1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,450 Begin first . We will adjourn the 2 00:00:02,450 --> 00:00:04,561 public portion of this hearing at one 3 00:00:04,561 --> 00:00:06,672 o'clock and immediately move upstairs 4 00:00:06,672 --> 00:00:08,783 for the classified portion . Second , 5 00:00:08,783 --> 00:00:10,894 as we noticed last week , we will run 6 00:00:10,894 --> 00:00:12,839 questions in reverse seniority for 7 00:00:12,839 --> 00:00:15,090 those president , the gavel . Uh we try 8 00:00:15,090 --> 00:00:17,260 to do this every year to give our 9 00:00:17,270 --> 00:00:19,437 members at the bottom of the diets the 10 00:00:19,437 --> 00:00:21,603 opportunity participate earlier in the 11 00:00:21,603 --> 00:00:25,060 process . Yeah , that's 12 00:00:25,060 --> 00:00:27,070 right . That's right . 13 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:30,420 I've heard many objections 14 00:00:32,080 --> 00:00:33,858 today . We kick off our posture 15 00:00:33,858 --> 00:00:36,024 hearings with North Common South com . 16 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:38,422 I want to thank our witnesses for being 17 00:00:38,422 --> 00:00:40,589 here in their service to our country . 18 00:00:40,589 --> 00:00:42,700 In recent weeks , the American people 19 00:00:42,700 --> 00:00:44,811 saw firsthand that China's aggression 20 00:00:44,811 --> 00:00:47,030 knows no geographic boundaries . 21 00:00:47,600 --> 00:00:49,650 China's spy balloon violated U S 22 00:00:49,650 --> 00:00:52,600 sovereignty and challenged us homeland 23 00:00:52,600 --> 00:00:56,020 defense . Unfortunately , uh this 24 00:00:56,030 --> 00:00:58,010 should come as no surprise . The 25 00:00:58,010 --> 00:01:00,121 Chinese Communist Party has long been 26 00:01:00,121 --> 00:01:02,177 expanding its influence in North and 27 00:01:02,177 --> 00:01:04,343 South America . 25 of the 31 countries 28 00:01:04,343 --> 00:01:07,240 in South com A O R have welcomed 29 00:01:07,240 --> 00:01:09,550 infrastructure investment from the CCP . 30 00:01:09,560 --> 00:01:12,840 21 have formally joined the CCPS Belt 31 00:01:12,840 --> 00:01:15,250 and Road initiative . The CCP is 32 00:01:15,250 --> 00:01:17,420 backing projects to build new or 33 00:01:17,420 --> 00:01:20,120 operate existing seaports in Brazil , 34 00:01:20,130 --> 00:01:22,980 Peru , Ecuador , Jamaica , Argentina 35 00:01:22,980 --> 00:01:26,150 Panama , Mexico and the Bahamas . This 36 00:01:26,150 --> 00:01:28,230 is concerning because the CCP is 37 00:01:28,230 --> 00:01:30,286 leveraging these investments to gain 38 00:01:30,286 --> 00:01:33,200 strategic footholds in our hemisphere . 39 00:01:34,010 --> 00:01:36,150 Many of these countries host ports , 40 00:01:36,150 --> 00:01:39,700 calls , host ports , calls by military 41 00:01:39,700 --> 00:01:41,922 equipment and receive training from the 42 00:01:41,922 --> 00:01:44,370 P L A . Sadly , the number of South and 43 00:01:44,370 --> 00:01:46,481 Central American countries willing to 44 00:01:46,481 --> 00:01:48,703 enter into partnerships with the CCP is 45 00:01:48,703 --> 00:01:51,320 only growing . We need to take , take 46 00:01:51,320 --> 00:01:53,042 action to reverse that trend . 47 00:01:53,300 --> 00:01:55,580 Unfortunately , the CCP is not only 48 00:01:55,590 --> 00:01:58,430 maligned , it's not the only malign 49 00:01:58,430 --> 00:02:00,541 influence in the western hemisphere . 50 00:02:00,541 --> 00:02:02,540 Russia recently deploys troops to 51 00:02:02,550 --> 00:02:05,580 Nicaragua Venezuela and continues to 52 00:02:05,580 --> 00:02:09,120 prop up Cuba's communist regime . Now 53 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:11,287 even Iran is gaining presence in South 54 00:02:11,287 --> 00:02:14,010 America . Just two weeks after 55 00:02:14,010 --> 00:02:16,121 President Biden welcomed Brazil's new 56 00:02:16,121 --> 00:02:18,066 president to the White House . Two 57 00:02:18,066 --> 00:02:20,177 Iranian warships were allowed to dock 58 00:02:20,177 --> 00:02:23,230 in Rio . We must stop being so 59 00:02:23,230 --> 00:02:25,080 complacent about our adversaries 60 00:02:25,080 --> 00:02:27,330 growing influence in our hemisphere . 61 00:02:27,340 --> 00:02:29,562 We need to do more to build and enhance 62 00:02:29,562 --> 00:02:31,800 partnerships in the region . Beyond the 63 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:33,911 growing presence of our adversaries , 64 00:02:33,911 --> 00:02:36,133 many areas of South and Central America 65 00:02:36,133 --> 00:02:38,356 continue to be havens for transnational 66 00:02:38,356 --> 00:02:40,467 criminal organizations . These brutal 67 00:02:40,467 --> 00:02:43,750 criminal gangs gangs prey on thousands 68 00:02:43,750 --> 00:02:46,550 of vulnerable men , women and Children , 69 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:48,780 they steal their money and endanger 70 00:02:48,780 --> 00:02:50,891 their lives with perilous attempts to 71 00:02:50,891 --> 00:02:53,590 gain illegal entry at our borders . 72 00:02:53,940 --> 00:02:56,560 They also uh they are also the main 73 00:02:56,560 --> 00:02:58,504 source of fentaNYL other dangerous 74 00:02:58,504 --> 00:03:00,449 drugs smuggled across our border . 75 00:03:00,449 --> 00:03:02,282 We're seeing the consequences on 76 00:03:02,282 --> 00:03:05,530 streets across America . Over 100,000 77 00:03:05,530 --> 00:03:07,419 are dying each year from fentaNYL 78 00:03:07,419 --> 00:03:10,530 overdoses alone at our southern border . 79 00:03:10,540 --> 00:03:14,100 A record 2.7 million migrants illegally 80 00:03:14,100 --> 00:03:17,130 crossed into our country in 2022 that 81 00:03:17,130 --> 00:03:19,241 blew away the previous record by over 82 00:03:19,241 --> 00:03:21,850 one million individuals , communities 83 00:03:21,850 --> 00:03:24,072 in our border states and throughout the 84 00:03:24,072 --> 00:03:26,128 country are struggling as a result . 85 00:03:26,660 --> 00:03:28,827 North common south com are doing their 86 00:03:28,827 --> 00:03:30,827 best to provide support to civilian 87 00:03:30,827 --> 00:03:32,716 authorities to address the border 88 00:03:32,716 --> 00:03:34,771 crisis . But the real solution rests 89 00:03:34,771 --> 00:03:37,090 with our president . He needs to stop 90 00:03:37,090 --> 00:03:39,368 with the excuses and secure our border . 91 00:03:39,368 --> 00:03:41,312 Finally , I'm very concerned about 92 00:03:41,312 --> 00:03:43,423 secretary's decision to go along with 93 00:03:43,423 --> 00:03:45,423 the Commerce Department's plan that 94 00:03:45,423 --> 00:03:47,368 will lead to the auctioning off of 95 00:03:47,368 --> 00:03:49,700 critical D O D spectrum . This spectrum 96 00:03:49,700 --> 00:03:51,756 is used for the vast majority of our 97 00:03:51,756 --> 00:03:53,811 military radar systems including our 98 00:03:53,811 --> 00:03:56,033 early warning , homeland and ship borne 99 00:03:56,033 --> 00:03:58,370 missile defense . Um Having a lot of 100 00:03:58,370 --> 00:04:00,592 trouble understanding the rationale for 101 00:04:00,592 --> 00:04:02,703 his decision , especially when Russia 102 00:04:02,703 --> 00:04:04,870 has suspended new start treaty , North 103 00:04:04,870 --> 00:04:07,180 Korea is launching more I C B M s and 104 00:04:07,180 --> 00:04:09,347 China is sending hypersonic around the 105 00:04:09,347 --> 00:04:11,700 globe . I expect the D O D to explain 106 00:04:11,700 --> 00:04:14,520 this to this committee how it is in our 107 00:04:14,520 --> 00:04:16,631 national security interest to auction 108 00:04:16,631 --> 00:04:18,464 off this vital spectrum . I look 109 00:04:18,464 --> 00:04:20,576 forward to hearing from our witnesses 110 00:04:20,576 --> 00:04:22,742 and getting their best military advice 111 00:04:22,742 --> 00:04:22,410 on how to overcome the security 112 00:04:22,410 --> 00:04:24,577 challenges we face . And with that , I 113 00:04:24,577 --> 00:04:26,910 yield to my friend , the ranking member , 114 00:04:26,910 --> 00:04:28,966 Mr Smith . Thank you Mr Chairman . I 115 00:04:28,966 --> 00:04:31,077 appreciate it . I want to welcome our 116 00:04:31,077 --> 00:04:33,243 witnesses , General Van Herk , General 117 00:04:33,243 --> 00:04:35,354 Richardson , Miss Dalton . Appreciate 118 00:04:35,354 --> 00:04:34,560 your leadership and appreciate you 119 00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:36,560 being before us today . I think the 120 00:04:36,560 --> 00:04:38,338 chairman laid out a pretty good 121 00:04:38,338 --> 00:04:40,393 analysis of the threats that we face 122 00:04:40,393 --> 00:04:43,250 and you two A O R s . And I just want 123 00:04:43,250 --> 00:04:45,990 to agree with that . Um , starting with 124 00:04:46,020 --> 00:04:49,100 in the North American Domain as General 125 00:04:49,100 --> 00:04:51,580 Van Herk put it , the domain awareness 126 00:04:51,580 --> 00:04:53,747 issues are , are significant . We , we 127 00:04:53,747 --> 00:04:55,858 need to know what's coming at us . We 128 00:04:55,858 --> 00:04:57,802 need to be able to see um what the 129 00:04:57,802 --> 00:05:00,024 threats are and certainly publicly , we 130 00:05:00,024 --> 00:05:02,024 saw what the threats could be um at 131 00:05:02,024 --> 00:05:04,302 high altitude from apparently balloons . 132 00:05:04,370 --> 00:05:06,314 But some of the bigger threats are 133 00:05:06,314 --> 00:05:08,426 cyber . Do we know how well protected 134 00:05:08,426 --> 00:05:10,537 our systems are ? So when it comes to 135 00:05:10,537 --> 00:05:12,703 protecting the homeland , that's where 136 00:05:12,703 --> 00:05:14,926 it starts , are we aware of the threats 137 00:05:14,926 --> 00:05:17,037 that are coming at us in all possible 138 00:05:17,037 --> 00:05:19,370 domains ? And this is not an easy thing . 139 00:05:19,370 --> 00:05:21,314 We certainly have radars , we have 140 00:05:21,314 --> 00:05:23,481 systems to pick up on things coming at 141 00:05:23,481 --> 00:05:25,259 us , but those radars can't see 142 00:05:25,259 --> 00:05:27,259 everything all the time . How do we 143 00:05:27,259 --> 00:05:29,259 prioritize or how do we improve the 144 00:05:29,259 --> 00:05:31,370 system so that they can see more . It 145 00:05:31,370 --> 00:05:33,537 seems like the Chinese became aware of 146 00:05:33,537 --> 00:05:35,370 a vulnerability that slow moving 147 00:05:35,370 --> 00:05:37,426 objects at high altitude with things 148 00:05:37,426 --> 00:05:39,592 that we tended not to see . Well , now 149 00:05:39,592 --> 00:05:41,426 we are seeing them , but we look 150 00:05:41,426 --> 00:05:43,648 forward to a further explanation of how 151 00:05:43,648 --> 00:05:45,814 we can make sure that we have a robust 152 00:05:45,814 --> 00:05:47,814 domain awareness . And again , even 153 00:05:47,814 --> 00:05:49,870 though it was very much in , in TV , 154 00:05:49,870 --> 00:05:51,981 about the , the objects moving across 155 00:05:51,981 --> 00:05:54,037 our airspace , the real threat is in 156 00:05:54,037 --> 00:05:53,780 the cyber domain and the real threat is 157 00:05:53,780 --> 00:05:55,724 whether or not we can make sure we 158 00:05:55,724 --> 00:05:57,502 protect our system . So I would 159 00:05:57,502 --> 00:05:59,724 appreciate an update on how we can make 160 00:05:59,724 --> 00:05:59,580 sure we do that . And then certainly , 161 00:05:59,580 --> 00:06:01,802 I think the chairman emphasized exactly 162 00:06:01,802 --> 00:06:03,913 the point that , that we are becoming 163 00:06:03,913 --> 00:06:06,024 aware of . And that is Russia , China 164 00:06:06,024 --> 00:06:09,240 and Iran are incredibly active um in 165 00:06:09,240 --> 00:06:11,296 the Western hemisphere . Um They are 166 00:06:11,296 --> 00:06:13,518 building relationships throughout Latin 167 00:06:13,518 --> 00:06:15,684 America . We need to better understand 168 00:06:15,684 --> 00:06:18,018 that and figure out how to deal with it . 169 00:06:18,018 --> 00:06:20,073 Um It is , it is a challenge that we 170 00:06:20,073 --> 00:06:22,240 have not seen for , for a while but is 171 00:06:22,240 --> 00:06:24,296 very much present that we need to be 172 00:06:24,296 --> 00:06:26,407 aware of the need to be ready to deal 173 00:06:26,407 --> 00:06:26,010 with . And I look forward to General 174 00:06:26,010 --> 00:06:28,066 Richardson explaining to us a little 175 00:06:28,066 --> 00:06:30,177 bit more about how we're doing that . 176 00:06:30,177 --> 00:06:32,399 And then lastly , of course , the issue 177 00:06:32,399 --> 00:06:34,621 of transnational criminal organizations 178 00:06:34,621 --> 00:06:34,500 engaged in drug and human trafficking , 179 00:06:34,680 --> 00:06:36,680 an enormous problem which we're all 180 00:06:36,680 --> 00:06:38,736 very much aware of that . We need to 181 00:06:38,736 --> 00:06:40,791 better understand how that threat is 182 00:06:40,791 --> 00:06:43,013 coming again from your A O R and how we 183 00:06:43,013 --> 00:06:45,013 can better deal with it . Again , I 184 00:06:45,013 --> 00:06:47,124 look forward to the testimony and the 185 00:06:47,124 --> 00:06:49,180 questions from our panel and I yield 186 00:06:49,180 --> 00:06:51,291 back , I think the ranking member now 187 00:06:51,291 --> 00:06:53,402 I'd like to introduce our witnesses . 188 00:06:53,402 --> 00:06:55,402 The honorable Melissa Dalton is the 189 00:06:55,402 --> 00:06:57,347 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 190 00:06:57,347 --> 00:06:59,402 Homeland Defense and the Hemispheric 191 00:06:59,402 --> 00:07:01,569 Affairs . She previously served as the 192 00:07:01,569 --> 00:07:03,791 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 193 00:07:03,791 --> 00:07:05,736 Defense for Strategic for Strategy 194 00:07:05,736 --> 00:07:07,569 plans and Capabilities . General 195 00:07:07,569 --> 00:07:09,791 General Glenn Van Herk is the commander 196 00:07:09,791 --> 00:07:11,902 of United States Northern Command and 197 00:07:11,902 --> 00:07:13,902 Northern American Aerospace Defense 198 00:07:13,902 --> 00:07:16,013 Command . He previously served as the 199 00:07:16,013 --> 00:07:18,124 Director of the Joint Staff General . 200 00:07:18,124 --> 00:07:17,720 Laura Richardson is the commander of 201 00:07:17,720 --> 00:07:19,664 United States Southern Command and 202 00:07:19,664 --> 00:07:21,664 previously served as the commanding 203 00:07:21,664 --> 00:07:23,831 general U S Army . North , welcome our 204 00:07:23,831 --> 00:07:25,887 witnesses and Miss Dalton will start 205 00:07:25,887 --> 00:07:27,942 with you for five minutes . Chairman 206 00:07:27,942 --> 00:07:29,942 Rogers , ranking member , Smith and 207 00:07:29,942 --> 00:07:32,220 distinguished members of the committee . 208 00:07:32,220 --> 00:07:31,940 Thank you for the opportunity to 209 00:07:31,940 --> 00:07:34,500 testify . Today . I will highlight how 210 00:07:34,500 --> 00:07:36,500 we are putting homeland defense and 211 00:07:36,500 --> 00:07:38,778 other interests across this hemisphere . 212 00:07:38,778 --> 00:07:41,110 Front and center to implement the 2022 213 00:07:41,120 --> 00:07:44,070 national defense strategy per the NDS . 214 00:07:44,070 --> 00:07:46,181 The People's Republic of China is the 215 00:07:46,181 --> 00:07:48,403 pacing challenge for D O D while Russia 216 00:07:48,403 --> 00:07:50,770 remains an acute threat . In addition 217 00:07:50,770 --> 00:07:52,826 to building conventional and nuclear 218 00:07:52,826 --> 00:07:54,881 capabilities , we are concerned that 219 00:07:54,881 --> 00:07:56,826 the PRC in particular is using non 220 00:07:56,826 --> 00:07:59,050 kinetic means to subvert our ability to 221 00:07:59,050 --> 00:08:02,170 project power . The NDS also ensures 222 00:08:02,170 --> 00:08:04,490 vigilance of other persistent threats . 223 00:08:04,520 --> 00:08:06,576 North Korea is expanding its nuclear 224 00:08:06,576 --> 00:08:08,742 and missile capability to threaten the 225 00:08:08,742 --> 00:08:10,964 homeland . Iran is testing space launch 226 00:08:10,964 --> 00:08:12,853 technologies and global terrorist 227 00:08:12,853 --> 00:08:15,090 groups require continued monitoring . A 228 00:08:15,090 --> 00:08:17,090 range of fast evolving technologies 229 00:08:17,090 --> 00:08:18,979 could disrupt us supply chain and 230 00:08:18,979 --> 00:08:21,034 logistics operations . For example , 231 00:08:21,034 --> 00:08:23,980 small unproved aircraft systems could 232 00:08:23,980 --> 00:08:25,880 pose a threat to domestic D O D 233 00:08:25,880 --> 00:08:28,180 facilities . Last year . The homeland 234 00:08:28,180 --> 00:08:30,110 endured 90 incidents caused by 235 00:08:30,110 --> 00:08:32,800 hurricanes , severe storms , wildfires 236 00:08:32,800 --> 00:08:35,630 and floods degrading our readiness in 237 00:08:35,630 --> 00:08:37,797 the western hemisphere . These hazards 238 00:08:37,797 --> 00:08:40,130 contribute to instability and migration , 239 00:08:40,130 --> 00:08:42,297 creating conditions that state and non 240 00:08:42,297 --> 00:08:44,519 state actors can exploit . We are doing 241 00:08:44,519 --> 00:08:46,574 more than ever to deter , defend and 242 00:08:46,574 --> 00:08:48,630 defeat aggression from competitors . 243 00:08:48,630 --> 00:08:50,750 We're using an integrated deterrence 244 00:08:50,750 --> 00:08:52,583 approach to harness conventional 245 00:08:52,583 --> 00:08:54,806 cyberspace and information capabilities 246 00:08:54,806 --> 00:08:56,750 to raise costs for our competitors 247 00:08:56,750 --> 00:08:58,917 while reducing their expected benefits 248 00:08:58,917 --> 00:09:01,110 of aggression . Per the 2022 missile 249 00:09:01,110 --> 00:09:03,166 defense review , our missile defense 250 00:09:03,166 --> 00:09:05,221 systems offer protection for the U S 251 00:09:05,221 --> 00:09:07,443 population while reassuring others that 252 00:09:07,443 --> 00:09:09,499 we will not be coerced by threats to 253 00:09:09,499 --> 00:09:11,666 the homeland nested within our missile 254 00:09:11,666 --> 00:09:13,777 defense approach . Integrated air and 255 00:09:13,777 --> 00:09:15,721 missile defense enables freedom of 256 00:09:15,721 --> 00:09:17,610 action by negating an adversary's 257 00:09:17,610 --> 00:09:19,777 ability to create adverse effects with 258 00:09:19,777 --> 00:09:21,943 air and missile capabilities . We also 259 00:09:21,943 --> 00:09:24,110 rely on strategic deterrence for large 260 00:09:24,110 --> 00:09:26,277 intercontinental range nuclear missile 261 00:09:26,277 --> 00:09:28,110 threats from the PRC in Russia . 262 00:09:28,110 --> 00:09:29,999 Investments in modern sensors and 263 00:09:29,999 --> 00:09:32,054 infrastructure are vital to homeland 264 00:09:32,054 --> 00:09:34,166 defense against airborne and maritime 265 00:09:34,166 --> 00:09:36,277 threats and to our ability to project 266 00:09:36,277 --> 00:09:38,110 force is we are grateful for the 267 00:09:38,110 --> 00:09:40,110 committee's support of the over the 268 00:09:40,110 --> 00:09:42,166 horizon radars . We are working with 269 00:09:42,166 --> 00:09:44,332 Canada to maximize Norad's coverage of 270 00:09:44,332 --> 00:09:46,554 the approaches to North America . It is 271 00:09:46,554 --> 00:09:48,610 also vital to extend the secretary's 272 00:09:48,610 --> 00:09:50,832 authority under section 1 30 I of title 273 00:09:50,832 --> 00:09:52,999 10 to protect certain D O D facilities 274 00:09:52,999 --> 00:09:55,330 and domestic assets from us by virtue 275 00:09:55,330 --> 00:09:57,460 of us sovereign territory in Alaska . 276 00:09:57,470 --> 00:09:59,581 The Arctic is an extension of the U S 277 00:09:59,581 --> 00:10:01,748 homeland . We are working to implement 278 00:10:01,748 --> 00:10:03,803 the national strategy for the Arctic 279 00:10:03,803 --> 00:10:05,748 region . We are leveraging the Ted 280 00:10:05,748 --> 00:10:07,970 Stevens Center for the Arctic Strategic 281 00:10:07,970 --> 00:10:09,914 Studies in Alaska . We demonstrate 282 00:10:09,914 --> 00:10:12,081 combat creditable forces in the Arctic 283 00:10:12,081 --> 00:10:14,137 by training and exercising including 284 00:10:14,137 --> 00:10:16,137 through Arctic edge with Canada and 285 00:10:16,137 --> 00:10:15,870 through bomber task force deployments 286 00:10:15,870 --> 00:10:17,981 with the United Kingdom and Norway to 287 00:10:17,981 --> 00:10:20,092 support NATO . Our competitors . Gray 288 00:10:20,092 --> 00:10:22,220 zone activities threaten key domestic 289 00:10:22,230 --> 00:10:24,286 assets , networks and infrastructure 290 00:10:24,286 --> 00:10:26,508 that D O D and the American people rely 291 00:10:26,508 --> 00:10:28,730 on D O D is enhancing the resilience of 292 00:10:28,730 --> 00:10:30,397 us systems working within the 293 00:10:30,397 --> 00:10:32,563 interagency with federal state , local 294 00:10:32,563 --> 00:10:34,563 tribal territorial partners and the 295 00:10:34,563 --> 00:10:36,619 private sector . We work the defense 296 00:10:36,619 --> 00:10:38,452 industrial base to enhance cyber 297 00:10:38,452 --> 00:10:40,750 security and resilience to operate 298 00:10:40,750 --> 00:10:42,917 through disruption . We are increasing 299 00:10:42,917 --> 00:10:45,139 the body's ability to operate in a more 300 00:10:45,139 --> 00:10:47,139 dispersed manner and from alternate 301 00:10:47,139 --> 00:10:49,194 locations , defense support of civil 302 00:10:49,194 --> 00:10:51,361 authorities or discuss is an important 303 00:10:51,361 --> 00:10:53,583 activity supporting the American public 304 00:10:53,583 --> 00:10:55,306 and our partners responding to 305 00:10:55,306 --> 00:10:57,417 disasters , public health emergencies 306 00:10:57,417 --> 00:10:59,386 and securing our borders . Today , 307 00:10:59,396 --> 00:11:02,226 approximately 202,500 military 308 00:11:02,226 --> 00:11:04,448 personnel are deployed to the Southwest 309 00:11:04,448 --> 00:11:06,666 border duty has supported Dhs's border 310 00:11:06,666 --> 00:11:08,966 security mission for 18 of the last 22 311 00:11:08,966 --> 00:11:11,486 years for the N D S D O D is prepared 312 00:11:11,486 --> 00:11:13,653 to support disk activities that do not 313 00:11:13,653 --> 00:11:15,882 impair warfighting readiness . Our 314 00:11:15,882 --> 00:11:17,993 domestic partners should be resourced 315 00:11:17,993 --> 00:11:19,826 for their mission requirements , 316 00:11:19,826 --> 00:11:21,604 preserving D O D s war fighting 317 00:11:21,604 --> 00:11:23,826 capabilities . We're also strengthening 318 00:11:23,826 --> 00:11:25,882 our ability to withstand and recover 319 00:11:25,882 --> 00:11:27,993 from extreme environmental events and 320 00:11:27,993 --> 00:11:30,104 to build a resilient joint force . We 321 00:11:30,104 --> 00:11:31,771 intend to use the new defense 322 00:11:31,771 --> 00:11:33,826 operational resilience International 323 00:11:33,826 --> 00:11:35,660 Cooperation Program to build our 324 00:11:35,660 --> 00:11:37,826 partners early warning capabilities to 325 00:11:37,826 --> 00:11:39,882 reduce the need for D O D assets for 326 00:11:39,882 --> 00:11:41,938 disasters and other emergencies . We 327 00:11:41,938 --> 00:11:44,215 are deepening partnerships with Canada , 328 00:11:44,215 --> 00:11:46,271 Mexico , Brazil , Colombia and Chile 329 00:11:46,271 --> 00:11:47,882 while reinforcing democratic 330 00:11:47,882 --> 00:11:50,049 institutions , civilian control of the 331 00:11:50,049 --> 00:11:52,160 military and respect for human rights 332 00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:54,326 and the rule of law . Secretary Austin 333 00:11:54,326 --> 00:11:55,993 highlighted the importance of 334 00:11:55,993 --> 00:11:58,049 integrated deterrence at last year's 335 00:11:58,049 --> 00:12:00,160 conference of the Defense Minister of 336 00:12:00,160 --> 00:12:02,160 the Americas in Brazil . Later this 337 00:12:02,160 --> 00:12:04,049 week , I will travel to Mexico to 338 00:12:04,049 --> 00:12:05,660 discuss defense issues . Our 339 00:12:05,660 --> 00:12:07,771 relationships in this hemisphere help 340 00:12:07,771 --> 00:12:09,438 ensure we are able to conduct 341 00:12:09,438 --> 00:12:11,771 humanitarian assist and disaster relief . 342 00:12:11,771 --> 00:12:13,604 Bolster cyber defenses , promote 343 00:12:13,604 --> 00:12:15,826 climate resilience and conduct pandemic 344 00:12:15,826 --> 00:12:17,993 response to conclude the department is 345 00:12:17,993 --> 00:12:20,215 committed to defending the homeland and 346 00:12:20,215 --> 00:12:22,104 pursuing us interests across this 347 00:12:22,104 --> 00:12:24,326 hemisphere . Thank you for support your 348 00:12:24,326 --> 00:12:26,382 support of the Department of Defense 349 00:12:26,382 --> 00:12:26,324 and I look forward to your questions . 350 00:12:26,414 --> 00:12:28,414 Thank you , Miss Dalton chair and I 351 00:12:28,414 --> 00:12:30,636 recognize General Van Herk five minutes 352 00:12:30,636 --> 00:12:32,858 to read a statement , Chairman Rogers , 353 00:12:32,858 --> 00:12:32,494 ranking member , Smith and 354 00:12:32,494 --> 00:12:34,772 distinguished members of the committee . 355 00:12:34,772 --> 00:12:36,994 Thank you for the opportunity to appear 356 00:12:36,994 --> 00:12:39,105 today And represent the men and women 357 00:12:39,105 --> 00:12:41,216 of the United States Northern Command 358 00:12:41,216 --> 00:12:43,050 and the North American Aerospace 359 00:12:43,050 --> 00:12:45,105 Defense Command . North Common NORAD 360 00:12:45,105 --> 00:12:46,994 are distinct commands United by a 361 00:12:46,994 --> 00:12:48,994 common purpose to defend the United 362 00:12:48,994 --> 00:12:51,105 States and Canadian homelands in what 363 00:12:51,105 --> 00:12:51,010 is clearly the most complex and dynamic 364 00:12:51,010 --> 00:12:52,899 strategic environment that I have 365 00:12:52,899 --> 00:12:55,010 experienced during more than 35 years 366 00:12:55,010 --> 00:12:56,800 in service . In my role as the 367 00:12:56,800 --> 00:12:58,411 commander of North Com , I'm 368 00:12:58,411 --> 00:13:00,244 responsible for homeland defense 369 00:13:00,244 --> 00:13:02,467 defense support of civil authorities in 370 00:13:02,467 --> 00:13:04,189 the United States and security 371 00:13:04,189 --> 00:13:06,356 cooperation with our military partners 372 00:13:06,356 --> 00:13:08,467 in Canada , Mexico and the Bahamas as 373 00:13:08,467 --> 00:13:10,633 the commander of NORAD , the unique US 374 00:13:10,633 --> 00:13:12,522 Canadian Binational Command . I'm 375 00:13:12,522 --> 00:13:14,522 responsible for aerospace warning , 376 00:13:14,522 --> 00:13:16,689 aerospace control and maritime warning 377 00:13:16,689 --> 00:13:18,744 in the approaches to North America . 378 00:13:18,770 --> 00:13:20,992 Despite the complexity of the strategic 379 00:13:20,992 --> 00:13:22,990 environment and recent erosion of 380 00:13:23,000 --> 00:13:25,167 military advantage , the United States 381 00:13:25,167 --> 00:13:27,333 military remains the most powerful and 382 00:13:27,333 --> 00:13:29,710 professional force in history . However , 383 00:13:29,710 --> 00:13:31,710 we must take action now to stop the 384 00:13:31,710 --> 00:13:34,220 erosion of our military advantage . Our 385 00:13:34,220 --> 00:13:36,331 competitors actions and ambitions are 386 00:13:36,331 --> 00:13:38,553 global and all domain in nature and our 387 00:13:38,553 --> 00:13:40,720 competitors have the capability intent 388 00:13:40,720 --> 00:13:42,887 to hold our homeland at risk above and 389 00:13:42,887 --> 00:13:44,831 below the nuclear threshold and in 390 00:13:44,831 --> 00:13:46,720 multiple domains to achieve their 391 00:13:46,720 --> 00:13:48,710 strategic objectives . The PRC and 392 00:13:48,710 --> 00:13:50,710 Russia have fielded cruise missiles 393 00:13:50,710 --> 00:13:52,610 delivery platforms , non kinetic 394 00:13:52,610 --> 00:13:54,443 capabilities that hold at risk , 395 00:13:54,443 --> 00:13:56,650 critical infrastructure and civilian 396 00:13:56,650 --> 00:13:58,872 infrastructure in the United States and 397 00:13:58,872 --> 00:14:00,872 Canada . And with the capability to 398 00:14:00,872 --> 00:14:02,706 strike with limited warning with 399 00:14:02,706 --> 00:14:04,650 significant consequences including 400 00:14:04,650 --> 00:14:06,594 reducing our capability to project 401 00:14:06,594 --> 00:14:08,761 power from a secure homeland , limited 402 00:14:08,761 --> 00:14:10,706 warning . Due due to a lack of all 403 00:14:10,706 --> 00:14:12,872 domain awareness inherently limits the 404 00:14:12,872 --> 00:14:14,706 risk and decisions based options 405 00:14:14,706 --> 00:14:16,840 available to national leaders which 406 00:14:16,850 --> 00:14:18,920 increases the risk of miscalculation 407 00:14:18,930 --> 00:14:21,780 and escalation . Today , I assess as I 408 00:14:21,780 --> 00:14:23,836 have for nearly three years that the 409 00:14:23,836 --> 00:14:26,058 homeland is a potential limiting factor 410 00:14:26,058 --> 00:14:27,836 to ensuring rapid and effective 411 00:14:27,836 --> 00:14:30,380 implementation and execution of global 412 00:14:30,380 --> 00:14:32,550 contingency plans . Due to my lack of 413 00:14:32,550 --> 00:14:34,850 domain awareness , timely access to 414 00:14:34,850 --> 00:14:36,683 forces that are ready to operate 415 00:14:36,683 --> 00:14:38,739 throughout my area of responsibility 416 00:14:38,739 --> 00:14:41,230 including in the Arctic and a lack of 417 00:14:41,230 --> 00:14:43,452 resilient infrastructure , enabling the 418 00:14:43,452 --> 00:14:45,508 joint force to fight in and from our 419 00:14:45,508 --> 00:14:47,619 homeland while ensuring forward power 420 00:14:47,619 --> 00:14:50,070 projection to address today strategic 421 00:14:50,070 --> 00:14:52,237 environment . For nearly three years , 422 00:14:52,237 --> 00:14:54,459 I have focused on four key priorities . 423 00:14:54,459 --> 00:14:57,350 Domain awareness or the ability to see 424 00:14:57,360 --> 00:14:59,360 and detect potential threats in all 425 00:14:59,360 --> 00:15:01,780 domains information dominance , which 426 00:15:01,780 --> 00:15:03,891 is the use of artificial intelligence 427 00:15:03,891 --> 00:15:05,947 and machine learning to process data 428 00:15:05,947 --> 00:15:08,240 more rapidly for strategic advantage , 429 00:15:08,250 --> 00:15:10,830 decisions , superiority , which is the 430 00:15:10,830 --> 00:15:12,941 dissemination of data and information 431 00:15:12,941 --> 00:15:15,163 to the right leader at the right time . 432 00:15:15,163 --> 00:15:17,108 From the tactical to the strategic 433 00:15:17,108 --> 00:15:18,886 level and finally global global 434 00:15:18,886 --> 00:15:20,719 integration , addressing today's 435 00:15:20,719 --> 00:15:22,719 environment with the global and all 436 00:15:22,719 --> 00:15:24,886 domain approach , vice legacy regional 437 00:15:24,886 --> 00:15:26,719 approaches and practices . Those 438 00:15:26,719 --> 00:15:28,941 priorities are critical to successfully 439 00:15:28,941 --> 00:15:31,163 defending the homeland and to providing 440 00:15:31,163 --> 00:15:33,108 our national leaders with the only 441 00:15:33,108 --> 00:15:32,960 thing I can never give them enough of . 442 00:15:32,960 --> 00:15:35,460 And that's time to create deterrence 443 00:15:35,460 --> 00:15:37,516 options . And if required defend and 444 00:15:37,516 --> 00:15:39,380 defeat options are competitors . 445 00:15:39,380 --> 00:15:41,380 Actions over the last several years 446 00:15:41,380 --> 00:15:43,491 have shown that regional crisis often 447 00:15:43,491 --> 00:15:46,250 take the department to have global 448 00:15:46,250 --> 00:15:48,472 implications implications which the and 449 00:15:48,472 --> 00:15:50,694 also the potential for rapid escalation 450 00:15:50,694 --> 00:15:53,460 and this vital that the department 451 00:15:53,470 --> 00:15:55,470 adopt globally integrated plans and 452 00:15:55,470 --> 00:15:57,748 policies that fully reflect competitor , 453 00:15:57,748 --> 00:15:59,692 capability , capacity and intent , 454 00:15:59,692 --> 00:16:01,748 including the intent to threaten our 455 00:16:01,748 --> 00:16:03,859 homeland . While we have work to do , 456 00:16:03,859 --> 00:16:05,914 there has been some notable progress 457 00:16:05,914 --> 00:16:05,790 towards the key priorities . I'm 458 00:16:05,790 --> 00:16:08,012 grateful to the Department and Congress 459 00:16:08,012 --> 00:16:09,846 for your support of the over the 460 00:16:09,846 --> 00:16:12,012 horizon radars that will significantly 461 00:16:12,012 --> 00:16:13,846 improve domain awareness and the 462 00:16:13,846 --> 00:16:15,846 ability to detect and track threats 463 00:16:15,846 --> 00:16:18,012 well before they reach North America . 464 00:16:18,012 --> 00:16:19,623 But we need to go faster and 465 00:16:19,623 --> 00:16:21,846 acquisition plan based on over a decade 466 00:16:21,846 --> 00:16:23,901 is too long . Both the Department of 467 00:16:23,901 --> 00:16:26,068 Defense and the Canadian Department of 468 00:16:26,068 --> 00:16:28,012 National Defense have committed to 469 00:16:28,012 --> 00:16:30,179 funding over the rise in the radar and 470 00:16:30,179 --> 00:16:32,401 I respectfully urge both governments to 471 00:16:32,401 --> 00:16:34,623 ensure this vital and proven capability 472 00:16:34,623 --> 00:16:36,679 has fielded as quickly as possible . 