31:57,900 uh , we have seen the continued 830 00:31:57,900 --> 00:32:00,730 involvement with the diaspora and 831 00:32:00,740 --> 00:32:02,740 economic fundraising , particularly 832 00:32:02,740 --> 00:32:04,640 down in the tri border region 833 00:32:04,650 --> 00:32:07,250 neighboring Paraguay , Argentina and 834 00:32:07,250 --> 00:32:10,340 Brazil . Well , you know , you're 835 00:32:10,340 --> 00:32:12,173 speaking of the diaspora that is 836 00:32:12,173 --> 00:32:14,173 extremely important . So how can we 837 00:32:14,173 --> 00:32:16,229 improve information sharing with our 838 00:32:16,229 --> 00:32:18,160 regional partners to identify and 839 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:20,750 disrupt Hezbollah's activity in Latin 840 00:32:20,750 --> 00:32:23,570 America ? One of the very 841 00:32:23,570 --> 00:32:26,400 positive things that I've seen over the 842 00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:28,344 last couple years is the extent to 843 00:32:28,344 --> 00:32:30,567 which we have increased our information 844 00:32:30,567 --> 00:32:32,900 sharing with key partners . Uh , Brazil , 845 00:32:32,900 --> 00:32:35,240 Colombia . We rely on them , their like 846 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:36,907 minded democracies , to share 847 00:32:36,907 --> 00:32:39,018 information so that we understand the 848 00:32:39,018 --> 00:32:40,740 threat . We have expanded that 849 00:32:40,740 --> 00:32:42,907 information sharing significantly this 850 00:32:42,907 --> 00:32:44,962 year . It is key to moving forward , 851 00:32:44,962 --> 00:32:47,018 and it's built on longstanding trust 852 00:32:47,018 --> 00:32:48,796 that we have that's born out of 853 00:32:48,796 --> 00:32:50,920 professional military education . We 854 00:32:50,920 --> 00:32:53,640 have security cooperation programs that 855 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:56,380 work to build professional intelligence 856 00:32:56,380 --> 00:32:59,210 services . We do this through our 333 857 00:32:59,210 --> 00:33:02,250 program , and sustaining those programs 858 00:33:02,250 --> 00:33:04,310 are very important . During the past 859 00:33:04,310 --> 00:33:06,290 year , we've been able to expand 860 00:33:06,300 --> 00:33:08,430 modestly those programs in 861 00:33:08,430 --> 00:33:10,880 cybersecurity , and that will really be 862 00:33:10,890 --> 00:33:13,580 critical to understanding both the 863 00:33:13,580 --> 00:33:15,900 threat that's posed by Iran and their 864 00:33:15,910 --> 00:33:18,030 their their state sponsored or 865 00:33:18,030 --> 00:33:20,260 terrorist organizations and other 866 00:33:20,270 --> 00:33:23,700 nation state actors like China . Thank 867 00:33:23,700 --> 00:33:26,240 you . I'd like to move on and ask 868 00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:28,462 General Van hurt a little bit about our 869 00:33:28,462 --> 00:33:30,670 covid response and support . You've 870 00:33:30,670 --> 00:33:32,837 been so terrific you've deployed maybe 871 00:33:32,837 --> 00:33:34,950 hospital ships at the start of the 872 00:33:34,950 --> 00:33:37,172 pandemic . You've cared for coronavirus 873 00:33:37,172 --> 00:33:39,360 patients at Army Field hospitals and 874 00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:41,416 now , of course , President Biden is 875 00:33:41,416 --> 00:33:43,638 directing states to open up vaccination 876 00:33:43,638 --> 00:33:45,804 appointments to all American adults by 877 00:33:45,804 --> 00:33:48,850 make first . Um , So I'm curious what 878 00:33:48,850 --> 00:33:51,200 your role , Maybe in this new mission . 879 00:33:51,210 --> 00:33:53,940 So how is North Com generating and 880 00:33:53,940 --> 00:33:56,270 deploying forces to support the vaccine 881 00:33:56,270 --> 00:33:59,300 distribution and administrative mission 882 00:33:59,310 --> 00:34:01,730 and specifically , as members of the 883 00:34:01,730 --> 00:34:03,508 military and their families get 884 00:34:03,508 --> 00:34:05,119 vaccinated and once military 885 00:34:05,119 --> 00:34:07,720 installations are covered , Do you have 886 00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:09,860 coordinated plans or preliminary ? Or 887 00:34:09,860 --> 00:34:11,471 how , If you had preliminary 888 00:34:11,471 --> 00:34:13,193 conversations with local civil 889 00:34:13,193 --> 00:34:15,270 authorities to leverage the capacity 890 00:34:15,270 --> 00:34:17,490 you have on the basis , uh , for the 891 00:34:17,490 --> 00:34:19,640 local communities to get the vaccines 892 00:34:19,640 --> 00:34:22,590 deployed , Senator , we worked with not 893 00:34:22,590 --> 00:34:24,640 only local communities , state 894 00:34:24,650 --> 00:34:27,090 authorities and our our local basis to 895 00:34:27,090 --> 00:34:29,370 ensure that we follow the D . O . D s 896 00:34:29,370 --> 00:34:32,660 published guidelines along with the C . 897 00:34:32,660 --> 00:34:35,660 D . C . As well . And so I'm confident 898 00:34:35,660 --> 00:34:37,660 going forward that will continue to 899 00:34:37,660 --> 00:34:40,100 provide that support . We've worked 900 00:34:40,100 --> 00:34:41,933 with the department . I put in a 901 00:34:41,933 --> 00:34:44,370 request for 100 teams , uh , 50 type 902 00:34:44,370 --> 00:34:46,840 one teams , the most capable capable of 903 00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:48,951 delivering about 6000 shots per day , 904 00:34:49,240 --> 00:34:52,180 Uh , and also , uh , 50 type two teams . 905 00:34:52,180 --> 00:34:54,180 As far as sourcing those , uh , the 906 00:34:54,180 --> 00:34:56,610 joint staff works with the services and 907 00:34:56,610 --> 00:34:58,830 the departments to calculate and come 908 00:34:58,830 --> 00:35:00,663 up with sourcing solutions . The 909 00:35:00,663 --> 00:35:02,830 secretary approves those and allocates 910 00:35:02,830 --> 00:35:04,941 them to me . Uh , and we work through 911 00:35:04,941 --> 00:35:07,620 FEMA for the the actual location of MS 912 00:35:07,620 --> 00:35:09,940 Assignment on how we're gonna continue 913 00:35:09,940 --> 00:35:12,107 executing President Biden's mission to 914 00:35:12,107 --> 00:35:14,750 get where he needs to be on one July . 915 00:35:16,140 --> 00:35:17,550 Thank you very much . 916 00:35:19,740 --> 00:35:21,740 Thank you . Senator Rosen . Senator 917 00:35:21,740 --> 00:35:24,670 Scott , please . Thank you . Chairman . 918 00:35:24,670 --> 00:35:26,840 Read . Mm . Follow . Thank you for the 919 00:35:26,840 --> 00:35:29,700 conversation last week . As we all know , 920 00:35:29,710 --> 00:35:31,432 the fundamental problem in our 921 00:35:31,432 --> 00:35:33,980 hemisphere is Cuba . Uh , they they're 922 00:35:33,980 --> 00:35:35,924 the root of all the instability in 923 00:35:35,924 --> 00:35:37,980 Latin America . They terrorize their 924 00:35:37,980 --> 00:35:40,036 own citizens . They steal from their 925 00:35:40,036 --> 00:35:41,813 own citizens . And they support 926 00:35:41,813 --> 00:35:43,758 dictators in Latin America such as 927 00:35:43,758 --> 00:35:46,270 Maduro in Venezuela and Ortega in 928 00:35:46,270 --> 00:35:49,800 Nicaragua . How important is it 929 00:35:49,810 --> 00:35:53,550 for in your role for the Cuban regime 930 00:35:53,560 --> 00:35:55,830 to not have resources to do everything 931 00:35:55,830 --> 00:35:58,790 we can as a country to make sure that 932 00:35:58,790 --> 00:36:00,623 the cash regime doesn't have the 933 00:36:00,623 --> 00:36:02,734 resources they to terrorize their own 934 00:36:02,734 --> 00:36:04,679 citizens and , uh , be involved in 935 00:36:04,679 --> 00:36:07,300 these other countries ? In addition to 936 00:36:07,300 --> 00:36:10,450 the the nefarious activity site center , 937 00:36:10,460 --> 00:36:13,440 Cuba and Russia and China actively 938 00:36:13,440 --> 00:36:16,450 engaged just miles from our home state . 939 00:36:16,830 --> 00:36:18,886 And it's concerning , as we see that 940 00:36:18,886 --> 00:36:21,360 relationship going forward . So to the 941 00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,660 extent to which we can 942 00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:27,260 prevent those kind of relationships 943 00:36:27,260 --> 00:36:29,150 from developing and from Cuba , 944 00:36:29,150 --> 00:36:31,317 enhancing its capabilities , it's very 945 00:36:31,317 --> 00:36:33,539 important . And one of our assets , one 946 00:36:33,539 --> 00:36:36,040 of our real strategic toeholds in that 947 00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:38,500 effort is our naval station at at 948 00:36:38,510 --> 00:36:42,190 Guantanamo Bay do . Is it 949 00:36:42,190 --> 00:36:43,912 important that they don't have 950 00:36:43,912 --> 00:36:46,590 resources ? I think it's extremely 951 00:36:46,590 --> 00:36:48,920 important that the , uh , we prevent 952 00:36:48,930 --> 00:36:51,810 the Cubans and they're communists from 953 00:36:51,810 --> 00:36:53,532 doing what they're doing in in 954 00:36:53,532 --> 00:36:55,421 Venezuela , where they're keeping 955 00:36:55,421 --> 00:36:57,366 Maduro and power and where they're 956 00:36:57,366 --> 00:36:59,310 undermining . We see them actively 957 00:36:59,310 --> 00:37:01,477 undermining free and fair elections of 958 00:37:01,477 --> 00:37:03,754 democracies across the hemisphere . So , 959 00:37:03,754 --> 00:37:03,510 yes , Senator , what's their 960 00:37:03,510 --> 00:37:06,050 involvement in Venezuela now ? Are they ? 961 00:37:06,060 --> 00:37:08,227 Are they part of provoking Venezuela's 962 00:37:08,227 --> 00:37:12,040 aggression against Guyana ? Cuba's uh , 963 00:37:12,050 --> 00:37:14,383 Praetorian guard keeps Maduro and power . 964 00:37:14,383 --> 00:37:16,328 They're they're in the thousands . 965 00:37:16,328 --> 00:37:18,217 They've They own the intelligence 966 00:37:18,217 --> 00:37:20,870 service , uh , alongside Russia 967 00:37:20,880 --> 00:37:23,280 primarily , and Iran and China . To a 968 00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:25,224 lesser extent , they're supporting 969 00:37:25,224 --> 00:37:27,940 maintaining Maduro's uh uh huh 970 00:37:28,930 --> 00:37:32,530 defense systems and security forces and 971 00:37:32,540 --> 00:37:36,330 the undoubtedly that then gives 972 00:37:36,340 --> 00:37:40,040 Maduro the capacity and capability to 973 00:37:40,050 --> 00:37:41,939 rattle the saber and threaten the 974 00:37:41,939 --> 00:37:44,740 neighbors , Uh , and also , frankly , 975 00:37:45,030 --> 00:37:46,700 allows a safe haven for 976 00:37:46,700 --> 00:37:48,880 narcotraffickers and narcoterrorists 977 00:37:48,880 --> 00:37:51,102 which is what Venezuela's become . It's 978 00:37:51,102 --> 00:37:53,090 it's hell for its citizens and its 979 00:37:53,090 --> 00:37:56,930 heaven for the terrorists . So what can 980 00:37:56,930 --> 00:37:58,763 your command due to confront the 981 00:37:58,763 --> 00:38:00,930 reports of illegal shipping , shipping 982 00:38:00,930 --> 00:38:03,030 activity out of Venezuela , 983 00:38:04,620 --> 00:38:06,620 were actively involved with all our 984 00:38:06,620 --> 00:38:08,731 energy partners to track that , learn 985 00:38:08,731 --> 00:38:10,980 as much as we can about it , and then 986 00:38:10,980 --> 00:38:12,758 provide that information to our 987 00:38:12,758 --> 00:38:14,924 diplomats who can call it out and come 988 00:38:14,924 --> 00:38:18,030 up with solutions that support the 989 00:38:18,030 --> 00:38:20,660 whole government ? Efforts to shift 990 00:38:20,670 --> 00:38:24,200 Venezuela Did democracy have you are 991 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:26,089 our government government through 992 00:38:26,089 --> 00:38:28,089 sanctions , been able to do much to 993 00:38:28,089 --> 00:38:30,256 stop the flow of oil from Venezuela to 994 00:38:30,256 --> 00:38:33,640 Cuba , the 995 00:38:33,650 --> 00:38:37,050 pressure has worked . The Maduro regime 996 00:38:37,050 --> 00:38:39,540 has been denied resources . But in any 997 00:38:39,540 --> 00:38:42,390 of these things are very clever . When 998 00:38:42,390 --> 00:38:44,880 you have no regard for rule law and and 999 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:46,936 corruption fuels everything you do , 1000 00:38:46,936 --> 00:38:48,991 and you're supported by nation state 1001 00:38:48,991 --> 00:38:51,360 actors like like Russia and China . You 1002 00:38:51,360 --> 00:38:53,830 can circumvent rules and laws , and and 1003 00:38:53,830 --> 00:38:56,200 they've been able to keep the flow up 1004 00:38:56,210 --> 00:38:59,940 just enough to maintain their economy , 1005 00:38:59,950 --> 00:39:03,080 particularly the regimes grip on that 1006 00:39:03,090 --> 00:39:05,650 economy and its people on life support . 1007 00:39:06,320 --> 00:39:08,320 Can you talk a little bit about the 1008 00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:10,376 humanitarian crisis both in Cuba and 1009 00:39:10,376 --> 00:39:12,860 Venezuela as a result of the Castro and 1010 00:39:12,860 --> 00:39:15,360 Maduro regimes . Well , the human 1011 00:39:15,370 --> 00:39:17,592 United Nations Human Rights Report lays 1012 00:39:17,592 --> 00:39:19,814 it out . The atrocities that the regime 1013 00:39:19,814 --> 00:39:23,220 has committed on the people are are 1014 00:39:23,230 --> 00:39:25,341 beyond compare in this hemisphere and 1015 00:39:25,341 --> 00:39:27,563 have created the largest migrant crisis 1016 00:39:27,563 --> 00:39:29,619 this hemisphere has ever seen . Some 1017 00:39:29,619 --> 00:39:31,841 five million migrants that have swelled 1018 00:39:31,841 --> 00:39:34,008 the the services and of all the social 1019 00:39:34,008 --> 00:39:35,897 services . That's why we deployed 1020 00:39:35,897 --> 00:39:38,119 hospital ship comfort twice in a year's 1021 00:39:38,119 --> 00:39:40,410 period prior to the pandemic . It's a 1022 00:39:40,410 --> 00:39:42,530 credit to Colombia and Brazil , and 1023 00:39:42,530 --> 00:39:44,640 other democracy is that they've been 1024 00:39:44,640 --> 00:39:46,696 able to handle it as effectively . I 1025 00:39:46,696 --> 00:39:49,930 commend them , and , uh , and in 1026 00:39:49,930 --> 00:39:53,130 similarly in in Cuba , it's , uh , you 1027 00:39:53,130 --> 00:39:55,074 know , and that's , uh , we've had 1028 00:39:55,074 --> 00:39:57,220 passed migrant crisis , and we have a 1029 00:39:57,220 --> 00:39:59,276 mission set to prepare with Homeland 1030 00:39:59,276 --> 00:40:01,350 Security . For that , we've seen a 1031 00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:03,820 slight uptick this year and migrants 1032 00:40:03,820 --> 00:40:06,170 and coming out of Cuba , we're watching 1033 00:40:06,170 --> 00:40:08,503 it very closely . And undoubtedly again . 