473 00:16:36,679 --> 00:16:38,901 Likewise , the Space Force's investment 474 00:16:38,901 --> 00:16:41,123 in advanced space based missile warning 475 00:16:41,123 --> 00:16:43,068 sensor capabilities and the Navy's 476 00:16:43,068 --> 00:16:45,123 commitment to modernizing integrated 477 00:16:45,123 --> 00:16:47,234 undersea surveillance are vital to my 478 00:16:47,234 --> 00:16:49,401 homeland defense mission . Yet again , 479 00:16:49,401 --> 00:16:51,401 we can't wait a decade or longer to 480 00:16:51,401 --> 00:16:53,457 feel these capabilities are commands 481 00:16:53,457 --> 00:16:55,679 and the Department of Defense need your 482 00:16:55,679 --> 00:16:55,630 continued support to outpace . The 483 00:16:55,630 --> 00:16:57,741 rapid gains made by our competitors , 484 00:16:57,741 --> 00:16:59,741 continued progress will require the 485 00:16:59,741 --> 00:17:01,908 Department and Congress to accept some 486 00:17:01,908 --> 00:17:03,510 risk by prioritizing rapid 487 00:17:03,510 --> 00:17:05,770 modernization and innovation over 488 00:17:05,770 --> 00:17:07,603 maintaining obsolete platforms , 489 00:17:07,603 --> 00:17:09,760 organizations and infrastructure and 490 00:17:09,760 --> 00:17:11,960 occasionally accept failure as part of 491 00:17:11,960 --> 00:17:13,830 the process , the generational 492 00:17:13,830 --> 00:17:16,052 challenges ahead of us will require the 493 00:17:16,052 --> 00:17:18,108 best minds and expertise we can find 494 00:17:18,108 --> 00:17:20,350 the department also must vest , invest 495 00:17:20,350 --> 00:17:22,406 accordingly in civilian and military 496 00:17:22,406 --> 00:17:24,406 personnel , recruiting , hiring and 497 00:17:24,406 --> 00:17:26,406 retention , and we must continue to 498 00:17:26,406 --> 00:17:28,239 build the enormous advantage and 499 00:17:28,239 --> 00:17:29,961 working with our international 500 00:17:29,961 --> 00:17:32,128 alliances and partnerships . I believe 501 00:17:32,128 --> 00:17:34,350 the greatest risk that our nation faces 502 00:17:34,350 --> 00:17:36,406 right now is our inability to change 503 00:17:36,406 --> 00:17:38,406 and adapt at a pace required by the 504 00:17:38,406 --> 00:17:38,210 strategic environment . Homeland 505 00:17:38,210 --> 00:17:40,432 Defense must be recognized as essential 506 00:17:40,432 --> 00:17:42,488 to contingency plans at home and for 507 00:17:42,488 --> 00:17:44,488 power projection abroad . And it is 508 00:17:44,488 --> 00:17:46,321 vital that all military planning 509 00:17:46,321 --> 00:17:48,488 account for that reality in an area of 510 00:17:48,488 --> 00:17:50,710 incredible innovation and technological 511 00:17:50,710 --> 00:17:52,710 advancement , inflexible , outdated 512 00:17:52,710 --> 00:17:54,821 processes are a greater impediment to 513 00:17:54,821 --> 00:17:56,988 success than many of our competitors . 514 00:17:56,988 --> 00:17:59,043 Advancements . Finally , I'd like to 515 00:17:59,043 --> 00:18:01,210 comment on recent events including the 516 00:18:01,210 --> 00:18:03,154 incursion of the PRC high altitude 517 00:18:03,154 --> 00:18:05,210 balloon into our national airspace . 518 00:18:05,210 --> 00:18:07,099 The PRC high altitude balloon was 519 00:18:07,099 --> 00:18:07,010 obviously a significant event that 520 00:18:07,010 --> 00:18:08,920 shine light on prc's brazen 521 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:10,920 intelligence collection against the 522 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:12,864 United States . And Canada was the 523 00:18:12,864 --> 00:18:14,976 first time in North Coms history . We 524 00:18:14,976 --> 00:18:17,198 conducted an engagement over the United 525 00:18:17,198 --> 00:18:19,087 States and it made clear that our 526 00:18:19,087 --> 00:18:21,087 competitors have the capability and 527 00:18:21,087 --> 00:18:23,087 intent to reach our homeland . Also 528 00:18:23,087 --> 00:18:25,309 clearly demonstrates the limitations of 529 00:18:25,309 --> 00:18:24,220 our domain awareness and the 530 00:18:24,220 --> 00:18:25,998 impediments we face and getting 531 00:18:25,998 --> 00:18:28,164 information into the hands of decision 532 00:18:28,164 --> 00:18:30,331 makers quickly candidly , the internal 533 00:18:30,331 --> 00:18:32,250 discord of this event caused just 534 00:18:32,250 --> 00:18:34,500 showed one of the ways our competitors 535 00:18:34,500 --> 00:18:36,500 target us each and every day in the 536 00:18:36,500 --> 00:18:38,278 information space . And they're 537 00:18:38,278 --> 00:18:40,167 becoming li increasingly adept at 538 00:18:40,167 --> 00:18:42,167 driving wedges between the American 539 00:18:42,167 --> 00:18:44,333 people . As for Northern North com , I 540 00:18:44,333 --> 00:18:46,222 commit to you that this event has 541 00:18:46,222 --> 00:18:48,389 already generated critical lessons for 542 00:18:48,389 --> 00:18:48,230 my commands and our mission partners . 543 00:18:48,230 --> 00:18:50,452 And I can guarantee you that both NORAD 544 00:18:50,452 --> 00:18:52,397 North Com are going to continue to 545 00:18:52,397 --> 00:18:54,508 learn and do whatever is necessary to 546 00:18:54,508 --> 00:18:56,563 keep our country safe . On behalf of 547 00:18:56,563 --> 00:18:56,500 all the soldiers , sailors , airmen , 548 00:18:56,500 --> 00:18:58,560 marines , guardians and civilians at 549 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:00,782 NORAD North com . I'd like to thank the 550 00:19:00,782 --> 00:19:03,004 committee for your steadfast support as 551 00:19:03,004 --> 00:19:05,116 we defend our nation . I look forward 552 00:19:05,116 --> 00:19:07,338 to your questions . Thank you . General 553 00:19:07,338 --> 00:19:09,560 Chair now recognizes General Richardson 554 00:19:09,560 --> 00:19:09,150 for five minutes for her opening 555 00:19:09,150 --> 00:19:13,030 statement , Chairman 556 00:19:13,030 --> 00:19:15,030 Rogers , ranking member , Smith and 557 00:19:15,030 --> 00:19:17,308 distinguished members of the committee . 558 00:19:17,308 --> 00:19:19,530 Thank you for the opportunity to appear 559 00:19:19,530 --> 00:19:21,308 before you today with assistant 560 00:19:21,308 --> 00:19:23,530 Secretary Dalton General Van Herk , who 561 00:19:23,530 --> 00:19:25,363 are my teammates in keeping this 562 00:19:25,363 --> 00:19:27,474 western hemisphere safe . I'm honored 563 00:19:27,474 --> 00:19:29,586 to represent the men and women of U S 564 00:19:29,586 --> 00:19:31,363 Southern Command to discuss the 565 00:19:31,363 --> 00:19:33,960 challenges we share and with our 566 00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:35,904 neighbors in Latin America and the 567 00:19:35,904 --> 00:19:38,070 Caribbean , as stated in the national 568 00:19:38,070 --> 00:19:40,360 security strategy , no region impacts 569 00:19:40,360 --> 00:19:42,600 the United States more directly than 570 00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,110 the western hemisphere . Last year . I 571 00:19:45,110 --> 00:19:47,054 testified before the committee and 572 00:19:47,054 --> 00:19:48,832 stated this region , our shared 573 00:19:48,832 --> 00:19:51,220 neighborhood is under assault from a 574 00:19:51,220 --> 00:19:53,276 host of cross cutting trans boundary 575 00:19:53,276 --> 00:19:55,400 challenges that directly threaten our 576 00:19:55,400 --> 00:19:58,950 homeland . This is still true today and 577 00:19:58,950 --> 00:20:01,400 is a call to action . In the last year , 578 00:20:01,400 --> 00:20:03,456 I've spent traveling in the region , 579 00:20:03,456 --> 00:20:05,178 meeting with leaders to better 580 00:20:05,178 --> 00:20:07,178 understand these challenges and the 581 00:20:07,178 --> 00:20:08,900 threat they pose to our mutual 582 00:20:08,900 --> 00:20:10,622 interests . The world is at an 583 00:20:10,622 --> 00:20:12,789 inflection point . Our partners in the 584 00:20:12,789 --> 00:20:14,789 western hemisphere with whom we are 585 00:20:14,789 --> 00:20:16,660 bonded by trade shared values , 586 00:20:16,670 --> 00:20:19,720 democratic traditions , family ties are 587 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:21,560 feeling the impacts of external 588 00:20:21,560 --> 00:20:24,620 interference and coercion . The 589 00:20:24,620 --> 00:20:26,731 People's Republic of China are pacing 590 00:20:26,731 --> 00:20:28,670 challenge continues to expand its 591 00:20:28,670 --> 00:20:31,940 economic diplomatic , technological 592 00:20:31,950 --> 00:20:34,172 informational and military influence in 593 00:20:34,172 --> 00:20:37,060 Latin America and the Caribbean , the 594 00:20:37,060 --> 00:20:39,610 PRC has the capability and intent to a 595 00:20:39,610 --> 00:20:42,930 shoe international norms advance its 596 00:20:42,940 --> 00:20:46,380 its brand of authoritarianism and amass 597 00:20:46,380 --> 00:20:48,990 power and influence at the expense of 598 00:20:48,990 --> 00:20:52,010 these democracies . The PRC has 599 00:20:52,010 --> 00:20:54,120 expanded its ability to extract 600 00:20:54,130 --> 00:20:56,970 resources , established ports , 601 00:20:56,980 --> 00:20:58,740 manipulate governments through 602 00:20:58,740 --> 00:21:01,450 predatory investment practices and 603 00:21:01,450 --> 00:21:03,860 build potential dual use space 604 00:21:03,860 --> 00:21:07,020 facilities , the most space facilities 605 00:21:07,020 --> 00:21:09,240 in any combatant command region , 606 00:21:10,130 --> 00:21:12,800 Russia , an acute threat bolsters 607 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:14,980 authoritarian regimes in Cuba , 608 00:21:14,990 --> 00:21:18,240 Nicaragua and Venezuela and continues 609 00:21:18,250 --> 00:21:21,320 its extensive disinformation campaign . 610 00:21:22,060 --> 00:21:24,320 These activities undermine democracies 611 00:21:24,320 --> 00:21:27,620 and challenge our credibility . Both 612 00:21:27,620 --> 00:21:29,731 China and Russia exploit the presence 613 00:21:29,731 --> 00:21:31,953 of transnational criminal organizations 614 00:21:31,953 --> 00:21:34,750 and amplify their destabilizing impact 615 00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:38,390 on democratic governments , T C O s 616 00:21:38,410 --> 00:21:40,340 spread violence and corruption 617 00:21:40,340 --> 00:21:43,340 throughout the region and beyond their 618 00:21:43,340 --> 00:21:45,600 fentaNYL laced cocaine contributes to 619 00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:47,910 the deaths of Americans in cities and 620 00:21:47,910 --> 00:21:51,060 towns across the country . The good 621 00:21:51,060 --> 00:21:53,340 news is is that working with our very 622 00:21:53,340 --> 00:21:55,870 willing partners leads to the best 623 00:21:55,870 --> 00:21:59,350 defense and we must use all available 624 00:21:59,350 --> 00:22:01,790 lovers to strengthen our partnerships 625 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:04,610 with the 28 like minded democracies in 626 00:22:04,610 --> 00:22:06,810 this hemisphere who understand the 627 00:22:06,810 --> 00:22:09,390 power of working together to counter 628 00:22:09,390 --> 00:22:13,050 these shared challenges . Our partners 629 00:22:13,050 --> 00:22:15,640 look to us to lead in the hemisphere . 630 00:22:15,650 --> 00:22:17,990 We have an obligation to meet them 631 00:22:17,990 --> 00:22:20,030 where they are and commit to 632 00:22:20,030 --> 00:22:21,808 aggressively address our common 633 00:22:21,808 --> 00:22:25,320 security challenges . We must continue 634 00:22:25,330 --> 00:22:27,340 to maximize the effectiveness of 635 00:22:27,340 --> 00:22:29,060 important tools like security 636 00:22:29,060 --> 00:22:32,870 cooperation programs to train and equip 637 00:22:32,870 --> 00:22:34,759 our partner militaries and public 638 00:22:34,759 --> 00:22:37,430 security forces and conduct 639 00:22:37,430 --> 00:22:39,620 multilateral exercises to build 640 00:22:39,620 --> 00:22:42,350 interoperability and to increase the 641 00:22:42,350 --> 00:22:44,290 state Department's International 642 00:22:44,290 --> 00:22:47,230 military education and training foreign 643 00:22:47,230 --> 00:22:49,940 military financing and foreign military 644 00:22:49,940 --> 00:22:52,990 sales programs to educate , train and 645 00:22:52,990 --> 00:22:55,620 build the capacity that our partners 646 00:22:55,620 --> 00:22:58,720 put to immediate use to stand shoulder 647 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:01,650 to shoulder with us . As the national 648 00:23:01,650 --> 00:23:03,483 defense strategy states , the US 649 00:23:03,483 --> 00:23:06,170 derives immense benefits from a stable 650 00:23:06,180 --> 00:23:08,250 peaceful and democratic western 651 00:23:08,250 --> 00:23:10,450 hemisphere that reduces security 652 00:23:10,450 --> 00:23:13,530 threats to our homeland U S South . Com 653 00:23:13,530 --> 00:23:15,700 is putting integrated deterrence into 654 00:23:15,700 --> 00:23:18,230 action every day using innovative 655 00:23:18,230 --> 00:23:20,910 methods to work seamlessly across all 656 00:23:20,910 --> 00:23:23,020 domains with the other combatant 657 00:23:23,020 --> 00:23:26,250 commands , the joint force , allies and 658 00:23:26,250 --> 00:23:29,020 partners , Congress , the U S 659 00:23:29,020 --> 00:23:32,610 Interagency , N G O s and the private 660 00:23:32,610 --> 00:23:35,310 sector to help build a hemisphere 661 00:23:35,310 --> 00:23:38,470 that's free , secure and prosperous for 662 00:23:38,470 --> 00:23:41,150 our generation and generations to come . 663 00:23:41,810 --> 00:23:44,330 I call this team democracy and we need 664 00:23:44,330 --> 00:23:47,360 to build and field a resource team . 665 00:23:47,510 --> 00:23:49,677 Thank you . And I look forward to your 666 00:23:49,677 --> 00:23:51,350 questions . Thank you . Chair 667 00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:53,572 recognizes himself , General Van Herk . 668 00:23:53,572 --> 00:23:55,739 Can you speak to the importance of the 669 00:23:55,739 --> 00:23:58,690 D O D s current spectrum to radar 670 00:23:58,700 --> 00:24:00,920 sensor interceptor systems and the 671 00:24:00,920 --> 00:24:03,340 risks of losing that spectrum would 672 00:24:03,340 --> 00:24:05,562 pose to homeland defense capabilities . 673 00:24:06,580 --> 00:24:09,620 Yeah , chairman . So uh the specific 674 00:24:09,620 --> 00:24:11,453 frequencies you're talking about 675 00:24:11,453 --> 00:24:13,453 multiple D O D platforms operate in 676 00:24:13,453 --> 00:24:15,509 that to include some of our maritime 677 00:24:15,509 --> 00:24:17,620 homeland defense capabilities and our 678 00:24:17,620 --> 00:24:19,930 airborne capabilities to detect threats 679 00:24:19,930 --> 00:24:21,986 here in the homeland . I think going 680 00:24:21,986 --> 00:24:24,152 forward , the best way to look at this 681 00:24:24,152 --> 00:24:26,374 is make sure that we understand exactly 682 00:24:26,374 --> 00:24:28,374 the impact of national security and 683 00:24:28,374 --> 00:24:30,597 homeland defense and the broader impact 684 00:24:30,597 --> 00:24:32,708 of any sell off of those capabilities 685 00:24:32,708 --> 00:24:34,910 or the frequencies going forward . So 686 00:24:34,910 --> 00:24:37,190 if you lost access to those that 687 00:24:37,190 --> 00:24:39,190 spectrum , would it have an adverse 688 00:24:39,190 --> 00:24:41,412 impact on your capability to defend the 689 00:24:41,412 --> 00:24:43,634 homeland chairman ? It absolutely could 690 00:24:43,634 --> 00:24:45,801 have an impact to those capabilities , 691 00:24:45,801 --> 00:24:47,579 maritime homeland defense radar 692 00:24:47,579 --> 00:24:49,412 capabilities along with airborne 693 00:24:49,412 --> 00:24:51,523 capabilities . Okay . General rich in 694 00:24:51,523 --> 00:24:53,634 your testimony outlines the extent to 695 00:24:53,634 --> 00:24:55,579 which China's pervasiveness in the 696 00:24:55,579 --> 00:24:57,857 region has taken place in recent years . 697 00:24:57,857 --> 00:24:59,912 What tools and resources do you need 698 00:24:59,912 --> 00:24:59,640 from this committee to improve 699 00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:01,807 partnerships and stop China's gains in 700 00:25:01,807 --> 00:25:04,670 the territory ? So my main levers to 701 00:25:04,670 --> 00:25:06,503 get after the problem set in the 702 00:25:06,503 --> 00:25:08,726 challenges and help our partners in the 703 00:25:08,726 --> 00:25:11,170 region uh is security cooperation . 704 00:25:11,170 --> 00:25:13,570 That is my main lever . That's the 705 00:25:13,570 --> 00:25:16,550 training , the equipping . Also our 706 00:25:16,550 --> 00:25:19,170 exercise program , we have eight large 707 00:25:19,170 --> 00:25:21,830 exercises . That's the ability to bring , 708 00:25:21,830 --> 00:25:24,210 be able to bring over 20 partner 709 00:25:24,210 --> 00:25:27,450 nations together uh to train to work 710 00:25:27,450 --> 00:25:29,920 through challenges with translation , 711 00:25:30,100 --> 00:25:33,090 interoperability , our doctrine , our 712 00:25:33,090 --> 00:25:35,230 tactics , all those kinds of things . 713 00:25:35,470 --> 00:25:37,940 That's one thing that PRC cannot do is 714 00:25:37,940 --> 00:25:39,830 bring nations together to conduct 715 00:25:39,830 --> 00:25:42,020 exercises so very , very powerful 716 00:25:42,020 --> 00:25:44,580 program . But the security cooperation , 717 00:25:44,590 --> 00:25:47,860 um we gotta be there with our partners 718 00:25:47,860 --> 00:25:50,070 on the field , with our Jersey , on 719 00:25:50,440 --> 00:25:53,250 with the training and the equipping 720 00:25:53,250 --> 00:25:55,361 that we bring to make them stronger . 721 00:25:55,361 --> 00:25:57,361 Their challenges and their security 722 00:25:57,361 --> 00:25:59,850 challenges are our security challenges . 723 00:25:59,860 --> 00:26:01,890 They turn right around and put the 724 00:26:01,890 --> 00:26:04,810 security cooperation to use in order to , 725 00:26:04,820 --> 00:26:06,931 to counter those challenges . So they 726 00:26:06,931 --> 00:26:09,153 don't end up north and on our Southwest 727 00:26:09,153 --> 00:26:11,980 border chair and I recognize the 728 00:26:11,980 --> 00:26:14,036 ranking member for any questions you 729 00:26:14,036 --> 00:26:16,258 may have . Thank you , General Van Herk 730 00:26:16,258 --> 00:26:18,480 on the Domain Awareness issue , which I 731 00:26:18,480 --> 00:26:20,591 did not explain as clearly as I would 732 00:26:20,591 --> 00:26:22,813 have liked to in my opening statement . 733 00:26:22,813 --> 00:26:24,813 But what , what do we need to do to 734 00:26:24,813 --> 00:26:26,758 make sure that we are aware of the 735 00:26:26,758 --> 00:26:28,813 threats that are coming at us in our 736 00:26:28,813 --> 00:26:30,924 air space and in cyberspace . Uh what 737 00:26:30,924 --> 00:26:33,091 are the most important steps ? And I'm 738 00:26:33,091 --> 00:26:35,147 assuming that you believe there is a 739 00:26:35,147 --> 00:26:35,110 vulnerability there and we need to do 740 00:26:35,110 --> 00:26:37,920 more to protect ourselves from ranking 741 00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:40,031 member Smith . Absolutely . There's a 742 00:26:40,031 --> 00:26:42,253 vulnerability there . The first thing I 743 00:26:42,253 --> 00:26:42,230 would say is field as soon as possible . 744 00:26:42,230 --> 00:26:44,452 The over the horizon capabilities , the 745 00:26:44,452 --> 00:26:46,620 department has already funded in last 746 00:26:46,620 --> 00:26:48,953 year's budget . So we need to go faster . 747 00:26:48,953 --> 00:26:51,287 Same thing with NORAD and the Canadians . 748 00:26:51,287 --> 00:26:53,231 We need to feel those capabilities 749 00:26:53,231 --> 00:26:55,120 right now . We employ a legacy 19 750 00:26:55,120 --> 00:26:57,064 eighties , eighties , Cold War era 751 00:26:57,064 --> 00:26:59,064 system , we need to ensure that the 752 00:26:59,064 --> 00:27:01,810 radars besides over the horizon radar , 753 00:27:01,810 --> 00:27:04,190 such as our FPs one seventeens that we 754 00:27:04,190 --> 00:27:06,690 have are fully modernized and 755 00:27:06,690 --> 00:27:08,746 integrated with the Federal Aviation 756 00:27:08,746 --> 00:27:10,550 and also D O D and other Domain 757 00:27:10,550 --> 00:27:12,950 Awareness Capabilities . I'm grateful 758 00:27:12,950 --> 00:27:14,561 for the funding for undersea 759 00:27:14,561 --> 00:27:17,370 surveillance with the I U S S . I think 760 00:27:17,370 --> 00:27:19,537 we need to go forward modernizing that 761 00:27:19,537 --> 00:27:21,481 though , in the Pacific , it'll be 762 00:27:21,481 --> 00:27:23,314 different than what we do in the 763 00:27:23,314 --> 00:27:25,481 Atlantic , do the vast reaches . So in 764 00:27:25,481 --> 00:27:27,592 the Pacific , I think laying cable on 765 00:27:27,592 --> 00:27:26,990 the Pacific will be a challenge . We 766 00:27:26,990 --> 00:27:29,046 need to get more mobile capabilities 767 00:27:29,046 --> 00:27:31,220 and also consider going to space based 768 00:27:31,220 --> 00:27:33,220 kind of capabilities for that . And 769 00:27:33,220 --> 00:27:34,998 finally , the cyber is the most 770 00:27:34,998 --> 00:27:36,942 concerning for me , ranking member 771 00:27:36,942 --> 00:27:39,109 Smith Candidly , we don't know what we 772 00:27:39,109 --> 00:27:41,053 don't know . And many of the cyber 773 00:27:41,053 --> 00:27:42,887 threats operate outside of D O D 774 00:27:42,887 --> 00:27:45,053 authority and also federal authorities 775 00:27:45,053 --> 00:27:47,220 such as sister with Jen Easterly . And 776 00:27:47,220 --> 00:27:49,331 that creates a vulnerability . I rely 777 00:27:49,331 --> 00:27:51,053 on municipalities , industry , 778 00:27:51,053 --> 00:27:53,470 commercial capabilities to project 779 00:27:53,470 --> 00:27:55,637 power from our homeland and defend our 780 00:27:55,637 --> 00:27:57,581 homeland . We need to make sure we 781 00:27:57,581 --> 00:27:59,914 understand those vulnerabilities . Yeah . 782 00:27:59,914 --> 00:27:59,720 And I think that that's something this 783 00:27:59,720 --> 00:28:01,831 committee really should prioritize as 784 00:28:01,831 --> 00:28:03,887 we're looking at the authorities and 785 00:28:03,887 --> 00:28:05,942 the systems that we need to fund . I 786 00:28:05,942 --> 00:28:08,053 mean , a lot of it's just a matter of 787 00:28:08,053 --> 00:28:10,387 upgrading what we have . I mean , we've , 788 00:28:10,387 --> 00:28:09,450 we've had a lot of great systems that 789 00:28:09,450 --> 00:28:11,339 have been around a long time . We 790 00:28:11,339 --> 00:28:13,283 haven't upgraded as technology has 791 00:28:13,283 --> 00:28:15,394 moved forward , enabling us to better 792 00:28:15,394 --> 00:28:17,283 protect ourselves . So I think we 793 00:28:17,283 --> 00:28:19,339 really need to focus on that . Can I 794 00:28:19,339 --> 00:28:18,870 add one thing ? I think it's crucial to 795 00:28:18,870 --> 00:28:21,300 point out that the 5702 authorities 796 00:28:21,300 --> 00:28:23,200 expire later this year . Those 797 00:28:23,200 --> 00:28:25,256 authorities have been crucial for us 798 00:28:25,256 --> 00:28:27,200 maintaining awareness on potential 799 00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:29,367 threats to our homeland and around the 800 00:28:29,367 --> 00:28:31,256 globe . And I would tell you that 801 00:28:31,256 --> 00:28:33,422 allowing that to expire could increase 802 00:28:33,422 --> 00:28:35,533 the threat to the Homeland . That's a 803 00:28:35,533 --> 00:28:37,478 very fair point . And the spectrum 804 00:28:37,478 --> 00:28:39,311 issue is also a challenge as the 805 00:28:39,311 --> 00:28:41,478 chairman alluded to , I mean , part of 806 00:28:41,478 --> 00:28:41,220 the reason on the spectrum is we're 807 00:28:41,220 --> 00:28:43,220 trying to keep up on the commercial 808 00:28:43,220 --> 00:28:45,387 side . And I think everyone here would 809 00:28:45,387 --> 00:28:47,387 agree that in terms of our national 810 00:28:47,387 --> 00:28:49,553 security , the degree to which the U S 811 00:28:49,553 --> 00:28:51,887 can be the leader um and communications , 812 00:28:51,887 --> 00:28:53,942 technology and make sure the we have 813 00:28:53,942 --> 00:28:56,053 access to that spectrum , even on the 814 00:28:56,053 --> 00:28:58,164 private side , it's important we just 815 00:28:58,164 --> 00:28:57,660 to figure out how to do it in a way 816 00:28:57,660 --> 00:28:59,716 that doesn't jeopardize our national 817 00:28:59,716 --> 00:29:01,938 security interests . And I've been been 818 00:29:01,938 --> 00:29:04,271 flailing away at that issue for a while . 819 00:29:04,271 --> 00:29:06,327 It's not an easy balance to strike , 820 00:29:06,327 --> 00:29:05,860 but it is one . We need to pay 821 00:29:05,860 --> 00:29:08,082 attention to General Richardson . We've 822 00:29:08,082 --> 00:29:10,249 talked about China , Russia and Iran . 823 00:29:10,249 --> 00:29:12,360 Um just in a nutshell . Why , why are 824 00:29:12,360 --> 00:29:14,582 we struggling so much on that ? Some of 825 00:29:14,582 --> 00:29:16,693 our Latin American countries when you 826 00:29:16,693 --> 00:29:16,520 and I met , we talked a little bit 827 00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:19,280 about how Brazil was basically cozying 828 00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:21,224 up to Russia and a number of other 829 00:29:21,224 --> 00:29:23,391 countries down there as well ? What is 830 00:29:23,391 --> 00:29:25,502 it that Russia and China are bringing 831 00:29:25,502 --> 00:29:27,502 to the game down there that is made 832 00:29:27,502 --> 00:29:29,669 making these countries so willing to , 833 00:29:29,669 --> 00:29:31,836 to , to embrace them ? And what can we 834 00:29:31,836 --> 00:29:33,780 do to get a , get a better balance 835 00:29:33,780 --> 00:29:33,270 there and understanding that we're not 836 00:29:33,270 --> 00:29:36,330 gonna keep China or even Russia um out 837 00:29:36,330 --> 00:29:38,497 of Latin America . But how can we make 838 00:29:38,497 --> 00:29:40,719 sure it doesn't jeopardize our national 839 00:29:40,719 --> 00:29:43,510 security interests ? Um Thank you for 840 00:29:43,510 --> 00:29:46,330 the question . The I think the just to 841 00:29:46,340 --> 00:29:48,740 go back a couple of years into COVID 842 00:29:48,740 --> 00:29:51,590 and uh and create a picture of the 843 00:29:51,590 --> 00:29:53,960 landscape , I think COVID has had had a 844 00:29:53,960 --> 00:29:57,380 devastating impact . Um uh more 845 00:29:57,380 --> 00:29:59,540 proportional than 8% of the world's 846 00:29:59,540 --> 00:30:01,470 population in this region . They 847 00:30:01,470 --> 00:30:03,640 suffered 29% of the world's COVID 848 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:07,590 deaths , 170 million put in a people in 849 00:30:07,590 --> 00:30:09,790 this region , put into poverty , their 850 00:30:09,790 --> 00:30:12,170 economies are struggling . And so as 851 00:30:12,170 --> 00:30:14,392 they're trying to dig out of the hole , 852 00:30:14,392 --> 00:30:17,340 all of them , uh and you have the PRC 853 00:30:17,340 --> 00:30:19,229 showing up with the Belt and Road 854 00:30:19,229 --> 00:30:22,320 initiative , the billions of dollars uh 855 00:30:22,330 --> 00:30:25,740 that they advertise available for these 856 00:30:25,740 --> 00:30:27,907 big projects , all these projects that 857 00:30:27,907 --> 00:30:30,720 they do , highways , electrical dams um 858 00:30:30,730 --> 00:30:32,952 and it looks like investment , but it's 859 00:30:32,952 --> 00:30:34,710 all in critical infrastructure 860 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:37,650 amazingly enough in space and 861 00:30:37,650 --> 00:30:40,440 telecommunications and deep water ports . 862 00:30:40,450 --> 00:30:43,340 One has to ask themselves why , why 863 00:30:43,340 --> 00:30:45,507 would the largest military build up on 864 00:30:45,507 --> 00:30:47,770 conventional nuclear forces in mainland 865 00:30:47,770 --> 00:30:50,180 China . Are they investing , investing 866 00:30:50,190 --> 00:30:53,050 looks to be investing across the globe 867 00:30:53,060 --> 00:30:55,116 in Latin America and the Caribbean . 868 00:30:55,610 --> 00:30:57,750 And so this , this is very concerning 869 00:30:57,750 --> 00:31:00,300 and I would say because of the status 870 00:31:00,300 --> 00:31:02,720 and the of the economies of these 871 00:31:02,720 --> 00:31:05,680 countries is that they have to look at 872 00:31:05,680 --> 00:31:07,902 whatever they can get their hands on to 873 00:31:07,902 --> 00:31:09,791 deliver for their people . Uh The 874 00:31:09,791 --> 00:31:11,958 leaders in the region are in there for 875 00:31:11,958 --> 00:31:14,124 a short period of time , generally one 876 00:31:14,124 --> 00:31:16,069 term and that's about four years . 877 00:31:16,069 --> 00:31:17,069 They've got 878 00:31:24,900 --> 00:31:27,300 thank you , Mr Chairman , uh Assistant 879 00:31:27,300 --> 00:31:29,880 Secretary Dalton , General Van Herk and 880 00:31:29,890 --> 00:31:31,834 General Richardson . I have to say 881 00:31:31,834 --> 00:31:33,890 General Richardson , you're probably 882 00:31:33,890 --> 00:31:35,946 one of the first to actually , in my 883 00:31:35,946 --> 00:31:38,450 opinion , properly address what China 884 00:31:38,450 --> 00:31:40,870 and Russia's real desire is there in 885 00:31:40,870 --> 00:31:43,240 Latin America for a long time . I've 886 00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:45,296 been talking about this geopolitical 887 00:31:45,296 --> 00:31:47,351 alignment for many years on Russia , 888 00:31:47,351 --> 00:31:49,660 China , Iran and North Korea . This 889 00:31:49,660 --> 00:31:51,771 Rodent Belt initiative chairman , she 890 00:31:51,771 --> 00:31:54,150 has launched which was really an effort 891 00:31:54,150 --> 00:31:56,094 to try and expand out the Eurasian 892 00:31:56,094 --> 00:31:58,900 borders . Take Africa , take Oceania , 893 00:31:58,910 --> 00:32:00,854 take over the ports and railways , 894 00:32:00,854 --> 00:32:02,966 creating almost a maritime silk route 895 00:32:02,966 --> 00:32:05,021 that would cut off and choke Western 896 00:32:05,021 --> 00:32:06,966 hemisphere supply chain , but also 897 00:32:06,966 --> 00:32:08,910 taking over and helping to try and 898 00:32:08,910 --> 00:32:10,966 increase tariffs and other things to 899 00:32:10,966 --> 00:32:12,743 the Panama Canal . And then the 900 00:32:12,743 --> 00:32:14,743 Russians actually creating almost a 901 00:32:14,743 --> 00:32:16,632 faux iron curtain , utilizing the 902 00:32:16,632 --> 00:32:18,410 Chavez in Venezuela , Pedro and 903 00:32:18,410 --> 00:32:20,632 Colombia , as well as for utilizing the 904 00:32:20,632 --> 00:32:22,632 darien gap to print fentaNYL by the 905 00:32:22,632 --> 00:32:24,743 mainland Chinese to utilize to poison 906 00:32:24,743 --> 00:32:26,799 Americans . It nearly seems as if it 907 00:32:26,799 --> 00:32:28,910 was an entrapment to try and go ahead 908 00:32:28,910 --> 00:32:30,799 and encircle America to choke off 909 00:32:30,799 --> 00:32:30,790 Western hemisphere supply chain . 910 00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:33,050 Because what we're really facing is the 911 00:32:33,050 --> 00:32:35,430 economic resource , cyber warfare 912 00:32:35,440 --> 00:32:39,020 against China and his malign activities . 913 00:32:39,700 --> 00:32:43,480 So in knowing this , what exactly 914 00:32:43,490 --> 00:32:47,490 is north com and south com doing to 915 00:32:47,490 --> 00:32:49,970 work on countering this additional 916 00:32:49,970 --> 00:32:52,220 ground that China is gaining within 917 00:32:52,220 --> 00:32:53,110 Latin America . 918 00:32:55,870 --> 00:32:58,280 So the I'll go back to thank you for 919 00:32:58,280 --> 00:33:00,336 the question , Congressman , I'll go 920 00:33:00,336 --> 00:33:02,113 back to my main levers and that 921 00:33:02,113 --> 00:33:04,740 security cooperation for South com also 922 00:33:04,740 --> 00:33:07,020 the exercises . And then in my opening 923 00:33:07,020 --> 00:33:09,353 statement , talking about the education , 924 00:33:09,353 --> 00:33:11,187 the foreign military financing , 925 00:33:11,187 --> 00:33:13,298 foreign military sales , it's crucial 926 00:33:13,298 --> 00:33:16,630 uh to help them achieve and obtain 927 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:19,340 the hardware that they need . In order 928 00:33:19,340 --> 00:33:22,860 to counter the line activity . The I S 929 00:33:22,860 --> 00:33:24,780 are to be able to see the domain 930 00:33:24,780 --> 00:33:26,669 awareness , to see the threats is 931 00:33:26,669 --> 00:33:28,780 really important . There are a lot of 932 00:33:28,780 --> 00:33:30,947 legacy systems that are out there that 933 00:33:30,947 --> 00:33:32,947 are partners have radar systems and 934 00:33:32,947 --> 00:33:34,891 they need to be advanced . But the 935 00:33:34,891 --> 00:33:37,169 thing is as uh as uh as I said earlier , 936 00:33:37,169 --> 00:33:39,450 our partners , our best defense and 937 00:33:39,450 --> 00:33:41,617 working with them , everything that we 938 00:33:41,617 --> 00:33:43,728 do with security cooperation is based 939 00:33:43,728 --> 00:33:45,950 in the human rights , the rule of law , 940 00:33:45,950 --> 00:33:47,783 the professionalization of their 941 00:33:47,783 --> 00:33:50,006 militaries and we've seen over the past 942 00:33:50,006 --> 00:33:52,228 few years , um the challenges that they 943 00:33:52,228 --> 00:33:54,172 had but how they have maintained a 944 00:33:54,172 --> 00:33:56,550 professional military , really , really 945 00:33:56,550 --> 00:33:58,383 proud of them . But the security 946 00:33:58,383 --> 00:34:00,550 cooperation is really important for us 947 00:34:00,560 --> 00:34:02,670 and kind of staying on topic and 948 00:34:02,670 --> 00:34:05,600 realizing that China has continued to 949 00:34:05,600 --> 00:34:08,490 utilize economic coercion as opposed to 950 00:34:08,490 --> 00:34:10,768 kind of the U S cash diplomacy efforts . 951 00:34:10,768 --> 00:34:14,090 How do you see a way that we can combat 952 00:34:14,100 --> 00:34:16,100 what they're doing from an economic 953 00:34:16,100 --> 00:34:18,100 perspective that would enable us to 954 00:34:18,100 --> 00:34:20,830 weaken them in that area . So uh in 955 00:34:20,830 --> 00:34:22,997 terms of from the military side that's 956 00:34:22,997 --> 00:34:24,997 being able to deliver in that short 957 00:34:24,997 --> 00:34:27,108 period of time , those leaders are in 958 00:34:27,108 --> 00:34:29,330 the seat for like four years there on a 959 00:34:29,330 --> 00:34:31,663 stopwatch , they're not on the calendar , 960 00:34:31,663 --> 00:34:33,997 they're trying to deliver in 3-6 months . 