1034 00:40:08,503 --> 00:40:10,281 It's due to the brutal economic 1035 00:40:10,281 --> 00:40:11,948 conditions and , uh , and the 1036 00:40:11,948 --> 00:40:13,950 repression and that we see . And we 1037 00:40:13,950 --> 00:40:16,170 study that , uh , intensely in our 1038 00:40:16,170 --> 00:40:18,226 intelligence and information sharing 1039 00:40:18,226 --> 00:40:20,392 efforts . Thank you , Admiral Fallon . 1040 00:40:20,392 --> 00:40:22,470 Thank you , Chairman . Thank you . 1041 00:40:22,480 --> 00:40:24,850 Senator Scott and let me recognize 1042 00:40:24,850 --> 00:40:27,220 under Kelly , please . Thank you . Mr 1043 00:40:27,220 --> 00:40:30,180 Chairman . Admiral Faller . Uh , you 1044 00:40:30,180 --> 00:40:32,291 and I had an extended discussion last 1045 00:40:32,291 --> 00:40:34,347 week about activity in the region as 1046 00:40:34,347 --> 00:40:36,300 well as some of the push factors 1047 00:40:36,310 --> 00:40:39,520 contributing to migration flows , 1048 00:40:40,010 --> 00:40:42,380 Uh , that are exacerbating the 1049 00:40:42,390 --> 00:40:44,501 challenging situation at the southern 1050 00:40:44,501 --> 00:40:46,420 border . I'd like to focus on the 1051 00:40:46,420 --> 00:40:49,040 strength of criminal organizations in 1052 00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:52,170 the region . A recent report by the 1053 00:40:52,170 --> 00:40:54,337 Center for Strategic and International 1054 00:40:54,337 --> 00:40:56,700 Studies found that the countries of the 1055 00:40:56,700 --> 00:40:59,960 Northern Triangle lose more than 3% of 1056 00:40:59,960 --> 00:41:03,520 their GDP to organized crime each year . 1057 00:41:04,010 --> 00:41:07,470 These TCO s also contribute to 1058 00:41:07,470 --> 00:41:10,950 outside outsized homicide rates and 1059 00:41:11,040 --> 00:41:13,470 undermine governance and security in 1060 00:41:13,470 --> 00:41:17,040 the region . The bottom line is they're 1061 00:41:17,040 --> 00:41:19,690 in some ways better resourced than 1062 00:41:19,690 --> 00:41:23,300 state actors and have proven capable of 1063 00:41:23,300 --> 00:41:26,050 trafficking guns , money , drugs and 1064 00:41:26,050 --> 00:41:29,050 people . It's a major problem , given 1065 00:41:29,050 --> 00:41:31,780 these dynamics . Do you feel you have 1066 00:41:31,780 --> 00:41:34,490 the authority necessarily to conduct 1067 00:41:34,490 --> 00:41:36,323 operations that will effectively 1068 00:41:36,323 --> 00:41:39,130 disrupt their activity in the long term ? 1069 00:41:41,510 --> 00:41:43,621 They , as you mentioned center , they 1070 00:41:43,621 --> 00:41:45,621 controlled territory . They're well 1071 00:41:45,621 --> 00:41:48,310 funded . They have a strength of in 1072 00:41:48,310 --> 00:41:50,532 close to 200,000 . When you look across 1073 00:41:50,532 --> 00:41:52,643 the region , which is on par with all 1074 00:41:52,643 --> 00:41:54,977 the police and military forces in total , 1075 00:41:55,110 --> 00:41:58,580 uh , so powerful enemy to host nations , 1076 00:41:58,580 --> 00:42:01,810 democracies and direct impact on our 1077 00:42:01,820 --> 00:42:03,931 homeland defense . Here in the United 1078 00:42:03,931 --> 00:42:06,380 States , the , uh , our role is 1079 00:42:06,380 --> 00:42:08,620 appropriately in support , detection 1080 00:42:08,620 --> 00:42:11,060 and monitoring , which means we we find 1081 00:42:11,060 --> 00:42:13,282 out as much as we can and where we have 1082 00:42:13,282 --> 00:42:15,393 authorities . We pass that off to law 1083 00:42:15,393 --> 00:42:17,800 enforcement to interdict , and then we 1084 00:42:17,800 --> 00:42:20,430 work at building our host station 1085 00:42:20,430 --> 00:42:23,050 partners capacity . We are short in 1086 00:42:23,050 --> 00:42:25,272 intelligence assets . We have less than 1087 00:42:25,272 --> 00:42:29,020 1% of those assets . We need additional 1088 00:42:29,020 --> 00:42:32,390 capacity to build our partners so that 1089 00:42:32,390 --> 00:42:34,334 they can take care of this problem 1090 00:42:34,334 --> 00:42:37,940 themselves . And we have received , uh , 1091 00:42:37,950 --> 00:42:40,006 about the right amount of presence . 1092 00:42:40,006 --> 00:42:42,339 But it's important we stay on the field . 1093 00:42:42,339 --> 00:42:44,394 An example of that is our Joint Task 1094 00:42:44,394 --> 00:42:46,561 Force Bravo , which is a small team of 1095 00:42:46,561 --> 00:42:48,450 about 700 soldiers and airmen and 1096 00:42:48,450 --> 00:42:50,450 Marines . It's Soto Cano , Honduras 1097 00:42:50,900 --> 00:42:53,450 that can support law enforcement with 1098 00:42:53,450 --> 00:42:56,180 lift with some intelligence , but more 1099 00:42:56,180 --> 00:42:58,347 importantly , can rapidly respond . We 1100 00:42:58,347 --> 00:43:01,140 saw that this past fall to back to back 1101 00:43:01,140 --> 00:43:03,650 hurricanes major hurricanes , and we 1102 00:43:03,650 --> 00:43:06,900 saved hundreds of lives rapidly and 1103 00:43:06,900 --> 00:43:08,790 what that does builds trust and 1104 00:43:08,790 --> 00:43:11,280 actually helps us build the case for 1105 00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:13,224 these partnerships and sustainable 1106 00:43:13,224 --> 00:43:16,600 security Long term . Earlier you 1107 00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:19,210 stressed you did again that the 1108 00:43:19,220 --> 00:43:22,840 1% of I s are funding 1109 00:43:22,850 --> 00:43:25,510 goes to South com . Is that correct ? 1110 00:43:26,400 --> 00:43:28,800 It's 1% of the overall of the overall 1111 00:43:28,800 --> 00:43:31,540 sits in capability center . So But 1112 00:43:31,540 --> 00:43:34,380 beyond that , if you were to , uh 1113 00:43:34,390 --> 00:43:37,420 wanted to ramp up the effectiveness of 1114 00:43:37,420 --> 00:43:40,490 disrupting their activity , what are 1115 00:43:40,490 --> 00:43:43,300 the resources would you need , sir ? 1116 00:43:43,300 --> 00:43:45,467 We've gotta We've gotta come up with a 1117 00:43:45,467 --> 00:43:47,411 more effective whole of government 1118 00:43:47,411 --> 00:43:49,578 effort in the United States and really 1119 00:43:49,578 --> 00:43:51,633 get at mapping . These networks were 1120 00:43:51,633 --> 00:43:53,856 doing that , but it's it's nascent . It 1121 00:43:53,856 --> 00:43:55,800 needs more effort than finding the 1122 00:43:55,800 --> 00:43:57,950 center of gravity what's key to each 1123 00:43:57,960 --> 00:44:00,380 organization and then going at 1124 00:44:00,380 --> 00:44:02,380 disrupting , defeating or deterring 1125 00:44:02,380 --> 00:44:04,350 that . And most of that is law 1126 00:44:04,350 --> 00:44:06,470 enforcement or a judicial or partner 1127 00:44:06,470 --> 00:44:08,803 nation effort with South common support . 1128 00:44:08,803 --> 00:44:10,914 So we play a critical role , but it's 1129 00:44:10,914 --> 00:44:13,670 got to be more holistically designed 1130 00:44:13,670 --> 00:44:15,790 here in the US We can't interdict our 1131 00:44:15,790 --> 00:44:17,846 way out of this . Well , thank you . 1132 00:44:17,846 --> 00:44:20,980 Thank you , Admiral . Uh , General Van 1133 00:44:20,980 --> 00:44:23,310 Herk , you mentioned in your testimony 1134 00:44:23,310 --> 00:44:25,420 that the Pathfinder program is a 1135 00:44:25,790 --> 00:44:27,980 compliment to the work done by the 1136 00:44:27,990 --> 00:44:30,800 Defense Innovation Unit . Um , 1137 00:44:31,390 --> 00:44:33,780 also the importance of being able to 1138 00:44:33,790 --> 00:44:37,070 rapidly field capabilities of the 1139 00:44:37,070 --> 00:44:39,292 future as chair of the emerging threats 1140 00:44:39,292 --> 00:44:41,514 and capabilities subcommittee . This is 1141 00:44:41,514 --> 00:44:43,459 something I've been thinking a lot 1142 00:44:43,459 --> 00:44:45,220 about . Are you looking into 1143 00:44:45,790 --> 00:44:47,700 technologies like artificial 1144 00:44:47,700 --> 00:44:50,760 intelligence to assist in processing 1145 00:44:50,760 --> 00:44:53,500 the increasingly large volumes of data 1146 00:44:53,980 --> 00:44:55,980 that come from our sensor systems , 1147 00:44:57,190 --> 00:44:59,301 Senator ? Absolutely . As a matter of 1148 00:44:59,301 --> 00:45:01,301 fact , Pathfinder does exactly that 1149 00:45:01,301 --> 00:45:03,079 uses machine learning , uh , an 1150 00:45:03,079 --> 00:45:05,301 additional capability . We must go down 1151 00:45:05,301 --> 00:45:07,357 that path to operate in a timely and 1152 00:45:07,357 --> 00:45:09,490 efficient , effective manner . Any 1153 00:45:09,490 --> 00:45:11,657 sense of our adversaries are doing the 1154 00:45:11,657 --> 00:45:13,880 same thing using these technologies . 1155 00:45:13,890 --> 00:45:16,223 Absolutely , Senator . Especially china . 1156 00:45:16,223 --> 00:45:19,500 Uh , they're actively moving forward 1157 00:45:19,500 --> 00:45:21,830 with artificial intelligence . And then 1158 00:45:21,830 --> 00:45:24,660 finally , are there any research gaps 1159 00:45:24,660 --> 00:45:26,771 that you see that you think we should 1160 00:45:26,771 --> 00:45:30,100 be investing more in ? Uh , 1161 00:45:30,590 --> 00:45:33,860 not specific to research . I would say 1162 00:45:33,870 --> 00:45:37,270 we must go to space sooner in space . 1163 00:45:37,270 --> 00:45:39,048 Space capabilities that give us 1164 00:45:39,048 --> 00:45:41,520 persistent domain awareness . That's 1165 00:45:41,520 --> 00:45:43,576 where I would be focusing my efforts 1166 00:45:43,576 --> 00:45:45,631 right now . Okay . Thank you . Thank 1167 00:45:45,631 --> 00:45:47,853 you , Mr Chairman . Thank you . Senator 1168 00:45:47,853 --> 00:45:49,853 Kelly . Let me recognize . Sandra . 1169 00:45:49,853 --> 00:45:52,520 Holy please . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 1170 00:45:52,530 --> 00:45:54,808 Thank you , gentlemen , for being here , 1171 00:45:54,808 --> 00:45:57,141 General Van her . Let me start with you . 1172 00:45:57,141 --> 00:45:59,197 Uh , let me thank you . On behalf of 1173 00:45:59,197 --> 00:46:01,308 all Missourians , it's great to see a 1174 00:46:01,308 --> 00:46:03,474 fellow Missourian here as before , and 1175 00:46:03,474 --> 00:46:02,940 we're very proud of you and your 1176 00:46:02,940 --> 00:46:05,162 service . So thank you for being here . 1177 00:46:05,162 --> 00:46:07,370 Uh , let's come back to this question 1178 00:46:07,370 --> 00:46:09,314 of the border . Customs and Border 1179 00:46:09,314 --> 00:46:11,480 Patrol issued a new batch of 1180 00:46:11,480 --> 00:46:13,760 operational statistics last week that 1181 00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:15,871 showed that CBP encountered more than 1182 00:46:15,871 --> 00:46:18,180 100,000 persons attempting entry across 1183 00:46:18,180 --> 00:46:20,069 the southern border in February . 1184 00:46:20,069 --> 00:46:22,236 That's about a 200% increase over this 1185 00:46:22,236 --> 00:46:24,291 time last year . They also show that 1186 00:46:24,291 --> 00:46:26,236 the number of unaccompanied minors 1187 00:46:26,236 --> 00:46:28,013 attempting to cross our borders 1188 00:46:28,013 --> 00:46:30,850 Children has doubled since January and 1189 00:46:30,850 --> 00:46:32,850 the number of family units has more 1190 00:46:32,850 --> 00:46:35,090 than doubled from January to February . 1191 00:46:35,280 --> 00:46:37,670 Give us a sense of how the surge of 1192 00:46:37,670 --> 00:46:40,060 migrants is helping or hindering the 1193 00:46:40,060 --> 00:46:42,300 cartel's operations along the border . 1194 00:46:44,680 --> 00:46:46,847 Senator , I'm not aware of necessarily 1195 00:46:46,847 --> 00:46:49,020 how it hinders or helps . I think it's 1196 00:46:49,020 --> 00:46:52,380 a symptom of the transnational criminal 1197 00:46:52,380 --> 00:46:54,491 organization problem that we actually 1198 00:46:54,491 --> 00:46:57,110 see . Uh , as Admiral Faller pointed 1199 00:46:57,110 --> 00:46:58,940 out , you know , hurricanes , 1200 00:46:58,950 --> 00:47:01,290 transnational criminal organizations . 1201 00:47:01,680 --> 00:47:03,850 Um , all the murders contribute 1202 00:47:03,850 --> 00:47:07,530 directly to , uh the what We're 1203 00:47:07,530 --> 00:47:09,641 seeing on the border , which includes 1204 00:47:09,880 --> 00:47:12,102 the migration that you're alluding to . 1205 00:47:12,480 --> 00:47:15,290 I think it's this today that the 1206 00:47:15,300 --> 00:47:17,300 secretary of Homeland Security said 1207 00:47:17,300 --> 00:47:19,870 that we're on pace now for a 20 year 1208 00:47:19,870 --> 00:47:22,490 high in border encounters , a 20 year 1209 00:47:22,500 --> 00:47:24,500 record , which is pretty astounding 1210 00:47:24,500 --> 00:47:27,040 considering some of the previous 1211 00:47:27,040 --> 00:47:29,262 searches we've seen , For instance , in 1212 00:47:29,262 --> 00:47:31,484 2014 . Is it fair to say that we've got 1213 00:47:31,484 --> 00:47:33,596 a crisis now at the southern border ? 