961 00:34:33,997 --> 00:34:36,520 Our foreign military sales is really 962 00:34:36,520 --> 00:34:38,631 built for long term . So we're really 963 00:34:38,631 --> 00:34:41,020 trying hard . And Secretary Dalton has 964 00:34:41,020 --> 00:34:43,760 been very helpful in that speeding up 965 00:34:43,760 --> 00:34:45,927 those processes working with the inter 966 00:34:45,927 --> 00:34:47,927 agency within our own department of 967 00:34:47,927 --> 00:34:50,038 defense to speed those up because our 968 00:34:50,038 --> 00:34:52,670 partners do see how quickly that we can 969 00:34:52,670 --> 00:34:55,200 get equipment to Ukraine . So we've got 970 00:34:55,200 --> 00:34:57,256 to be able to not take two and three 971 00:34:57,256 --> 00:34:59,422 years to get one coastal patrol vessel 972 00:34:59,422 --> 00:35:02,150 or one maritime patrol aircraft , a 973 00:35:02,160 --> 00:35:04,640 King Air 2 50 to a country to help them 974 00:35:04,640 --> 00:35:06,920 be able to see and counter the malign 975 00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:08,960 activity and we can do it . We can 976 00:35:08,960 --> 00:35:11,127 compete with the P R C . We don't have 977 00:35:11,127 --> 00:35:13,349 to outspend them to compete with them , 978 00:35:13,349 --> 00:35:15,460 but we got to meet our partners needs 979 00:35:15,460 --> 00:35:17,627 where they need it . And a little goes 980 00:35:17,627 --> 00:35:19,627 a long way in this region , we talk 981 00:35:19,627 --> 00:35:21,793 about some of the older equipment that 982 00:35:21,793 --> 00:35:24,016 we utilize in the importance of I S our 983 00:35:24,016 --> 00:35:26,016 capabilities in these areas . And I 984 00:35:26,016 --> 00:35:28,130 recently visited Florida Atlantic 985 00:35:28,130 --> 00:35:30,200 University who's working a lot on 986 00:35:30,210 --> 00:35:32,321 quantum linkage and as well as for ai 987 00:35:32,321 --> 00:35:34,210 autonomous drone capabilities and 988 00:35:34,210 --> 00:35:36,680 capacities . Do you feel that ? And 989 00:35:36,680 --> 00:35:38,847 this is a concern Obviously , Chairman 990 00:35:38,847 --> 00:35:41,069 Xi has as well because he has said that 991 00:35:41,069 --> 00:35:42,902 he's outpacing us militarily and 992 00:35:42,902 --> 00:35:45,013 economically innovation is really the 993 00:35:45,013 --> 00:35:47,180 area that he needs to pick things up . 994 00:35:47,180 --> 00:35:49,402 Do you ? I think getting those types of 995 00:35:49,402 --> 00:35:51,624 innovations into the field and into the 996 00:35:51,624 --> 00:35:51,190 hands of the military would actually 997 00:35:51,190 --> 00:35:53,360 help us and being able to combat some 998 00:35:53,360 --> 00:35:55,527 of these efforts . Absolutely . And so 999 00:35:55,527 --> 00:35:58,240 I advertise the south com region as an 1000 00:35:58,240 --> 00:36:01,760 area , bring your tools for innovation , 1001 00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:03,982 laboratory tests , whatever you want to 1002 00:36:03,982 --> 00:36:06,204 do , we'll put it to real world use and 1003 00:36:06,204 --> 00:36:08,260 a real world mission get hands on in 1004 00:36:08,260 --> 00:36:10,520 the military , be able to use it , test 1005 00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:12,660 it , uh see what works , what doesn't 1006 00:36:12,660 --> 00:36:14,438 work . Uh And we've been pretty 1007 00:36:14,438 --> 00:36:16,604 successful with that , but I advertise 1008 00:36:16,604 --> 00:36:18,960 that to all of the services . And uh 1009 00:36:18,960 --> 00:36:20,960 and we have a lot of folks that are 1010 00:36:20,960 --> 00:36:23,182 really taking advantage of that . Thank 1011 00:36:23,182 --> 00:36:25,404 you so much with that . I yield my time 1012 00:36:25,404 --> 00:36:27,571 back . Gentlemen from Texas . Mr Vesey 1013 00:36:27,571 --> 00:36:29,571 is recognized for five minutes , Mr 1014 00:36:29,571 --> 00:36:31,404 Chairman . Thank you . Very much 1015 00:36:31,404 --> 00:36:33,071 Secretary Dalton , uh General 1016 00:36:33,071 --> 00:36:35,127 Richardson noted in her testimony uh 1017 00:36:35,127 --> 00:36:37,238 that China's trade footprint in Latin 1018 00:36:37,238 --> 00:36:39,349 America and the Caribbean is going to 1019 00:36:39,349 --> 00:36:43,110 increase by about 4000% by 2025 . I was 1020 00:36:43,110 --> 00:36:46,810 curious how the department uh is part 1021 00:36:46,810 --> 00:36:49,190 of the response to address prc's 1022 00:36:49,190 --> 00:36:51,670 expanding uh influence in the region . 1023 00:36:52,980 --> 00:36:55,091 Congressman ? Thank you for , for the 1024 00:36:55,091 --> 00:36:57,000 question . And um it is deeply 1025 00:36:57,000 --> 00:37:00,130 concerning the trend lines in the 1026 00:37:00,130 --> 00:37:02,241 region and it reflects , I think this 1027 00:37:02,241 --> 00:37:05,310 broader approach by , by the PRC um 1028 00:37:05,320 --> 00:37:07,710 leveraging all tools of its national 1029 00:37:07,710 --> 00:37:10,010 power to ext and its reach really 1030 00:37:10,020 --> 00:37:12,076 globally and and to compete with the 1031 00:37:12,076 --> 00:37:14,210 United States um that comes through 1032 00:37:14,210 --> 00:37:16,266 gray zone tactics , it comes through 1033 00:37:16,266 --> 00:37:18,432 economic linkages in the Caribbean and 1034 00:37:18,432 --> 00:37:20,620 Latin America as , as you noted in 1035 00:37:20,620 --> 00:37:22,750 terms of what D O D is doing . Um I 1036 00:37:22,750 --> 00:37:25,780 think General Richardson's um lay down 1037 00:37:25,790 --> 00:37:28,220 of the security cooperation lovers that , 1038 00:37:28,220 --> 00:37:32,100 that we have um is quite right . Um Our 1039 00:37:32,100 --> 00:37:34,530 ability to bolster our defense 1040 00:37:34,530 --> 00:37:38,010 relationships , empower the leaders um 1041 00:37:38,020 --> 00:37:40,242 that are aligned with our interests and 1042 00:37:40,242 --> 00:37:43,150 values um in the region and accelerate 1043 00:37:43,160 --> 00:37:44,882 our , our security cooperation 1044 00:37:44,882 --> 00:37:47,540 activities to them um will enhance our 1045 00:37:47,540 --> 00:37:49,850 relationships and crowd out the 1046 00:37:49,850 --> 00:37:52,860 possibilities for for the PRC to make 1047 00:37:52,860 --> 00:37:55,100 further inroads . I do think there's 1048 00:37:55,100 --> 00:37:57,390 also more that we could be doing in the 1049 00:37:57,390 --> 00:37:59,446 region building upon great work that 1050 00:37:59,446 --> 00:38:01,990 South com is already doing to expose 1051 00:38:02,000 --> 00:38:04,810 the predatory nature of some of the 1052 00:38:04,810 --> 00:38:07,990 prc's activities um through information 1053 00:38:07,990 --> 00:38:10,220 operations and , and public affairs . 1054 00:38:10,230 --> 00:38:12,750 Thank you very much . Um I wanted to 1055 00:38:12,750 --> 00:38:15,170 ask General Van Herk a question on 1056 00:38:15,170 --> 00:38:18,270 China also uh when the previous 1057 00:38:18,270 --> 00:38:20,440 administration put in trade 1058 00:38:20,440 --> 00:38:23,400 restrictions on China , one of the 1059 00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:25,456 things that the Chinese did was that 1060 00:38:25,456 --> 00:38:27,456 they just upped their investment in 1061 00:38:27,456 --> 00:38:29,344 Mexico , one of our NAFTA trading 1062 00:38:29,344 --> 00:38:31,511 partners . As a matter of fact , uh we 1063 00:38:31,511 --> 00:38:34,290 saw record high investment uh in Mexico 1064 00:38:34,300 --> 00:38:38,020 around 24,021 1065 00:38:38,020 --> 00:38:40,930 time period . And the D A is saying 1066 00:38:40,930 --> 00:38:43,097 that China is still the primary source 1067 00:38:43,097 --> 00:38:45,210 of fentaNYL and fentaNYL related 1068 00:38:45,210 --> 00:38:47,370 substances that come into the United 1069 00:38:47,370 --> 00:38:50,340 States . Uh Can you talk a little bit 1070 00:38:50,350 --> 00:38:53,410 about as trade continues to increase 1071 00:38:53,410 --> 00:38:55,243 with our partners in the South , 1072 00:38:55,243 --> 00:38:57,410 particularly Mexico . How important it 1073 00:38:57,410 --> 00:39:01,000 is that we get a hold of this ? So make 1074 00:39:01,000 --> 00:39:03,222 sure I understand your question , get a 1075 00:39:03,222 --> 00:39:05,278 hold of the Chinese investment , not 1076 00:39:05,278 --> 00:39:07,500 that , how concerned should we be about 1077 00:39:07,500 --> 00:39:10,210 the Chinese investment and , and there 1078 00:39:10,210 --> 00:39:13,370 and being correlated with them being in 1079 00:39:13,370 --> 00:39:15,592 control of so much fentaNYL coming into 1080 00:39:15,592 --> 00:39:17,481 the United States . You know , we 1081 00:39:17,481 --> 00:39:19,648 should be very concerned about Chinese 1082 00:39:19,648 --> 00:39:19,340 investment in the entire western 1083 00:39:19,340 --> 00:39:21,310 hemisphere . Not only in Mexico , 1084 00:39:21,320 --> 00:39:23,750 there's significant Chinese investment 1085 00:39:23,750 --> 00:39:25,600 in Mexico , about 80% of their 1086 00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:27,630 telecommunications is provided by 1087 00:39:27,630 --> 00:39:29,590 Chinese companies such as Huawei , 1088 00:39:29,830 --> 00:39:31,663 their border detection and their 1089 00:39:31,663 --> 00:39:33,886 security going back and forth . We work 1090 00:39:33,886 --> 00:39:35,774 closely with Mexico to ensure the 1091 00:39:35,774 --> 00:39:38,290 Chinese aren't allowed to uh provide uh 1092 00:39:38,300 --> 00:39:40,470 you know , that the capabilities that 1093 00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:43,130 uh look at vehicles and processing go 1094 00:39:43,130 --> 00:39:45,352 across the border as well as far as the 1095 00:39:45,352 --> 00:39:47,463 fentaNYL piece . Let's let's be clear 1096 00:39:47,463 --> 00:39:49,352 when we say China , it comes from 1097 00:39:49,352 --> 00:39:51,408 individuals and companies in China , 1098 00:39:51,408 --> 00:39:53,408 but the PRC themselves is turning a 1099 00:39:53,408 --> 00:39:55,408 blind eye . So it's crucial that we 1100 00:39:55,408 --> 00:39:57,352 expose that we , we name and shame 1101 00:39:57,352 --> 00:39:59,463 their activities , the fact that they 1102 00:39:59,463 --> 00:40:01,463 aren't taking advantage of stopping 1103 00:40:01,463 --> 00:40:03,630 that and we shouldn't expect them to , 1104 00:40:03,630 --> 00:40:05,852 but we should do more . It's coming not 1105 00:40:05,852 --> 00:40:07,852 only from China but other places in 1106 00:40:07,852 --> 00:40:07,830 Asia as well . And we need to work 1107 00:40:07,830 --> 00:40:10,052 closely . I'm working very closely with 1108 00:40:10,052 --> 00:40:12,108 Samara . They've been charged , some 1109 00:40:12,108 --> 00:40:14,274 are as the , the Secretary of the Navy 1110 00:40:14,274 --> 00:40:16,740 uh in Mexico and providing information 1111 00:40:16,740 --> 00:40:18,970 to enable them to basically go after 1112 00:40:18,970 --> 00:40:20,803 some of these precursors as they 1113 00:40:20,803 --> 00:40:22,692 provide ports security . I'd also 1114 00:40:22,692 --> 00:40:24,914 expand that it's not just in Mexico and 1115 00:40:24,914 --> 00:40:27,248 the western hemisphere in Latin America , 1116 00:40:27,248 --> 00:40:29,303 it's in the Bahamas as well . And so 1117 00:40:29,303 --> 00:40:31,248 they have the largest Megara Built 1118 00:40:31,248 --> 00:40:33,770 right on top of our Navy's test and 1119 00:40:33,770 --> 00:40:35,937 training range is and where our cables 1120 00:40:35,937 --> 00:40:38,048 come ashore . So things that we could 1121 00:40:38,048 --> 00:40:40,214 do is we have to continue to educate , 1122 00:40:40,214 --> 00:40:42,270 declassify and let these nations see 1123 00:40:42,270 --> 00:40:44,326 what's actually going on as well and 1124 00:40:44,326 --> 00:40:46,548 continue building their relationships . 1125 00:40:46,548 --> 00:40:46,530 It would vastly help to have a 1126 00:40:46,540 --> 00:40:48,707 ambassador in the Bahamas . We haven't 1127 00:40:48,707 --> 00:40:50,860 had one since 2011 . Yeah . Well , 1128 00:40:50,860 --> 00:40:52,527 thank you very much , General 1129 00:40:52,527 --> 00:40:54,820 Richardson in in short . Um but you 1130 00:40:54,820 --> 00:40:57,070 know , based on that , what sort of 1131 00:40:57,070 --> 00:40:59,970 platform should we be investing in for 1132 00:40:59,970 --> 00:41:01,970 the future particularly now that we 1133 00:41:01,970 --> 00:41:04,192 know that China is going to continue to 1134 00:41:04,192 --> 00:41:06,414 uh want to have this large footprint in 1135 00:41:06,414 --> 00:41:09,580 the in our southern hemisphere . So I 1136 00:41:09,580 --> 00:41:12,520 think the the challenges that are , 1137 00:41:12,530 --> 00:41:14,720 that are countries face in the region 1138 00:41:14,730 --> 00:41:17,900 is the sybers at the top of their list 1139 00:41:17,900 --> 00:41:20,067 of the challenges that they're dealing 1140 00:41:20,067 --> 00:41:22,289 with ransomware attacks . Cyber attacks 1141 00:41:22,289 --> 00:41:24,456 are very , very prevalent and building 1142 00:41:24,456 --> 00:41:27,640 their capacity and capability to um one 1143 00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:29,807 hardened their networks and be able to 1144 00:41:29,807 --> 00:41:31,862 do that very , very quickly , uh and 1145 00:41:31,862 --> 00:41:33,918 hardened critical infrastructure and 1146 00:41:33,918 --> 00:41:36,840 having uh the ability to be able to do 1147 00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:38,980 that . And again , I go back to the 1148 00:41:38,990 --> 00:41:41,101 struggling economies of some of these 1149 00:41:41,101 --> 00:41:43,268 countries are having a hard time doing 1150 00:41:43,268 --> 00:41:45,490 that . So we're , we're helping them to 1151 00:41:45,490 --> 00:41:48,800 identify the their vulnerabilities in 1152 00:41:48,800 --> 00:41:51,200 order to put a focus on that and be 1153 00:41:51,200 --> 00:41:53,200 able to , to fix that . Gentlemen , 1154 00:41:53,200 --> 00:41:55,422 thank you , expired and I recognize the 1155 00:41:55,422 --> 00:41:57,589 gentleman from Missouri Mr offered for 1156 00:41:57,589 --> 00:41:59,589 five minutes . Thank you , Chairman 1157 00:41:59,589 --> 00:42:01,811 Rogers , ranking member , Smith and our 1158 00:42:01,811 --> 00:42:01,360 witnesses here today . Proud to say 1159 00:42:01,360 --> 00:42:03,360 that both of our generals today are 1160 00:42:03,360 --> 00:42:05,527 Missouri natives . Thank you for being 1161 00:42:05,527 --> 00:42:07,471 here today . I too am increasingly 1162 00:42:07,471 --> 00:42:09,638 concerned about the threat China poses 1163 00:42:09,638 --> 00:42:11,860 not just in the Indo Pacific region but 1164 00:42:11,860 --> 00:42:13,960 us here at home here in America with 1165 00:42:13,960 --> 00:42:16,071 the recent Chinese spy balloon flying 1166 00:42:16,071 --> 00:42:17,682 over the US homeland China's 1167 00:42:17,682 --> 00:42:19,904 surveillance of American through tiktok 1168 00:42:19,904 --> 00:42:21,904 on their , on their phones . Um New 1169 00:42:21,904 --> 00:42:23,627 reports of Chinese made cranes 1170 00:42:23,627 --> 00:42:25,738 operating at American ports including 1171 00:42:25,738 --> 00:42:27,960 cranes used by our own military being 1172 00:42:27,960 --> 00:42:30,680 used for surveillance by the CCP . It 1173 00:42:30,680 --> 00:42:32,791 makes me wonder what part , what part 1174 00:42:32,791 --> 00:42:35,013 of our society , what part of our , our 1175 00:42:35,013 --> 00:42:37,236 country , our , our precious nation has 1176 00:42:37,236 --> 00:42:39,236 not been infiltrated by the Chinese 1177 00:42:39,236 --> 00:42:40,958 kindness government . I'm also 1178 00:42:40,958 --> 00:42:42,847 concerned that we do not have the 1179 00:42:42,847 --> 00:42:44,902 capabilities in place to protect our 1180 00:42:44,902 --> 00:42:46,958 homeland from a non kinetic threat , 1181 00:42:46,958 --> 00:42:49,124 for example , electromagnetic or cyber 1182 00:42:49,124 --> 00:42:51,124 attack . And that leads to my first 1183 00:42:51,124 --> 00:42:52,902 question for General Van Hurt , 1184 00:42:52,902 --> 00:42:54,847 considering the recent Chinese spy 1185 00:42:54,847 --> 00:42:56,958 balloon that flew unchecked over most 1186 00:42:56,958 --> 00:42:56,570 of the continental United States , 1187 00:42:56,580 --> 00:42:59,060 including near White Men Air Force Base . 1188 00:42:59,060 --> 00:43:01,060 Can you talk a little bit about the 1189 00:43:01,060 --> 00:43:03,210 resources and capabilities that we do 1190 00:43:03,210 --> 00:43:05,390 have in place to defend our homeland 1191 00:43:05,390 --> 00:43:07,223 from non kinetic attacks such as 1192 00:43:07,223 --> 00:43:09,390 electromagnetic and cyber attacks ? 1193 00:43:11,590 --> 00:43:13,590 So that , that's a great question , 1194 00:43:13,590 --> 00:43:16,010 Congressman as far as uh resources in 1195 00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:18,190 place , General Nakasone primarily has 1196 00:43:18,190 --> 00:43:20,590 the responsibility for D O D and 1197 00:43:20,590 --> 00:43:24,200 defense from uh the non kinetic effects 1198 00:43:24,200 --> 00:43:26,200 that you're talking about and being 1199 00:43:26,200 --> 00:43:29,100 aware as far as being aware of E M P . 1200 00:43:29,110 --> 00:43:31,166 Uh I would say that's not a specific 1201 00:43:31,166 --> 00:43:33,221 capability but more broadly , that's 1202 00:43:33,221 --> 00:43:35,277 our strategic deterrent that defends 1203 00:43:35,277 --> 00:43:35,090 against that any kind of an 1204 00:43:35,090 --> 00:43:37,760 electromagnetic . And it's also my 1205 00:43:37,760 --> 00:43:39,704 capabilities to defend against any 1206 00:43:39,704 --> 00:43:41,871 platform that may deliver that such as 1207 00:43:41,871 --> 00:43:43,927 an airborne platform a high altitude 1208 00:43:43,927 --> 00:43:46,300 balloon which could effectively utilize 1209 00:43:46,300 --> 00:43:48,467 an E M P attack on our homeland . So I 1210 00:43:48,467 --> 00:43:50,467 think I have the capabilities to do 1211 00:43:50,467 --> 00:43:52,633 that if I have the domain awareness to 1212 00:43:52,633 --> 00:43:54,856 see that more broadly in defend against 1213 00:43:54,856 --> 00:43:56,856 an E M P kind of threat . As far as 1214 00:43:56,856 --> 00:43:59,080 specific E M P for D O D facilities and 1215 00:43:59,080 --> 00:44:01,191 key critical infrastructure , much of 1216 00:44:01,191 --> 00:44:03,191 that is already hardened from E M P 1217 00:44:03,191 --> 00:44:06,530 attacks . So the way we uh deliver our 1218 00:44:06,540 --> 00:44:08,707 emergency action message is the way we 1219 00:44:08,707 --> 00:44:11,580 uh look at our commanding control that 1220 00:44:11,580 --> 00:44:13,524 is critical to nuclear command and 1221 00:44:13,524 --> 00:44:15,747 control . Much of that is already E M P 1222 00:44:15,747 --> 00:44:17,802 hardened . Thank you , sir . Another 1223 00:44:17,802 --> 00:44:19,858 concern I have is that we may not be 1224 00:44:19,858 --> 00:44:22,024 focusing enough on the army's domestic 1225 00:44:22,024 --> 00:44:24,136 role as it relates to north com . Can 1226 00:44:24,136 --> 00:44:26,136 you talk about the army's role with 1227 00:44:26,136 --> 00:44:28,136 north com ? Do you believe that the 1228 00:44:28,136 --> 00:44:30,191 army has the resources , it needs to 1229 00:44:30,191 --> 00:44:32,191 support our nation during a federal 1230 00:44:32,191 --> 00:44:35,890 disaster ? Yes , I believe that 1231 00:44:35,890 --> 00:44:37,890 question would be best asked by the 1232 00:44:37,890 --> 00:44:40,410 army or to the army . But my concern is 1233 00:44:40,410 --> 00:44:42,521 access to forces that are organized , 1234 00:44:42,521 --> 00:44:44,743 trained and equipped in a timely manner 1235 00:44:44,743 --> 00:44:46,688 to conduct both defense support to 1236 00:44:46,688 --> 00:44:48,799 civil authorities and also defense of 1237 00:44:48,799 --> 00:44:50,743 the homeland . I'm the only combat 1238 00:44:50,743 --> 00:44:52,966 commander that doesn't have a threshold 1239 00:44:52,966 --> 00:44:55,350 force day to day uh to defend my area 1240 00:44:55,350 --> 00:44:57,294 of responsibility . I have to gain 1241 00:44:57,294 --> 00:44:59,350 access to that through a request for 1242 00:44:59,350 --> 00:45:01,350 forces for just in time . And those 1243 00:45:01,350 --> 00:45:03,572 forces then have to come from somewhere 1244 00:45:03,572 --> 00:45:05,683 else , either retained by the service 1245 00:45:05,683 --> 00:45:07,906 or somebody else's . Oh , plan . Uh I'm 1246 00:45:07,906 --> 00:45:10,017 confident the army has what they need 1247 00:45:10,017 --> 00:45:12,239 from a capacity wise to get to it . And 1248 00:45:12,239 --> 00:45:14,350 my question is access to it . I would 1249 00:45:14,350 --> 00:45:16,517 also point out that I do have concerns 1250 00:45:16,517 --> 00:45:18,628 about the Arctic . 52% of my A O R is 1251 00:45:18,628 --> 00:45:20,739 in the Arctic . Okay . And we need to 1252 00:45:20,739 --> 00:45:22,683 ensure that forces are organized , 1253 00:45:22,683 --> 00:45:24,850 trained and equipped to operate day to 1254 00:45:24,850 --> 00:45:26,683 day in the Arctic . And I'm less 1255 00:45:26,683 --> 00:45:26,470 confident there that the services are 1256 00:45:26,470 --> 00:45:28,637 organized . They all have strategies , 1257 00:45:28,637 --> 00:45:30,859 they have not funded those strategies . 1258 00:45:30,859 --> 00:45:33,081 I look forward to seeing the budget for 1259 00:45:33,081 --> 00:45:34,914 24 . So do we thank you our last 1260 00:45:34,914 --> 00:45:37,081 question for you . General . Could you 1261 00:45:37,081 --> 00:45:39,303 please explain what North Commons doing 1262 00:45:39,303 --> 00:45:41,526 to counter Huawei ? You mentioned their 1263 00:45:41,526 --> 00:45:43,748 involvement uh in Mexico . We know that 1264 00:45:43,748 --> 00:45:43,460 the Chinese Communist government has 1265 00:45:43,460 --> 00:45:45,627 their tentacles spread throughout with 1266 00:45:45,627 --> 00:45:47,710 Huawei and ZTE hardware uh in 1267 00:45:47,710 --> 00:45:49,988 particular near military installations , 1268 00:45:49,988 --> 00:45:52,210 please address that . So worked closely 1269 00:45:52,210 --> 00:45:54,154 with General Marcus Tony and genie 1270 00:45:54,154 --> 00:45:56,377 Easterly at CISA to address those . And 1271 00:45:56,377 --> 00:45:58,432 this is uh an ongoing topic that you 1272 00:45:58,432 --> 00:46:00,654 see in the media right now . It's about 1273 00:46:00,654 --> 00:46:02,932 the investment of Chinese corporations , 1274 00:46:02,932 --> 00:46:04,877 companies of the Chinese Communist 1275 00:46:04,877 --> 00:46:07,043 Party itself into our nation . So this 1276 00:46:07,043 --> 00:46:09,210 is an education aspect that we have to 1277 00:46:09,210 --> 00:46:11,210 ensure folks understand the risk as 1278 00:46:11,210 --> 00:46:13,620 they sell off properties around 1279 00:46:13,620 --> 00:46:15,842 military installations . Primarily that 1280 00:46:15,842 --> 00:46:18,064 responsibility would fall outside of my 1281 00:46:18,064 --> 00:46:20,064 authorities . But I'm significantly 1282 00:46:20,064 --> 00:46:22,510 working with those who have that 1283 00:46:22,510 --> 00:46:24,677 responsibility , commerce and others . 1284 00:46:25,590 --> 00:46:27,479 We had a good conversation in our 1285 00:46:27,479 --> 00:46:29,534 office yesterday and we talked about 1286 00:46:29,534 --> 00:46:31,646 the not just domain awareness but the 1287 00:46:31,646 --> 00:46:33,812 awareness of the American people . How 1288 00:46:33,812 --> 00:46:35,812 do we get America to wake up to the 1289 00:46:35,812 --> 00:46:37,812 actual threat the Communist Chinese 1290 00:46:37,812 --> 00:46:39,979 government poses ? Yeah , I think this 1291 00:46:39,979 --> 00:46:41,979 is an education and understanding . 1292 00:46:41,979 --> 00:46:44,034 We're so economically intertwined as 1293 00:46:44,034 --> 00:46:46,146 well with China that it's hard to set 1294 00:46:46,146 --> 00:46:48,201 policies in place that could have an 1295 00:46:48,201 --> 00:46:50,423 impact on ourselves . And so we have to 1296 00:46:50,423 --> 00:46:50,100 understand the threat . We have to be 1297 00:46:50,100 --> 00:46:52,211 willing to declassify and expose that 1298 00:46:52,211 --> 00:46:54,211 threat a little bit more . So folks 1299 00:46:54,211 --> 00:46:56,433 fully understand what China is actually 1300 00:46:56,433 --> 00:46:58,378 trying to do the P R C . Thank you 1301 00:46:58,378 --> 00:46:57,820 General . Thank you to all of our 1302 00:46:57,820 --> 00:47:00,098 witnesses , Mr Chairman , I yield back , 1303 00:47:00,240 --> 00:47:02,462 recognized from California , Mr Panetta 1304 00:47:02,462 --> 00:47:04,351 for five minutes . Thank you , Mr 1305 00:47:04,351 --> 00:47:06,462 Chairman Mr ranking member , uh sir , 1306 00:47:06,462 --> 00:47:08,790 gentle ladies . Good , good morning and 1307 00:47:08,790 --> 00:47:10,901 thank you for being here . Um I think 1308 00:47:10,901 --> 00:47:13,068 the chairman did a pretty good job and 1309 00:47:13,068 --> 00:47:15,290 setting the scene , at least in regards 1310 00:47:15,290 --> 00:47:17,401 to the question I'm about to oppose , 1311 00:47:17,401 --> 00:47:19,457 I'm gonna hit you , Mr Dalton , Miss 1312 00:47:19,457 --> 00:47:21,457 Dalton first . Um Obviously , we've 1313 00:47:21,457 --> 00:47:23,623 heard about the horrific reports about 1314 00:47:23,623 --> 00:47:26,480 the killing of two American uh people 1315 00:47:26,480 --> 00:47:28,424 and the kidnapping of two more . I 1316 00:47:28,424 --> 00:47:30,647 guess this group of four that was going 1317 00:47:30,647 --> 00:47:32,869 down there for a medical procedure . Um 1318 00:47:32,869 --> 00:47:34,813 You know , we're hearing about the 1319 00:47:34,813 --> 00:47:36,924 explosion of illicit drug deaths here 1320 00:47:36,924 --> 00:47:39,091 in our country . We were hearing about 1321 00:47:39,091 --> 00:47:41,147 people , thousands upon thousands of 1322 00:47:41,147 --> 00:47:43,202 people just disappearing in Mexico . 1323 00:47:43,202 --> 00:47:45,258 The Washington Post did an excellent 1324 00:47:45,258 --> 00:47:47,258 expose about the amount of fentaNYL 1325 00:47:47,258 --> 00:47:49,369 that is coming into our country . And 1326 00:47:49,369 --> 00:47:51,480 now you're obviously hearing more and 1327 00:47:51,480 --> 00:47:53,570 more public officials , Attorney 1328 00:47:53,570 --> 00:47:55,910 General's former A G Barr , you're 1329 00:47:55,910 --> 00:47:57,854 seeing a house resolution . You're 1330 00:47:57,854 --> 00:48:00,077 going to see a Senate bill , I think by 1331 00:48:00,077 --> 00:48:02,440 Senator Graham about what we can do to 1332 00:48:02,440 --> 00:48:05,270 designate cartels as terrorist groups 1333 00:48:05,820 --> 00:48:08,220 and authorized quote unquote , select 1334 00:48:08,230 --> 00:48:10,960 military capabilities . Obviously , 1335 00:48:10,970 --> 00:48:13,081 Miss Dalton , there's a lot of policy 1336 00:48:13,081 --> 00:48:15,610 challenges in regards to this . But I 1337 00:48:15,610 --> 00:48:18,460 think we understand why people are 1338 00:48:18,470 --> 00:48:20,470 asking for this based on what we're 1339 00:48:20,470 --> 00:48:22,581 seeing . If you could go into some of 1340 00:48:22,581 --> 00:48:24,748 the challenges that there could be for 1341 00:48:24,748 --> 00:48:27,026 this type of policy to be put in place , 1342 00:48:27,240 --> 00:48:29,184 especially when it comes to Mexico 1343 00:48:29,560 --> 00:48:31,710 Congressman . Thank you very much for 1344 00:48:31,710 --> 00:48:33,766 the question . And first of all , to 1345 00:48:33,766 --> 00:48:36,820 acknowledge the tragedy of the killing 1346 00:48:36,820 --> 00:48:39,560 of Americans over over the last week . 1347 00:48:39,560 --> 00:48:42,060 And this is of course , a priority for 1348 00:48:42,070 --> 00:48:44,630 this administration um to , to look out 1349 00:48:44,630 --> 00:48:47,270 for , for the families and um to ensure 1350 00:48:47,270 --> 00:48:49,980 that um the personal affected um are 1351 00:48:49,980 --> 00:48:53,610 are returned home . Um And I would say , 1352 00:48:53,620 --> 00:48:55,787 you know , from a policy perspective , 1353 00:48:55,787 --> 00:48:57,731 certainly concerning the levels of 1354 00:48:57,731 --> 00:48:59,731 violence , um the flow of irregular 1355 00:48:59,731 --> 00:49:03,070 migrants to our southwest border . Um 1356 00:49:03,080 --> 00:49:05,260 the prevalence of fentaNYL coming 1357 00:49:05,260 --> 00:49:07,970 through our ports of entry . Um These 1358 00:49:07,970 --> 00:49:10,820 are all deeply concerning trend lines 1359 00:49:10,820 --> 00:49:13,250 and we need a holistic approach to 1360 00:49:13,250 --> 00:49:16,500 address it . Um not only with , with 1361 00:49:16,500 --> 00:49:19,320 Mexico but as discussed more upstream 1362 00:49:19,320 --> 00:49:21,420 in terms of the sources , whether 1363 00:49:21,430 --> 00:49:24,050 that's prc's connection to fentaNYL or 1364 00:49:24,060 --> 00:49:26,740 um working closely with partners um 1365 00:49:26,750 --> 00:49:30,140 upstream in the region . Um As well , I 1366 00:49:30,140 --> 00:49:32,970 think to , to your question in terms of 1367 00:49:32,970 --> 00:49:34,750 weighing the advantages and 1368 00:49:34,750 --> 00:49:36,750 disadvantages of some , some of the 1369 00:49:36,750 --> 00:49:38,950 steps that are under consideration um 1370 00:49:38,960 --> 00:49:41,140 in terms of use of force or certain 1371 00:49:41,140 --> 00:49:43,196 designations , I think we need to be 1372 00:49:43,196 --> 00:49:45,490 clear eyed about what some of the 1373 00:49:45,490 --> 00:49:48,720 implications might be . Um For the 1374 00:49:48,730 --> 00:49:52,210 lines of cooperation we do have um with , 1375 00:49:52,210 --> 00:49:54,099 with Mexico and I'll speak from a 1376 00:49:54,099 --> 00:49:56,260 defense perspective is that's my , my 1377 00:49:56,260 --> 00:49:59,650 primary line of oversight . Um So I'm , 1378 00:49:59,660 --> 00:50:01,870 I'm going down to , to Mexico actually 1379 00:50:01,870 --> 00:50:04,920 tonight um to engage Mexican partners 1380 00:50:04,930 --> 00:50:08,080 on um intelligence cooperation , cyber 1381 00:50:08,080 --> 00:50:11,580 cooperation , a whole host of critical 1382 00:50:11,580 --> 00:50:13,580 defense cooperation activities . Um 1383 00:50:13,580 --> 00:50:15,580 There are important from a national 1384 00:50:15,580 --> 00:50:18,090 security perspective and I do worry um 1385 00:50:18,090 --> 00:50:20,810 based on um you know , signals , very 1386 00:50:20,810 --> 00:50:22,866 strong signals we've gotten from the 1387 00:50:22,866 --> 00:50:24,810 Mexicans in the past . Um concerns 1388 00:50:24,810 --> 00:50:26,977 about their sovereignty concerns about 1389 00:50:26,977 --> 00:50:29,280 potential reciprocal steps that they 1390 00:50:29,280 --> 00:50:32,600 might take to cut off our , our access . 1391 00:50:32,610 --> 00:50:35,050 Um if we were to take some of the steps 1392 00:50:35,050 --> 00:50:37,217 that are in consideration . So I think 1393 00:50:37,217 --> 00:50:39,328 we need to be really clear eyed about 1394 00:50:39,328 --> 00:50:41,550 weighing those , those trade offs and I 1395 00:50:41,550 --> 00:50:43,606 at least it's a plan that I'll be in 1396 00:50:43,606 --> 00:50:45,830 Mexico as well next week . Uh speaking 1397 00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:48,640 with the President and obviously , you 1398 00:50:48,640 --> 00:50:51,050 know , you had a Wall Street Journal 1399 00:50:51,050 --> 00:50:53,880 editorial , excuse me , op ed uh 1400 00:50:53,890 --> 00:50:56,090 recently that said basically the chief 1401 00:50:56,090 --> 00:50:58,620 enabler is President Andres Manuel 1402 00:50:58,630 --> 00:51:00,686 Lopez Obrador . Would you agree with 1403 00:51:00,686 --> 00:51:04,580 that statement ? I believe these 1404 00:51:04,580 --> 00:51:06,747 are really complex challenges that are 1405 00:51:06,747 --> 00:51:09,910 gonna require engagement at all levels 1406 00:51:09,920 --> 00:51:13,280 to include with the head of state . Um 1407 00:51:13,290 --> 00:51:15,068 And you know , there , there is 1408 00:51:15,068 --> 00:51:17,570 cooperation that we need to further um 1409 00:51:17,570 --> 00:51:19,681 when it comes to counter drug efforts 1410 00:51:19,681 --> 00:51:21,681 encountering a regular migration as 1411 00:51:21,681 --> 00:51:24,320 well . Jack . Um in the last 40 seconds , 1412 00:51:24,330 --> 00:51:28,000 uh General Van Herk , I realized that 1413 00:51:28,010 --> 00:51:30,780 there's a lot of discussion about the 1414 00:51:30,790 --> 00:51:33,210 Chinese surveillance balloon over 1415 00:51:33,220 --> 00:51:35,980 America . There was also reported and 1416 00:51:35,980 --> 00:51:38,550 to be assessed by the Pentagon , a 1417 00:51:38,560 --> 00:51:40,782 surveillance balloon over Latin America 1418 00:51:40,782 --> 00:51:43,210 at the same time , whatever happened to 1419 00:51:43,210 --> 00:51:47,070 that . Well , I'll 1420 00:51:47,070 --> 00:51:48,959 speak for what I know and General 1421 00:51:48,959 --> 00:51:50,959 Richards can talk about it . What I 1422 00:51:50,959 --> 00:51:54,250 understand is the P R C uh actually uh 1423 00:51:54,260 --> 00:51:56,482 terminated that balloon in the Atlantic 1424 00:51:56,482 --> 00:51:58,371 Ocean off the east coast of South 1425 00:51:58,371 --> 00:52:00,538 America . That's what my understanding 1426 00:52:00,538 --> 00:52:02,427 is , General Richardson . Is that 1427 00:52:02,427 --> 00:52:05,180 correct ? That's what I understand as 1428 00:52:05,180 --> 00:52:07,580 well . Yes . Okay . Thank you . I yield 1429 00:52:07,580 --> 00:52:09,747 back , time's expired and I recognized 1430 00:52:09,890 --> 00:52:11,779 from New York , Mr Loder for five 1431 00:52:11,779 --> 00:52:13,668 minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman 1432 00:52:13,668 --> 00:52:15,668 Status of Forces Agreements are the 1433 00:52:15,668 --> 00:52:17,723 compacts . The Department of Defense 1434 00:52:17,723 --> 00:52:19,668 has in place with friendly foreign 1435 00:52:19,668 --> 00:52:21,668 nations who host us troops overseas 1436 00:52:21,668 --> 00:52:23,779 among other things . These agreements 1437 00:52:23,779 --> 00:52:26,001 ensure that when deployed us forces are 1438 00:52:26,001 --> 00:52:28,112 accused of crimes by our allies . Our 1439 00:52:28,112 --> 00:52:29,834 troops are afforded the proper 1440 00:52:29,834 --> 00:52:31,779 protocols and civil American civil 1441 00:52:31,779 --> 00:52:33,946 rights such as the right to counsel of 1442 00:52:33,946 --> 00:52:36,057 their choice , an interpreter , a bar 1443 00:52:36,057 --> 00:52:37,946 against pretrial confinement when 1444 00:52:37,946 --> 00:52:40,001 accused of a non violent crime . And 1445 00:52:40,001 --> 00:52:42,223 for decades , United States forces have 1446 00:52:42,223 --> 00:52:44,557 been stationed in the deployed to Japan , 1447 00:52:44,557 --> 00:52:46,446 one of our greatest allies in the 1448 00:52:46,446 --> 00:52:48,390 Western Pacific . And our nation's 1449 00:52:48,390 --> 00:52:50,557 military cooperation has been a strong 1450 00:52:50,557 --> 00:52:52,557 source of stability for the Western 1451 00:52:52,557 --> 00:52:54,501 Pacific in the in the face of real 1452 00:52:54,501 --> 00:52:56,557 threats from China and North Korea . 