1214 00:47:33,596 --> 00:47:36,570 General Senator , I'll stay out of the 1215 00:47:36,570 --> 00:47:38,626 politics of whether it's a crisis or 1216 00:47:38,626 --> 00:47:41,500 not . Uh , it's absolutely a homeland 1217 00:47:41,500 --> 00:47:43,910 defense issue that I'm concerned about . 1218 00:47:43,920 --> 00:47:45,753 I'm concerned because it creates 1219 00:47:45,753 --> 00:47:47,253 opportunities . It creates 1220 00:47:47,253 --> 00:47:49,253 vulnerabilities , and we have to be 1221 00:47:49,253 --> 00:47:51,087 postured for each of those . The 1222 00:47:51,087 --> 00:47:53,364 vulnerabilities that it creates forces , 1223 00:47:53,364 --> 00:47:55,031 uh , instability . It creates 1224 00:47:55,031 --> 00:47:57,253 instability and governance . It creates 1225 00:47:57,253 --> 00:47:59,364 instabilities in the rule of law , if 1226 00:47:59,364 --> 00:48:01,476 you will , in neighboring countries , 1227 00:48:01,476 --> 00:48:03,531 those will be exploited by countries 1228 00:48:03,531 --> 00:48:05,698 such as China , Russia , Iran . So for 1229 00:48:05,698 --> 00:48:07,531 me , it's a homeland defense and 1230 00:48:07,531 --> 00:48:09,698 national security imperative to take a 1231 00:48:09,698 --> 00:48:11,753 look at that . Yeah , I think you're 1232 00:48:11,753 --> 00:48:13,476 absolutely right . It's also a 1233 00:48:13,476 --> 00:48:15,698 humanitarian crisis , and I'm from what 1234 00:48:15,698 --> 00:48:15,420 I'm not afraid of the word crisis . I 1235 00:48:15,420 --> 00:48:16,864 can't understand why this 1236 00:48:16,864 --> 00:48:18,920 administration is afraid of the word 1237 00:48:18,920 --> 00:48:20,753 crisis and given the given , the 1238 00:48:20,753 --> 00:48:22,920 unbelievable humanitarian issues we're 1239 00:48:22,920 --> 00:48:24,920 seeing at the border and the record 1240 00:48:24,920 --> 00:48:27,087 surge that we're on pace for , I think 1241 00:48:27,087 --> 00:48:29,031 this administration's inability to 1242 00:48:29,031 --> 00:48:30,920 admit that their own policies are 1243 00:48:30,920 --> 00:48:33,031 causing this crisis and the effect it 1244 00:48:33,031 --> 00:48:32,920 is having in terms of emboldening the 1245 00:48:32,920 --> 00:48:34,976 cartels . As you're saying , we know 1246 00:48:34,976 --> 00:48:37,031 that no nobody crosses that southern 1247 00:48:37,031 --> 00:48:39,350 border without the permission . And 1248 00:48:39,350 --> 00:48:41,294 indeed , without the profit of the 1249 00:48:41,294 --> 00:48:43,239 cartels , nobody . It's a holy run 1250 00:48:43,239 --> 00:48:45,461 criminal enterprise at the southern end 1251 00:48:45,461 --> 00:48:47,683 of the border and this administration's 1252 00:48:47,683 --> 00:48:47,460 inability to grapple with that and do 1253 00:48:47,460 --> 00:48:49,349 something about it . I think it's 1254 00:48:49,349 --> 00:48:51,460 frankly astounding , and we're seeing 1255 00:48:51,460 --> 00:48:53,627 it just a day on day on day grow worse 1256 00:48:53,627 --> 00:48:55,516 and worse . Let me ask you this , 1257 00:48:55,516 --> 00:48:57,349 General , we've sent billions of 1258 00:48:57,349 --> 00:48:59,182 dollars in security in money , a 1259 00:48:59,182 --> 00:49:01,127 security assistance to the Mexican 1260 00:49:01,127 --> 00:49:03,349 government over the past 14 years . Yet 1261 00:49:03,349 --> 00:49:05,404 we are seeing as you just alluded to 1262 00:49:05,404 --> 00:49:08,000 escalating violence , uh , even more 1263 00:49:08,000 --> 00:49:10,540 drugs headed northward that those drugs 1264 00:49:10,540 --> 00:49:12,707 make their way into every state of the 1265 00:49:12,707 --> 00:49:14,762 union , including including our home 1266 00:49:14,762 --> 00:49:16,929 state , my home state of Missouri . In 1267 00:49:16,929 --> 00:49:19,590 your assessment , why has our security 1268 00:49:19,670 --> 00:49:21,892 assistance to Mexico fallen so short of 1269 00:49:21,892 --> 00:49:24,059 its security objectives . Why have not 1270 00:49:24,059 --> 00:49:26,114 we've been able to to achieve more , 1271 00:49:26,114 --> 00:49:28,170 considering the prodigious sums that 1272 00:49:28,170 --> 00:49:31,520 we've invested ? Uh , first , I would 1273 00:49:31,520 --> 00:49:33,520 talk to Homeland Security about the 1274 00:49:33,520 --> 00:49:35,960 problem . It's a law enforcement issue , 1275 00:49:35,960 --> 00:49:38,071 much of it coming across the border . 1276 00:49:38,071 --> 00:49:40,182 But I would tell you that the Mexican 1277 00:49:40,182 --> 00:49:42,238 military we have an incredibly close 1278 00:49:42,238 --> 00:49:41,980 partnership , and they're doing 1279 00:49:41,980 --> 00:49:43,980 incredible things down there . With 1280 00:49:43,980 --> 00:49:46,147 that being said , I think , is Admiral 1281 00:49:46,147 --> 00:49:48,202 Faller alluded to We need a whole of 1282 00:49:48,202 --> 00:49:50,258 government strategy , you know , the 1283 00:49:50,258 --> 00:49:49,580 arms that are arming these 1284 00:49:49,590 --> 00:49:51,646 transnational criminal organizations 1285 00:49:51,646 --> 00:49:53,812 come right here from the United States 1286 00:49:53,812 --> 00:49:55,812 of America and they flow south . In 1287 00:49:55,812 --> 00:49:57,701 addition to that , the money that 1288 00:49:57,701 --> 00:49:59,868 they're creating is being generated by 1289 00:49:59,868 --> 00:50:02,090 precursors coming from Asia from Asia , 1290 00:50:02,090 --> 00:50:05,120 China businesses and in , uh , industry , 1291 00:50:05,130 --> 00:50:07,297 if you will , that flows in there . So 1292 00:50:07,297 --> 00:50:09,408 we have to take a broader approach to 1293 00:50:09,408 --> 00:50:11,408 get after this , which includes the 1294 00:50:11,408 --> 00:50:13,130 whole of government effort and 1295 00:50:13,130 --> 00:50:15,241 prioritizing and putting resources to 1296 00:50:15,241 --> 00:50:15,140 the problem . Speaking of China , 1297 00:50:15,140 --> 00:50:17,307 Admiral , let me come to you in just a 1298 00:50:17,307 --> 00:50:19,529 little bit of time . I've got remaining 1299 00:50:19,529 --> 00:50:21,696 you wrote in your testimony that China 1300 00:50:21,696 --> 00:50:23,418 is seeking to establish global 1301 00:50:23,418 --> 00:50:25,584 logistics and basing infrastructure in 1302 00:50:25,584 --> 00:50:27,751 our hemisphere in order to project and 1303 00:50:27,751 --> 00:50:29,862 sustain military power . What kind of 1304 00:50:29,862 --> 00:50:31,600 presence do the Chinese forces 1305 00:50:31,600 --> 00:50:33,656 maintained in the Western Hemisphere 1306 00:50:33,656 --> 00:50:35,656 today that we ought to be concerned 1307 00:50:35,656 --> 00:50:37,490 about ? I have to ask ourselves 1308 00:50:37,490 --> 00:50:39,434 questions . Why is China trying to 1309 00:50:39,434 --> 00:50:41,601 achieve deep water ports and Dominican 1310 00:50:41,601 --> 00:50:43,546 Republic , Jamaica , El Salvador , 1311 00:50:43,546 --> 00:50:45,268 Panama , Panama , canals , key 1312 00:50:45,268 --> 00:50:47,434 strategic ground , Argentina . They're 1313 00:50:47,434 --> 00:50:49,601 sitting there . They're using economic 1314 00:50:49,601 --> 00:50:51,379 influence and access to set the 1315 00:50:51,379 --> 00:50:53,601 conditions for the blue water Navy that 1316 00:50:53,601 --> 00:50:55,601 they've built . Very good . I think 1317 00:50:55,601 --> 00:50:57,601 we're gonna have a closed session , 1318 00:50:57,601 --> 00:50:57,490 aren't we , Mr Chairman ? So , uh , 1319 00:50:57,500 --> 00:50:59,722 we're plenty that Yes . Okay , I have a 1320 00:50:59,722 --> 00:51:01,722 few more questions for you , then . 1321 00:51:01,722 --> 00:51:03,833 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 1322 00:51:03,833 --> 00:51:03,810 Senator Howley . Now let me recognize , 1323 00:51:03,810 --> 00:51:04,977 Senator to be real . 1324 00:51:07,560 --> 00:51:10,340 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you 1325 00:51:10,340 --> 00:51:12,284 both for being here today and what 1326 00:51:12,284 --> 00:51:14,118 you've done for Homeland and our 1327 00:51:14,118 --> 00:51:16,229 hemisphere . Uh , General , it's been 1328 00:51:16,229 --> 00:51:18,340 20 years since we've had an attack on 1329 00:51:18,340 --> 00:51:20,562 our homeland . Thank you for that . And 1330 00:51:20,562 --> 00:51:22,700 everybody at North Com hard work that 1331 00:51:22,700 --> 00:51:24,756 you've done . You know , I very much 1332 00:51:24,756 --> 00:51:26,867 agree with you . What ? What you said 1333 00:51:26,867 --> 00:51:28,978 about outpacing our competitors ? I'm 1334 00:51:28,978 --> 00:51:31,144 proud to say that Alabama were working 1335 00:51:31,144 --> 00:51:33,144 to leap ahead in the areas of hyper 1336 00:51:33,144 --> 00:51:35,430 Sonics working very hard on that . And 1337 00:51:35,440 --> 00:51:37,607 right now , if the world's largest and 1338 00:51:37,607 --> 00:51:39,920 fastest hypersonic wind tunnel is under 1339 00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:42,410 construction in Huntsville and I know 1340 00:51:42,410 --> 00:51:44,980 they're working in a fast pace , uh , 1341 00:51:45,660 --> 00:51:47,771 Admiral and Georgia conversation last 1342 00:51:47,771 --> 00:51:50,850 week and Georgia straight talk , I hope 1343 00:51:50,850 --> 00:51:53,510 the American people will , uh , start 1344 00:51:53,510 --> 00:51:55,621 getting a sense of urgency . Uh , you 1345 00:51:55,621 --> 00:51:57,732 have your hands full and south . Um , 1346 00:51:57,732 --> 00:52:00,340 no doubt about it between transnational 1347 00:52:00,340 --> 00:52:02,340 criminal organization in Russia and 1348 00:52:02,340 --> 00:52:05,470 China . You're a busy man . Uh , I do 1349 00:52:05,470 --> 00:52:08,690 believe for a moment that the PRC's 1350 00:52:08,690 --> 00:52:12,120 plan in our hemisphere are benign , and 1351 00:52:12,120 --> 00:52:14,480 I hope that will not take a Chinese 1352 00:52:14,490 --> 00:52:16,379 aircraft carriers selling between 1353 00:52:16,379 --> 00:52:19,030 Florida and the Bahamas for Americans 1354 00:52:19,030 --> 00:52:21,540 to wake up to the fact that the CCP 1355 00:52:21,550 --> 00:52:23,980 wish to nominate the world stage . I 1356 00:52:23,990 --> 00:52:25,990 hope it doesn't take something like 1357 00:52:25,990 --> 00:52:28,212 that . You know , the work that both of 1358 00:52:28,212 --> 00:52:30,212 you done for South Common North com 1359 00:52:30,212 --> 00:52:32,212 does for our nation is incredible , 1360 00:52:32,212 --> 00:52:34,379 important to maintaining our strategic 1361 00:52:34,379 --> 00:52:36,950 military objectives . Many of the items 1362 00:52:36,950 --> 00:52:38,728 for both of you in the areas of 1363 00:52:38,728 --> 00:52:41,210 responsibility strongly impact my home 1364 00:52:41,210 --> 00:52:43,530 state in Alabama admiral following the 1365 00:52:43,540 --> 00:52:46,650 2018 national defense strategy is 1366 00:52:46,650 --> 00:52:48,650 something I personally believe in a 1367 00:52:48,650 --> 00:52:50,594 good way to position our forces to 1368 00:52:50,594 --> 00:52:52,800 thinking towards the future . Can you 1369 00:52:52,800 --> 00:52:55,560 explain how south , um is important to 1370 00:52:55,560 --> 00:52:57,700 this strategy and specifically , how 1371 00:52:57,700 --> 00:52:59,756 would you describe China's strategic 1372 00:52:59,756 --> 00:53:01,720 objectives in a five or 10 year 1373 00:53:01,720 --> 00:53:05,650 timeline ? Well , I think that China 1374 00:53:05,660 --> 00:53:08,650 has , uh , seeks economic dominance 1375 00:53:08,650 --> 00:53:10,840 globally , and their strategic 1376 00:53:10,840 --> 00:53:13,290 objective is to be the dominant global 1377 00:53:13,290 --> 00:53:15,520 power unquestionably . And they'll do 1378 00:53:15,520 --> 00:53:18,040 that in whatever way possible to ensure 1379 00:53:18,040 --> 00:53:20,420 they have the prominence of the 1380 00:53:20,430 --> 00:53:23,700 Communist Party . In this hemisphere , 1381 00:53:23,710 --> 00:53:26,050 it's across all fronts . It's not just 1382 00:53:26,050 --> 00:53:28,350 economics . Typically , we think about 1383 00:53:28,350 --> 00:53:30,239 that , and we have this fallacy . 1384 00:53:30,239 --> 00:53:32,290 That's just economics . It's in the 1385 00:53:32,290 --> 00:53:34,530 military realm . They've recognized 1386 00:53:34,530 --> 00:53:36,697 that partners in this hemisphere can't 1387 00:53:36,697 --> 00:53:38,863 afford a lot of equipment . So they've 1388 00:53:38,863 --> 00:53:41,780 upped the game and gifts , and , uh , 1389 00:53:41,790 --> 00:53:43,568 and when they do offer military 1390 00:53:43,568 --> 00:53:45,679 equipment , it's , uh , often through 1391 00:53:45,679 --> 00:53:47,679 corrupt deals that we can't compete 1392 00:53:47,679 --> 00:53:49,346 with . They've replicated our 1393 00:53:49,346 --> 00:53:52,030 professional military education . They 1394 00:53:52,030 --> 00:53:55,130 have u bic UIs , I t solutions . They 1395 00:53:55,130 --> 00:53:57,860 have created engineering and cyber 1396 00:53:57,860 --> 00:53:59,920 scholarships for military personnel 1397 00:53:59,920 --> 00:54:02,087 that goes beyond the kind of education 1398 00:54:02,087 --> 00:54:04,309 and training that we offer in our I met 1399 00:54:04,309 --> 00:54:06,570 programs , they have expanded their 1400 00:54:06,570 --> 00:54:09,620 defense attache presence . They have , 1401 00:54:09,630 --> 00:54:12,670 uh , at least turned a blind eye to a 1402 00:54:12,670 --> 00:54:15,770 range of illegal activity , unregulated 1403 00:54:15,780 --> 00:54:18,360 fishing , unreported fishing . I'm 1404 00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:21,320 illegal mining and logging . And all 1405 00:54:21,320 --> 00:54:23,431 this is done in an environment fueled 1406 00:54:23,431 --> 00:54:26,500 by corruption , with no regard for 1407 00:54:26,500 --> 00:54:28,611 little regard for human rights trying 1408 00:54:28,611 --> 00:54:30,850 to write their version of the rules of 1409 00:54:30,850 --> 00:54:33,130 the game . Uh , we've got to stay on 1410 00:54:33,130 --> 00:54:35,160 the field to compete . We do that . 