1453 00:52:56,557 --> 00:52:58,557 Also for decades , military men and 1454 00:52:58,557 --> 00:53:00,650 women stationed in and deployed to 1455 00:53:00,650 --> 00:53:02,261 Japan have operated with the 1456 00:53:02,261 --> 00:53:04,483 understanding that if they were accused 1457 00:53:04,483 --> 00:53:06,650 of a non violent crime in Japan , they 1458 00:53:06,650 --> 00:53:08,817 would be afforded basic civil rights . 1459 00:53:08,817 --> 00:53:10,983 Contrary to that understanding , Ridge 1460 00:53:10,983 --> 00:53:13,094 Alcon is a United States Navy surface 1461 00:53:13,094 --> 00:53:15,039 warfare officer stationed in Japan 1462 00:53:15,039 --> 00:53:16,928 subsequent to being involved in a 1463 00:53:16,928 --> 00:53:18,872 vehicular accident where everybody 1464 00:53:18,872 --> 00:53:21,206 agrees no drugs or alcohol was involved , 1465 00:53:21,206 --> 00:53:23,150 was arrested , confined pretrial , 1466 00:53:23,150 --> 00:53:25,560 denied access to his own attorney and 1467 00:53:25,560 --> 00:53:27,850 denied access to a translator . And 1468 00:53:27,850 --> 00:53:29,739 subsequent to the denial of these 1469 00:53:29,739 --> 00:53:32,072 rights . And while sleep deprived Ridge , 1470 00:53:32,072 --> 00:53:34,128 Al Connors was coerced to confessing 1471 00:53:34,128 --> 00:53:36,400 and forced to personally pay about a 1472 00:53:36,400 --> 00:53:38,233 million dollars in restitution . 1473 00:53:38,990 --> 00:53:41,101 Balconies is now serving a three year 1474 00:53:41,101 --> 00:53:43,720 sentence in a Japanese jail . General 1475 00:53:43,720 --> 00:53:45,887 Richardson , you command forces in and 1476 00:53:45,887 --> 00:53:48,580 around 32 different nations in General . 1477 00:53:48,580 --> 00:53:50,750 Van Herk . Your command reaches three 1478 00:53:50,750 --> 00:53:52,417 foreign nations . From what I 1479 00:53:52,417 --> 00:53:54,583 understand , can you each describe the 1480 00:53:54,583 --> 00:53:56,583 importance of valid and enforceable 1481 00:53:56,583 --> 00:53:59,050 status of forces agreements and what 1482 00:53:59,050 --> 00:54:01,490 does the lack of um them do , 1483 00:54:01,490 --> 00:54:03,000 especially with respect to 1484 00:54:03,000 --> 00:54:05,010 operationally and otherwise for our 1485 00:54:05,010 --> 00:54:06,950 forces morale and effectiveness ? 1486 00:54:10,350 --> 00:54:12,580 So , thank you for the question . Uh I 1487 00:54:12,580 --> 00:54:15,530 think it's very important and for the 1488 00:54:15,540 --> 00:54:17,762 few countries , would you put the mic a 1489 00:54:17,762 --> 00:54:19,873 little bit closer ? We can't hear you 1490 00:54:20,510 --> 00:54:23,280 so very important the uh in terms of 1491 00:54:23,280 --> 00:54:25,391 the , the status of forces agreements 1492 00:54:25,391 --> 00:54:27,502 and for the few countries that , that 1493 00:54:27,502 --> 00:54:30,940 don't have the sofa in place yet , uh 1494 00:54:30,950 --> 00:54:33,117 That is one of the first things that , 1495 00:54:33,117 --> 00:54:35,172 that I bring up when I meet with the 1496 00:54:35,172 --> 00:54:37,394 leaders when I traveled to the region . 1497 00:54:37,394 --> 00:54:39,561 And so , and explaining the importance 1498 00:54:39,561 --> 00:54:41,839 of it and what it really means , right ? 1499 00:54:41,839 --> 00:54:44,006 I think that in some cases that is not 1500 00:54:44,006 --> 00:54:46,117 fully understood and so being able to 1501 00:54:46,117 --> 00:54:48,283 describe it and explain it helps a lot 1502 00:54:48,283 --> 00:54:52,250 and uh uh so much so that that enables 1503 00:54:52,260 --> 00:54:55,820 um then uh we've had a couple um 1504 00:54:55,830 --> 00:54:58,052 cases where we've been able to get that 1505 00:54:58,052 --> 00:55:00,370 across the goal line , as I would say , 1506 00:55:00,380 --> 00:55:02,602 where we've been able to get a sofa put 1507 00:55:02,602 --> 00:55:04,824 in place that wasn't there previously . 1508 00:55:05,240 --> 00:55:08,290 Thank you . Yeah , it's crucial to have 1509 00:55:08,290 --> 00:55:10,401 a good sofa in place . We just have a 1510 00:55:10,401 --> 00:55:12,457 new one in Bahamas put in place . Uh 1511 00:55:12,457 --> 00:55:14,512 without that , our folks are at risk 1512 00:55:14,512 --> 00:55:16,623 serving there to what we would expect 1513 00:55:16,623 --> 00:55:18,568 for due process here in the United 1514 00:55:18,568 --> 00:55:20,734 States as well . And this puts us at a 1515 00:55:20,734 --> 00:55:22,957 common place to negotiate when we start 1516 00:55:22,957 --> 00:55:25,123 with any country where we're serving , 1517 00:55:25,123 --> 00:55:27,290 have a foundation going forward . When 1518 00:55:27,290 --> 00:55:29,457 there's instances as you described and 1519 00:55:29,457 --> 00:55:31,512 General Richard of the 32 nations in 1520 00:55:31,512 --> 00:55:33,734 your area are about how many do you not 1521 00:55:33,734 --> 00:55:36,068 have a status of forces agreements with ? 1522 00:55:36,068 --> 00:55:38,179 So the exact number I will get to you 1523 00:55:38,179 --> 00:55:40,290 for sure , but it's we have more than 1524 00:55:40,290 --> 00:55:42,790 we don't . And so , and as I said , we 1525 00:55:42,790 --> 00:55:45,012 will continue to aggressively work that 1526 00:55:45,012 --> 00:55:46,957 to protect our service members and 1527 00:55:46,957 --> 00:55:49,068 ensure the countries that , that they 1528 00:55:49,068 --> 00:55:52,180 know that this isn't just a way to uh 1529 00:55:52,190 --> 00:55:55,100 you know , allow our service members to 1530 00:55:55,100 --> 00:55:57,322 be able to do something and then not be 1531 00:55:57,322 --> 00:55:59,378 held accountable . We hold our , our 1532 00:55:59,378 --> 00:56:01,378 service members accountable uh when 1533 00:56:01,378 --> 00:56:03,433 appropriate and we will take care of 1534 00:56:03,433 --> 00:56:05,489 that , make sure that that happens . 1535 00:56:05,489 --> 00:56:07,600 And so that education piece is really 1536 00:56:07,600 --> 00:56:09,822 important . Thank you and Miss Dalton , 1537 00:56:09,822 --> 00:56:12,044 what is the Department of Defense doing 1538 00:56:12,044 --> 00:56:14,156 to get a valid and enforceable status 1539 00:56:14,156 --> 00:56:16,378 of forces agreement in place with Japan 1540 00:56:16,378 --> 00:56:18,600 so that our troops can operate with the 1541 00:56:18,600 --> 00:56:20,822 confidence they deserve . Congressman . 1542 00:56:20,822 --> 00:56:22,989 Thank you for the question . I'll have 1543 00:56:22,989 --> 00:56:25,211 to take that back to our team that that 1544 00:56:25,211 --> 00:56:27,840 works the into Pacific . Thank you , Mr 1545 00:56:27,920 --> 00:56:30,087 Will you commit to bringing this issue 1546 00:56:30,087 --> 00:56:32,253 to Secretary Austin and express to him 1547 00:56:32,253 --> 00:56:34,420 how important this committee thinks it 1548 00:56:34,420 --> 00:56:36,587 is ? I will Thank you . Are you back , 1549 00:56:36,587 --> 00:56:38,642 Mr Chairman ? Sure . And I recognize 1550 00:56:38,642 --> 00:56:40,864 the gentle lady from Alabama Sewell for 1551 00:56:40,864 --> 00:56:43,142 five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman . 1552 00:56:43,142 --> 00:56:42,870 And I want to thank all of our 1553 00:56:42,870 --> 00:56:45,037 witnesses . I'm particularly concerned 1554 00:56:45,037 --> 00:56:47,203 about the People's Republic of China's 1555 00:56:47,203 --> 00:56:49,300 Belt and Road initiative and their 1556 00:56:49,300 --> 00:56:51,078 footprint in South America , in 1557 00:56:51,078 --> 00:56:53,940 particular , 21 of the 31 countries 1558 00:56:53,940 --> 00:56:55,440 within South calms area of 1559 00:56:55,440 --> 00:56:57,750 responsibility have Belt and Road um 1560 00:56:57,760 --> 00:57:00,750 projects in their countries . Moreover , 1561 00:57:00,750 --> 00:57:03,390 China has become South America's top 1562 00:57:03,400 --> 00:57:05,344 trading partner . While the United 1563 00:57:05,344 --> 00:57:08,900 States spend our time to coupling 1564 00:57:08,900 --> 00:57:12,130 our defense industrial supply chains 1565 00:57:12,130 --> 00:57:14,186 from China . I think we also have to 1566 00:57:14,186 --> 00:57:15,908 think about how our allies and 1567 00:57:15,908 --> 00:57:18,130 neighbors in the western hemisphere are 1568 00:57:18,130 --> 00:57:19,963 responding to this Belt and Road 1569 00:57:19,963 --> 00:57:22,019 initiative . In fact , I have a bill 1570 00:57:22,019 --> 00:57:24,130 called the Leveling The Playing Field 1571 00:57:24,130 --> 00:57:26,460 Act , which would counter the prc's 1572 00:57:26,470 --> 00:57:28,650 cross border subsidies and other anti 1573 00:57:28,650 --> 00:57:31,210 free market economic tools which are at 1574 00:57:31,210 --> 00:57:33,780 the core of the Belt and and Road 1575 00:57:33,780 --> 00:57:35,947 initiative . Ultimately , I believe we 1576 00:57:35,947 --> 00:57:37,947 have to take a holistic approach to 1577 00:57:37,947 --> 00:57:40,058 deepening our military , economic and 1578 00:57:40,058 --> 00:57:42,230 humanitarian ties in the western 1579 00:57:42,230 --> 00:57:44,760 hemisphere . General Richardson . In 1580 00:57:44,760 --> 00:57:46,927 your testimony , you discussed how the 1581 00:57:46,927 --> 00:57:48,750 prc's use of the Belt and Road 1582 00:57:48,750 --> 00:57:50,770 initiative to promote trade and 1583 00:57:50,770 --> 00:57:52,881 investment in South America . Can you 1584 00:57:52,881 --> 00:57:54,992 talk a little bit more about how that 1585 00:57:54,992 --> 00:57:57,300 is being used to undermine existing um 1586 00:57:57,310 --> 00:57:59,660 and emerging democracies in , in South 1587 00:57:59,660 --> 00:58:01,910 America and what our , our approach 1588 00:58:01,910 --> 00:58:04,400 should be um with respect to that and 1589 00:58:04,410 --> 00:58:07,780 and how should we all as lawmakers view 1590 00:58:07,790 --> 00:58:11,330 this threat ? So it's definitely a 1591 00:58:11,330 --> 00:58:13,497 threat and it's all the instruments of 1592 00:58:13,497 --> 00:58:15,663 national power that are coming to bear 1593 00:58:15,663 --> 00:58:17,830 that the PRC brings to the table . And 1594 00:58:17,830 --> 00:58:20,400 I think that uh with team USA , we have 1595 00:58:20,400 --> 00:58:22,567 a lot of investment , we have a lot of 1596 00:58:22,567 --> 00:58:24,550 things that are happening in this 1597 00:58:24,550 --> 00:58:26,680 region and in this uh in this area of 1598 00:58:26,680 --> 00:58:28,990 responsibility , the A O R . And I 1599 00:58:28,990 --> 00:58:31,212 think that we've got to um we've got to 1600 00:58:31,212 --> 00:58:33,700 show that we've got to showcase that 1601 00:58:33,700 --> 00:58:35,811 because there's a lot happening , but 1602 00:58:35,811 --> 00:58:38,180 we need to put team USA is flag on 1603 00:58:38,180 --> 00:58:40,820 everything that we do . And we do you 1604 00:58:40,820 --> 00:58:42,820 think that these countries actually 1605 00:58:42,820 --> 00:58:45,540 understand ? Um like for example , in 1606 00:58:45,540 --> 00:58:49,330 Africa , that the PRC is using their 1607 00:58:49,340 --> 00:58:51,700 Belt and Road initiative to actually 1608 00:58:51,710 --> 00:58:54,850 have state uh state owned enterprises 1609 00:58:54,850 --> 00:58:56,683 and their ports running military 1610 00:58:56,683 --> 00:58:59,450 operations . And so I wanna know , I 1611 00:58:59,450 --> 00:59:01,506 wanna understand , I know that these 1612 00:59:01,506 --> 00:59:04,420 countries have serious um economic 1613 00:59:04,420 --> 00:59:07,960 problems um that the Chinese prey on . 1614 00:59:07,970 --> 00:59:10,192 But do they understand the magnitude of 1615 00:59:10,192 --> 00:59:12,303 allowing their , those projects to go 1616 00:59:12,303 --> 00:59:14,526 on in their country ? I think that they 1617 00:59:14,526 --> 00:59:16,581 understand , but they're desperate , 1618 00:59:16,581 --> 00:59:19,280 they're desperate for their economies , 1619 00:59:19,290 --> 00:59:21,240 they're struggling to deliver in a 1620 00:59:21,240 --> 00:59:24,130 short period of time and uh they can't 1621 00:59:24,130 --> 00:59:26,241 make up the difference and dig out of 1622 00:59:26,241 --> 00:59:28,186 the hole fast enough . And so when 1623 00:59:28,186 --> 00:59:30,230 there's nothing else available , we 1624 00:59:30,230 --> 00:59:32,230 don't have Western or international 1625 00:59:32,230 --> 00:59:35,020 investment or bidders on the tenders 1626 00:59:35,020 --> 00:59:36,853 that come out when there are big 1627 00:59:36,853 --> 00:59:38,298 projects for the critical 1628 00:59:38,298 --> 00:59:41,100 infrastructure and they're only PRC and 1629 00:59:41,100 --> 00:59:43,240 Chinese bidders for those tenders . 1630 00:59:43,250 --> 00:59:45,480 They've got no choice . And so I think 1631 00:59:45,480 --> 00:59:47,550 that we've got to , we've got to pay 1632 00:59:47,550 --> 00:59:49,550 more attention to this region , the 1633 00:59:49,550 --> 00:59:51,930 proximity matters . They are on the 20 1634 00:59:51,930 --> 00:59:54,480 yard line of our homeland . We are in a 1635 00:59:54,480 --> 00:59:56,647 neighborhood , these are our neighbors 1636 00:59:56,647 --> 00:59:58,647 and we have got to pay attention to 1637 00:59:58,647 --> 01:00:00,702 them . I know that we have America's 1638 01:00:00,702 --> 01:00:02,813 partnership for economic prosperity . 1639 01:00:02,813 --> 01:00:04,924 Um And it has a lot of initiatives on 1640 01:00:04,924 --> 01:00:06,924 that and I fully support that in my 1641 01:00:06,924 --> 01:00:08,980 time remaining . I wanted to talk to 1642 01:00:08,980 --> 01:00:10,770 General Van Ark about the 702 1643 01:00:10,770 --> 01:00:13,630 authorities . I sat on the , The 1644 01:00:13,630 --> 01:00:15,297 permanent select committee on 1645 01:00:15,297 --> 01:00:17,519 intelligence for eight years and I grew 1646 01:00:17,519 --> 01:00:19,741 to understand the importance of the 702 1647 01:00:19,741 --> 01:00:21,574 authorities . I do know that the 1648 01:00:21,574 --> 01:00:23,186 average American hears about 1649 01:00:23,186 --> 01:00:25,297 warrantless surveillance and they get 1650 01:00:25,297 --> 01:00:27,130 quite concerned about it . But I 1651 01:00:27,130 --> 01:00:29,352 understand that there are um you know , 1652 01:00:29,352 --> 01:00:31,574 obviously guard wells that are in place 1653 01:00:31,574 --> 01:00:33,741 to protect American citizens from such 1654 01:00:33,741 --> 01:00:35,797 surveillance . Can you talk to us as 1655 01:00:35,797 --> 01:00:38,150 we're embarking upon reauthorizing Fisa ? 1656 01:00:39,600 --> 01:00:41,800 Yeah . So I'm I'm very confident that 1657 01:00:41,800 --> 01:00:44,090 the the Americans uh society is 1658 01:00:44,090 --> 01:00:47,600 protected under our right to not have 1659 01:00:47,600 --> 01:00:49,656 our own people spying on us . Okay . 1660 01:00:49,656 --> 01:00:52,090 And 702 gives us access to foreign 1661 01:00:52,090 --> 01:00:55,450 entities utilizing us infrastructure 1662 01:00:55,460 --> 01:00:58,100 for their benefit , which puts our 1663 01:00:58,100 --> 01:01:00,211 homeland at risk , puts our people at 1664 01:01:00,211 --> 01:01:03,210 risk . General Nakasone is very uh 1665 01:01:03,570 --> 01:01:05,880 Uh you know , confident that he can 1666 01:01:05,890 --> 01:01:08,340 maintain the separation of our people's 1667 01:01:08,340 --> 01:01:10,590 rights along with our national security 1668 01:01:10,600 --> 01:01:13,780 that fires a 702 gives us . Thank you . 1669 01:01:13,780 --> 01:01:15,780 And can you talk a little bit about 1670 01:01:15,780 --> 01:01:17,947 what we have discovered and how we use 1671 01:01:17,947 --> 01:01:21,380 it to , to our own homeland defense of 1672 01:01:21,380 --> 01:01:23,602 our own homeland . We should talk about 1673 01:01:23,602 --> 01:01:25,658 that in a classified environment . I 1674 01:01:25,658 --> 01:01:27,880 will just tell you that it has given us 1675 01:01:27,880 --> 01:01:30,047 insights into potential attacks on our 1676 01:01:30,047 --> 01:01:31,991 homeland or intent by personnel to 1677 01:01:31,991 --> 01:01:34,047 attack our homeland . Thank you very 1678 01:01:34,047 --> 01:01:36,324 much . You're back the rest of my time . 1679 01:01:36,324 --> 01:01:38,547 I think the general here not recognized 1680 01:01:38,547 --> 01:01:38,110 generally from Virginia , MS Kagan's 1681 01:01:38,110 --> 01:01:40,332 for five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chair 1682 01:01:40,332 --> 01:01:42,443 and thank you so much to the three of 1683 01:01:42,443 --> 01:01:44,499 you for being here with us today and 1684 01:01:44,499 --> 01:01:46,499 educating us over the past decade . 1685 01:01:46,499 --> 01:01:48,721 We've seen our world become more unsafe 1686 01:01:48,721 --> 01:01:50,777 in our adversaries are becoming more 1687 01:01:50,777 --> 01:01:52,777 aggressive and assertive and we see 1688 01:01:52,777 --> 01:01:54,943 Russia's actions in the Ukraine and we 1689 01:01:54,943 --> 01:01:57,166 know that China is waiting and watching 1690 01:01:57,166 --> 01:01:57,120 with Taiwan and we see China's behavior 1691 01:01:57,120 --> 01:01:59,380 specifically be more aggressive like 1692 01:01:59,380 --> 01:02:01,324 you all mentioned on , on creating 1693 01:02:01,324 --> 01:02:03,213 civilian ports and not , not only 1694 01:02:03,213 --> 01:02:05,380 growing their navy but on the economic 1695 01:02:05,380 --> 01:02:07,602 and civilian side as well . Uh they are 1696 01:02:07,602 --> 01:02:09,769 in places such as important Chokeholds 1697 01:02:09,769 --> 01:02:12,047 and Djibouti and now we're seeing them , 1698 01:02:12,047 --> 01:02:14,213 you know , spread to the Atlantic side 1699 01:02:14,213 --> 01:02:16,269 of , of the Horn of Africa . So , so 1700 01:02:16,269 --> 01:02:18,491 with your a O R specifically in general 1701 01:02:18,491 --> 01:02:20,658 Richardson , if you could address , uh 1702 01:02:20,658 --> 01:02:22,713 you know , I know there's deep water 1703 01:02:22,713 --> 01:02:22,660 ports that have a potential for dual 1704 01:02:22,660 --> 01:02:24,827 use for China with commercial military 1705 01:02:24,827 --> 01:02:27,790 activities uh including uh the both 1706 01:02:27,790 --> 01:02:29,846 ends of the Panama Canal . And we've 1707 01:02:29,846 --> 01:02:31,679 seen recent attempts to , to for 1708 01:02:31,679 --> 01:02:33,846 Chinese securing those rights to build 1709 01:02:33,846 --> 01:02:35,790 maritime installations in Southern 1710 01:02:35,790 --> 01:02:37,790 Argentina which would provide China 1711 01:02:37,790 --> 01:02:39,846 with direct access to the straits of 1712 01:02:39,846 --> 01:02:41,957 Magellan in Antarctica . So given the 1713 01:02:41,957 --> 01:02:41,890 strategic location of those two sites , 1714 01:02:41,890 --> 01:02:44,112 do you have any concerns in a potential 1715 01:02:44,112 --> 01:02:46,334 conflict with China ? These sites could 1716 01:02:46,334 --> 01:02:48,557 be militarized by the PRC and limit our 1717 01:02:48,557 --> 01:02:50,668 ability to reinforce supply lines and 1718 01:02:50,668 --> 01:02:53,410 move key assets to the Pacific . So the 1719 01:02:53,420 --> 01:02:56,210 Belt and Road initiative and all of the 1720 01:02:56,220 --> 01:02:58,700 companies you know , the that go in the 1721 01:02:58,700 --> 01:03:00,970 state owned enterprises by the P R C 1722 01:03:00,980 --> 01:03:03,036 that I worry about could become dual 1723 01:03:03,036 --> 01:03:05,091 use and used for military purposes . 1724 01:03:05,091 --> 01:03:07,620 And so the five Chinese companies along 1725 01:03:07,620 --> 01:03:10,040 the Panama Canal , obviously , I need 1726 01:03:10,040 --> 01:03:12,770 to keep the Panama Canal open as well 1727 01:03:12,770 --> 01:03:14,992 as the Strait of Magellan and the Drake 1728 01:03:14,992 --> 01:03:17,159 passage that connects the East and the 1729 01:03:17,159 --> 01:03:19,214 West , not just for our militaries , 1730 01:03:19,214 --> 01:03:21,326 but the global economy . We've got to 1731 01:03:21,326 --> 01:03:23,548 keep those things open . And so yes , I 1732 01:03:23,548 --> 01:03:25,714 absolutely worry about the state owned 1733 01:03:25,714 --> 01:03:28,070 enterprises and the do dual use nature 1734 01:03:28,070 --> 01:03:31,220 that they could be used for . And you 1735 01:03:31,220 --> 01:03:33,990 spoke before about security cooperation 1736 01:03:33,990 --> 01:03:36,101 and how important those relationships 1737 01:03:36,101 --> 01:03:38,710 are with , especially the South com and 1738 01:03:38,710 --> 01:03:40,766 within the South comes A O R and the 1739 01:03:40,766 --> 01:03:42,654 training and equipment that we're 1740 01:03:42,654 --> 01:03:44,488 providing aside from our defense 1741 01:03:44,488 --> 01:03:46,766 relationships that we have in this A R , 1742 01:03:46,766 --> 01:03:48,821 what else are we doing ? Or is there 1743 01:03:48,821 --> 01:03:51,190 diplomacy exchanges , economic uh just 1744 01:03:51,190 --> 01:03:53,190 partnerships that we're creating or 1745 01:03:53,190 --> 01:03:55,357 what else are we doing ? And what else 1746 01:03:55,357 --> 01:03:57,468 can we be doing to strengthen some of 1747 01:03:57,468 --> 01:03:57,460 the , some of the security cooperation 1748 01:03:57,460 --> 01:04:00,160 that you spoke of ? So I , as I spoke 1749 01:04:00,160 --> 01:04:02,049 about earlier , the exercises are 1750 01:04:02,049 --> 01:04:04,300 really important . I have eight uh 1751 01:04:04,310 --> 01:04:06,610 exercises at the South com level . And 1752 01:04:06,610 --> 01:04:08,870 then my five components underneath me 1753 01:04:08,870 --> 01:04:10,981 from one from every service including 1754 01:04:10,981 --> 01:04:13,190 special operations command also has 1755 01:04:13,200 --> 01:04:15,920 several exercises that they do . And so 1756 01:04:16,140 --> 01:04:18,320 the resourcing of those exercises is 1757 01:04:18,320 --> 01:04:20,376 really important because that's what 1758 01:04:20,376 --> 01:04:22,690 really brings the nations together . Uh 1759 01:04:22,700 --> 01:04:25,470 that uh that the PRC can't do , they 1760 01:04:25,470 --> 01:04:27,581 don't convene exercises , they're not 1761 01:04:27,581 --> 01:04:30,430 able to bring those that , that number , 1762 01:04:30,430 --> 01:04:32,319 that level from the entire region 1763 01:04:32,319 --> 01:04:34,600 together to work together during 1764 01:04:34,600 --> 01:04:37,100 exercises . Panamax defense of the 1765 01:04:37,100 --> 01:04:39,156 Panama Canal . We just had that , we 1766 01:04:39,156 --> 01:04:41,820 have that every other year and we have 1767 01:04:41,820 --> 01:04:43,431 over 20 partner nations that 1768 01:04:43,431 --> 01:04:45,550 participate in that the Chinese are 1769 01:04:45,550 --> 01:04:47,960 using our playbook against us . They do 1770 01:04:47,960 --> 01:04:50,500 all expense paid training to Beijing , 1771 01:04:50,510 --> 01:04:52,800 professional military education , but 1772 01:04:52,800 --> 01:04:54,856 they're not able to do the exercises 1773 01:04:54,856 --> 01:04:56,744 yet . And that's why I think that 1774 01:04:56,744 --> 01:04:58,633 that's such a crucial , important 1775 01:04:58,633 --> 01:05:00,744 program for us . And so why are we so 1776 01:05:00,744 --> 01:05:02,856 successful is that our reputation are 1777 01:05:02,856 --> 01:05:04,911 we , uh , you know , that's , that's 1778 01:05:04,911 --> 01:05:07,078 disheartening to hear that the Chinese 1779 01:05:07,078 --> 01:05:09,244 are using our playbook , as you said , 1780 01:05:09,244 --> 01:05:11,467 because I , I think that is a , that is 1781 01:05:11,467 --> 01:05:13,356 a concern . Is it just we do well 1782 01:05:13,356 --> 01:05:15,522 because we are or what is our strength 1783 01:05:15,522 --> 01:05:17,744 there that , that we can do even better 1784 01:05:17,744 --> 01:05:19,911 because we were owning that space of , 1785 01:05:19,911 --> 01:05:22,022 of creating those partnerships and do 1786 01:05:22,022 --> 01:05:21,510 they . It's a matter of trust , I'm 1787 01:05:21,510 --> 01:05:23,800 assuming and , uh , and reputation . 1788 01:05:23,800 --> 01:05:26,022 But what else can we do to , to kind of 1789 01:05:26,022 --> 01:05:28,189 fortify what we're doing right there ? 1790 01:05:28,189 --> 01:05:30,189 I would say also , uh , trust is an 1791 01:05:30,189 --> 01:05:32,300 issue . Um , it becomes an issue when 1792 01:05:32,300 --> 01:05:34,522 they feel like they've been ignored and 1793 01:05:34,522 --> 01:05:36,578 we haven't , uh , paid attention and 1794 01:05:36,578 --> 01:05:38,578 look south enough . I call it south 1795 01:05:38,578 --> 01:05:40,744 blindness sometimes because we do , we 1796 01:05:40,744 --> 01:05:42,911 have a lot of things going on east and 1797 01:05:42,911 --> 01:05:44,800 west right now . And we have been 1798 01:05:44,800 --> 01:05:47,022 however , they want to make sure that I 1799 01:05:47,022 --> 01:05:49,356 don't want to be taken for granted very , 1800 01:05:49,356 --> 01:05:51,411 very important countries , sovereign 1801 01:05:51,411 --> 01:05:53,411 nations , but they are very willing 1802 01:05:53,411 --> 01:05:55,522 partners . They are , are their first 1803 01:05:55,522 --> 01:05:57,467 choice to work with as a partner . 1804 01:05:57,467 --> 01:05:59,578 Nation is the United States . So it's 1805 01:05:59,578 --> 01:06:01,710 ours to lose . And , uh , and so I 1806 01:06:01,710 --> 01:06:03,766 really appreciate Congress's support 1807 01:06:03,766 --> 01:06:05,321 for that . I appreciate the 1808 01:06:05,321 --> 01:06:07,488 congressional delegations that go into 1809 01:06:07,488 --> 01:06:09,321 the region uh to visit these key 1810 01:06:09,321 --> 01:06:11,710 leaders when they come to washing that , 1811 01:06:11,720 --> 01:06:13,831 that they , that you give them time . 1812 01:06:13,831 --> 01:06:16,164 And I want to really thank you for that , 1813 01:06:16,164 --> 01:06:18,331 that you see them when they ask for an 1814 01:06:18,331 --> 01:06:20,164 office call and things like that 1815 01:06:20,164 --> 01:06:22,331 because that really matters . A little 1816 01:06:22,331 --> 01:06:24,220 goes a long way . And so I really 1817 01:06:24,220 --> 01:06:26,331 appreciate the support . I agree with 1818 01:06:26,331 --> 01:06:25,810 you that it's the little things that 1819 01:06:25,810 --> 01:06:27,977 count . So please continue to , to let 1820 01:06:27,977 --> 01:06:30,143 us help in that regard . And thank you 1821 01:06:30,143 --> 01:06:32,254 for all you do yield deck chair and I 1822 01:06:32,254 --> 01:06:34,310 recognize you from North Carolina Mr 1823 01:06:34,310 --> 01:06:36,254 Davis for five minutes . Oh , good 1824 01:06:36,254 --> 01:06:38,310 morning . And thank you so much , Mr 1825 01:06:38,310 --> 01:06:40,532 Chair . Thank you to each and every one 1826 01:06:40,532 --> 01:06:42,699 of you for being here today . And also 1827 01:06:42,699 --> 01:06:44,810 want to personally thank you for your 1828 01:06:44,810 --> 01:06:47,032 years of service to our country . Thank 1829 01:06:47,032 --> 01:06:49,560 you . I'm General Richardson . Um First 1830 01:06:49,560 --> 01:06:52,170 question , can you please just discuss 1831 01:06:52,180 --> 01:06:54,630 a little further the prc's growing 1832 01:06:54,630 --> 01:06:58,300 space footprint um in your region and 1833 01:06:58,300 --> 01:07:00,189 the security implications for the 1834 01:07:00,189 --> 01:07:03,190 United States . So , out of any 1835 01:07:03,190 --> 01:07:05,357 geographic combatant command , we have 1836 01:07:05,357 --> 01:07:07,523 the most space enabling infrastructure 1837 01:07:07,523 --> 01:07:09,840 by the Chinese in this region and uh 1838 01:07:09,840 --> 01:07:12,390 and the planned uh space facilities 1839 01:07:12,390 --> 01:07:14,650 will continue to grow um from what we 1840 01:07:14,650 --> 01:07:16,872 see and I'll be able to talk about that 1841 01:07:16,872 --> 01:07:19,206 more in the , in the classified setting . 1842 01:07:19,206 --> 01:07:21,590 But um out of the Chinese have three 1843 01:07:21,590 --> 01:07:24,580 deep space stations too are in mainland 1844 01:07:24,580 --> 01:07:27,590 China and one is in Argentina , the new 1845 01:07:27,590 --> 01:07:30,950 Ken Space facility . And so um just the 1846 01:07:30,950 --> 01:07:34,390 increase uh the very aggressive 1847 01:07:34,390 --> 01:07:36,090 increase in space enabling 1848 01:07:36,090 --> 01:07:38,390 infrastructure is , is very concerning 1849 01:07:38,390 --> 01:07:40,501 the telemetry and tracking the uplink 1850 01:07:40,501 --> 01:07:43,160 down links the ability for the P R C to 1851 01:07:43,160 --> 01:07:45,271 track their own satellites . But then 1852 01:07:45,271 --> 01:07:47,438 also the surveillance sites to be able 1853 01:07:47,438 --> 01:07:50,950 to surveil uh other partner nations , 1854 01:07:50,950 --> 01:07:54,570 allies , our own satellites as well and 1855 01:07:54,570 --> 01:07:56,292 eventually be able to use that 1856 01:07:56,292 --> 01:07:59,230 apparatus for targeting as what a 1857 01:07:59,240 --> 01:08:02,160 concern is . Okay . Thank you . Let me 1858 01:08:02,160 --> 01:08:04,880 ask this . You've shared so many 1859 01:08:04,890 --> 01:08:07,001 different steps that you're currently 1860 01:08:07,001 --> 01:08:09,223 taking right now within the region . Um 1861 01:08:09,223 --> 01:08:11,450 My question would be right now broadly 1862 01:08:11,450 --> 01:08:14,310 speaking , what's the greatest priority 1863 01:08:14,320 --> 01:08:18,150 regarding any new ways that we 1864 01:08:18,150 --> 01:08:20,890 should be partnering with our allies 1865 01:08:20,890 --> 01:08:24,640 and partners um within the region um to 1866 01:08:24,650 --> 01:08:27,630 out compete our strategic competitors 1867 01:08:27,630 --> 01:08:30,360 and um to address these transnational 1868 01:08:30,360 --> 01:08:34,310 challenges trans , right ? 1869 01:08:34,310 --> 01:08:37,730 So they are um just continuing to some 1870 01:08:37,730 --> 01:08:39,897 of the new things , all domain I would 1871 01:08:39,897 --> 01:08:43,450 say being able to help them uh 1872 01:08:43,460 --> 01:08:47,100 be uh increase their capability and 1873 01:08:47,100 --> 01:08:49,890 capacity with cyber . Uh as we talk 1874 01:08:49,890 --> 01:08:53,010 about space cyberspace , uh they're 1875 01:08:53,010 --> 01:08:55,600 trying to tack tackle cyber issues . 1876 01:08:55,600 --> 01:08:57,822 But then when you bring cyberspace into 1877 01:08:57,822 --> 01:09:00,180 it , all domains , uh the exercise 1878 01:09:00,180 --> 01:09:04,180 program to be able to uh to um exercise 1879 01:09:04,180 --> 01:09:05,680 the interoperability , the 1880 01:09:05,680 --> 01:09:08,120 communications , the ability to talk 1881 01:09:08,130 --> 01:09:10,430 securely with our partner nations is 1882 01:09:10,430 --> 01:09:13,340 very important . And so the sharing 1883 01:09:13,340 --> 01:09:16,410 agreements , uh we talked about sofa 1884 01:09:16,410 --> 01:09:18,410 before , but there are all kinds of 1885 01:09:18,410 --> 01:09:20,632 intel sharing agreements . We've got to 1886 01:09:20,632 --> 01:09:23,420 be able with the investment of the PRC 1887 01:09:23,420 --> 01:09:26,070 into the telecommunications . Five G , 1888 01:09:26,270 --> 01:09:28,580 uh five of our countries have the five 1889 01:09:28,580 --> 01:09:32,470 G backbone . 24 have P R C three G 1890 01:09:32,470 --> 01:09:34,692 or four G backbone and I'm sure they'll 1891 01:09:34,692 --> 01:09:36,970 be offered a discount to upgrade to 1892 01:09:36,970 --> 01:09:39,290 stay with the , with Huawei or ZTE . 1893 01:09:39,290 --> 01:09:41,740 And so very concerning because we want 1894 01:09:41,740 --> 01:09:43,518 to be able to continue to share 1895 01:09:43,518 --> 01:09:45,740 intelligence and share information with 1896 01:09:45,740 --> 01:09:47,573 our partner nations to make them 1897 01:09:47,573 --> 01:09:49,740 stronger , to counter the threats that 1898 01:09:49,740 --> 01:09:51,740 eventually end up in our homeland . 1899 01:09:51,740 --> 01:09:53,930 Okay . Thank you , General Van Hurst . 1900 01:09:54,070 --> 01:09:56,920 I'm concerned about the , I'm sorry . 