1411 00:54:35,160 --> 00:54:37,382 Well , no one is better than the United 1412 00:54:37,390 --> 00:54:40,260 States Military Department of Defense . 1413 00:54:40,270 --> 00:54:42,440 Uh , but we've got to work hard 1414 00:54:42,440 --> 00:54:44,551 entirely with a sense of urgency that 1415 00:54:44,551 --> 00:54:47,230 you mentioned to stay number one in the 1416 00:54:47,230 --> 00:54:50,710 game and to be the best . Thank you , 1417 00:54:50,710 --> 00:54:53,350 General , In regards to our southern 1418 00:54:53,350 --> 00:54:55,406 border security , we we hear all the 1419 00:54:55,406 --> 00:54:57,510 negatives . What do you think has 1420 00:54:57,510 --> 00:54:59,454 improved the most in the last four 1421 00:54:59,454 --> 00:55:02,010 years , and and then what worries you 1422 00:55:02,010 --> 00:55:04,140 most looking forward at the southern 1423 00:55:04,140 --> 00:55:05,140 border . 1424 00:55:07,140 --> 00:55:10,040 Uh , I think the coordination between 1425 00:55:10,040 --> 00:55:12,040 the department and the inter agency 1426 00:55:12,040 --> 00:55:15,090 with regards to , uh since 2018 has , 1427 00:55:15,100 --> 00:55:17,044 uh , has been probably the biggest 1428 00:55:17,044 --> 00:55:20,240 improvement , Uh , with regards to what 1429 00:55:20,240 --> 00:55:22,407 worries me most is about having domain 1430 00:55:22,407 --> 00:55:24,407 awareness and the opportunities and 1431 00:55:24,407 --> 00:55:26,407 vulnerabilities , Uh , that already 1432 00:55:26,407 --> 00:55:28,184 talked about in our own Western 1433 00:55:28,184 --> 00:55:30,970 Hemisphere . For state actors such as 1434 00:55:30,970 --> 00:55:34,090 China , Russia or Iran , uh , in our 1435 00:55:34,090 --> 00:55:35,812 own neighborhood , uh , due to 1436 00:55:35,812 --> 00:55:38,780 instability due to ungoverned areas and 1437 00:55:38,790 --> 00:55:41,012 spaces . So I'm significantly concerned 1438 00:55:41,012 --> 00:55:43,234 about what's going on right here in our 1439 00:55:43,234 --> 00:55:45,800 own hemisphere and neighborhood . Do 1440 00:55:45,810 --> 00:55:49,810 you think we need a wall ? I'll stay 1441 00:55:49,810 --> 00:55:52,240 out of the the politics of a wall . 1442 00:55:52,250 --> 00:55:54,417 Border security , politics . You think 1443 00:55:54,417 --> 00:55:56,720 we need one Border security is national 1444 00:55:56,720 --> 00:55:58,942 security . We we need to ensure that we 1445 00:55:58,942 --> 00:56:01,160 have policies in place . Laws are 1446 00:56:01,160 --> 00:56:03,310 enforced to ensure that homeland 1447 00:56:03,310 --> 00:56:05,510 defense does not become a more 1448 00:56:05,510 --> 00:56:08,140 strategic issue from the borders . Yeah , 1449 00:56:08,230 --> 00:56:10,230 One thing I noticed coaching for 40 1450 00:56:10,230 --> 00:56:12,730 years and being in education is the 1451 00:56:12,730 --> 00:56:14,841 just the influx of drugs . You know , 1452 00:56:14,841 --> 00:56:17,008 just take away everybody coming across 1453 00:56:17,008 --> 00:56:19,174 the border is just the influx of drugs 1454 00:56:19,174 --> 00:56:21,119 are killing . Our kids were losing 1455 00:56:21,119 --> 00:56:24,120 60,000 year to overdose . I mean , that 1456 00:56:24,120 --> 00:56:26,610 right there should be a just to alarm 1457 00:56:26,610 --> 00:56:28,443 that we've got to have something 1458 00:56:28,443 --> 00:56:31,400 different . Senator , I agree with you . 1459 00:56:31,410 --> 00:56:33,632 Actually , I believe the number of this 1460 00:56:33,632 --> 00:56:35,688 past year was approximately 80,000 . 1461 00:56:35,688 --> 00:56:37,799 That's that's unsatisfactory . And we 1462 00:56:37,799 --> 00:56:39,910 have to get after that . And that's a 1463 00:56:39,910 --> 00:56:39,870 symptom of that broader problem that I 1464 00:56:39,870 --> 00:56:41,870 talked about transnational criminal 1465 00:56:41,870 --> 00:56:43,648 organizations that we can apply 1466 00:56:43,648 --> 00:56:45,814 priority and resources to to get after 1467 00:56:45,814 --> 00:56:47,981 it . Yeah . Thank you . Thank you , Mr 1468 00:56:47,981 --> 00:56:49,703 Chairman . Thank you , Senator 1469 00:56:49,703 --> 00:56:51,703 Tuberville . Now , let me recognize 1470 00:56:51,703 --> 00:56:55,330 Senator Blackburn via WebEx . Thank you , 1471 00:56:55,330 --> 00:56:59,130 Mr Chairman . We so appreciate having 1472 00:56:59,130 --> 00:57:02,460 the hearing today and getting the 1473 00:57:02,460 --> 00:57:05,650 update . And Admiral Faller , thank you 1474 00:57:05,660 --> 00:57:08,210 for the time that you spent with me on 1475 00:57:08,210 --> 00:57:12,170 the phone last week . Um , General Van 1476 00:57:12,170 --> 00:57:15,160 Ark , I I wanna go back to your 1477 00:57:15,160 --> 00:57:18,330 statement on Pathfinder , the prototype 1478 00:57:18,330 --> 00:57:22,280 Pathfinder Data Analytics project . Um , 1479 00:57:22,290 --> 00:57:25,270 this is the kind of project that I 1480 00:57:25,270 --> 00:57:29,140 think attacks two primary concerns with 1481 00:57:29,150 --> 00:57:32,940 D o D data streams . One is 1482 00:57:32,950 --> 00:57:35,780 the stove piping , and the other is the 1483 00:57:35,780 --> 00:57:38,810 need for modernization . And many times 1484 00:57:38,810 --> 00:57:40,930 I sound like a broken record , if you 1485 00:57:40,930 --> 00:57:44,350 will , by talking about 1486 00:57:44,830 --> 00:57:48,010 of what has happened with d o . D . 1487 00:57:48,010 --> 00:57:50,130 Through the years , as things have 1488 00:57:50,130 --> 00:57:53,910 become so stovepiped and the need for 1489 00:57:53,910 --> 00:57:55,730 this modernization , because 1490 00:57:55,730 --> 00:57:59,480 information is power , we all know that . 1491 00:57:59,490 --> 00:58:02,910 But you have to be able to 1492 00:58:02,920 --> 00:58:06,260 analyze to share and to 1493 00:58:06,270 --> 00:58:09,650 make actionable that data . 1494 00:58:10,320 --> 00:58:13,610 So my question for you 1495 00:58:13,620 --> 00:58:17,310 is how could the Pentagon 1496 00:58:17,320 --> 00:58:21,280 better , Um , utilize some 1497 00:58:21,280 --> 00:58:24,880 of these emerging technologies such as 1498 00:58:24,890 --> 00:58:28,580 artificial intelligence , such as the 1499 00:58:28,590 --> 00:58:32,170 data that we're getting v A s R , um , 1500 00:58:32,170 --> 00:58:35,320 and the AI that is used by 1501 00:58:35,320 --> 00:58:38,940 Pathfinder , too ? Really ? 1502 00:58:39,420 --> 00:58:42,280 Make that information accessible . 