1901 01:09:57,220 --> 01:10:00,960 Um you noted in your testimony that the 1902 01:10:00,960 --> 01:10:03,310 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1903 01:10:03,320 --> 01:10:06,870 testing more missiles in 2022 than any 1904 01:10:06,870 --> 01:10:09,710 time in its history . Um prioritizing 1905 01:10:09,710 --> 01:10:11,800 their military capabilities at the 1906 01:10:11,800 --> 01:10:14,670 expense of other essential items . Can 1907 01:10:14,670 --> 01:10:17,230 you please discuss the dangers this 1908 01:10:17,240 --> 01:10:20,830 regime possesses ? And um , assistant 1909 01:10:20,830 --> 01:10:23,640 secretary Dalton would also appreciate 1910 01:10:23,650 --> 01:10:26,760 any insight as well . Thank you , 1911 01:10:27,640 --> 01:10:30,100 DPRK or North Korea has absolutely 1912 01:10:30,100 --> 01:10:31,920 continued to develop additional 1913 01:10:31,920 --> 01:10:33,864 capacity and capability with their 1914 01:10:33,864 --> 01:10:36,430 ballistic missile and their short range 1915 01:10:36,430 --> 01:10:38,486 missile program as well . And we saw 1916 01:10:38,486 --> 01:10:41,390 far more uh tests this year than , than 1917 01:10:41,390 --> 01:10:44,630 any other year in the past . Um We 1918 01:10:44,630 --> 01:10:46,852 should take them at their word . They , 1919 01:10:46,852 --> 01:10:49,074 they say they will use them . We should 1920 01:10:49,074 --> 01:10:51,186 ensure that we understand that and we 1921 01:10:51,186 --> 01:10:53,019 operate as such today . I remain 1922 01:10:53,019 --> 01:10:54,908 confident in my ability to defend 1923 01:10:54,908 --> 01:10:57,074 against a limited attack from an I C B 1924 01:10:57,074 --> 01:11:00,000 M from North Korea on the homeland . Uh 1925 01:11:00,010 --> 01:11:02,121 I am concerned going forward based on 1926 01:11:02,121 --> 01:11:04,066 what we saw in their parade on the 1927 01:11:04,066 --> 01:11:06,232 eighth of February and what we've seen 1928 01:11:06,232 --> 01:11:08,343 on their capacity and capability that 1929 01:11:08,343 --> 01:11:10,510 they could exceed my ability to defend 1930 01:11:10,510 --> 01:11:12,930 against a limited attack . Thank you 1931 01:11:12,930 --> 01:11:15,041 and completely agree with General Van 1932 01:11:15,041 --> 01:11:17,790 Herk assessment . Um You know , the NDS 1933 01:11:17,790 --> 01:11:19,620 makes clear that North Korea is 1934 01:11:19,620 --> 01:11:21,970 expanding its nuclear and missile 1935 01:11:21,970 --> 01:11:24,081 capability to threaten the homeland . 1936 01:11:24,081 --> 01:11:26,460 Um This is a space that we are watching 1937 01:11:26,460 --> 01:11:29,380 quite closely and through a combination 1938 01:11:29,390 --> 01:11:31,680 of our strategic nuclear deterrent and 1939 01:11:31,680 --> 01:11:33,950 our missile defense systems through an 1940 01:11:33,950 --> 01:11:36,310 integrated deterrence approach . Um We 1941 01:11:36,310 --> 01:11:38,643 are looking to , to meet that challenge . 1942 01:11:38,643 --> 01:11:42,080 Thank you , Chair now recognizes from 1943 01:11:42,080 --> 01:11:44,080 Texas Mr Latrell for five minutes . 1944 01:11:45,040 --> 01:11:47,320 Thank you , Mr Chairman and thank the 1945 01:11:47,320 --> 01:11:49,487 panel for , for coming and speaking in 1946 01:11:49,487 --> 01:11:51,431 front of us today and in general , 1947 01:11:51,431 --> 01:11:51,120 thank you for your distinguished 1948 01:11:51,120 --> 01:11:53,120 service , General Richard . Can you 1949 01:11:53,120 --> 01:11:54,676 tell us about the I S I S R 1950 01:11:54,676 --> 01:11:56,898 capabilities that you have and are they 1951 01:11:56,898 --> 01:11:59,120 sufficient ? And if not , what upgrades 1952 01:11:59,120 --> 01:12:01,820 can we can we help you with ? So I get 1953 01:12:01,830 --> 01:12:05,760 about 2% of the D O D I s are in 1954 01:12:05,760 --> 01:12:08,460 U S South com and um and it meets about 1955 01:12:08,460 --> 01:12:11,780 17% of my requirement for the I S R . I 1956 01:12:11,780 --> 01:12:14,370 wanna thank the department and thank 1957 01:12:14,370 --> 01:12:17,480 Congress for the support of the 1958 01:12:17,490 --> 01:12:19,730 government owned and contract operated 1959 01:12:19,730 --> 01:12:21,740 and the contract own and contract 1960 01:12:21,740 --> 01:12:24,160 operated I S R that I'm able to get as 1961 01:12:24,160 --> 01:12:27,900 well . Um That helps build that 1962 01:12:27,900 --> 01:12:30,780 requirement a little bit more . Uh 1963 01:12:30,790 --> 01:12:32,957 Domain awareness is really important . 1964 01:12:32,957 --> 01:12:34,901 For the region . It's a really big 1965 01:12:34,901 --> 01:12:36,734 region and being able to see the 1966 01:12:36,734 --> 01:12:39,290 threats , counter the threats . Um also 1967 01:12:39,290 --> 01:12:41,179 expose the malign activity to our 1968 01:12:41,179 --> 01:12:43,346 partner nations because when we expose 1969 01:12:43,346 --> 01:12:45,680 it and say where it is , uh they go 1970 01:12:45,690 --> 01:12:47,746 right after it , they'll go out with 1971 01:12:47,746 --> 01:12:50,760 their coastal patrol vessels to um To 1972 01:12:50,760 --> 01:12:53,560 the semi submersibles or go fast 1973 01:12:53,560 --> 01:12:56,150 vessels that are in the maritime domain , 1974 01:12:56,160 --> 01:12:59,570 excuse me to counter that . And 1975 01:12:59,570 --> 01:13:01,710 so , but the ISR is critical and the 1976 01:13:01,710 --> 01:13:04,000 domain awareness is critical . And so 1977 01:13:04,010 --> 01:13:06,950 we don't have , as I said , 17% of the 1978 01:13:06,950 --> 01:13:09,510 requirement , 17% , right . 1979 01:13:10,810 --> 01:13:13,490 Where's your comfortable operating zone ? 1980 01:13:13,500 --> 01:13:16,660 80 it would be more towards that end . 1981 01:13:16,660 --> 01:13:19,150 Yes . Okay . 1982 01:13:21,430 --> 01:13:23,450 What authorities do you have in 1983 01:13:23,450 --> 01:13:25,283 combating transnational criminal 1984 01:13:25,283 --> 01:13:27,590 organizations ? And what authorities 1985 01:13:27,590 --> 01:13:29,812 would you like to have on top of that ? 1986 01:13:29,812 --> 01:13:32,300 That you do not . So I say that I have 1987 01:13:32,300 --> 01:13:34,356 a joint interagency task force South 1988 01:13:34,356 --> 01:13:36,411 which is J out of South based out of 1989 01:13:36,411 --> 01:13:39,470 Key West that does it has a detection 1990 01:13:39,470 --> 01:13:42,670 and monitoring mission . And then we uh 1991 01:13:42,680 --> 01:13:44,902 turn that information that intelligence 1992 01:13:44,902 --> 01:13:47,190 over to law enforcement or to our 1993 01:13:47,190 --> 01:13:49,520 partner nations uh depending on which 1994 01:13:49,520 --> 01:13:51,720 is closest and who is able to go after 1995 01:13:51,720 --> 01:13:54,190 it and , and be able to disrupt it or 1996 01:13:54,190 --> 01:13:57,200 interdict it . And so , and in terms of 1997 01:13:57,200 --> 01:13:58,811 the authorities , I have the 1998 01:13:58,811 --> 01:14:00,867 authorities that I need right now in 1999 01:14:00,867 --> 01:14:04,140 order to do uh what I need to do based 2000 01:14:04,140 --> 01:14:06,362 on the missions that I'm given in South 2001 01:14:06,362 --> 01:14:08,140 com looking forward just at the 2002 01:14:08,140 --> 01:14:10,940 narrative of globally right now . Is 2003 01:14:10,940 --> 01:14:13,710 there anything that's on your radar 2004 01:14:13,710 --> 01:14:15,988 that we , we may need to be briefed on ? 2005 01:14:16,440 --> 01:14:18,773 So , in the , in the classified session , 2006 01:14:18,773 --> 01:14:20,496 I can expand more upon all the 2007 01:14:20,496 --> 01:14:22,440 activities that we're doing in the 2008 01:14:22,440 --> 01:14:24,607 region . Certainly , I'm very thankful 2009 01:14:24,607 --> 01:14:26,720 for all of the exercise funding and 2010 01:14:26,720 --> 01:14:28,831 resourcing that I do get , I could do 2011 01:14:28,831 --> 01:14:30,887 more . I'd like to get more into the 2012 01:14:30,887 --> 01:14:32,910 Southern Cone and have more , more 2013 01:14:32,910 --> 01:14:35,000 persistence presence , not just 2014 01:14:35,030 --> 01:14:37,590 episodic where we visit and you know , 2015 01:14:37,590 --> 01:14:41,130 do uh maybe an exchange on Cyber for a 2016 01:14:41,130 --> 01:14:43,300 week or two weeks or an exchange with 2017 01:14:43,300 --> 01:14:45,540 our special forces . I'd like to change 2018 01:14:45,540 --> 01:14:48,420 up acidic to uh to more persistent 2019 01:14:49,180 --> 01:14:51,180 that my next question maybe for the 2020 01:14:51,180 --> 01:14:53,236 classified setting as a former socom 2021 01:14:53,236 --> 01:14:56,360 guy . Um is the socom footprint in 2022 01:14:56,360 --> 01:14:59,510 South com , what you would like to see 2023 01:14:59,510 --> 01:15:01,454 or is that something that we could 2024 01:15:01,454 --> 01:15:03,399 increase and is their capabilities 2025 01:15:03,399 --> 01:15:06,750 beneficial ? Absolutely beneficial . 2026 01:15:06,760 --> 01:15:09,640 The sock that I have the special 2027 01:15:09,640 --> 01:15:11,584 operations , the theater , special 2028 01:15:11,584 --> 01:15:13,473 operations command socks South as 2029 01:15:13,473 --> 01:15:15,362 they're called at a Homestead Air 2030 01:15:15,362 --> 01:15:18,230 Reserve base in Florida . Um Fantastic 2031 01:15:18,230 --> 01:15:20,720 huge enabler to what we do and the 2032 01:15:20,720 --> 01:15:22,720 presence and the activities and the 2033 01:15:22,720 --> 01:15:24,942 training and enabling that they do with 2034 01:15:24,942 --> 01:15:26,831 our partner nations is absolutely 2035 01:15:26,831 --> 01:15:29,320 essential and it really contributes to 2036 01:15:29,320 --> 01:15:32,270 making our partner stronger . Um As a , 2037 01:15:32,280 --> 01:15:35,350 as a border state , it does the South 2038 01:15:35,350 --> 01:15:37,850 come footprint is that , how , how is 2039 01:15:37,850 --> 01:15:39,906 that handling the drug trafficking ? 2040 01:15:39,906 --> 01:15:42,072 And is there anything that we can do ? 2041 01:15:42,072 --> 01:15:44,239 Is there any , again , any authorities 2042 01:15:44,239 --> 01:15:43,980 that you might need in that , in that 2043 01:15:43,980 --> 01:15:46,450 space ? So I haven't say in the , we're 2044 01:15:46,450 --> 01:15:48,617 not gonna be able to interdict our way 2045 01:15:48,617 --> 01:15:50,672 out of the drug trafficking . That's 2046 01:15:50,672 --> 01:15:52,783 really , um , I think going after the 2047 01:15:52,783 --> 01:15:54,506 labs and going after the money 2048 01:15:54,506 --> 01:15:56,550 laundering and getting after that , 2049 01:15:56,550 --> 01:15:58,717 follow the money piece of it is really 2050 01:15:58,717 --> 01:16:00,939 the hard part , but that's really where 2051 01:16:00,939 --> 01:16:02,994 we need to focus because by the time 2052 01:16:02,994 --> 01:16:05,050 that we're interdicting it , whether 2053 01:16:05,050 --> 01:16:07,580 it's in the maritime domain , um and uh 2054 01:16:07,590 --> 01:16:09,780 it's already been broken down one or 2055 01:16:09,780 --> 01:16:11,947 two times already . It would be better 2056 01:16:11,947 --> 01:16:14,058 to get it at the lab where it's being 2057 01:16:14,058 --> 01:16:16,058 made and cultivated and things like 2058 01:16:16,058 --> 01:16:19,080 that . Uh But the interdiction is , is 2059 01:16:19,080 --> 01:16:22,180 not going to solve the problem . I have 2060 01:16:22,190 --> 01:16:24,190 30 seconds left . Is there anything 2061 01:16:24,190 --> 01:16:26,246 that we haven't asked today that you 2062 01:16:26,246 --> 01:16:28,357 might , that you can speak about that 2063 01:16:28,357 --> 01:16:30,690 would help , help us , help us help you ? 2064 01:16:30,690 --> 01:16:32,801 Well , thank you , Congressman . It's 2065 01:16:32,801 --> 01:16:35,023 really just the attention and the focus 2066 01:16:35,023 --> 01:16:34,720 on this region and show that this 2067 01:16:34,720 --> 01:16:37,480 region matters . This region is full of 2068 01:16:37,480 --> 01:16:40,170 resources and I worry about the malign 2069 01:16:40,170 --> 01:16:42,420 activity of our adversaries taking 2070 01:16:42,420 --> 01:16:44,587 advantage of that looking like they're 2071 01:16:44,587 --> 01:16:46,253 investing when they're really 2072 01:16:46,253 --> 01:16:48,087 extracting . We have the lithium 2073 01:16:48,087 --> 01:16:50,142 triangle in this region . 60% of the 2074 01:16:50,142 --> 01:16:52,142 world's lithium , Argentina Bolivia 2075 01:16:52,142 --> 01:16:54,070 Chile have this and it's taking 2076 01:16:54,070 --> 01:16:56,292 resources away from these countries and 2077 01:16:56,292 --> 01:16:58,348 from there people that are trying to 2078 01:16:58,348 --> 01:17:00,292 deliver these democracies that are 2079 01:17:00,292 --> 01:17:02,459 trying to deliver for their people and 2080 01:17:02,459 --> 01:17:04,459 they're having a hard time doing it 2081 01:17:04,459 --> 01:17:06,348 because of the malign activity of 2082 01:17:06,348 --> 01:17:08,514 transnational criminal organizations . 2083 01:17:08,514 --> 01:17:10,514 Uh Gentlemen , time's expired and I 2084 01:17:10,514 --> 01:17:10,450 recognized him from Pennsylvania . Mr 2085 01:17:10,450 --> 01:17:13,000 De Lucio . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 2086 01:17:13,000 --> 01:17:15,222 Good morning assistant Secretary Dalton 2087 01:17:15,222 --> 01:17:17,444 General Van Herk , General Richardson . 2088 01:17:17,444 --> 01:17:19,667 Hello . Uh I want to focus my questions 2089 01:17:19,667 --> 01:17:21,833 as many of my colleagues on have today 2090 01:17:21,833 --> 01:17:23,667 on how North Common South com uh 2091 01:17:23,667 --> 01:17:25,611 playing in a strategic competition 2092 01:17:25,611 --> 01:17:27,778 deterrence with China . Uh Frankly , I 2093 01:17:27,778 --> 01:17:29,500 think , and I think most of my 2094 01:17:29,500 --> 01:17:31,500 colleagues agree whether it's trade 2095 01:17:31,500 --> 01:17:33,278 hollowing out of our industrial 2096 01:17:33,278 --> 01:17:35,750 manufacturing base , theft of I P . So 2097 01:17:35,750 --> 01:17:37,417 much of this conduct has been 2098 01:17:37,417 --> 01:17:39,639 commonplace uh in the last however many 2099 01:17:39,639 --> 01:17:41,750 decades with the People's Republic of 2100 01:17:41,750 --> 01:17:43,694 China , the New York Times article 2101 01:17:43,694 --> 01:17:45,750 released yesterday , the daring ruse 2102 01:17:45,750 --> 01:17:47,917 that exposed China's campaign to steal 2103 01:17:47,917 --> 01:17:50,139 American secrets , highlighting efforts 2104 01:17:50,139 --> 01:17:53,600 uh among communist Chinese officials to 2105 01:17:53,600 --> 01:17:55,544 undermine our country , preying on 2106 01:17:55,544 --> 01:17:57,767 scientists , academics , engineers , uh 2107 01:17:57,767 --> 01:17:59,822 and others . Of course , we have our 2108 01:17:59,822 --> 01:18:02,044 own struggles as General Richardson's , 2109 01:18:02,044 --> 01:18:01,980 you were just mentioning , you know , 2110 01:18:01,980 --> 01:18:03,980 around critical materials and other 2111 01:18:03,980 --> 01:18:06,202 pieces of our own things here at home . 2112 01:18:06,202 --> 01:18:08,313 Uh I want to turn , you know , to the 2113 01:18:08,313 --> 01:18:10,424 western hemisphere though and efforts 2114 01:18:10,424 --> 01:18:12,424 from China closer to home , General 2115 01:18:12,424 --> 01:18:14,369 Richardson , I'll start with you . 2116 01:18:14,369 --> 01:18:16,313 Latin America has seen significant 2117 01:18:16,313 --> 01:18:18,480 investment in diplomatic outreach from 2118 01:18:18,480 --> 01:18:20,647 China . You've talked about it today . 2119 01:18:20,647 --> 01:18:22,813 Uh And your , your written testimony , 2120 01:18:22,813 --> 01:18:24,702 you highlighted Communist China's 2121 01:18:24,702 --> 01:18:24,700 investment in critical infrastructure 2122 01:18:24,700 --> 01:18:26,990 in the hemisphere . So tell me if you 2123 01:18:26,990 --> 01:18:29,101 could , what are your concerns here ? 2124 01:18:29,101 --> 01:18:31,323 And what do you propose that we in this 2125 01:18:31,323 --> 01:18:33,434 committee or the government generally 2126 01:18:33,434 --> 01:18:35,657 should and can do about it ? I think we 2127 01:18:35,657 --> 01:18:38,590 need to um definitely concern with the , 2128 01:18:38,600 --> 01:18:40,711 with the aggressiveness of that , the 2129 01:18:40,711 --> 01:18:42,878 belt and road initiative with 21 of 31 2130 01:18:42,878 --> 01:18:45,990 countries . Uh and we have four 2131 01:18:45,990 --> 01:18:47,823 additional countries that aren't 2132 01:18:47,823 --> 01:18:49,934 signatories of the BRI , but actually 2133 01:18:49,934 --> 01:18:52,101 have PRC projects that are going on in 2134 01:18:52,101 --> 01:18:54,680 their countries . And so um quite a bit 2135 01:18:54,680 --> 01:18:56,791 so they're taking advantage of that , 2136 01:18:56,791 --> 01:18:58,791 but then there's also the debt trap 2137 01:18:58,791 --> 01:19:01,124 associated with it , the multiple loans . 2138 01:19:01,124 --> 01:19:03,180 They don't invest , as I said , they 2139 01:19:03,180 --> 01:19:05,124 don't invest in the country , they 2140 01:19:05,124 --> 01:19:07,124 extract , they bring their own host 2141 01:19:07,124 --> 01:19:06,810 nation workers , they've got an 2142 01:19:06,810 --> 01:19:08,866 unemployment problem . So they bring 2143 01:19:08,866 --> 01:19:11,088 their host nation , their own workers , 2144 01:19:11,088 --> 01:19:13,730 Chinese laborers to the country and uh 2145 01:19:13,740 --> 01:19:16,290 build these high rise apartments . Um 2146 01:19:16,290 --> 01:19:18,512 And so , you know , the investing , you 2147 01:19:18,512 --> 01:19:20,734 don't see the investment in the country 2148 01:19:20,734 --> 01:19:22,623 and then sometimes those projects 2149 01:19:22,623 --> 01:19:24,734 aren't done well . And so what we try 2150 01:19:24,734 --> 01:19:26,846 to do is capitalize upon that again , 2151 01:19:26,846 --> 01:19:29,123 meet the partners needs where they are , 2152 01:19:29,123 --> 01:19:29,050 we will bring the corps of engineers in 2153 01:19:29,050 --> 01:19:31,400 who's very prevalent in my , in my 2154 01:19:31,410 --> 01:19:34,890 region and fix the project . But 2155 01:19:34,890 --> 01:19:38,400 the capability of those funds um is a 2156 01:19:38,400 --> 01:19:41,480 sliver compared to what the P R C has . 2157 01:19:41,490 --> 01:19:43,900 Um But I would say in terms of our 2158 01:19:43,900 --> 01:19:46,067 instruments of national power from our 2159 01:19:46,067 --> 01:19:48,067 United States , we need to showcase 2160 01:19:48,067 --> 01:19:50,289 that more . We have a lot of investment 2161 01:19:50,289 --> 01:19:52,640 from our big companies that are in the 2162 01:19:52,640 --> 01:19:55,100 Americas investing . We just don't ever 2163 01:19:55,230 --> 01:19:57,800 ties . It were too modest and we don't 2164 01:19:57,800 --> 01:19:59,967 need to be modest anymore . We need to 2165 01:19:59,967 --> 01:20:02,189 put our American flag team USA on there 2166 01:20:02,189 --> 01:20:04,411 and we need to , we need to speak about 2167 01:20:04,411 --> 01:20:06,356 what we're doing and make sure the 2168 01:20:06,356 --> 01:20:08,411 countries know how much actually the 2169 01:20:08,411 --> 01:20:10,633 United States is involved . I would say 2170 01:20:10,633 --> 01:20:12,689 trade is also very important . South 2171 01:20:12,689 --> 01:20:14,744 America's number one trading partner 2172 01:20:14,744 --> 01:20:18,280 now is the P R C . The region is still 2173 01:20:18,280 --> 01:20:20,391 the United States is still the number 2174 01:20:20,391 --> 01:20:22,669 one trading partner , but we're losing , 2175 01:20:22,669 --> 01:20:24,724 we're starting to lose and we remain 2176 01:20:24,724 --> 01:20:26,724 flat lined with our trade general . 2177 01:20:26,724 --> 01:20:28,836 Thank you . I want to also talk a bit 2178 01:20:28,836 --> 01:20:31,113 about domestic critical infrastructure . 2179 01:20:31,113 --> 01:20:33,830 Uh Miss Dalton , assistant Secretary 2180 01:20:33,830 --> 01:20:36,130 Dalton , excuse me , you mentioned gray 2181 01:20:36,130 --> 01:20:38,010 zone activities in your written 2182 01:20:38,010 --> 01:20:40,460 testimony , describing them as largely 2183 01:20:40,460 --> 01:20:42,516 non attributable coercive means that 2184 01:20:42,516 --> 01:20:44,516 fall below perceived thresholds for 2185 01:20:44,516 --> 01:20:46,682 military action . Give us some sense , 2186 01:20:46,682 --> 01:20:48,682 folks watching at home or you might 2187 01:20:48,682 --> 01:20:50,682 hear about this later . What are we 2188 01:20:50,682 --> 01:20:50,320 talking about ? What are those 2189 01:20:50,320 --> 01:20:52,910 activities look like ? Absolutely . 2190 01:20:52,920 --> 01:20:54,753 Thanks so much , Congressman for 2191 01:20:54,753 --> 01:20:56,930 highlighting this . Um The NDS makes 2192 01:20:56,930 --> 01:20:59,750 quite clear that central to the prc's 2193 01:20:59,750 --> 01:21:01,940 theory of victory is coming after our 2194 01:21:01,940 --> 01:21:04,160 critical infrastructure at home to 2195 01:21:04,160 --> 01:21:06,440 subvert our ability to conduct four 2196 01:21:06,440 --> 01:21:09,480 slow mobilization and project power in 2197 01:21:09,480 --> 01:21:11,813 the event of crisis or contingency . So , 2198 01:21:11,813 --> 01:21:14,460 what they are doing today is getting 2199 01:21:14,460 --> 01:21:16,850 into our our systems , whether that's 2200 01:21:16,850 --> 01:21:19,960 through cyber means um through um 2201 01:21:19,970 --> 01:21:22,570 counterintelligence . Um and , and 2202 01:21:22,580 --> 01:21:25,690 really across the gray zone spectrum um 2203 01:21:25,690 --> 01:21:27,801 to get a better understanding the lay 2204 01:21:27,801 --> 01:21:29,760 of the land of where potential 2205 01:21:29,760 --> 01:21:31,760 vulnerabilities are from a critical 2206 01:21:31,760 --> 01:21:33,982 infrastructure perspective . What makes 2207 01:21:33,982 --> 01:21:36,149 this so complex ? And General Van Herk 2208 01:21:36,149 --> 01:21:38,038 alluded to this earlier is um the 2209 01:21:38,038 --> 01:21:40,680 interdependencies that defense critical 2210 01:21:40,680 --> 01:21:42,940 infrastructure has with other sectors . 2211 01:21:42,950 --> 01:21:45,200 Um You know , whether that's water , 2212 01:21:45,200 --> 01:21:47,760 telecommunications or power , we're 2213 01:21:47,760 --> 01:21:49,871 gonna have to work across our federal 2214 01:21:49,871 --> 01:21:52,250 family . We're gonna have to work with 2215 01:21:52,250 --> 01:21:54,417 state and local and tribal territorial 2216 01:21:54,417 --> 01:21:56,417 governments and we're gonna have to 2217 01:21:56,417 --> 01:21:58,361 work with the private sector um to 2218 01:21:58,361 --> 01:22:00,417 understand where those risks lie and 2219 01:22:00,417 --> 01:22:02,528 how we close them . Well , my time is 2220 01:22:02,528 --> 01:22:04,528 just about in it , but I'm glad you 2221 01:22:04,528 --> 01:22:04,260 mentioned the private sector piece of 2222 01:22:04,260 --> 01:22:06,093 this too , given how much of our 2223 01:22:06,093 --> 01:22:08,316 critical infrastructure is not publicly 2224 01:22:08,316 --> 01:22:10,482 owned or controlled . So , thank you , 2225 01:22:10,482 --> 01:22:12,482 you're back and I recognize General 2226 01:22:12,482 --> 01:22:14,816 from Alabama Mr strong for five minutes . 2227 01:22:14,816 --> 01:22:16,982 Thank you , Secretary Dalton , General 2228 01:22:16,982 --> 01:22:19,093 Van Herk , General Richardson . Thank 2229 01:22:19,093 --> 01:22:21,149 you for coming before us last year , 2230 01:22:21,149 --> 01:22:23,316 General Van Herk last year during your 2231 01:22:23,316 --> 01:22:25,316 Senate posture here , you testified 2232 01:22:25,316 --> 01:22:27,204 that you were concerned about the 2233 01:22:27,204 --> 01:22:29,260 ability to pace North Korean missile 2234 01:22:29,260 --> 01:22:31,630 production capacity and capabilities . 2235 01:22:31,630 --> 01:22:34,380 Just yesterday . We saw Kim Jong Un's 2236 01:22:34,380 --> 01:22:36,491 sister warned that any attempt by the 2237 01:22:36,491 --> 01:22:38,547 United States to intercept a missile 2238 01:22:38,547 --> 01:22:40,713 test would be considered a declaration 2239 01:22:40,713 --> 01:22:42,824 of war as I've shared before Redstone 2240 01:22:42,824 --> 01:22:44,880 Arsenal is the center of gravity for 2241 01:22:44,880 --> 01:22:46,713 missile defense agency's testing 2242 01:22:46,713 --> 01:22:48,900 integration and field activity . Uh 2243 01:22:48,910 --> 01:22:51,220 There are also a key player in fielding 2244 01:22:51,220 --> 01:22:53,700 the next generation interceptor general . 2245 01:22:53,700 --> 01:22:55,811 Can you share why it's important that 2246 01:22:55,811 --> 01:22:58,033 the next generation interceptor reaches 2247 01:22:58,033 --> 01:23:00,144 initial operating capacity as soon as 2248 01:23:00,144 --> 01:23:03,280 possible ? Absolutely . Congressman . 2249 01:23:03,280 --> 01:23:05,502 So the next generation interceptor will 2250 01:23:05,502 --> 01:23:07,790 give us 20 additional uh ground based 2251 01:23:07,790 --> 01:23:09,734 interceptors , gives me additional 2252 01:23:09,734 --> 01:23:13,120 capable or capacity uh to pace with the 2253 01:23:13,120 --> 01:23:15,176 DPRK that you're talking about . But 2254 01:23:15,176 --> 01:23:16,953 more importantly , it gives you 2255 01:23:16,953 --> 01:23:19,009 capability , gives you capability to 2256 01:23:19,009 --> 01:23:21,750 distinguish between there 2257 01:23:22,860 --> 01:23:25,800 capabilities to deceive our systems . 2258 01:23:25,800 --> 01:23:28,022 If you will , we should talk more about 2259 01:23:28,022 --> 01:23:30,244 that in the classified environment that 2260 01:23:30,244 --> 01:23:32,300 that's crucial . Also crucial is the 2261 01:23:32,300 --> 01:23:34,467 service service life extension program 2262 01:23:34,467 --> 01:23:36,578 for the G B I S that's ongoing . That 2263 01:23:36,578 --> 01:23:38,689 creates additional reliability for me 2264 01:23:38,689 --> 01:23:40,800 and gives me the ability to adjust my 2265 01:23:40,800 --> 01:23:40,690 shot doctrine , which gives me 2266 01:23:40,690 --> 01:23:43,130 additional capability or capacity as 2267 01:23:43,130 --> 01:23:45,320 well . Thank you . How can the program 2268 01:23:45,320 --> 01:23:47,760 be accelerated to meet IOC faster ? 2269 01:23:48,400 --> 01:23:50,567 Yeah , that's a great question for M D 2270 01:23:50,567 --> 01:23:52,789 A . I think they have a great structure 2271 01:23:52,789 --> 01:23:54,900 in place , the two companies that are 2272 01:23:54,900 --> 01:23:56,900 competing and the structure for the 2273 01:23:56,900 --> 01:23:59,122 contract rewards going faster . We just 2274 01:23:59,122 --> 01:24:01,178 need to make sure that we don't have 2275 01:24:01,178 --> 01:24:03,289 bureaucratic mechanisms in place that 2276 01:24:03,289 --> 01:24:05,490 slow down . Uh the testing , the 2277 01:24:05,500 --> 01:24:07,611 fielding those kind of capabilities . 2278 01:24:07,611 --> 01:24:09,620 Thank you , General Van Herk . I've 2279 01:24:09,620 --> 01:24:11,620 noticed that you've been requesting 2280 01:24:11,620 --> 01:24:13,453 greater sensor coverage over the 2281 01:24:13,453 --> 01:24:15,820 homeland for a while . Now , please 2282 01:24:15,820 --> 01:24:17,987 know I support you in this effort . Uh 2283 01:24:17,987 --> 01:24:20,098 It is clear that in addition to being 2284 01:24:20,098 --> 01:24:22,400 able to see various threats , we need 2285 01:24:22,410 --> 01:24:24,840 the ability to defend against them . 2286 01:24:24,840 --> 01:24:26,980 Also , would you assess that the US 2287 01:24:26,980 --> 01:24:29,147 should provide better homeland defense 2288 01:24:29,147 --> 01:24:31,490 against most pressing missile threats , 2289 01:24:31,490 --> 01:24:35,400 cruise and ballistic ? I 2290 01:24:35,400 --> 01:24:37,790 would assess that based on the Taskings , 2291 01:24:37,790 --> 01:24:39,846 I'm given that we do need additional 2292 01:24:39,846 --> 01:24:42,280 capability for cruise missiles . Uh and 2293 01:24:42,280 --> 01:24:44,650 also uh the ballistic missiles that you 2294 01:24:44,650 --> 01:24:46,594 referenced there . Thank you . The 2295 01:24:46,594 --> 01:24:48,817 missile defense agency doesn't have the 2296 01:24:48,817 --> 01:24:51,039 cruise missile responsibility . The air 2297 01:24:51,039 --> 01:24:52,872 force does . Uh isn't that right 2298 01:24:52,872 --> 01:24:54,928 general ? That is right the way it's 2299 01:24:54,928 --> 01:24:56,928 structured right now . Thank you as 2300 01:24:56,928 --> 01:24:58,872 part of the reason for that is the 2301 01:24:58,872 --> 01:25:01,039 threats of the US homeland or many and 2302 01:25:01,039 --> 01:25:03,261 they are growing yet , we have kept the 2303 01:25:03,261 --> 01:25:05,039 missile defense agency's budget 2304 01:25:05,039 --> 01:25:07,250 essentially capped at about eight 2305 01:25:07,250 --> 01:25:09,750 billion uh for year . This is 2306 01:25:09,750 --> 01:25:11,972 concerning to me . I hope my colleagues 2307 01:25:11,972 --> 01:25:14,139 will join me in uh enacting the proper 2308 01:25:14,139 --> 01:25:16,361 budget and policy investments this year 2309 01:25:16,361 --> 01:25:18,840 to properly address what capabilities 2310 01:25:18,840 --> 01:25:20,673 are armed forces need to protect 2311 01:25:20,673 --> 01:25:22,840 America's people abroad , but also at 2312 01:25:22,840 --> 01:25:26,000 home , Mr Chairman , I yield back chair 2313 01:25:26,000 --> 01:25:28,056 and I recognize the gentle lady from 2314 01:25:28,056 --> 01:25:30,056 Texas MS Escobar for five minutes . 2315 01:25:30,056 --> 01:25:32,278 Thank you , Mr Chairman and many thanks 2316 01:25:32,278 --> 01:25:34,444 to you and the ranking member for this 2317 01:25:34,444 --> 01:25:36,611 very important hearing . Thanks to our 2318 01:25:36,611 --> 01:25:38,790 witnesses and General Richardson . 2319 01:25:38,790 --> 01:25:41,310 Thanks so much uh for ongoing 2320 01:25:41,310 --> 01:25:43,366 conversations . Um You know , I've , 2321 01:25:43,366 --> 01:25:46,000 I've long been a believer . I represent 2322 01:25:46,010 --> 01:25:49,340 El Paso Texas , a community uh that is 2323 01:25:49,340 --> 01:25:52,280 home to Fort Bliss , a key military 2324 01:25:52,280 --> 01:25:55,560 installation . But also we are the 2325 01:25:55,570 --> 01:25:57,860 community that's at our nation's front 2326 01:25:57,860 --> 01:26:01,010 door . And so we frequently see and we 2327 01:26:01,010 --> 01:26:04,450 have seen for decades that what happens 2328 01:26:04,450 --> 01:26:06,506 through our , throughout the western 2329 01:26:06,506 --> 01:26:08,561 hemisphere ultimately ends up at our 2330 01:26:08,561 --> 01:26:11,640 doorstep . And I'm a big believer that 2331 01:26:11,650 --> 01:26:15,350 we can't continue to just obsess 2332 01:26:15,360 --> 01:26:17,527 about the border . We've got to obsess 2333 01:26:17,527 --> 01:26:20,710 about the hemisphere . And so the work 2334 01:26:20,710 --> 01:26:23,660 that is being done , especially around 2335 01:26:23,830 --> 01:26:27,140 targeting criminal organizations 2336 01:26:27,150 --> 01:26:30,740 that prey upon communities 2337 01:26:30,770 --> 01:26:34,190 south of us and prey upon vulnerable 2338 01:26:34,190 --> 01:26:36,910 migrants who are fleeing their homeland . 2339 01:26:36,930 --> 01:26:38,960 It's really critical that we do 2340 01:26:38,970 --> 01:26:42,560 everything possible to attack 2341 01:26:42,570 --> 01:26:45,530 the , the challenge south of us . Um 2342 01:26:45,540 --> 01:26:47,470 And that we provide the resources 2343 01:26:47,480 --> 01:26:50,540 necessary , especially at the same time , 2344 01:26:50,540 --> 01:26:53,140 we have to realize what we do living on 2345 01:26:53,140 --> 01:26:55,640 the southern border and seeing the long 2346 01:26:55,640 --> 01:26:58,930 lines for southbound checks for all of 2347 01:26:58,930 --> 01:27:02,220 the weapons from the United States that 2348 01:27:02,220 --> 01:27:04,470 are going South . We have to 2349 01:27:04,470 --> 01:27:06,470 acknowledge as a country , the role 2350 01:27:06,470 --> 01:27:08,410 that we are playing in creating 2351 01:27:08,420 --> 01:27:11,650 instability um and access to weaponry 2352 01:27:11,650 --> 01:27:13,560 that creates more violence and 2353 01:27:13,560 --> 01:27:15,760 instability south of us . So I want to 2354 01:27:15,760 --> 01:27:18,340 thank you all so much for consistently 2355 01:27:18,340 --> 01:27:20,610 shedding a light on all of that . But 2356 01:27:20,610 --> 01:27:23,620 also for using um what I consider not 2357 01:27:23,620 --> 01:27:26,180 enough resources um and trying to make 2358 01:27:26,180 --> 01:27:28,180 them stretch and go a long way . It 2359 01:27:28,180 --> 01:27:30,720 really is on Congress and on all of us , 2360 01:27:30,730 --> 01:27:34,450 if we want to address much of what we 2361 01:27:34,450 --> 01:27:36,672 are seeing as a country at our southern 2362 01:27:36,672 --> 01:27:38,450 border , we have to provide the 2363 01:27:38,450 --> 01:27:41,810 resources to all agencies and groups 2364 01:27:41,810 --> 01:27:43,810 that are doing the , the incredibly 2365 01:27:43,810 --> 01:27:46,800 hard work um in our hemisphere . Um 2366 01:27:46,800 --> 01:27:49,140 With that , I would like um for 2367 01:27:49,140 --> 01:27:51,196 Secretary Dalton and actually all of 2368 01:27:51,196 --> 01:27:54,610 our witnesses um to respond if you can 2369 01:27:54,810 --> 01:27:57,310 um a critical aspect of addressing and 2370 01:27:57,310 --> 01:27:59,143 combating the threats across the 2371 01:27:59,143 --> 01:28:01,940 Northern and Southern Command . Kors is 2372 01:28:01,940 --> 01:28:04,380 acknowledging the infrastructure and 2373 01:28:04,380 --> 01:28:07,020 networks that T C O s are using the 2374 01:28:07,020 --> 01:28:09,630 traffic persons weapons and narcotics 2375 01:28:09,640 --> 01:28:11,790 that make their way in and out of our 2376 01:28:11,790 --> 01:28:14,250 country . Can you all speak to the 2377 01:28:14,250 --> 01:28:16,790 efforts in support of the inter agency 2378 01:28:16,940 --> 01:28:19,830 and our partners and allies to assess 2379 01:28:19,830 --> 01:28:22,350 the size and complexity of these 2380 01:28:22,350 --> 01:28:24,920 networks ? And how are you working to 2381 01:28:24,920 --> 01:28:28,470 dismantle them ? Congresswoman ? Thank 2382 01:28:28,470 --> 01:28:30,600 you so much for , for the question . 