1503 00:58:42,290 --> 00:58:44,800 Share a ble across platforms and 1504 00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:48,240 divisions and actionable when you're 1505 00:58:48,240 --> 00:58:51,650 looking at how you implement plans for 1506 00:58:51,650 --> 00:58:54,800 the future , how you change plans 1507 00:58:54,810 --> 00:58:58,350 based on the information that you're 1508 00:58:58,350 --> 00:59:02,280 getting Senator First , I 1509 00:59:02,280 --> 00:59:04,336 would tell you I'm encouraged by the 1510 00:59:04,336 --> 00:59:06,502 joint warfighting concept , which also 1511 00:59:06,502 --> 00:59:09,220 has a supplement for information 1512 00:59:09,220 --> 00:59:11,331 advantage that will help us move down 1513 00:59:11,331 --> 00:59:13,620 this as far as utilizing the data , I 1514 00:59:13,620 --> 00:59:17,410 agree . It's a strategic , uh , asset . 1515 00:59:17,410 --> 00:59:20,020 If you will data , we can utilize it to 1516 00:59:20,020 --> 00:59:23,150 not only a dominating conflict , but to 1517 00:59:23,150 --> 00:59:25,372 create deterrence day to day . So , for 1518 00:59:25,372 --> 00:59:27,594 example , as an operational commander , 1519 00:59:27,594 --> 00:59:29,706 this data that's available to me if I 1520 00:59:29,706 --> 00:59:32,790 utilize it with applying artificial 1521 00:59:32,790 --> 00:59:35,610 intelligence and machine learning and 1522 00:59:35,610 --> 00:59:37,700 then disseminate it to key decision 1523 00:59:37,700 --> 00:59:39,756 makers , I'm able to position forces 1524 00:59:39,756 --> 00:59:42,000 ahead of a competitor or adversaries 1525 00:59:42,000 --> 00:59:44,222 actions which creates deterrence . It's 1526 00:59:44,222 --> 00:59:46,420 that deterrence by denial but we must 1527 00:59:46,420 --> 00:59:48,520 go faster in the department . And 30 1528 00:59:48,520 --> 00:59:50,687 years ago , the department led the way 1529 00:59:50,687 --> 00:59:52,960 with innovations . Today , I think that 1530 00:59:52,970 --> 00:59:55,192 paradigm has flip flopped to where much 1531 00:59:55,192 --> 00:59:57,360 of industry and Silicon Valley is 1532 00:59:57,360 --> 00:59:59,840 leading , uh , the way forward , 1533 00:59:59,850 --> 01:00:02,072 especially with regard to data . And so 1534 01:00:02,072 --> 01:00:03,739 we need to take a look at our 1535 01:00:03,739 --> 01:00:05,906 acquisition processes or modernization 1536 01:00:05,906 --> 01:00:07,850 processes and potentially flip the 1537 01:00:07,850 --> 01:00:11,230 paradigm to stay competitive . Do you 1538 01:00:11,230 --> 01:00:14,720 feel like that the Pentagon 1539 01:00:14,730 --> 01:00:18,720 itself is flexible and agile 1540 01:00:18,730 --> 01:00:22,270 enough to make these changes 1541 01:00:22,280 --> 01:00:25,350 utilize this data , make a change in a 1542 01:00:25,350 --> 01:00:29,090 game plan immediately and apply what 1543 01:00:29,090 --> 01:00:31,034 they're learning from that intel ? 1544 01:00:33,410 --> 01:00:36,140 I believe that the Pentagon has proven 1545 01:00:36,140 --> 01:00:37,807 over history to be incredibly 1546 01:00:37,807 --> 01:00:40,270 successful in adapting when we need to . 1547 01:00:40,370 --> 01:00:42,370 It hasn't always been as fast , and 1548 01:00:42,370 --> 01:00:44,537 that's one of the reasons I talk about 1549 01:00:44,537 --> 01:00:46,426 it . We have to have some culture 1550 01:00:46,426 --> 01:00:48,648 change . I would also tell you this may 1551 01:00:48,648 --> 01:00:50,759 require some looks at policy . It may 1552 01:00:50,759 --> 01:00:52,648 even require some looks at law to 1553 01:00:52,648 --> 01:00:54,537 utilize data differently as we go 1554 01:00:54,537 --> 01:00:56,648 forward . What we don't want to do is 1555 01:00:56,648 --> 01:00:58,870 create capabilities that we can utilize 1556 01:00:58,870 --> 01:01:00,870 and the policy that we have and the 1557 01:01:00,870 --> 01:01:03,037 laws that we have don't allow us to be 1558 01:01:03,037 --> 01:01:04,870 successful with the data and the 1559 01:01:04,870 --> 01:01:06,926 information that's available . Thank 1560 01:01:06,926 --> 01:01:09,037 you for that . I may come back to you 1561 01:01:09,037 --> 01:01:11,660 for some . Some specifics . Admiral 1562 01:01:11,660 --> 01:01:14,810 Faller , we've talked a lot about China 1563 01:01:14,820 --> 01:01:18,220 this morning and the transnational 1564 01:01:18,230 --> 01:01:20,580 organizations . But as you look at 1565 01:01:20,580 --> 01:01:23,590 dealing with China , whether it is 1566 01:01:23,590 --> 01:01:27,110 through fentanyl and drugs or belt and 1567 01:01:27,110 --> 01:01:30,030 road or great power competition , what 1568 01:01:30,030 --> 01:01:33,000 do you not have access to in self calm 1569 01:01:33,010 --> 01:01:36,850 that you need ? But as 1570 01:01:36,850 --> 01:01:38,850 we've discussed , China is a global 1571 01:01:38,850 --> 01:01:41,017 threat . And we've got to address some 1572 01:01:41,017 --> 01:01:43,230 holistic that challenged holistically 1573 01:01:43,230 --> 01:01:45,460 across the U . S . Government in the 1574 01:01:45,460 --> 01:01:47,630 South . Kamio are We've got to be . We 1575 01:01:47,630 --> 01:01:49,797 have to be appropriately postured . So 1576 01:01:49,797 --> 01:01:53,210 we need the right footprint of forces 1577 01:01:53,220 --> 01:01:56,190 working with our embassies and our 1578 01:01:56,190 --> 01:01:58,470 interagency team to stay engaged with 1579 01:01:58,470 --> 01:02:01,450 our partner . So additional locations 1580 01:02:01,460 --> 01:02:03,860 for presence , not permanent , but 1581 01:02:03,870 --> 01:02:05,814 access is really critical . Moving 1582 01:02:05,814 --> 01:02:09,680 forward . Such a network concept 1583 01:02:09,680 --> 01:02:13,520 with our allies . Correct . Correct 1584 01:02:13,520 --> 01:02:16,930 center . Okay . Thank you all for that . 1585 01:02:16,930 --> 01:02:19,130 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you , 1586 01:02:19,130 --> 01:02:21,241 Senator . Very much . And gentlemen , 1587 01:02:21,241 --> 01:02:23,880 thank you for your testimony and your 1588 01:02:23,880 --> 01:02:26,740 service to the nation . Uh , let me 1589 01:02:26,740 --> 01:02:29,470 remind my colleagues that upon a 1590 01:02:29,470 --> 01:02:32,940 journey that will immediately move to 1591 01:02:32,950 --> 01:02:36,130 SPC . To 17 for a classified briefing 1592 01:02:36,130 --> 01:02:38,880 by Admiral Faler about increasing 1593 01:02:38,880 --> 01:02:41,090 Chinese influence in the south calm 1594 01:02:41,100 --> 01:02:43,950 area . Uh , there also is a vote 1595 01:02:43,950 --> 01:02:47,330 scheduled for noon . Uh , so we will 1596 01:02:47,330 --> 01:02:49,441 try to We will accomplish both . I'll 1597 01:02:49,441 --> 01:02:51,608 see you shortly over there , Admiral . 1598 01:02:51,608 --> 01:02:53,774 Follow . And , General , thank you for 1599 01:02:53,774 --> 01:02:56,108 your distinguished service at North Com . 1600 01:02:56,108 --> 01:02:57,830 No further business before the 1601 01:02:57,830 --> 01:02:59,930 committee . I'll adjourn . Yeah .