2383 01:28:30,600 --> 01:28:32,433 And I completely agree with your 2384 01:28:32,433 --> 01:28:34,489 framing in terms of the need to look 2385 01:28:34,489 --> 01:28:36,489 holistically and leveraging all the 2386 01:28:36,489 --> 01:28:38,960 tools of , of national state and local 2387 01:28:38,970 --> 01:28:41,490 power to , to get after this challenge 2388 01:28:41,490 --> 01:28:43,657 and with partners in , in the region . 2389 01:28:43,657 --> 01:28:45,879 And um I actually had an opportunity to 2390 01:28:45,879 --> 01:28:47,934 visit El Paso just a couple of weeks 2391 01:28:47,934 --> 01:28:50,740 ago to meet with some of our local D H 2392 01:28:50,740 --> 01:28:52,962 S and , and D O D officials . I'm doing 2393 01:28:52,962 --> 01:28:55,129 some great work on , on this challenge 2394 01:28:55,129 --> 01:28:57,400 set . Um to answer your question . 2395 01:28:57,400 --> 01:29:00,740 Congresswoman , um Do you d provides a 2396 01:29:00,740 --> 01:29:02,796 detection and monitoring support and 2397 01:29:02,796 --> 01:29:04,880 intelligence support um through our 2398 01:29:04,880 --> 01:29:07,730 counternarcotics , authorities to key 2399 01:29:07,730 --> 01:29:10,250 partners in the region . And this fits 2400 01:29:10,250 --> 01:29:12,139 into the administration's broader 2401 01:29:12,139 --> 01:29:14,460 approach of addressing the root causes 2402 01:29:14,470 --> 01:29:17,600 of migration and challenges in the 2403 01:29:17,600 --> 01:29:20,240 region um that have a bit of a Venn 2404 01:29:20,240 --> 01:29:23,480 diagram overlap um with the challenge 2405 01:29:23,490 --> 01:29:26,220 of , of T C O s . Um you know , they're , 2406 01:29:26,220 --> 01:29:28,498 they're not one in the same challenges . 2407 01:29:28,498 --> 01:29:30,850 Um But certainly the T C O s are 2408 01:29:30,850 --> 01:29:33,370 creating conditions that , that fuel 2409 01:29:33,380 --> 01:29:36,450 migration . Um And the broader context 2410 01:29:36,460 --> 01:29:38,480 of governance and development 2411 01:29:38,490 --> 01:29:41,510 challenges are , are stressing to um 2412 01:29:41,520 --> 01:29:44,000 economies in the region and compelling 2413 01:29:44,010 --> 01:29:46,740 um not only the flow of irregular 2414 01:29:46,740 --> 01:29:48,796 migration but creating opportunities 2415 01:29:48,796 --> 01:29:50,820 for the T C O s to thrive . Um So 2416 01:29:50,820 --> 01:29:53,280 that's the D O D piece um in this 2417 01:29:53,280 --> 01:29:55,447 broader framework . But I know General 2418 01:29:55,447 --> 01:29:57,391 Richardson will have um more great 2419 01:29:57,391 --> 01:30:00,850 amplification on this . Thanks , 2420 01:30:00,850 --> 01:30:03,490 congresswoman and uh JTF North , which 2421 01:30:03,490 --> 01:30:06,080 is in your district as well . Has a big 2422 01:30:06,090 --> 01:30:08,146 role here . First , I couldn't agree 2423 01:30:08,146 --> 01:30:10,312 more . It's not about the board , it's 2424 01:30:10,312 --> 01:30:10,030 about the Western Hemisphere and we 2425 01:30:10,030 --> 01:30:12,252 need to think much broader . Uh T C O s 2426 01:30:12,252 --> 01:30:14,419 are a global problem as well . General 2427 01:30:14,419 --> 01:30:17,060 Sandoval and Admiral o'hara from Mexico 2428 01:30:17,060 --> 01:30:19,420 often tell me that we also should focus 2429 01:30:19,420 --> 01:30:21,364 on what comes South not what comes 2430 01:30:21,364 --> 01:30:23,340 North . And so JTF North has been 2431 01:30:23,340 --> 01:30:25,750 instrumental in developing support to 2432 01:30:25,750 --> 01:30:27,861 the interagency partners that we work 2433 01:30:27,861 --> 01:30:30,028 with providing intel to go after money 2434 01:30:30,028 --> 01:30:32,028 that's going south weapons that are 2435 01:30:32,028 --> 01:30:34,361 going south , which are just as crucial . 2436 01:30:34,361 --> 01:30:36,472 We're not gonna interdict our way out 2437 01:30:36,472 --> 01:30:36,370 of this problem . We need a broader 2438 01:30:36,370 --> 01:30:38,648 holistic strategy that gets after that . 2439 01:30:38,648 --> 01:30:40,648 And so I look forward to continuing 2440 01:30:40,648 --> 01:30:43,520 doing that . So as you said , 2441 01:30:43,520 --> 01:30:46,020 Congresswoman , the TCOS bring violence 2442 01:30:46,020 --> 01:30:48,930 and corruption and then uh and the PRC 2443 01:30:48,930 --> 01:30:51,400 comes in and is able to exploit that . 2444 01:30:51,410 --> 01:30:53,900 So it all connects together . But the 2445 01:30:53,900 --> 01:30:56,940 violence is uh it's off the charts . Uh 2446 01:30:56,950 --> 01:30:59,006 these organizations are getting more 2447 01:30:59,006 --> 01:31:02,200 powerful $310 billion dollars 2448 01:31:02,210 --> 01:31:05,210 revenue annually . They've diversified 2449 01:31:05,210 --> 01:31:06,877 the portfolio . It's not just 2450 01:31:06,877 --> 01:31:08,543 counternarcotics , it's human 2451 01:31:08,543 --> 01:31:10,543 trafficking , it's illegal mining , 2452 01:31:10,543 --> 01:31:12,710 it's eagle , eagle logging , fishing , 2453 01:31:12,710 --> 01:31:14,877 whatever they can get their hands on . 2454 01:31:14,877 --> 01:31:16,988 And then the Chinese money laundering 2455 01:31:16,988 --> 01:31:19,280 that with the seven PRC banks , 275 2456 01:31:19,280 --> 01:31:21,600 branches in the region . It's just a 2457 01:31:21,610 --> 01:31:24,530 vicious cycle that continues . So the 2458 01:31:24,530 --> 01:31:26,419 work that we do with the security 2459 01:31:26,419 --> 01:31:28,697 cooperation to help our partner nation , 2460 01:31:28,697 --> 01:31:30,863 militaries and certain public security 2461 01:31:30,863 --> 01:31:32,752 forces deal with these challenges 2462 01:31:32,752 --> 01:31:34,919 internally and be able to secure their 2463 01:31:34,919 --> 01:31:36,863 borders and work cross border with 2464 01:31:36,863 --> 01:31:38,919 their neighbors , uh enables them to 2465 01:31:38,919 --> 01:31:41,840 handle these situations . So it doesn't 2466 01:31:41,850 --> 01:31:44,880 again uh expired and I recognize 2467 01:31:44,880 --> 01:31:46,991 gentleman in Florida , Mr Jimenez for 2468 01:31:46,991 --> 01:31:49,047 five minutes . Thank you very much . 2469 01:31:49,047 --> 01:31:51,213 And um want to expand on , on what you 2470 01:31:51,213 --> 01:31:53,480 just said General Richardson about the 2471 01:31:53,480 --> 01:31:55,760 banks , the Chinese banks and the and 2472 01:31:55,760 --> 01:31:57,816 the branches that they have in South 2473 01:31:57,816 --> 01:32:00,149 America . Do any of these Chinese banks ? 2474 01:32:00,149 --> 01:32:02,038 Do they do business in the United 2475 01:32:02,038 --> 01:32:04,920 States ? Congressman ? I'm not , I'm 2476 01:32:04,920 --> 01:32:07,400 not for sure . I can't answer that and 2477 01:32:07,410 --> 01:32:09,710 find out if they do okay so we can take 2478 01:32:09,710 --> 01:32:11,880 some steps against them . Okay . And 2479 01:32:11,880 --> 01:32:13,991 these activities because they they're 2480 01:32:13,991 --> 01:32:15,713 they seem to be what the money 2481 01:32:15,713 --> 01:32:17,991 laundering arm of these enterprises is , 2482 01:32:17,991 --> 01:32:20,158 are these Chinese banks ? Is that what 2483 01:32:20,158 --> 01:32:22,660 you're saying ? Okay . Alright , fair 2484 01:32:22,660 --> 01:32:26,560 enough . Um and and thank you again for 2485 01:32:26,570 --> 01:32:28,792 for the briefing that you gave me in uh 2486 01:32:28,792 --> 01:32:30,737 in South com um for those who know 2487 01:32:30,737 --> 01:32:32,959 South comes about a mile away from my , 2488 01:32:32,959 --> 01:32:34,681 from my district and it's very 2489 01:32:34,681 --> 01:32:37,770 important part of my my district and um 2490 01:32:37,780 --> 01:32:40,002 it some of the things you told me , you 2491 01:32:40,002 --> 01:32:42,113 know where you you've said here , but 2492 01:32:42,113 --> 01:32:44,410 you said that 60% of the lithium uh in 2493 01:32:44,410 --> 01:32:46,632 the world , the world supply of lithium 2494 01:32:46,632 --> 01:32:48,410 comes from South America . What 2495 01:32:48,410 --> 01:32:50,466 percentage of that ? 60% is actually 2496 01:32:50,466 --> 01:32:52,580 controlled by the PRC ? I don't have 2497 01:32:52,580 --> 01:32:54,691 the answer to that , but I could uh I 2498 01:32:54,691 --> 01:32:56,858 could try to get that for you from one 2499 01:32:56,858 --> 01:33:00,290 of our interagency partners , but it's 2500 01:33:00,300 --> 01:33:03,480 uh the the when you talk to the U S 2501 01:33:03,480 --> 01:33:06,550 ambassadors for Chile and Argentina and 2502 01:33:06,550 --> 01:33:09,670 then the companies that are there , uh 2503 01:33:09,680 --> 01:33:12,350 the aggressiveness of the P R C and the 2504 01:33:12,350 --> 01:33:14,350 ground game that they have with the 2505 01:33:14,350 --> 01:33:18,100 lithium is , um , uh , is very advanced 2506 01:33:18,100 --> 01:33:21,060 and very aggressive . Yeah . Look , I 2507 01:33:21,070 --> 01:33:23,126 don't think that combating China , I 2508 01:33:23,126 --> 01:33:25,014 mean , combating the PRC in South 2509 01:33:25,014 --> 01:33:27,126 America is , I do believe that that's 2510 01:33:27,126 --> 01:33:29,237 our greatest threat . It's just gonna 2511 01:33:29,237 --> 01:33:28,620 take military , it's gonna be a 2512 01:33:28,620 --> 01:33:30,787 military . Although you all do a great 2513 01:33:30,787 --> 01:33:32,564 job in the partnership . That's 2514 01:33:32,564 --> 01:33:34,787 actually an economic and I believe that 2515 01:33:34,787 --> 01:33:36,953 for far too long , we have ignored our 2516 01:33:36,953 --> 01:33:40,560 own backyard . Uh and allowed Russia 2517 01:33:40,570 --> 01:33:43,730 China , Iran adversary of the United 2518 01:33:43,730 --> 01:33:45,952 States to actually make great footholds 2519 01:33:45,952 --> 01:33:48,130 in into our region and we need to do 2520 01:33:48,130 --> 01:33:50,241 something about it . Uh And it has to 2521 01:33:50,241 --> 01:33:52,350 be a holistic approach , economic 2522 01:33:52,350 --> 01:33:54,683 approach . How do we help our neighbors ? 2523 01:33:54,683 --> 01:33:56,739 Because the P R C is not helping our 2524 01:33:56,739 --> 01:33:58,572 neighbors . They're building the 2525 01:33:58,572 --> 01:34:00,628 infrastructure with our own people , 2526 01:34:00,628 --> 01:34:02,794 their own material . Uh And then , and 2527 01:34:02,794 --> 01:34:04,572 then getting those countries to 2528 01:34:04,572 --> 01:34:06,739 actually pay for their own people . So 2529 01:34:06,739 --> 01:34:09,017 it's actually a pretty good gig , okay . 2530 01:34:09,017 --> 01:34:10,961 Uh It's , it's a great racket what 2531 01:34:10,961 --> 01:34:13,183 they're doing right now . Um uh General 2532 01:34:13,183 --> 01:34:15,540 Van Herk , we talked about uh your 2533 01:34:15,540 --> 01:34:17,790 cooperation with Mexican authorities . 2534 01:34:17,800 --> 01:34:21,540 Um uh dealing with the cartels . You 2535 01:34:21,540 --> 01:34:25,000 think they're doing enough ? Do I think 2536 01:34:25,000 --> 01:34:27,480 the Mexicans are doing enough ? I think 2537 01:34:27,490 --> 01:34:29,712 everybody can do more than we are right 2538 01:34:29,712 --> 01:34:31,879 now to look at this problem . They are 2539 01:34:31,879 --> 01:34:34,046 doing a significant amount . They have 2540 01:34:34,046 --> 01:34:36,212 tens of thousands of forces applied to 2541 01:34:36,212 --> 01:34:36,140 the problem . The problem just 2542 01:34:36,140 --> 01:34:38,251 continues to grow though . So I think 2543 01:34:38,251 --> 01:34:40,473 that's a better policy question than it 2544 01:34:40,473 --> 01:34:42,529 is for a military . I stand ready to 2545 01:34:42,529 --> 01:34:44,362 support if directed to do more , 2546 01:34:44,362 --> 01:34:46,362 directed to plan more etcetera . It 2547 01:34:46,362 --> 01:34:48,362 wasn't a policy question . It was a 2548 01:34:48,362 --> 01:34:50,473 question . Are they doing it enough ? 2549 01:34:50,473 --> 01:34:52,751 Are they , do you think that if we had , 2550 01:34:52,751 --> 01:34:54,529 if we in the United States were 2551 01:34:54,529 --> 01:34:57,360 allowing our organizations to flood 2552 01:34:57,370 --> 01:35:00,260 Mexico and kill 100,000 Mexicans a year ? 2553 01:35:00,260 --> 01:35:02,482 Do you think that they'd be happy about 2554 01:35:02,482 --> 01:35:04,649 it ? I don't think they would be happy 2555 01:35:04,649 --> 01:35:04,550 about that . Congressman . Would they 2556 01:35:04,550 --> 01:35:07,510 be asking us to do more ? Uh I would 2557 01:35:07,510 --> 01:35:09,677 ask them , I would assume they would . 2558 01:35:09,677 --> 01:35:12,010 Okay . Do you think they should do more ? 2559 01:35:12,010 --> 01:35:15,240 I think we all can do more . Okay . 2560 01:35:15,250 --> 01:35:17,472 Fair enough . One other question I have 2561 01:35:17,472 --> 01:35:19,694 about a minute and 30 . I live in Miami 2562 01:35:19,694 --> 01:35:21,861 and I have a bunch of friends in Miami 2563 01:35:21,861 --> 01:35:24,028 and they're a bunch of them coming and 2564 01:35:24,028 --> 01:35:23,330 saying , hey , you need to see what's 2565 01:35:23,330 --> 01:35:26,230 going on in the Bahamas with , with the 2566 01:35:26,230 --> 01:35:29,190 PRC . So what's going on in the Bahamas ? 2567 01:35:29,200 --> 01:35:31,200 And by the way , the Bahamas are 15 2568 01:35:31,200 --> 01:35:33,200 miles away . Yeah . Congressman , I 2569 01:35:33,200 --> 01:35:35,367 couldn't agree with you more . The PRC 2570 01:35:35,367 --> 01:35:37,589 is aggressively pursuing their economic 2571 01:35:37,589 --> 01:35:39,756 coercion in , in the Bahamas . They've 2572 01:35:39,756 --> 01:35:41,811 built the biggest embassy around the 2573 01:35:41,811 --> 01:35:44,033 globe in the Bahamas . They have a very 2574 01:35:44,033 --> 01:35:45,756 aggressive ambassador uses the 2575 01:35:45,756 --> 01:35:47,922 information space to undermine us each 2576 01:35:47,922 --> 01:35:49,978 and every day . The resort that they 2577 01:35:49,978 --> 01:35:52,200 built on top of our uh cables that come 2578 01:35:52,200 --> 01:35:54,256 ashore there , which are crucial for 2579 01:35:54,256 --> 01:35:56,478 command and control , which are crucial 2580 01:35:56,478 --> 01:35:58,589 for economic prosperity , those kinds 2581 01:35:58,589 --> 01:36:00,756 of things as well . They're right over 2582 01:36:00,756 --> 01:36:02,922 that as they gain additional access to 2583 01:36:02,922 --> 01:36:04,922 land and right on top of the navy's 2584 01:36:04,922 --> 01:36:04,820 test and training facilities in the 2585 01:36:04,820 --> 01:36:06,860 Atlantic as well . So they're very 2586 01:36:06,860 --> 01:36:09,193 aggressive in the Bahamas . They , they , 2587 01:36:09,193 --> 01:36:11,304 after the hurricane in Abaco Island , 2588 01:36:11,390 --> 01:36:14,410 Uh the Chinese financed and uh ensured 2589 01:36:14,410 --> 01:36:16,632 they built a ports there that ports not 2590 01:36:16,632 --> 01:36:18,799 being used for military purposes right 2591 01:36:18,799 --> 01:36:20,799 now . But it's another indicator of 2592 01:36:20,799 --> 01:36:22,910 their aggressive nature to coerce and 2593 01:36:22,910 --> 01:36:25,132 use their economic influence around the 2594 01:36:25,132 --> 01:36:27,354 globe . And we don't have an ambassador 2595 01:36:27,354 --> 01:36:29,354 since 2011 to the Bahamas . There's 2596 01:36:29,354 --> 01:36:31,077 currently an ambassador that's 2597 01:36:31,077 --> 01:36:33,190 nominated but not uh confirmed . And 2598 01:36:33,190 --> 01:36:35,246 it's been since 2011 since we've had 2599 01:36:35,246 --> 01:36:37,412 ambassador . Fair enough . That's very 2600 01:36:37,412 --> 01:36:39,468 concerning to me because obviously , 2601 01:36:39,468 --> 01:36:41,579 you know , I live in Miami and that's 2602 01:36:41,579 --> 01:36:43,746 only 15 miles away . So thank you very 2603 01:36:43,746 --> 01:36:43,480 much for and my , my time is up by your 2604 01:36:43,480 --> 01:36:45,424 my time back chair and I recognize 2605 01:36:45,424 --> 01:36:47,591 generate from Pennsylvania MS Hoolahan 2606 01:36:47,591 --> 01:36:50,700 for five minutes . Oops , thank you and 2607 01:36:50,700 --> 01:36:52,811 thank you to the panel for coming and 2608 01:36:52,811 --> 01:36:54,922 speaking to us , General Richardson . 2609 01:36:54,922 --> 01:36:58,130 My questions are for you for at first , 2610 01:36:58,130 --> 01:37:00,297 the T C O s are very much a large part 2611 01:37:00,297 --> 01:37:02,241 of the reason why we have concerns 2612 01:37:02,241 --> 01:37:04,186 about the security of the southern 2613 01:37:04,186 --> 01:37:06,241 border and you spoke about that here 2614 01:37:06,241 --> 01:37:08,297 and also in your testimony about the 2615 01:37:08,297 --> 01:37:08,270 flow of drugs that they are , are 2616 01:37:08,280 --> 01:37:10,530 generating . These guys are super well 2617 01:37:10,530 --> 01:37:13,580 funded $310 billion annually . As you 2618 01:37:13,580 --> 01:37:15,750 also noted in your testimony , can you 2619 01:37:15,750 --> 01:37:17,917 talk a little bit about if you're able 2620 01:37:17,917 --> 01:37:19,750 in this setting , these criminal 2621 01:37:19,750 --> 01:37:21,972 organizations and how they're receiving 2622 01:37:21,972 --> 01:37:24,194 support from the PRC connected criminal 2623 01:37:24,194 --> 01:37:26,194 organizations and what South com is 2624 01:37:26,194 --> 01:37:29,600 doing to prevent that . So the 2625 01:37:29,610 --> 01:37:33,500 the connection um that the what the T C 2626 01:37:33,500 --> 01:37:35,333 O s do with the violence and the 2627 01:37:35,333 --> 01:37:38,960 corruption and it it cracks the 2628 01:37:38,970 --> 01:37:41,640 fragile fragility . You know , these 2629 01:37:41,640 --> 01:37:43,862 democracies again are trying to deliver 2630 01:37:43,862 --> 01:37:45,970 for their people . It creates a ncic 2631 01:37:45,970 --> 01:37:48,980 your itty and unstable environments . 2632 01:37:48,980 --> 01:37:51,280 It causes people to have to move and 2633 01:37:51,280 --> 01:37:53,336 get on the move . It , it feeds into 2634 01:37:53,336 --> 01:37:55,391 this irregular migration when people 2635 01:37:55,391 --> 01:37:57,613 and families don't feel safe . But what 2636 01:37:57,613 --> 01:37:59,669 are the mechanisms that the P R C is 2637 01:37:59,669 --> 01:38:02,450 exercising to deliver funding or 2638 01:38:02,450 --> 01:38:04,870 support to the to these organizations 2639 01:38:04,870 --> 01:38:07,092 to these criminal organizations through 2640 01:38:07,092 --> 01:38:09,203 the , through the money laundering in 2641 01:38:09,203 --> 01:38:12,170 terms of the uh the transnational 2642 01:38:12,170 --> 01:38:14,226 criminal organizations being able to 2643 01:38:14,226 --> 01:38:16,890 provide the money to the PRC who then 2644 01:38:16,900 --> 01:38:19,860 sell it back to the countries through 2645 01:38:19,870 --> 01:38:23,870 um through the goods . Uh is one way to 2646 01:38:23,870 --> 01:38:27,210 do it . Uh We have law enforcement 2647 01:38:27,210 --> 01:38:29,420 agencies within that work as part of 2648 01:38:29,420 --> 01:38:31,587 liaison officers within South com . We 2649 01:38:31,587 --> 01:38:33,587 try to connect those dots work very 2650 01:38:33,587 --> 01:38:35,587 closely with Department of Treasury 2651 01:38:35,587 --> 01:38:38,120 justice commerce on following this 2652 01:38:38,120 --> 01:38:40,009 money . Because I think as I said 2653 01:38:40,009 --> 01:38:42,470 earlier , getting after how you follow 2654 01:38:42,470 --> 01:38:45,000 the money and what is actually uh you 2655 01:38:45,000 --> 01:38:47,360 know , enabling this piece to clean the 2656 01:38:47,360 --> 01:38:49,370 money and be able for these 2657 01:38:49,370 --> 01:38:51,750 organizations to flourish is uh we've 2658 01:38:51,750 --> 01:38:53,639 got to get after that in order to 2659 01:38:53,639 --> 01:38:55,694 counter it . And then real quickly , 2660 01:38:55,694 --> 01:38:57,806 you mentioned , you felt like you had 2661 01:38:57,806 --> 01:38:56,890 the authorities that you needed in 2662 01:38:56,890 --> 01:38:58,779 those particular areas . You also 2663 01:38:58,779 --> 01:39:00,890 mentioned twice today that we are too 2664 01:39:00,890 --> 01:39:03,001 modest that we should put our flag on 2665 01:39:03,001 --> 01:39:05,223 more things that us companies are doing 2666 01:39:05,223 --> 01:39:07,334 things that we hear , you know , with 2667 01:39:07,334 --> 01:39:09,610 federal um money and taxpayer money are 2668 01:39:09,610 --> 01:39:11,810 doing things . What do you mean by 2669 01:39:11,810 --> 01:39:13,960 putting your flag on it more when 2670 01:39:13,960 --> 01:39:15,849 you're speaking about industry or 2671 01:39:15,849 --> 01:39:18,530 private industry , how can we advertise 2672 01:39:18,530 --> 01:39:20,700 more explicitly ? What are , what's 2673 01:39:20,700 --> 01:39:22,533 your idea ? And I'm gaining this 2674 01:39:22,533 --> 01:39:24,756 perspective when I meet with leaders in 2675 01:39:24,756 --> 01:39:28,700 the countries and um and they don't , 2676 01:39:28,710 --> 01:39:30,932 they're not , don't seem to be aware of 2677 01:39:30,932 --> 01:39:33,154 a lot of the United States investment , 2678 01:39:33,154 --> 01:39:35,460 the tenders that come out the project 2679 01:39:35,470 --> 01:39:37,900 bids for big projects within these 2680 01:39:37,900 --> 01:39:40,011 countries only have Chinese bidders . 2681 01:39:40,011 --> 01:39:41,844 So it's all this information I'm 2682 01:39:41,844 --> 01:39:43,900 receiving from them that we're not . 2683 01:39:43,900 --> 01:39:46,233 And then when I meet with the companies , 2684 01:39:46,233 --> 01:39:48,289 I've met with the Atlantic Council , 2685 01:39:48,289 --> 01:39:50,400 the Council of the Americas and these 2686 01:39:50,400 --> 01:39:52,511 companies have an opportunity to tell 2687 01:39:52,511 --> 01:39:54,511 me what they're doing and there's a 2688 01:39:54,511 --> 01:39:56,678 mismatch and what the country sees and 2689 01:39:56,678 --> 01:39:58,844 what our companies say they're doing . 2690 01:39:58,844 --> 01:40:01,067 And so that's why I said we uh it seems 2691 01:40:01,067 --> 01:40:03,233 to me that we need to bring all of our 2692 01:40:03,233 --> 01:40:05,344 strengths together and advertise it , 2693 01:40:05,344 --> 01:40:07,660 say what we're doing uh to talk about 2694 01:40:07,660 --> 01:40:09,771 team U S A and the investment in this 2695 01:40:09,771 --> 01:40:11,938 region and how important it is because 2696 01:40:11,938 --> 01:40:14,104 it absolutely is . Thank you and , and 2697 01:40:14,104 --> 01:40:16,438 General Van Herk with my remaining time , 2698 01:40:16,438 --> 01:40:18,438 I wanted to drill down on something 2699 01:40:18,438 --> 01:40:20,660 that you talked about . I just recently 2700 01:40:20,660 --> 01:40:22,604 led a delegation to Finland and to 2701 01:40:22,604 --> 01:40:24,716 Norway bipartisan delegation . And we 2702 01:40:24,716 --> 01:40:26,938 spoke a lot about the Arctic and I know 2703 01:40:26,938 --> 01:40:29,049 this hearing is not necessarily about 2704 01:40:29,049 --> 01:40:31,216 that , but , but you brought it into , 2705 01:40:31,216 --> 01:40:33,327 into play . Can you talk a little bit 2706 01:40:33,327 --> 01:40:35,327 about your insights into the impact 2707 01:40:35,327 --> 01:40:37,382 that climate change is having in the 2708 01:40:37,382 --> 01:40:37,260 Arctic ? What it means for national 2709 01:40:37,260 --> 01:40:39,620 security , visa , the uh Russia and 2710 01:40:39,620 --> 01:40:41,860 even China as well . You also mentioned 2711 01:40:41,860 --> 01:40:44,082 that you were worried about being ready 2712 01:40:44,082 --> 01:40:45,804 to train and , and wanted more 2713 01:40:45,804 --> 01:40:47,916 resources in that area . We're hoping 2714 01:40:47,916 --> 01:40:47,890 that the budget would reflect that if 2715 01:40:47,890 --> 01:40:50,001 you could be more specific about what 2716 01:40:50,001 --> 01:40:52,223 you're looking for when the president's 2717 01:40:52,223 --> 01:40:52,070 budget is released , that would be 2718 01:40:52,070 --> 01:40:54,890 great . Thanks , environmental changes , 2719 01:40:54,890 --> 01:40:57,057 absolutely . Having significant impact 2720 01:40:57,057 --> 01:40:59,001 in the Arctic , it gives access to 2721 01:40:59,001 --> 01:41:01,168 resources which is going to definitely 2722 01:41:01,168 --> 01:41:03,480 challenge uh nations , there will be 2723 01:41:03,480 --> 01:41:05,758 friction . So competition is important . 2724 01:41:05,758 --> 01:41:07,980 That's what the uh the national defense 2725 01:41:07,980 --> 01:41:09,980 strategy tells us to do is go after 2726 01:41:09,980 --> 01:41:12,036 competing in the Arctic as far as uh 2727 01:41:12,036 --> 01:41:14,147 the importance in the capabilities we 2728 01:41:14,147 --> 01:41:16,313 need . So , persistence is one thing . 2729 01:41:16,313 --> 01:41:18,313 So the jobs and infrastructure bill 2730 01:41:18,313 --> 01:41:20,480 provided $250 million for the porch of 2731 01:41:20,480 --> 01:41:22,202 Nome , which will help me with 2732 01:41:22,202 --> 01:41:23,647 persistence in the Arctic 2733 01:41:23,647 --> 01:41:25,758 communications capabilities as well . 2734 01:41:25,758 --> 01:41:28,091 When you get north of about 65 latitude , 2735 01:41:28,091 --> 01:41:30,258 it's very challenging environment . So 2736 01:41:30,258 --> 01:41:32,369 the commercial such as SpaceX through 2737 01:41:32,369 --> 01:41:34,536 Starlink has given the opportunity for 2738 01:41:34,536 --> 01:41:36,647 us to take advantage of that . I need 2739 01:41:36,647 --> 01:41:38,813 more funding for terminals to use that 2740 01:41:38,813 --> 01:41:40,702 allow us to access those kinds of 2741 01:41:40,702 --> 01:41:42,536 capabilities . Infrastructure is 2742 01:41:42,536 --> 01:41:44,536 crucial for campaigning . It's also 2743 01:41:44,536 --> 01:41:46,758 crucial for crisis . And when we defend 2744 01:41:46,758 --> 01:41:48,980 our homeland infrastructure is severely 2745 01:41:48,980 --> 01:41:51,036 limited , both in Canada and the U S 2746 01:41:51,036 --> 01:41:53,258 and access to infrastructure such as in 2747 01:41:53,258 --> 01:41:55,313 Tuli Greenland as well . So when you 2748 01:41:55,313 --> 01:41:57,536 only have a day's worth of fuel or , or 2749 01:41:57,536 --> 01:41:59,536 limited ability , those things will 2750 01:41:59,536 --> 01:42:01,758 prevent me from doing what I need to do 2751 01:42:01,758 --> 01:42:03,813 to defend the homeland . Thank you . 2752 01:42:03,813 --> 01:42:05,924 I've run out of time . I yield back . 2753 01:42:06,060 --> 01:42:08,171 Recognizes the gentleman from Texas , 2754 01:42:08,171 --> 01:42:11,410 Mr Fallon . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 2755 01:42:11,410 --> 01:42:13,410 thank you for having this hearing . 2756 01:42:13,410 --> 01:42:15,466 It's very , it's vitally important , 2757 01:42:15,466 --> 01:42:18,570 General Van Herk in January . Um 2758 01:42:20,100 --> 01:42:23,220 There were 1400 lb of fentaNYL seized 2759 01:42:23,220 --> 01:42:25,220 at the southern border . I mean , I 2760 01:42:25,220 --> 01:42:27,387 found that to be startling . And uh so 2761 01:42:27,387 --> 01:42:29,387 I'd like to start if we can dial it 2762 01:42:29,387 --> 01:42:31,442 back a minute . And Miss Dalton , do 2763 01:42:31,442 --> 01:42:33,540 you believe that national security , 2764 01:42:33,610 --> 01:42:35,499 the border security is a national 2765 01:42:35,499 --> 01:42:37,930 security issue . It's a homeland 2766 01:42:37,930 --> 01:42:39,986 security issue . Do you think it's a 2767 01:42:39,986 --> 01:42:42,152 national security issue ? We , we have 2768 01:42:42,152 --> 01:42:44,690 national security . It's a question . 2769 01:42:44,690 --> 01:42:46,579 Yes or no . We , we have national 2770 01:42:46,579 --> 01:42:48,912 security interest in the security . Yes . 2771 01:42:48,912 --> 01:42:51,079 You're not going to answer yes or no . 2772 01:42:51,230 --> 01:42:54,780 Okay . So , General Van Herk , same 2773 01:42:54,780 --> 01:42:57,560 question is real simple . Is border 2774 01:42:57,560 --> 01:42:59,727 security and national security issue . 2775 01:42:59,727 --> 01:43:01,727 I'm on record of saying that border 2776 01:43:01,727 --> 01:43:03,838 security is national security . See , 2777 01:43:03,838 --> 01:43:06,004 it's not that hard . Yes , thank you . 2778 01:43:06,280 --> 01:43:08,558 You know , it's interesting because we , 2779 01:43:08,558 --> 01:43:10,669 I had an amendment to the NDA in 2021 2780 01:43:10,669 --> 01:43:13,100 and it simply said that and I was very 2781 01:43:13,100 --> 01:43:15,322 careful in crafting and it was one page 2782 01:43:15,322 --> 01:43:17,433 because I wanted it to be a unanimous 2783 01:43:17,433 --> 01:43:20,170 vote And it did pass and we were in the 2784 01:43:20,170 --> 01:43:22,337 Republican were in the minority at the 2785 01:43:22,337 --> 01:43:24,950 time was 31-28 and it passed 33 , which 2786 01:43:24,950 --> 01:43:27,250 meant that five Democrats voted for 2787 01:43:27,250 --> 01:43:29,472 that and agreed with the statement that 2788 01:43:29,472 --> 01:43:31,583 general just made and I made . But 26 2789 01:43:31,583 --> 01:43:33,583 Democrats said no , they voted no , 2790 01:43:33,583 --> 01:43:35,900 which was shocking to me . So as you 2791 01:43:35,900 --> 01:43:37,980 know , we laid out that securing our 2792 01:43:37,980 --> 01:43:40,091 southern border against transnational 2793 01:43:40,091 --> 01:43:42,313 criminal organizations and drug dealers 2794 01:43:42,313 --> 01:43:44,091 and human traffickers , weapons 2795 01:43:44,091 --> 01:43:46,036 smugglers , terrorists and various 2796 01:43:46,036 --> 01:43:48,258 other criminals is a matter of national 2797 01:43:48,258 --> 01:43:49,924 security . And what we really 2798 01:43:49,924 --> 01:43:52,036 ultimately have to decide is , is the 2799 01:43:52,036 --> 01:43:54,202 United States federal government gonna 2800 01:43:54,202 --> 01:43:54,050 control our southern border . Are we 2801 01:43:54,050 --> 01:43:56,161 gonna let the Mexican drug cartels do 2802 01:43:56,161 --> 01:43:58,510 it Because we've seen in the last 2803 01:43:58,520 --> 01:44:00,740 couple of years , we have never had a 2804 01:44:00,740 --> 01:44:02,907 month that we had over 200,000 illegal 2805 01:44:02,907 --> 01:44:05,220 border crossings . And then we had 10 2806 01:44:05,220 --> 01:44:07,442 months in a row of over 200,000 illegal 2807 01:44:07,442 --> 01:44:09,553 border crossings . We had caught over 2808 01:44:09,553 --> 01:44:11,664 100 people that were on the terrorist 2809 01:44:11,664 --> 01:44:13,553 watch list . We had 160 countries 2810 01:44:13,553 --> 01:44:15,980 represented by folks that were crossing 2811 01:44:15,980 --> 01:44:18,850 the border illegally . £25,000 of 2812 01:44:18,850 --> 01:44:21,017 fentaNYL has been seized even more now 2813 01:44:21,017 --> 01:44:23,128 over the last couple of years , which 2814 01:44:23,128 --> 01:44:25,350 is enough to kill every man , woman and 2815 01:44:25,350 --> 01:44:27,350 child , dozens of times over And we 2816 01:44:27,350 --> 01:44:29,406 lost 108,000 Americans defending all 2817 01:44:29,406 --> 01:44:31,760 overdoses last year . And as we 2818 01:44:31,760 --> 01:44:34,250 mentioned , General about the £1400 . 2819 01:44:34,260 --> 01:44:36,371 So earlier this year , I co sponsored 2820 01:44:36,371 --> 01:44:38,427 legislation to author legislation to 2821 01:44:38,427 --> 01:44:40,410 author military force against any 2822 01:44:40,410 --> 01:44:42,521 foreign nation organization or person 2823 01:44:42,521 --> 01:44:44,743 responsible for trafficking fentaNYL in 2824 01:44:44,743 --> 01:44:46,854 the United States . Specifically , it 2825 01:44:46,854 --> 01:44:48,743 names nine cartels that have used 2826 01:44:48,743 --> 01:44:50,688 violence and intimidation to wreak 2827 01:44:50,688 --> 01:44:52,743 havoc in our country . And in Mexico 2828 01:44:52,743 --> 01:44:54,854 and Central America . So general , do 2829 01:44:54,854 --> 01:44:56,966 you believe that Mexican drug cartels 2830 01:44:56,966 --> 01:44:59,230 present a clear and present danger to 2831 01:44:59,230 --> 01:45:02,900 the United States ? I I believe 2832 01:45:02,900 --> 01:45:05,090 that transnational criminal 2833 01:45:05,090 --> 01:45:07,540 organizations are a global security 2834 01:45:07,540 --> 01:45:09,762 problem which would include here in the 2835 01:45:09,762 --> 01:45:11,762 homeland . And , and sir , what are 2836 01:45:11,762 --> 01:45:13,873 your thoughts on authorizing military 2837 01:45:13,873 --> 01:45:15,984 force against the cartels to stop the 2838 01:45:15,984 --> 01:45:17,873 deadly flow of narcotics into our 2839 01:45:17,873 --> 01:45:19,762 country . I think that's a policy 2840 01:45:19,762 --> 01:45:21,596 decision if directed to plan and 2841 01:45:21,596 --> 01:45:23,596 execute uh and use military force , 2842 01:45:23,596 --> 01:45:25,762 then I would do that . Posse comitatus 2843 01:45:25,762 --> 01:45:27,984 prevents me from enforcing our laws . I 2844 01:45:27,984 --> 01:45:30,207 believe that inside the United States , 2845 01:45:30,207 --> 01:45:32,207 this problem is a Homeland Security 2846 01:45:32,207 --> 01:45:34,429 Department of Justice problem , not a D 2847 01:45:34,429 --> 01:45:36,651 O D problem . And they need to be fully 2848 01:45:36,651 --> 01:45:36,320 resourced to execute their missions . 2849 01:45:36,330 --> 01:45:38,386 And what else do you think ? In your 2850 01:45:38,386 --> 01:45:40,497 opinion , we could use to effectively 2851 01:45:40,497 --> 01:45:42,719 confront the cartels and to protect the 2852 01:45:42,719 --> 01:45:46,290 country ? I think information 2853 01:45:46,290 --> 01:45:49,000 sharing , helping our interagency 2854 01:45:49,000 --> 01:45:51,222 partners , which is what we're doing is 2855 01:45:51,222 --> 01:45:53,333 crucial . I think information sharing 2856 01:45:53,333 --> 01:45:55,680 with Mexico and other uh Western 2857 01:45:55,680 --> 01:45:57,347 hemisphere nations as General 2858 01:45:57,347 --> 01:45:59,513 Richardson has discussed is crucial to 2859 01:45:59,513 --> 01:46:01,458 enable them uh to , to address the 2860 01:46:01,458 --> 01:46:03,680 problems that they have on their soil , 2861 01:46:03,680 --> 01:46:05,624 their problems on their soil are a 2862 01:46:05,624 --> 01:46:07,847 problem in our soil as well . And so we 2863 01:46:07,847 --> 01:46:07,810 need to work together . And so I really 2864 01:46:07,810 --> 01:46:10,032 quickly to want to get to the fact that 2865 01:46:10,032 --> 01:46:12,143 you stated in your testimony in front 2866 01:46:12,143 --> 01:46:14,254 of the United States Senate . I found 2867 01:46:14,254 --> 01:46:16,310 this fascinating that most G are you 2868 01:46:16,310 --> 01:46:15,870 members ? We would probably know 2869 01:46:16,130 --> 01:46:19,180 locally as KGB that the um their 2870 01:46:19,180 --> 01:46:22,820 predecessors that most of the G R U 2871 01:46:22,820 --> 01:46:24,931 members in the world are in Mexico at 2872 01:46:24,931 --> 01:46:26,987 the moment , which I found startling 2873 01:46:26,987 --> 01:46:28,764 that those Russian intelligence 2874 01:46:28,764 --> 01:46:30,709 personnel , you know , and they're 2875 01:46:30,709 --> 01:46:30,350 keeping a close eye on their 2876 01:46:30,350 --> 01:46:32,517 opportunities for influence the United 2877 01:46:32,517 --> 01:46:34,572 States . And then in Fy 2022 customs 2878 01:46:34,572 --> 01:46:36,739 and border patrol officers encountered 2879 01:46:36,739 --> 01:46:40,690 21,763 illegal aliens from Russia . 2880 01:46:40,690 --> 01:46:42,690 And then in this fiscal year , it's 2881 01:46:42,690 --> 01:46:45,500 been 17,000 already . And you know , 2882 01:46:45,500 --> 01:46:48,110 you think about that and even if 1% of 2883 01:46:48,110 --> 01:46:51,000 those are Russian intelligence agents , 2884 01:46:51,010 --> 01:46:53,150 uh and that's the ones we caught . 2885 01:46:53,150 --> 01:46:55,428 Never mind the ones we didn't . I mean , 2886 01:46:55,428 --> 01:46:57,539 we could be looking at a battalion of 2887 01:46:57,620 --> 01:46:59,953 essentially KGB officers in our country . 2888 01:46:59,953 --> 01:47:02,176 So , is it a reasonable assumption that 2889 01:47:02,176 --> 01:47:04,342 adversarial intelligence services such 2890 01:47:04,342 --> 01:47:06,640 as the Russians and hostile non state 2891 01:47:06,640 --> 01:47:08,584 actors would take advantage of the 2892 01:47:08,584 --> 01:47:10,751 vulnerabilities of the southern border 2893 01:47:10,751 --> 01:47:13,029 to serve their interests . Congressman . 2894 01:47:13,029 --> 01:47:15,196 I would say that potential adversaries 2895 01:47:15,196 --> 01:47:17,418 would take advantage of any opportunity 2896 01:47:17,418 --> 01:47:19,473 to gain access here , whether it's a 2897 01:47:19,473 --> 01:47:21,696 southern border , whether it be through 2898 01:47:21,696 --> 01:47:23,807 cyberspace , the information space as 2899 01:47:23,807 --> 01:47:25,973 well , they're going to take advantage 2900 01:47:25,973 --> 01:47:25,830 of any loops or gaps . Gentlemen , 2901 01:47:25,830 --> 01:47:27,830 time's expired here and I recognize 2902 01:47:27,830 --> 01:47:29,997 them from California , Mr Carvajal for 2903 01:47:29,997 --> 01:47:32,163 five minutes . Thank you , Mr Chairman 2904 01:47:32,163 --> 01:47:34,330 and thank you to all the witnesses for 2905 01:47:34,330 --> 01:47:36,552 being here today . General Richardson , 2906 01:47:36,552 --> 01:47:38,774 you highlighted significant investments 2907 01:47:38,774 --> 01:47:40,774 from the People's Republic of China 2908 01:47:40,774 --> 01:47:43,660 into the South South . Com A R I agree 2909 01:47:43,660 --> 01:47:45,216 with you that strengthening 2910 01:47:45,216 --> 01:47:46,827 partnerships to help partner 2911 01:47:46,827 --> 01:47:48,493 democracies deliver for their 2912 01:47:48,493 --> 01:47:50,850 population is imperative in helping 2913 01:47:50,850 --> 01:47:53,610 counter the prc's influence . Do you 2914 01:47:53,610 --> 01:47:55,721 think we can strengthen relationships 2915 01:47:55,721 --> 01:47:57,832 with countries who are sympathetic to 2916 01:47:57,832 --> 01:48:00,930 the PRC through this strategy ? And 2917 01:48:00,940 --> 01:48:02,718 what other strategies are being 2918 01:48:02,718 --> 01:48:05,010 implemented ? To encourage alternatives 2919 01:48:05,020 --> 01:48:07,820 to cooperation with the P R C and how 2920 01:48:07,820 --> 01:48:11,160 can Congress help to further uh that 2921 01:48:11,160 --> 01:48:14,610 support ? So , thank you , Congressman . 2922 01:48:14,610 --> 01:48:16,721 I think that the work that we do with 2923 01:48:16,721 --> 01:48:19,260 the answer is yes . And uh the , the 2924 01:48:19,270 --> 01:48:20,937 work that we do with security 2925 01:48:20,937 --> 01:48:22,548 cooperation , building those 2926 01:48:22,548 --> 01:48:24,270 relationships . Uh I'd like to 2927 01:48:24,270 --> 01:48:28,210 highlight the , this , the uh I met the 2928 01:48:28,220 --> 01:48:30,276 international military education and 2929 01:48:30,276 --> 01:48:32,220 training as well as a professional 2930 01:48:32,220 --> 01:48:34,387 military education When you're talking 2931 01:48:34,387 --> 01:48:36,609 about building that trust , uh not just 2932 01:48:36,609 --> 01:48:38,720 at the leader level , but all the way 2933 01:48:38,720 --> 01:48:40,942 down at uh leaders because they grow up 2934 01:48:40,942 --> 01:48:43,164 to be in charge of their militaries and 2935 01:48:43,164 --> 01:48:45,550 their services and the investment that 2936 01:48:45,550 --> 01:48:47,730 we make in that program . I would say 2937 01:48:47,730 --> 01:48:49,897 that we really need to look hard at it 2938 01:48:49,897 --> 01:48:51,897 and continue to fund that and maybe 2939 01:48:51,897 --> 01:48:54,063 even a little bit more because it's so 2940 01:48:54,063 --> 01:48:56,230 important when I can pick up the phone 2941 01:48:56,230 --> 01:48:58,397 and , and we can have a conversation , 2942 01:48:58,397 --> 01:49:00,508 the folks that have been the military 2943 01:49:00,508 --> 01:49:02,730 leaders that have been to school in the 2944 01:49:02,730 --> 01:49:04,841 United States speak English . There's 2945 01:49:04,841 --> 01:49:04,810 no translating . We've already built 2946 01:49:04,810 --> 01:49:07,370 the trust , we are already crossed the 2947 01:49:07,370 --> 01:49:09,037 bridge and we're building the 2948 01:49:09,037 --> 01:49:11,360 relationship already as opposed to not . 2949 01:49:11,370 --> 01:49:14,130 And so just a shout out for that 2950 01:49:14,130 --> 01:49:16,860 education training program because it's 2951 01:49:16,860 --> 01:49:19,300 just huge , just a huge enabler for us . 2952 01:49:19,360 --> 01:49:21,380 But the security cooperation , the 2953 01:49:21,380 --> 01:49:23,510 train and equip understanding the 2954 01:49:23,510 --> 01:49:25,510 challenges from their perspective , 2955 01:49:25,510 --> 01:49:27,910 being able to link the leaders together 2956 01:49:27,910 --> 01:49:30,220 from the different nations , we've been 2957 01:49:30,220 --> 01:49:32,800 very successful at that . Uh And they 2958 01:49:32,800 --> 01:49:34,967 can do cross border operations because 2959 01:49:34,967 --> 01:49:37,022 the borders , a lot of times between 2960 01:49:37,022 --> 01:49:39,133 our partner nations are very porous . 2961 01:49:39,133 --> 01:49:41,300 Uh and they're not wanting to cause an 2962 01:49:41,300 --> 01:49:44,180 international incident . So uh there 2963 01:49:44,180 --> 01:49:46,450 might be some scenes and gaps , they're 2964 01:49:46,460 --> 01:49:48,460 closing those gaps and having those 2965 01:49:48,460 --> 01:49:50,682 leaders work together . And I have many 2966 01:49:50,682 --> 01:49:52,682 cases where they've been able to do 2967 01:49:52,682 --> 01:49:55,120 that over the past years . But uh those 2968 01:49:55,120 --> 01:49:57,250 levers that , that I have in order to 2969 01:49:57,250 --> 01:49:59,410 make our partner nations stronger are 2970 01:49:59,410 --> 01:50:02,260 really where we um where we succeed as 2971 01:50:02,260 --> 01:50:04,093 partners and our partner nations 2972 01:50:04,093 --> 01:50:06,204 succeed . We succeed as a team , team 2973 01:50:06,204 --> 01:50:09,580 democracy . Thank you , General 2974 01:50:09,590 --> 01:50:12,380 General Van Herk . As you noted , the 2975 01:50:12,380 --> 01:50:14,580 administration funded over the horizon 2976 01:50:14,580 --> 01:50:17,460 radars allowing us to better detect 2977 01:50:17,470 --> 01:50:20,760 potential threats to the homeland . Can 2978 01:50:20,760 --> 01:50:22,960 you elaborate on how this enhanced 2979 01:50:22,960 --> 01:50:25,490 detection capability will create more 2980 01:50:25,490 --> 01:50:28,490 time for military leaders allowing for 2981 01:50:28,490 --> 01:50:30,379 the creation of better deterrence 2982 01:50:30,379 --> 01:50:33,400 options and on how the over the horizon 2983 01:50:33,400 --> 01:50:35,930 radar will affect Norad's capabilities ? 2984 01:50:37,470 --> 01:50:39,710 Yes , thank you . So today's radar 2985 01:50:39,710 --> 01:50:41,432 systems designed basically and 2986 01:50:41,432 --> 01:50:43,654 implemented in the 80s only allow me to 2987 01:50:43,654 --> 01:50:45,330 see uh based on the 2988 01:50:49,580 --> 01:50:51,636 horizon capabilities will bounce off 2989 01:50:51,636 --> 01:50:54,810 the ionosphere and give me the ability 2990 01:50:54,810 --> 01:50:56,980 to see potentially a cousin miles or 2991 01:50:56,980 --> 01:50:58,813 beyond and not not only that for 2992 01:50:58,813 --> 01:51:01,610 airborne objects but maritime objects 2993 01:51:01,610 --> 01:51:03,920 as well as space objects and depending 2994 01:51:03,920 --> 01:51:05,976 on how you prioritize though . So it 2995 01:51:05,976 --> 01:51:08,142 gives me the ability to see further in 2996 01:51:08,142 --> 01:51:10,490 the future to anticipate what may come 2997 01:51:10,490 --> 01:51:12,870 our way and create options for me as an 2998 01:51:12,870 --> 01:51:14,926 operational commander by positioning 2999 01:51:14,926 --> 01:51:17,100 forces or at the strategic level with 3000 01:51:17,100 --> 01:51:19,156 the president or the secretary , the 3001 01:51:19,156 --> 01:51:21,322 option to pick up the phone and have a 3002 01:51:21,322 --> 01:51:23,544 discussion with the nation and create a 3003 01:51:23,544 --> 01:51:25,544 deterrent types of options ahead of 3004 01:51:25,544 --> 01:51:27,656 time . As far as NORAD , it's crucial 3005 01:51:27,656 --> 01:51:29,489 to field these uh to give us the 3006 01:51:29,489 --> 01:51:31,656 ability to not only see like we said , 3007 01:51:31,656 --> 01:51:33,711 airborne objects , but to be able to 3008 01:51:33,711 --> 01:51:35,822 provide my threat warning for NORAD , 3009 01:51:35,822 --> 01:51:38,156 which is crucial to strategic stability , 3010 01:51:38,156 --> 01:51:37,940 to be able to see hypersonic , to be 3011 01:51:37,940 --> 01:51:39,910 able to see objects that could 3012 01:51:39,910 --> 01:51:42,188 potentially emanate from space as well . 3013 01:51:42,660 --> 01:51:44,660 Thank you , General Mr Chairman . I 3014 01:51:44,660 --> 01:51:46,960 yield back Here . Now , recognize the 3015 01:51:46,960 --> 01:51:49,182 gentle lady from Michigan , Miss McLean 3016 01:51:49,182 --> 01:51:51,320 for five minutes . Thank you , Mr 3017 01:51:51,320 --> 01:51:53,330 Chairman . Um And thank you all for 3018 01:51:53,330 --> 01:51:55,552 being here today , General Richardson , 3019 01:51:55,552 --> 01:51:57,608 you've warned about China's constant 3020 01:51:57,608 --> 01:52:00,110 attempts to invest further in the South 3021 01:52:00,110 --> 01:52:03,210 com A R um General , would you agree 3022 01:52:03,210 --> 01:52:05,570 that several of the countries in your A 3023 01:52:05,570 --> 01:52:07,920 O R adapt socialist or communist 3024 01:52:07,920 --> 01:52:11,040 regimes ? Um It is even more important 3025 01:52:11,040 --> 01:52:13,151 than ever for the United States to be 3026 01:52:13,151 --> 01:52:16,560 involved in South America ? Absolutely , 3027 01:52:16,560 --> 01:52:18,393 Congressman , we need to be more 3028 01:52:18,393 --> 01:52:20,504 involved . Pay more attention to what 3029 01:52:20,504 --> 01:52:22,616 is so close to our homeland . This is 3030 01:52:22,616 --> 01:52:24,616 our neighborhood , this is a shared 3031 01:52:24,616 --> 01:52:26,671 neighborhood and neighbors watch out 3032 01:52:26,671 --> 01:52:28,671 for each other . We're good to each 3033 01:52:28,671 --> 01:52:30,838 other . We help each other . Um And uh 3034 01:52:30,838 --> 01:52:32,949 and so , absolutely , but I would say 3035 01:52:32,949 --> 01:52:35,004 that they're paying attention to the 3036 01:52:35,004 --> 01:52:37,116 PRC , not because they want to , it's 3037 01:52:37,116 --> 01:52:39,282 because they have to . And in the past 3038 01:52:39,282 --> 01:52:41,504 you've raised the specific issue of the 3039 01:52:41,504 --> 01:52:43,616 Port of Cartagena . In Colombia , the 3040 01:52:43,616 --> 01:52:45,782 Chinese have been attempting to gain a 3041 01:52:45,782 --> 01:52:48,004 majority stake at this vital ports . Um 3042 01:52:48,004 --> 01:52:49,727 in South America , if they are 3043 01:52:49,727 --> 01:52:51,893 successful , they would have access to 3044 01:52:51,893 --> 01:52:53,560 a deep water ports . But more 3045 01:52:53,560 --> 01:52:55,393 importantly , China would have a 3046 01:52:55,393 --> 01:52:59,260 significant I S R asset . I want to 3047 01:52:59,260 --> 01:53:02,280 know specifically what tools do you 3048 01:53:02,280 --> 01:53:04,580 have to counter Chinese investments in 3049 01:53:04,580 --> 01:53:08,460 South come . So in order to 3050 01:53:08,460 --> 01:53:10,571 counter the investment that they have 3051 01:53:10,571 --> 01:53:13,110 is to uh talk about it , which is what 3052 01:53:13,110 --> 01:53:15,332 I'm doing and bringing awareness to the 3053 01:53:15,332 --> 01:53:17,900 fact that uh when there are tenders and 3054 01:53:17,900 --> 01:53:20,590 projects uh that come out from the 3055 01:53:20,590 --> 01:53:22,646 countries and there are only Chinese 3056 01:53:22,646 --> 01:53:24,757 bidders on there . We have got to get 3057 01:53:24,757 --> 01:53:26,800 our international community , our 3058 01:53:26,810 --> 01:53:29,040 Western investment , our team usa 3059 01:53:29,040 --> 01:53:31,280 investment focused on what these 3060 01:53:31,280 --> 01:53:33,690 countries when these bids come out . Uh 3061 01:53:33,700 --> 01:53:35,756 so that they have a choice . Uh it's 3062 01:53:35,756 --> 01:53:37,720 not just all Chinese state owned 3063 01:53:37,720 --> 01:53:39,942 enterprises and we got to pay attention 3064 01:53:39,942 --> 01:53:42,164 to that . Would you agree that we could 3065 01:53:42,164 --> 01:53:44,164 use a little more help in this , in 3066 01:53:44,164 --> 01:53:46,190 this task ? I do , I think it's the 3067 01:53:46,200 --> 01:53:48,256 awareness and talking about it and , 3068 01:53:48,256 --> 01:53:50,640 and making it uh making it well known 3069 01:53:50,640 --> 01:53:53,100 that we're , we're not competing as we 3070 01:53:53,100 --> 01:53:55,270 should and we can and we can now 3071 01:53:55,270 --> 01:53:57,380 compete , we can in Congress 3072 01:53:57,380 --> 01:53:59,180 established the development the 3073 01:53:59,180 --> 01:54:02,470 Development Finance Corporation in 2018 , 3074 01:54:02,470 --> 01:54:04,810 build act . The DFC was supposed to 3075 01:54:04,810 --> 01:54:07,130 facilitate private sector investments 3076 01:54:07,130 --> 01:54:10,120 that specifically um complimented and 3077 01:54:10,120 --> 01:54:12,200 are guided by overall United States 3078 01:54:12,200 --> 01:54:14,700 foreign policy development and national 3079 01:54:14,700 --> 01:54:18,340 security objectives . Has DFC been 3080 01:54:18,340 --> 01:54:20,380 working with south com to establish 3081 01:54:20,380 --> 01:54:23,770 investments in South com kor to achieve 3082 01:54:23,780 --> 01:54:27,050 our national security objectives . So I 3083 01:54:27,050 --> 01:54:29,217 would want , I would want to come back 3084 01:54:29,217 --> 01:54:31,272 to you Congresswoman on that to make 3085 01:54:31,272 --> 01:54:33,606 sure that I give you the correct answer . 3086 01:54:33,606 --> 01:54:35,900 I think that um as I've said , we can 3087 01:54:35,910 --> 01:54:38,470 uh continually , we gotta uh shine the 3088 01:54:38,470 --> 01:54:40,920 light on it and make that , that 3089 01:54:40,920 --> 01:54:43,450 investment and uh coordinated , 3090 01:54:43,450 --> 01:54:46,110 consolidated and more aggressive 3091 01:54:47,000 --> 01:54:50,160 point blank . Do you ? What tools if 3092 01:54:50,160 --> 01:54:51,716 you can articulate ? Do you 3093 01:54:51,716 --> 01:54:54,060 specifically need that ? You don't have ? 3094 01:54:54,070 --> 01:54:56,660 I would say just the continued re 3095 01:54:56,660 --> 01:54:58,438 sourcing of my requirements for 3096 01:54:58,438 --> 01:55:00,590 security cooperation , my exercise 3097 01:55:00,590 --> 01:55:03,360 program , the state department's 3098 01:55:03,370 --> 01:55:06,110 foreign military sales , financing , 3099 01:55:06,120 --> 01:55:08,870 excess defense articles . And we make 3100 01:55:08,870 --> 01:55:10,981 those processes which are really more 3101 01:55:10,981 --> 01:55:13,290 long term . We've got to pressurize 3102 01:55:13,290 --> 01:55:15,123 them and make them to where they 3103 01:55:15,123 --> 01:55:17,450 deliver within months , not years . And 3104 01:55:17,450 --> 01:55:19,900 I want to go back to this D the D F C 3105 01:55:20,580 --> 01:55:23,360 is , you will get back with me on my 3106 01:55:23,360 --> 01:55:26,250 question on have they been working with 3107 01:55:26,250 --> 01:55:28,790 you ? And to what end because we give 3108 01:55:28,790 --> 01:55:30,957 them a lot of taxpayer dollars . And I 3109 01:55:30,957 --> 01:55:33,068 want to make sure that those taxpayer 3110 01:55:33,068 --> 01:55:36,730 dollars are being spent . Um We're 3111 01:55:36,730 --> 01:55:38,841 getting good value for our money , so 3112 01:55:38,841 --> 01:55:40,452 to speak . I mean , Congress 3113 01:55:40,452 --> 01:55:42,674 established the DFC to help counter the 3114 01:55:42,674 --> 01:55:44,786 Belt and Road initiative . Right from 3115 01:55:44,786 --> 01:55:47,580 the C C P D F C was supposed to be 3116 01:55:47,580 --> 01:55:50,230 coordinating private sector investments 3117 01:55:50,240 --> 01:55:52,240 in projects that benefit the United 3118 01:55:52,240 --> 01:55:55,740 States um that benefit our interests . 3119 01:55:56,320 --> 01:55:59,030 Instead , what I'm seeing is DFC has 3120 01:55:59,030 --> 01:56:01,390 dozens of product projects in the 3121 01:56:01,390 --> 01:56:04,600 western hemisphere that provide not , 3122 01:56:04,610 --> 01:56:07,130 not no real value to the national 3123 01:56:07,130 --> 01:56:09,130 security . While at the same time , 3124 01:56:09,130 --> 01:56:11,190 China is investing in critical 3125 01:56:11,190 --> 01:56:13,210 infrastructure , I mean , mineral 3126 01:56:13,210 --> 01:56:15,377 mining for their military and , and to 3127 01:56:15,377 --> 01:56:17,599 provide greater I R I S are in , in the 3128 01:56:17,599 --> 01:56:21,310 A R . So what's a little concerning ? I 3129 01:56:21,310 --> 01:56:23,532 don't mean this disrespectfully but you 3130 01:56:23,532 --> 01:56:25,532 can't rattle this off at the top of 3131 01:56:25,532 --> 01:56:27,588 your head yet . I'm sure if we asked 3132 01:56:27,588 --> 01:56:29,254 China they have direct mining 3133 01:56:29,254 --> 01:56:31,477 initiatives . Belt . I mean , they have 3134 01:56:31,477 --> 01:56:33,588 clear and precise initiatives . In my 3135 01:56:33,588 --> 01:56:35,810 opinion , Congress needs to take a hard 3136 01:56:35,810 --> 01:56:38,180 look at the DFC , the DFCS mandates 3137 01:56:38,190 --> 01:56:40,790 when , when there's legislation to 3138 01:56:40,790 --> 01:56:43,012 reauthorize this agency , when it comes 3139 01:56:43,012 --> 01:56:45,068 up for reauthorization this year , I 3140 01:56:45,068 --> 01:56:47,290 mean , we need to take a good hard look 3141 01:56:47,290 --> 01:56:49,660 at what are those dollars getting spent 3142 01:56:49,990 --> 01:56:52,120 for ? And are they being spent 3143 01:56:52,130 --> 01:56:54,408 appropriately generation times expired ? 3144 01:56:54,408 --> 01:56:56,574 And I recognize General from Nevada Mr 3145 01:56:56,574 --> 01:56:58,797 Horse for five minutes . Thank you very 3146 01:56:58,797 --> 01:57:00,741 much , Chairman Rogers and ranking 3147 01:57:00,741 --> 01:57:02,963 member Smith for holding this important 3148 01:57:02,963 --> 01:57:05,186 hearing . Assistant Secretary Dalton in 3149 01:57:05,186 --> 01:57:07,186 your testimony . You mentioned that 3150 01:57:07,186 --> 01:57:09,408 rising temperatures , droughts and more 3151 01:57:09,408 --> 01:57:11,463 frequent , intense and unpredictable 3152 01:57:11,463 --> 01:57:13,800 storms and floods have already begun to 3153 01:57:13,800 --> 01:57:16,110 affect military readiness and impose 3154 01:57:16,110 --> 01:57:18,460 significant costs on the department . I 3155 01:57:18,460 --> 01:57:20,682 agree with you that these environmental 3156 01:57:20,682 --> 01:57:23,280 hazards are degrading readiness , 3157 01:57:23,290 --> 01:57:25,020 critical infrastructure and 3158 01:57:25,020 --> 01:57:27,270 capabilities . In my home state of 3159 01:57:27,270 --> 01:57:29,810 Nevada , the vast majority of the state 3160 01:57:29,820 --> 01:57:31,910 is currently experiencing a severe 3161 01:57:31,920 --> 01:57:35,270 drought . That means that 2.6 million 3162 01:57:35,270 --> 01:57:37,492 people are affected by the drought with 3163 01:57:37,492 --> 01:57:41,460 6.13% of Nevadans experiencing 3164 01:57:41,470 --> 01:57:44,280 extreme drought . The Colorado River 3165 01:57:44,280 --> 01:57:47,060 basin has racked up such dramatic 3166 01:57:47,070 --> 01:57:49,640 deficits that a single season can't 3167 01:57:49,650 --> 01:57:52,440 foretell the dire water supply concerns . 3168 01:57:52,450 --> 01:57:54,670 And Lake Mead , the nation's largest 3169 01:57:54,680 --> 01:57:58,070 reservoir has fallen by about 170 3170 01:57:58,070 --> 01:58:00,360 ft since the current drought began in 3171 01:58:00,360 --> 01:58:04,310 2000 and currently sits at 27% 3172 01:58:04,320 --> 01:58:07,690 capacity . In fact , if Lake Mead falls 3173 01:58:07,700 --> 01:58:11,660 below 950 ft , it will go to Deadpool 3174 01:58:11,660 --> 01:58:13,930 status which will prevent it from 3175 01:58:13,930 --> 01:58:16,870 generating power that serves 40 million 3176 01:58:16,870 --> 01:58:19,180 people throughout the West . This 3177 01:58:19,180 --> 01:58:21,347 clearly has an impact on our readiness 3178 01:58:21,347 --> 01:58:23,500 including the bases in my district at 3179 01:58:23,500 --> 01:58:25,860 Nellis Air Force Base , Creature Force 3180 01:58:25,860 --> 01:58:28,000 Base , the National Test and Training 3181 01:58:28,000 --> 01:58:31,090 Range and the Hawthorne Army Depot . So 3182 01:58:31,090 --> 01:58:33,500 could you explain how extreme weather 3183 01:58:33,500 --> 01:58:35,840 is affecting our military readiness 3184 01:58:35,840 --> 01:58:37,729 further and how the department is 3185 01:58:37,729 --> 01:58:39,770 addressing climate resiliency 3186 01:58:40,690 --> 01:58:42,246 congressman ? Thank you for 3187 01:58:42,246 --> 01:58:44,280 highlighting this really important 3188 01:58:44,280 --> 01:58:46,660 issue . The NDS captures it as a 3189 01:58:46,670 --> 01:58:49,520 critical trans boundary challenge um 3190 01:58:49,530 --> 01:58:51,820 facing not just the United states but 3191 01:58:51,820 --> 01:58:53,987 also our global network of , of allies 3192 01:58:53,987 --> 01:58:56,100 and partners . The department is 3193 01:58:56,100 --> 01:58:57,933 seeking to make our systems more 3194 01:58:57,933 --> 01:58:59,989 resilient to a range of threats that 3195 01:58:59,989 --> 01:59:02,510 result from our or are exacerbated by 3196 01:59:02,520 --> 01:59:04,820 extreme weather events which are being 3197 01:59:04,820 --> 01:59:07,420 reshaped by climate change , increasing 3198 01:59:07,430 --> 01:59:09,597 the resilience of our bases making our 3199 01:59:09,597 --> 01:59:11,410 structures , power grids , fuel 3200 01:59:11,410 --> 01:59:13,600 distribution systems and water lines 3201 01:59:13,600 --> 01:59:15,790 more survivable , not only gives us a 3202 01:59:15,790 --> 01:59:18,250 strategic advantage , particularly in 3203 01:59:18,250 --> 01:59:20,520 contested logistics um but also 3204 01:59:20,520 --> 01:59:22,900 improves our operational effectiveness . 3205 01:59:22,910 --> 01:59:24,966 The military's mission is to provide 3206 01:59:24,966 --> 01:59:27,210 the most lethal , effective and capable 3207 01:59:27,210 --> 01:59:29,377 fight fighting force and that requires 3208 01:59:29,377 --> 01:59:31,154 adapting to a changing security 3209 01:59:31,154 --> 01:59:33,210 environment including the effects of 3210 01:59:33,210 --> 01:59:35,432 climate change . Additionally , working 3211 01:59:35,432 --> 01:59:37,654 to build the resiliency of our partners 3212 01:59:37,654 --> 01:59:39,821 to respond to climate related disaster 3213 01:59:39,821 --> 01:59:42,043 response efforts through both D O D and 3214 01:59:42,043 --> 01:59:44,154 non D O D programming will help D O D 3215 01:59:44,154 --> 01:59:46,210 sustain focus on our key warfighting 3216 01:59:46,210 --> 01:59:48,210 mission , for example , um South 3217 01:59:48,210 --> 01:59:49,988 Commons working with allies and 3218 01:59:49,988 --> 01:59:52,043 partners in the Caribbean to enhance 3219 01:59:52,043 --> 01:59:54,210 their planning capabilities and better 3220 01:59:54,210 --> 01:59:56,377 prepare for the anticipated impacts of 3221 01:59:56,377 --> 01:59:58,377 extreme weather events and regional 3222 01:59:58,377 --> 02:00:00,321 climate related hazards through an 3223 02:00:00,321 --> 02:00:02,488 upcoming tabletop exercise . And we're 3224 02:00:02,488 --> 02:00:04,543 grateful for Congress's support of a 3225 02:00:04,543 --> 02:00:06,766 new authority , the defense operational 3226 02:00:06,766 --> 02:00:08,988 um resilience International Cooperation 3227 02:00:08,988 --> 02:00:12,050 Fund that will enable us to help build 3228 02:00:12,050 --> 02:00:14,250 the resiliency of of our allies and 3229 02:00:14,250 --> 02:00:16,417 partners abroad . But we're looking at 3230 02:00:16,417 --> 02:00:19,610 this both domestically and abroad to 3231 02:00:19,610 --> 02:00:21,990 tackle the effects of climate change . 3232 02:00:22,000 --> 02:00:25,270 And what happens if we fail to build 3233 02:00:25,280 --> 02:00:27,420 resilience against these effects of 3234 02:00:27,420 --> 02:00:30,220 climate change and its effect on the 3235 02:00:30,220 --> 02:00:33,760 loss of military capability . Thank you , 3236 02:00:33,760 --> 02:00:35,982 Carson . Let me give you a pretty stark 3237 02:00:35,982 --> 02:00:38,260 example . Um The nds makes clear the 3238 02:00:38,260 --> 02:00:40,670 PRC is our pacing challenge priority 3239 02:00:40,670 --> 02:00:42,892 theater theater is the end of Pacific . 3240 02:00:42,892 --> 02:00:45,600 When we look at Pacific Islands that we 3241 02:00:45,600 --> 02:00:47,790 rely upon for access basing and 3242 02:00:47,800 --> 02:00:50,890 overflight for priority war plans for 3243 02:00:50,890 --> 02:00:53,510 PRC contingency . Those are the very 3244 02:00:53,510 --> 02:00:57,060 islands that are subject to uh storm 3245 02:00:57,060 --> 02:01:00,190 surge and sea level rise um over the 3246 02:01:00,190 --> 02:01:03,500 next 10 to 20 years . Um And so if we 3247 02:01:03,500 --> 02:01:06,330 failed to build climate resiliency , um 3248 02:01:06,330 --> 02:01:08,750 in the Pacific Islands , key locations 3249 02:01:08,750 --> 02:01:12,150 like the quality Jolene a toll um that 3250 02:01:12,150 --> 02:01:13,761 has critical missile defense 3251 02:01:13,761 --> 02:01:16,880 capabilities . Um We're gonna be at 3252 02:01:16,880 --> 02:01:19,190 risk of being able to , to perform our 3253 02:01:19,190 --> 02:01:21,270 warfighting missions full stop . I 3254 02:01:21,270 --> 02:01:24,000 appreciate very much the department 3255 02:01:24,000 --> 02:01:26,590 taking these challenges seriously for 3256 02:01:26,590 --> 02:01:28,701 you answering my questions and I look 3257 02:01:28,701 --> 02:01:30,868 forward to continuing to work with the 3258 02:01:30,868 --> 02:01:32,701 department and this committee to 3259 02:01:32,701 --> 02:01:34,923 address the threats facing our national 3260 02:01:34,923 --> 02:01:37,080 security , including those related to 3261 02:01:37,080 --> 02:01:39,413 climate . Thank you , I yield back here . 3262 02:01:39,413 --> 02:01:41,550 Now , recognize you from Texas , Mr 3263 02:01:41,550 --> 02:01:43,717 Jackson for five minutes . Thank you , 3264 02:01:43,717 --> 02:01:45,828 Mr Chairman . I appreciate it . And I 3265 02:01:45,828 --> 02:01:47,883 also want to thank our witnesses for 3266 02:01:47,883 --> 02:01:47,110 taking time out of your schedule to be 3267 02:01:47,110 --> 02:01:49,110 here today . Much appreciated . The 3268 02:01:49,120 --> 02:01:51,176 past 5 to 10 years have brought with 3269 02:01:51,176 --> 02:01:53,342 them unprecedented challenges in North 3270 02:01:53,342 --> 02:01:55,342 and South America including natural 3271 02:01:55,342 --> 02:01:57,453 disasters , political upheaval border 3272 02:01:57,453 --> 02:01:59,453 and migration crisis and pandemic , 3273 02:01:59,453 --> 02:02:01,564 overshadowing all of these challenges 3274 02:02:01,564 --> 02:02:03,620 are the ever growing attempts of the 3275 02:02:03,620 --> 02:02:05,564 Chinese Communist Party to achieve 3276 02:02:05,564 --> 02:02:07,676 influence in a foothold right here in 3277 02:02:07,676 --> 02:02:09,898 the western hemisphere in the last five 3278 02:02:09,898 --> 02:02:09,840 years . And I know this has been 3279 02:02:09,840 --> 02:02:11,840 touched on a little bit in the last 3280 02:02:11,840 --> 02:02:13,729 five years . Taiwan has lost four 3281 02:02:13,729 --> 02:02:15,729 allies in Central America Panama in 3282 02:02:15,729 --> 02:02:17,896 2017 , El Salvador in 2018 , Dominican 3283 02:02:17,896 --> 02:02:20,690 Republic in 2018 , and Nicaragua in 3284 02:02:20,690 --> 02:02:23,010 2021 . In all cases , the seven of 3285 02:02:23,010 --> 02:02:25,066 these relationships with Taiwan came 3286 02:02:25,066 --> 02:02:27,066 hand in hand with Chinese predatory 3287 02:02:27,066 --> 02:02:29,180 economic tactics uh in the form of 3288 02:02:29,180 --> 02:02:31,180 investments and loans for the small 3289 02:02:31,180 --> 02:02:33,347 countries . Something Beijing has been 3290 02:02:33,347 --> 02:02:35,402 able to exploit all over the world . 3291 02:02:35,402 --> 02:02:37,624 Quite frankly , the majority of Chinese 3292 02:02:37,624 --> 02:02:39,736 enticements to these small vulnerable 3293 02:02:39,736 --> 02:02:39,120 countries have come in the form of 3294 02:02:39,120 --> 02:02:40,910 significant financial aid and 3295 02:02:40,910 --> 02:02:42,910 investment in exchange for severing 3296 02:02:42,910 --> 02:02:45,270 ties with Taiwan General Richardson to 3297 02:02:45,270 --> 02:02:47,159 your knowledge , have any Chinese 3298 02:02:47,159 --> 02:02:49,640 offers involved military assistance ? 3299 02:02:49,650 --> 02:02:51,706 And have there been any requirements 3300 02:02:51,706 --> 02:02:54,130 from the PRC to allow access to Chinese 3301 02:02:54,130 --> 02:02:56,840 forces on any territories here in the 3302 02:02:56,840 --> 02:03:00,830 Western hemisphere ? So in terms of the 3303 02:03:00,840 --> 02:03:04,780 hardware and the ability so that the 3304 02:03:04,790 --> 02:03:08,460 PRC does compete uh in terms of 3305 02:03:08,460 --> 02:03:12,450 the um whether a country is looking for 3306 02:03:12,460 --> 02:03:15,230 vehicles or aircraft or things like 3307 02:03:15,230 --> 02:03:17,880 that . And so , um certainly with our 3308 02:03:17,880 --> 02:03:20,910 processes and and the the countries now 3309 02:03:20,910 --> 02:03:23,520 partner nations are looking at because 3310 02:03:23,520 --> 02:03:27,310 of the economies and , and the the 3311 02:03:27,310 --> 02:03:29,421 issues with their economies , they're 3312 02:03:29,421 --> 02:03:31,366 looking at what's the best finance 3313 02:03:31,366 --> 02:03:34,820 package to uh to also be able to , 3314 02:03:34,830 --> 02:03:37,000 before they make the big decision on , 3315 02:03:37,010 --> 02:03:40,630 on buying uh aircraft or um or 3316 02:03:40,630 --> 02:03:42,797 vehicles and things like that . And so 3317 02:03:42,797 --> 02:03:45,019 the PRC is definitely competing in that 3318 02:03:45,019 --> 02:03:47,600 space in the military space as well . 3319 02:03:47,610 --> 02:03:50,060 And in terms of the , they're more in 3320 02:03:50,060 --> 02:03:52,520 the terms of training and education , 3321 02:03:52,520 --> 02:03:54,750 all expense paid training and education 3322 02:03:54,760 --> 02:03:58,510 to Beijing and to China for one 3323 02:03:58,510 --> 02:04:01,620 year to year and even recently found 3324 02:04:01,620 --> 02:04:03,620 out about a four year program , but 3325 02:04:03,620 --> 02:04:05,287 today really no big plans for 3326 02:04:05,287 --> 02:04:07,453 installations , ports , things of that 3327 02:04:07,453 --> 02:04:09,564 nature that we see going on right now 3328 02:04:09,564 --> 02:04:09,130 in Africa . And I would say what the 3329 02:04:09,130 --> 02:04:11,280 PRC is doing now , sir is setting the 3330 02:04:11,280 --> 02:04:13,336 theater is what I call it or setting 3331 02:04:13,336 --> 02:04:16,250 the table uh for the state owned 3332 02:04:16,250 --> 02:04:18,361 enterprises that come in and could be 3333 02:04:18,361 --> 02:04:20,417 used for dual use capability for the 3334 02:04:20,417 --> 02:04:22,694 military in the future . So while they , 3335 02:04:22,694 --> 02:04:24,694 we don't have any bases right now , 3336 02:04:24,694 --> 02:04:26,917 from the PRC , I would say that that is 3337 02:04:26,917 --> 02:04:29,028 something that will eventually happen 3338 02:04:29,028 --> 02:04:31,390 possibly 7 , 10 , 15 years from now . 3339 02:04:31,460 --> 02:04:33,516 Yes , ma'am . Thank you . That makes 3340 02:04:33,516 --> 02:04:35,571 that makes sense . Thank you . Um As 3341 02:04:35,571 --> 02:04:37,571 we've discussed today , some of our 3342 02:04:37,571 --> 02:04:37,400 most sensitive vital and advanced 3343 02:04:37,400 --> 02:04:39,233 defense platforms are heavily on 3344 02:04:39,233 --> 02:04:41,400 certain ranges of the spectrum . China 3345 02:04:41,400 --> 02:04:43,400 also relies on the spectrum for its 3346 02:04:43,400 --> 02:04:45,511 defense apparatus . However , here in 3347 02:04:45,511 --> 02:04:47,567 the United States are spectrum usage 3348 02:04:47,567 --> 02:04:49,511 and allocation system is currently 3349 02:04:49,511 --> 02:04:51,622 somewhat in flux and there's a lot of 3350 02:04:51,622 --> 02:04:53,844 debate on how we're going to ultimately 3351 02:04:53,844 --> 02:04:56,011 resolve this general man hurt . Do you 3352 02:04:56,011 --> 02:04:58,067 believe that China is exploiting our 3353 02:04:58,067 --> 02:04:57,900 spectra allocation in the , in the 3354 02:04:57,900 --> 02:04:59,844 dilemma that we're currently going 3355 02:04:59,844 --> 02:05:02,178 through regarding this uh this spectrum ? 3356 02:05:02,178 --> 02:05:03,956 And are they making significant 3357 02:05:03,956 --> 02:05:06,122 advances beyond our own capabilities ? 3358 02:05:06,122 --> 02:05:08,344 If so , do you believe that we can make 3359 02:05:08,344 --> 02:05:10,456 up our losses on this issue ? And how 3360 02:05:10,456 --> 02:05:12,511 do you suggest we recapture the high 3361 02:05:12,511 --> 02:05:14,567 ground on spectrum ? Congressman ? I 3362 02:05:14,567 --> 02:05:16,567 don't have any direct evidence that 3363 02:05:16,567 --> 02:05:20,350 China is exploiting the electromagnetic 3364 02:05:20,350 --> 02:05:22,520 spectrum . I would say that that would 3365 02:05:22,520 --> 02:05:24,631 be their intent if they could the way 3366 02:05:24,631 --> 02:05:26,631 they exploit everything else . Uh I 3367 02:05:26,631 --> 02:05:28,687 believe that what we need to do with 3368 02:05:28,687 --> 02:05:30,798 regards to spectrum is not look at it 3369 02:05:30,798 --> 02:05:33,076 from only a commercial aspect , a sale , 3370 02:05:33,076 --> 02:05:35,020 but a national security aspect and 3371 02:05:35,020 --> 02:05:37,187 ensure that all decisions with regards 3372 02:05:37,187 --> 02:05:39,650 to spectrum , look and assess the 3373 02:05:39,660 --> 02:05:41,549 impact of national security , the 3374 02:05:41,549 --> 02:05:43,327 ability , accomplish all of our 3375 02:05:43,327 --> 02:05:45,604 national security missions . Yes , sir . 3376 02:05:45,604 --> 02:05:47,549 Thank you . One last question . In 3377 02:05:47,549 --> 02:05:49,660 Europe , we operate in a theater with 3378 02:05:49,660 --> 02:05:51,438 many allies possessing military 3379 02:05:51,438 --> 02:05:53,549 capabilities and technologies . Uh We 3380 02:05:53,549 --> 02:05:55,549 rely on knowing that when deterring 3381 02:05:55,549 --> 02:05:57,882 aggression or stopping bad actors there , 3382 02:05:57,882 --> 02:05:59,771 we have capable competent trained 3383 02:05:59,771 --> 02:05:59,520 forces with whom we can work side by 3384 02:05:59,520 --> 02:06:02,200 side with South . Com by contrast , 3385 02:06:02,210 --> 02:06:04,377 operates in an area of the world where 3386 02:06:04,377 --> 02:06:06,543 we just kind of discuss to some extent 3387 02:06:06,543 --> 02:06:08,488 that is often still developing and 3388 02:06:08,488 --> 02:06:10,377 lacks institutional knowledge and 3389 02:06:10,377 --> 02:06:12,599 defense means and re sourcing that many 3390 02:06:12,599 --> 02:06:14,710 of our European allies have . General 3391 02:06:14,710 --> 02:06:14,540 Richardson . How does South com manage 3392 02:06:14,550 --> 02:06:16,328 the distinct power and resource 3393 02:06:16,328 --> 02:06:18,730 imbalance between the US and our South 3394 02:06:18,730 --> 02:06:20,700 com a our allies when it comes to 3395 02:06:20,710 --> 02:06:22,710 ensuring U S strategic interests in 3396 02:06:22,710 --> 02:06:25,390 South America and the Yukon NATO model 3397 02:06:25,400 --> 02:06:27,790 are different from what we we we face 3398 02:06:27,790 --> 02:06:30,012 in , in this command . So Congressman , 3399 02:06:30,012 --> 02:06:32,123 I'm happy to report that we just last 3400 02:06:32,123 --> 02:06:34,610 spring . Um myself and the other allies 3401 02:06:34,610 --> 02:06:36,832 that operate within the region signed a 3402 02:06:36,832 --> 02:06:38,777 western hemisphere framework . And 3403 02:06:38,777 --> 02:06:40,999 that's really a non binding agreement . 3404 02:06:40,999 --> 02:06:43,166 But it's a , it's a commitment to work 3405 02:06:43,166 --> 02:06:45,332 better together to share information . 3406 02:06:45,332 --> 02:06:47,700 And as we are getting after integrated 3407 02:06:47,700 --> 02:06:49,756 deterrence and team democracy in the 3408 02:06:49,756 --> 02:06:51,978 western hemisphere , that's really what 3409 02:06:51,978 --> 02:06:53,922 that's about . And I'm recognizing 3410 02:06:53,922 --> 02:06:55,756 gentlemen from Nebraska for five 3411 02:06:55,756 --> 02:06:57,978 minutes . Thank you to all three of you 3412 02:06:57,978 --> 02:07:00,033 for being here today . It's great to 3413 02:07:00,033 --> 02:06:59,610 see Gerald Van Herk . I've had the 3414 02:06:59,610 --> 02:07:01,721 honor of working with in the past and 3415 02:07:01,721 --> 02:07:03,777 thank you General Richard Richardson 3416 02:07:03,777 --> 02:07:05,721 for visiting yesterday . I want to 3417 02:07:05,721 --> 02:07:07,888 clarify with Jeroen Van Herk , some of 3418 02:07:07,888 --> 02:07:09,777 the news reporting on the Chinese 3419 02:07:09,777 --> 02:07:11,832 reconnaissance balloon . Some of the 3420 02:07:11,832 --> 02:07:14,054 news reports claim that the citizens of 3421 02:07:14,054 --> 02:07:16,277 Montana detected the balloon which then 3422 02:07:16,277 --> 02:07:18,499 led the military to brief the president 3423 02:07:18,499 --> 02:07:20,554 on what on the location of it , what 3424 02:07:20,554 --> 02:07:22,666 was going on and the reporting of the 3425 02:07:22,666 --> 02:07:24,777 case that was the first the president 3426 02:07:24,777 --> 02:07:26,943 had heard of it is that the case where 3427 02:07:26,943 --> 02:07:29,110 do we wait until citizens detected the 3428 02:07:29,110 --> 02:07:31,332 balloon before we briefed the president 3429 02:07:31,332 --> 02:07:33,443 on the balloon status congressman . I 3430 02:07:33,443 --> 02:07:35,499 can't answer that question because I 3431 02:07:35,499 --> 02:07:37,610 didn't specifically discuss that with 3432 02:07:37,610 --> 02:07:39,721 the White House . I can tell you that 3433 02:07:39,721 --> 02:07:41,554 on 27 January , I made the , the 3434 02:07:41,554 --> 02:07:43,666 department aware and when we detected 3435 02:07:43,666 --> 02:07:45,890 it with radar on the 28th of January 3436 02:07:45,890 --> 02:07:47,946 again , I made him aware and made my 3437 02:07:47,946 --> 02:07:50,001 assessment that there was no hostile 3438 02:07:50,001 --> 02:07:52,112 intent that being maneuvering to seek 3439 02:07:52,112 --> 02:07:54,340 an offensive advantage or hostile acts 3440 02:07:54,340 --> 02:07:56,340 such as dropping weapons . Uh And I 3441 02:07:56,340 --> 02:07:58,960 provided that to the department , I 3442 02:07:58,960 --> 02:08:01,520 just a little worrisome that it sounds 3443 02:08:01,520 --> 02:08:03,687 like in some of the reporting that the 3444 02:08:03,687 --> 02:08:05,853 president wasn't going to be briefed , 3445 02:08:05,853 --> 02:08:07,742 but the fact that citizens saw it 3446 02:08:07,742 --> 02:08:09,798 triggered , you know , the briefs to 3447 02:08:09,798 --> 02:08:11,964 the president that those that would be 3448 02:08:11,964 --> 02:08:14,076 my concern . I'd like to follow to on 3449 02:08:14,076 --> 02:08:16,076 your comment on the uh the mid band 3450 02:08:16,076 --> 02:08:17,909 frequency spectrum you mentioned 3451 02:08:17,909 --> 02:08:19,964 earlier that the auction of the , of 3452 02:08:19,964 --> 02:08:21,853 the part of the spectrum that our 3453 02:08:21,853 --> 02:08:24,020 radars operate in that area would have 3454 02:08:24,020 --> 02:08:26,187 a significant impact on your mission . 3455 02:08:26,187 --> 02:08:28,131 If the science indicates that it's 3456 02:08:28,131 --> 02:08:28,040 possible to effectively share the 3457 02:08:28,040 --> 02:08:30,040 spectrum and these frequency ranges 3458 02:08:30,040 --> 02:08:32,207 ranges . Would that reduce the risk to 3459 02:08:32,207 --> 02:08:34,210 your mission ? Or , or should we be 3460 02:08:34,220 --> 02:08:36,442 even more cautious and not go down that 3461 02:08:36,442 --> 02:08:38,387 path at all ? Yeah , Congressman , 3462 02:08:38,387 --> 02:08:40,650 ultimately , it's a policy decision uh 3463 02:08:40,660 --> 02:08:43,890 with regards to sharing , I'm agnostic 3464 02:08:43,890 --> 02:08:45,779 to the solution , we just need to 3465 02:08:45,779 --> 02:08:48,270 understand the impacts of any selloff 3466 02:08:48,280 --> 02:08:50,447 on national security and defending our 3467 02:08:50,447 --> 02:08:52,391 homeland . Thank you . And General 3468 02:08:52,391 --> 02:08:54,710 Richardson Brazil's a rising power . 3469 02:08:54,720 --> 02:08:56,740 How do you characterize our two 3470 02:08:56,740 --> 02:08:58,840 countries relationships ? How's it 3471 02:08:58,840 --> 02:09:01,007 trending and what can we do to involve 3472 02:09:01,007 --> 02:09:03,300 Brazil more in the world's leadership 3473 02:09:03,310 --> 02:09:05,532 of standing up to authoritarian regimes 3474 02:09:05,532 --> 02:09:07,477 and being part of the free nations 3475 02:09:07,477 --> 02:09:10,460 continue to engage congressman . Um We 3476 02:09:10,460 --> 02:09:12,571 have a foreign liaison officer at the 3477 02:09:12,571 --> 02:09:14,627 United States Southern Command . The 3478 02:09:14,627 --> 02:09:16,627 second one from Brazil , we need to 3479 02:09:16,627 --> 02:09:18,738 keep that relationship and build upon 3480 02:09:18,738 --> 02:09:20,682 that and it's through our exercise 3481 02:09:20,682 --> 02:09:22,682 program . I really think that we're 3482 02:09:22,682 --> 02:09:24,682 able to continue to build that . We 3483 02:09:24,682 --> 02:09:26,738 have a very good mil to Mil . I have 3484 02:09:26,738 --> 02:09:26,570 the Chief of Defense that's visiting 3485 02:09:26,570 --> 02:09:28,737 the south com headquarters this , this 3486 02:09:28,737 --> 02:09:31,014 coming Monday and Tuesday of next week . 3487 02:09:31,014 --> 02:09:33,160 And um and then I will go to Brazil 3488 02:09:33,160 --> 02:09:35,327 next month and visit with the Minister 3489 02:09:35,327 --> 02:09:37,271 of Defense as well as the Chief of 3490 02:09:37,271 --> 02:09:39,438 Defense again . But it's to build that 3491 02:09:39,438 --> 02:09:40,993 trust . We have a brand new 3492 02:09:40,993 --> 02:09:43,104 administration that's in the seat and 3493 02:09:43,104 --> 02:09:45,271 so clean slate and we gotta move out . 3494 02:09:45,271 --> 02:09:47,216 Thank you . Would you benefit from 3495 02:09:47,216 --> 02:09:49,438 having more Navy and Air Force presence 3496 02:09:49,438 --> 02:09:51,980 in the southern part of South America ? 3497 02:09:51,990 --> 02:09:54,370 I would say our presence from , from 3498 02:09:54,370 --> 02:09:56,640 team USA in the region , as I said 3499 02:09:56,640 --> 02:09:58,418 earlier , getting down into the 3500 02:09:58,418 --> 02:10:00,529 Southern cone because it is , it is a 3501 02:10:00,529 --> 02:10:02,584 little bit further and it takes , uh 3502 02:10:02,584 --> 02:10:04,362 you know , we need to visit our 3503 02:10:04,362 --> 02:10:06,362 partners there . We need to be with 3504 02:10:06,362 --> 02:10:08,362 them on the field . We need to meet 3505 02:10:08,362 --> 02:10:07,780 with them in person . We need to do 3506 02:10:07,780 --> 02:10:10,250 exercises in that region and be present 3507 02:10:10,280 --> 02:10:12,280 because there's a lot of uh I think 3508 02:10:12,280 --> 02:10:14,502 that that's why the P R C has been able 3509 02:10:14,502 --> 02:10:17,810 to gain inroads in the Southern Cone of 3510 02:10:17,810 --> 02:10:20,032 Latin America because we're not there , 3511 02:10:20,070 --> 02:10:22,292 we're not there to compete with them on 3512 02:10:22,292 --> 02:10:24,820 the field . Thank you . One last 3513 02:10:24,820 --> 02:10:27,153 question since I got a little more time . 3514 02:10:27,153 --> 02:10:29,264 One of the things that concerns me is 3515 02:10:29,264 --> 02:10:31,431 the nuclear command control and having 3516 02:10:31,431 --> 02:10:31,270 the survivability of it . You know , 3517 02:10:31,270 --> 02:10:34,820 it's more in the stratcom stratcom Rome . 3518 02:10:34,830 --> 02:10:38,040 What's your take ? What's our , what's 3519 02:10:38,040 --> 02:10:40,540 your assessment of our ability to track 3520 02:10:40,550 --> 02:10:42,910 hypersonic weapons and the warning 3521 02:10:42,910 --> 02:10:45,260 times that , that , that we would have 3522 02:10:45,270 --> 02:10:49,120 to respond . I'll give you more in a 3523 02:10:49,120 --> 02:10:50,898 classified setting , but I have 3524 02:10:50,898 --> 02:10:53,009 significant concerns about my ability 3525 02:10:53,009 --> 02:10:55,760 to track hypersonic and cruise missiles 3526 02:10:55,760 --> 02:10:58,610 for that matter and track undersea 3527 02:10:58,610 --> 02:11:00,777 capabilities for submarines that could 3528 02:11:00,777 --> 02:11:02,666 potentially threaten us and cyber 3529 02:11:02,666 --> 02:11:04,888 threats to our homeland . I've , I'm on 3530 02:11:04,888 --> 02:11:07,054 record . I've been saying it for three 3531 02:11:07,054 --> 02:11:08,999 years . So significantly concerned 3532 02:11:08,999 --> 02:11:10,943 about that . With that in mind , I 3533 02:11:10,943 --> 02:11:12,499 think we need to do more on 3534 02:11:12,499 --> 02:11:14,388 strengthening our command control 3535 02:11:14,388 --> 02:11:16,780 survivability . I want to point out why 3536 02:11:16,780 --> 02:11:18,890 this is crucial , okay . This is 3537 02:11:18,890 --> 02:11:21,370 decision space for our national 3538 02:11:21,370 --> 02:11:23,537 security apparatus , for continuity of 3539 02:11:23,537 --> 02:11:25,370 government , for survival of our 3540 02:11:25,370 --> 02:11:27,370 nuclear forces . And when you can't 3541 02:11:27,370 --> 02:11:29,203 provide threat warning or attack 3542 02:11:29,203 --> 02:11:31,259 assessment in a timely manner , then 3543 02:11:31,259 --> 02:11:33,203 strategic stability erodes and the 3544 02:11:33,203 --> 02:11:35,370 potential risk of strategic deterrence 3545 02:11:35,370 --> 02:11:37,481 failure goes up . So I couldn't agree 3546 02:11:37,481 --> 02:11:37,360 more . We need to be very concerned 3547 02:11:37,360 --> 02:11:39,249 about that . The Russians and the 3548 02:11:39,249 --> 02:11:41,471 Chinese must know that we can respond . 3549 02:11:41,471 --> 02:11:43,416 We have to ensure that we have the 3550 02:11:43,416 --> 02:11:45,416 capabilities of place to do it . We 3551 02:11:45,416 --> 02:11:47,471 absolutely can respond . And I would 3552 02:11:47,471 --> 02:11:49,360 remind you that the foundation of 3553 02:11:49,360 --> 02:11:51,138 homeland defense is the nuclear 3554 02:11:51,138 --> 02:11:53,082 deterrent . It's a safe , secure , 3555 02:11:53,082 --> 02:11:52,940 reliable , nuclear deterrent that we 3556 02:11:52,940 --> 02:11:54,996 have today . Thank you , Mr Chairman 3557 02:11:55,150 --> 02:11:57,261 back . Thank the gentleman here and I 3558 02:11:57,261 --> 02:11:59,372 recognize gentleman from Georgia , Mr 3559 02:11:59,372 --> 02:12:01,594 Scott for five minutes . Thank you , Mr 3560 02:12:01,594 --> 02:12:03,761 Chairman . And I'd like to take just a 3561 02:12:03,761 --> 02:12:05,539 minute to read from each of our 3562 02:12:05,539 --> 02:12:07,317 witnesses testimony and General 3563 02:12:07,317 --> 02:12:09,390 Richardson on page two , uh give a 3564 02:12:09,390 --> 02:12:11,668 pretty bold and direct statement today . 3565 02:12:11,668 --> 02:12:13,668 The PRC has both the capability and 3566 02:12:13,668 --> 02:12:15,779 intent to issue international norms , 3567 02:12:15,779 --> 02:12:17,890 advance its brand of authoritarianism 3568 02:12:17,890 --> 02:12:19,946 and amass power and influence at the 3569 02:12:19,946 --> 02:12:22,001 expense of the existing and emerging 3570 02:12:22,001 --> 02:12:24,223 democracies in our hemisphere . This is 3571 02:12:24,223 --> 02:12:26,279 a decisive decade and our actions or 3572 02:12:26,279 --> 02:12:28,390 inactions regarding the PRC will have 3573 02:12:28,390 --> 02:12:30,501 ramifications for decades to come . I 3574 02:12:30,501 --> 02:12:32,557 agree with you 100% and I appreciate 3575 02:12:32,557 --> 02:12:34,723 you being as bold as you are with that 3576 02:12:34,723 --> 02:12:37,130 statement , General Van Herk . In your 3577 02:12:37,130 --> 02:12:39,400 statement on page four 3578 02:12:41,360 --> 02:12:44,530 In May of 2022 , the PRC and Russia 3579 02:12:45,420 --> 02:12:48,040 conducted a combined bomber patrol over 3580 02:12:48,040 --> 02:12:50,096 the sea of Japan coinciding with the 3581 02:12:50,096 --> 02:12:53,190 quad leaders summit in Tokyo . The May 3582 02:12:53,190 --> 02:12:55,412 20 22nd bomber patrol was followed by a 3583 02:12:55,412 --> 02:12:57,634 second bomber patrol in November 2022 . 3584 02:12:57,634 --> 02:12:59,801 The cooperation is not confined to the 3585 02:12:59,801 --> 02:13:02,023 air domain PRC and Russian naval forces 3586 02:13:02,023 --> 02:13:04,134 conducted combined patrol in the fall 3587 02:13:04,134 --> 02:13:07,770 of 2022 Miss 3588 02:13:07,770 --> 02:13:10,040 Dalton . In your testimony , 3589 02:13:15,210 --> 02:13:18,700 in the N D S , the secretary director 3590 02:13:18,700 --> 02:13:20,756 of the department to act urgently to 3591 02:13:20,756 --> 02:13:22,811 sustain and strengthen us determines 3592 02:13:22,811 --> 02:13:24,978 with the People's Republic of China as 3593 02:13:24,978 --> 02:13:27,200 the pacing challenge for the department 3594 02:13:27,200 --> 02:13:30,320 in Russia , a stark example of these 3595 02:13:30,320 --> 02:13:32,780 challenges pushing them forward was 3596 02:13:32,780 --> 02:13:34,836 recently brought to the attention of 3597 02:13:34,836 --> 02:13:37,058 the American people in the world . When 3598 02:13:37,058 --> 02:13:39,300 the PRC irresponsibly entered our 3599 02:13:39,300 --> 02:13:41,522 sovereign airspace with a high altitude 3600 02:13:41,522 --> 02:13:43,633 balloon , we know with certainty they 3601 02:13:43,633 --> 02:13:45,522 intended to surveil sensitive U S 3602 02:13:45,522 --> 02:13:47,578 military and critical infrastructure 3603 02:13:47,578 --> 02:13:51,320 sites . I would have changed one word 3604 02:13:51,320 --> 02:13:54,230 and put intentionally maybe instead of 3605 02:13:54,240 --> 02:13:56,073 irresponsibly . But I think your 3606 02:13:56,073 --> 02:13:58,510 statement is very direct as well . And 3607 02:13:58,510 --> 02:14:00,510 General Van Herk , I appreciate you 3608 02:14:00,510 --> 02:14:02,288 giving specific examples of the 3609 02:14:02,288 --> 02:14:04,590 alliance between China in Russia . 3610 02:14:06,520 --> 02:14:09,880 Mr Alfred , I believe it was earlier . 3611 02:14:10,830 --> 02:14:14,740 Um or Alfred said , how do we 3612 02:14:14,740 --> 02:14:18,640 get America to wake up less 3613 02:14:18,640 --> 02:14:21,960 than 14 days after China flu that 3614 02:14:21,960 --> 02:14:23,960 balloon across the United States of 3615 02:14:23,960 --> 02:14:25,960 America Ford Motor Company , one of 3616 02:14:25,960 --> 02:14:28,127 America's most iconic brands announced 3617 02:14:28,127 --> 02:14:30,610 a multi billion dollar partnership with 3618 02:14:30,610 --> 02:14:33,200 Communist China's C A T L for battery 3619 02:14:33,200 --> 02:14:35,256 technology . Are you aware of this ? 3620 02:14:37,560 --> 02:14:41,140 Are you all aware of this ? I'm not 3621 02:14:41,140 --> 02:14:43,362 aware of that . Congressman . Less than 3622 02:14:43,362 --> 02:14:45,529 Okay . I hope you'll look at that less 3623 02:14:45,529 --> 02:14:48,360 than 15 days . Now , I've thought about 3624 02:14:48,360 --> 02:14:50,780 whether or not this was the right 3625 02:14:50,780 --> 02:14:52,947 action or not because I don't like the 3626 02:14:52,947 --> 02:14:55,002 heavy hand of government , but every 3627 02:14:55,002 --> 02:14:54,680 now and then it needs to be used . And 3628 02:14:54,680 --> 02:14:56,736 I'll tell you something , someone at 3629 02:14:56,736 --> 02:14:58,958 the Pentagon needs to have enough brass 3630 02:14:58,958 --> 02:15:00,902 to pick up the phone and call Ford 3631 02:15:00,902 --> 02:15:03,069 Motor Company and tell them that the D 3632 02:15:03,069 --> 02:15:06,000 O D will not purchase any 3633 02:15:06,000 --> 02:15:08,440 vehicle that , that , that has that 3634 02:15:08,440 --> 02:15:11,040 communist Chinese technology in it . 3635 02:15:12,410 --> 02:15:14,243 Now , I don't have a choice as a 3636 02:15:14,243 --> 02:15:16,410 consumer when I go to Home Depot and I 3637 02:15:16,410 --> 02:15:18,577 want to buy a power tool . Every tools 3638 02:15:18,577 --> 02:15:21,350 made in China , the American citizens 3639 02:15:21,350 --> 02:15:23,517 can either can either walk out of that 3640 02:15:23,517 --> 02:15:25,683 store without a power tool or they can 3641 02:15:25,683 --> 02:15:27,794 buy one made in China . But I'm gonna 3642 02:15:27,794 --> 02:15:29,906 tell you something , the D O D budget 3643 02:15:29,906 --> 02:15:32,072 is big enough that we can correct this 3644 02:15:32,072 --> 02:15:31,860 action . We should have started 3645 02:15:31,860 --> 02:15:34,290 correcting this a long time ago . 3646 02:15:35,360 --> 02:15:37,780 Now , Vietnam , 3647 02:15:39,520 --> 02:15:42,460 Vietnam , we lost 58,000 Americans in 3648 02:15:42,460 --> 02:15:44,571 almost 20 years . If I'm not mistaken 3649 02:15:46,400 --> 02:15:49,700 Over 100,000 overdoses this last year 3650 02:15:50,000 --> 02:15:53,270 in the United States of America . You 3651 02:15:53,270 --> 02:15:56,690 have all testified that China is 3652 02:15:56,700 --> 02:15:59,510 indifferent and not willing to help us 3653 02:15:59,510 --> 02:16:01,177 with this . Is that correct ? 3654 02:16:02,660 --> 02:16:04,716 Congressman ? I did say that they're 3655 02:16:04,716 --> 02:16:06,938 turning a blind eye to the precursors , 3656 02:16:06,938 --> 02:16:09,160 turning a blind eye to the desk that we 3657 02:16:09,160 --> 02:16:11,271 have , I apologize if the rest of you 3658 02:16:11,271 --> 02:16:13,327 didn't say it , but it's pretty much 3659 02:16:13,327 --> 02:16:15,216 the consensus of our intelligence 3660 02:16:15,216 --> 02:16:17,160 community and military communities 3661 02:16:17,160 --> 02:16:19,049 China could help but they won't . 3662 02:16:20,380 --> 02:16:22,602 Corporate America has got to step up to 3663 02:16:22,602 --> 02:16:25,320 the plate and help us stop this . And I 3664 02:16:25,320 --> 02:16:27,760 will tell you it's time for the heavy 3665 02:16:27,760 --> 02:16:30,630 hand of government to , to pick up the 3666 02:16:30,630 --> 02:16:32,741 phone and call Ford Motor Company and 3667 02:16:32,741 --> 02:16:35,250 say you develop those batteries with 3668 02:16:35,250 --> 02:16:37,620 China and we're not buying any of your 3669 02:16:37,620 --> 02:16:39,676 battery powered vehicles through the 3670 02:16:39,676 --> 02:16:41,787 Department of Defense . With that , I 3671 02:16:41,787 --> 02:16:44,490 yield the remainder of my time . We can 3672 02:16:44,490 --> 02:16:47,130 do that . Statutorily think I'll help 3673 02:16:47,130 --> 02:16:49,352 you with that . I'll help you with it . 3674 02:16:49,620 --> 02:16:53,180 Now , chairman I plan to now we've got 3675 02:16:53,180 --> 02:16:55,291 the gentleman from Indiana , Mr Banks 3676 02:16:55,291 --> 02:16:57,180 for five minutes . Thank you , Mr 3677 02:16:57,180 --> 02:16:59,236 Chairman General Van Herk . How many 3678 02:16:59,236 --> 02:17:01,630 times have you briefed specifically 3679 02:17:01,630 --> 02:17:03,630 briefed the president of the United 3680 02:17:03,630 --> 02:17:05,519 States about the situation at the 3681 02:17:05,519 --> 02:17:08,050 border congressman ? I have not 3682 02:17:08,050 --> 02:17:10,272 personally briefed the president of the 3683 02:17:10,272 --> 02:17:12,328 United States . Has the president of 3684 02:17:12,328 --> 02:17:14,494 the United States requested a briefing 3685 02:17:14,494 --> 02:17:16,494 from you about the situation at the 3686 02:17:16,494 --> 02:17:18,550 border . Not that I'm aware of . Are 3687 02:17:18,550 --> 02:17:20,717 you surprised by that ? No , not , not 3688 02:17:20,717 --> 02:17:23,610 necessarily . Um He works closely with 3689 02:17:23,610 --> 02:17:25,554 obviously the secretary and senior 3690 02:17:25,554 --> 02:17:28,180 leaders , but I'm not necessarily 3691 02:17:28,180 --> 02:17:30,291 surprised . It's been said many times 3692 02:17:30,291 --> 02:17:33,800 already . 107,375 Americans 3693 02:17:34,360 --> 02:17:36,260 have died from drug overdoses , 3694 02:17:36,270 --> 02:17:39,040 overdoses specifically related to 3695 02:17:39,040 --> 02:17:41,096 fentaNYL , leading cause of death of 3696 02:17:41,096 --> 02:17:43,262 Americans my age in this country today 3697 02:17:43,262 --> 02:17:45,670 and we know that the vast majority of 3698 02:17:45,670 --> 02:17:48,060 the fentaNYL is coming across the 3699 02:17:48,060 --> 02:17:49,949 southern border . It surprises me 3700 02:17:49,949 --> 02:17:52,171 greatly frankly . It angers me that the 3701 02:17:52,171 --> 02:17:54,060 president of the United States of 3702 02:17:54,060 --> 02:17:56,227 America is so tone deaf and has turned 3703 02:17:56,227 --> 02:17:58,282 a blind eye that he's not asking the 3704 02:17:58,282 --> 02:18:00,282 top general in the United States of 3705 02:18:00,282 --> 02:18:03,380 America task with overseeing drug 3706 02:18:03,390 --> 02:18:05,557 interdiction at our southern border to 3707 02:18:05,557 --> 02:18:07,779 come and brief him on the leading cause 3708 02:18:07,779 --> 02:18:09,834 of the death of Americans of working 3709 02:18:09,834 --> 02:18:11,723 age in this country . What is the 3710 02:18:11,723 --> 02:18:13,834 specific role that you are playing at 3711 02:18:13,834 --> 02:18:15,890 the border to stop drugs from coming 3712 02:18:15,890 --> 02:18:17,946 into this country ? So to be clear , 3713 02:18:17,946 --> 02:18:20,440 I'm in support of homeland security . I 3714 02:18:20,440 --> 02:18:22,384 don't have a direct role . I can't 3715 02:18:22,384 --> 02:18:24,607 enforce the law because posse comitatus 3716 02:18:24,607 --> 02:18:26,884 prevents me from doing that day to day . 3717 02:18:26,884 --> 02:18:29,051 So my direct role is providing support 3718 02:18:29,051 --> 02:18:31,860 such as intel analysis , uh detection 3719 02:18:31,860 --> 02:18:34,027 and monitoring those types of things , 3720 02:18:34,027 --> 02:18:36,138 but I'm not authorized to provide the 3721 02:18:36,138 --> 02:18:36,100 support that you're talking about . 3722 02:18:36,100 --> 02:18:38,322 What is North com doing at the southern 3723 02:18:38,322 --> 02:18:40,267 border . We are doing two things . 3724 02:18:40,267 --> 02:18:42,489 Number one , we provide support through 3725 02:18:42,489 --> 02:18:44,267 the request for assistance from 3726 02:18:44,267 --> 02:18:46,080 homeland security detection and 3727 02:18:46,080 --> 02:18:48,670 monitoring , which we have about 100 3728 02:18:48,670 --> 02:18:50,900 and six locations where we provide 3729 02:18:50,900 --> 02:18:52,900 support . We provide aerial support 3730 02:18:52,900 --> 02:18:54,733 about 12,000 hours for detection 3731 02:18:54,733 --> 02:18:56,511 monitoring and we provide intel 3732 02:18:56,511 --> 02:18:58,570 analysis . JTF North . My joint task 3733 02:18:58,570 --> 02:19:01,100 force North provides direct support to 3734 02:19:01,100 --> 02:19:03,460 enable law enforcement agencies to 3735 02:19:03,460 --> 02:19:05,627 conduct their mission to include intel 3736 02:19:05,627 --> 02:19:07,860 assessments in Mexico . Pointing out 3737 02:19:07,860 --> 02:19:10,160 where the Mexicans can utilize intel 3738 02:19:10,160 --> 02:19:12,140 assessment to collect precursors 3739 02:19:12,170 --> 02:19:14,590 interdict precursors . Uh and also 3740 02:19:14,590 --> 02:19:17,570 provide support to enable our folks , 3741 02:19:17,580 --> 02:19:19,302 folks here in the homeland law 3742 02:19:19,302 --> 02:19:21,413 enforcement agencies to get after the 3743 02:19:21,413 --> 02:19:23,469 problems north to South flow such as 3744 02:19:23,469 --> 02:19:25,120 interdicting money and also 3745 02:19:25,120 --> 02:19:27,231 interdicting weapons . But I can't do 3746 02:19:27,231 --> 02:19:29,176 that directly because that's a law 3747 02:19:29,176 --> 02:19:31,120 enforcement action . But could the 3748 02:19:31,120 --> 02:19:33,176 president asked you to do that ? The 3749 02:19:33,176 --> 02:19:32,880 president could ask under special 3750 02:19:32,880 --> 02:19:35,830 authorities for the military to do more ? 3751 02:19:35,830 --> 02:19:38,052 Yes . Yeah . I mean , this is , this is 3752 02:19:38,052 --> 02:19:40,170 pure insanity and a testament to the 3753 02:19:40,170 --> 02:19:42,226 lack of leadership of this president 3754 02:19:42,226 --> 02:19:44,448 that he's not asking you to do whatever 3755 02:19:44,448 --> 02:19:46,614 you can to stop fentaNYL from flooding 3756 02:19:46,614 --> 02:19:48,670 into this country . In fact , let me 3757 02:19:48,670 --> 02:19:50,800 point out that in 2020 20 President 3758 02:19:50,800 --> 02:19:53,910 Trump visited South com for a briefing 3759 02:19:53,910 --> 02:19:56,132 specifically , he went to South Com for 3760 02:19:56,132 --> 02:19:58,350 a briefing to talk about the campaign 3761 02:19:58,350 --> 02:20:00,461 against drug trafficking . That's the 3762 02:20:00,461 --> 02:20:02,628 type of leadership that he provided in 3763 02:20:02,628 --> 02:20:04,628 this country . The opposite of what 3764 02:20:04,628 --> 02:20:06,572 we're seeing coming from President 3765 02:20:06,572 --> 02:20:09,220 Biden . Um It's just , it's , it's Mr 3766 02:20:09,220 --> 02:20:11,490 Chairman just it's unbelievable to me 3767 02:20:11,490 --> 02:20:13,434 that this president has completely 3768 02:20:13,434 --> 02:20:15,490 ignored the situation that I'm , I'm 3769 02:20:15,490 --> 02:20:17,546 baffled by it , that the general has 3770 02:20:17,546 --> 02:20:19,546 not briefed the President of United 3771 02:20:19,546 --> 02:20:21,657 States directly and showing that kind 3772 02:20:21,657 --> 02:20:23,768 of leadership knowing that he could , 3773 02:20:23,768 --> 02:20:25,934 as you just said , he could ask you to 3774 02:20:25,934 --> 02:20:28,157 do more at the border . He's not asking 3775 02:20:28,157 --> 02:20:30,323 you to do it . There's not a family in 3776 02:20:30,323 --> 02:20:29,770 my district in northeast Indiana 3777 02:20:29,770 --> 02:20:31,714 anymore that I talked to who isn't 3778 02:20:31,714 --> 02:20:33,881 directly affected by the drug epidemic 3779 02:20:33,881 --> 02:20:36,048 in this country and that the president 3780 02:20:36,048 --> 02:20:38,103 of the United States won't go to his 3781 02:20:38,103 --> 02:20:40,326 top general in charge of protecting our 3782 02:20:40,326 --> 02:20:42,492 southern border and stopping direction 3783 02:20:42,492 --> 02:20:42,400 coming in here when you could . It's 3784 02:20:42,400 --> 02:20:45,490 just , it's , it's , uh , just 3785 02:20:45,490 --> 02:20:48,510 absolutely , um , it's shameful and 3786 02:20:48,510 --> 02:20:50,780 uh I'm gonna continue to do whatever I 3787 02:20:50,780 --> 02:20:52,502 can to make sure that we get a 3788 02:20:52,502 --> 02:20:54,920 president uh in the White House who was 3789 02:20:54,920 --> 02:20:57,253 paying attention to the southern border . 3790 02:20:57,253 --> 02:20:59,587 So with that Mr Chairman , I yield back , 3791 02:21:00,820 --> 02:21:03,153 Uh the gentleman from Florida , in fact , 3792 02:21:03,153 --> 02:21:04,987 is recognized for five minutes . 3793 02:21:05,320 --> 02:21:07,542 General Van Herk . Ever heard of Rice's 3794 02:21:07,542 --> 02:21:10,600 Whale Congressman ? I have not , I 3795 02:21:10,600 --> 02:21:12,990 don't blame you . There are only 51 of 3796 02:21:12,990 --> 02:21:16,230 them and until 2021 , even the rice's 3797 02:21:16,230 --> 02:21:18,397 whale didn't know that it was a rice's 3798 02:21:18,397 --> 02:21:20,563 whale . People thought it was a bird's 3799 02:21:20,563 --> 02:21:23,010 whale . But now because in 2021 , some 3800 02:21:23,010 --> 02:21:26,740 scientist believes they found 51 rice's 3801 02:21:26,740 --> 02:21:29,310 whales off the coast of Florida , right 3802 02:21:29,310 --> 02:21:31,477 off the continental shelf . There's no 3803 02:21:31,477 --> 02:21:33,970 live fire testing going on right now in 3804 02:21:33,970 --> 02:21:36,830 the Gulf test range because uh the 3805 02:21:36,840 --> 02:21:39,520 renewal process that is required has 3806 02:21:39,520 --> 02:21:42,350 been cleared by the Department of 3807 02:21:42,350 --> 02:21:44,910 Commerce . Uh as you well know , the 3808 02:21:44,910 --> 02:21:47,132 Gulf test range is the only place where 3809 02:21:47,132 --> 02:21:49,243 we do certain types of exquisite live 3810 02:21:49,243 --> 02:21:52,200 fire testing . Um , doesn't it seem odd 3811 02:21:52,200 --> 02:21:54,311 that our country would suspend all of 3812 02:21:54,311 --> 02:21:56,850 that for 51 whales that are a 3813 02:21:56,850 --> 02:21:58,870 subspecies of a different whale ? 3814 02:22:00,960 --> 02:22:03,071 Certainly a policy decision . I'm not 3815 02:22:03,071 --> 02:22:05,127 aware of the specifics behind that , 3816 02:22:05,127 --> 02:22:08,140 but certainly I think the stopping of 3817 02:22:08,150 --> 02:22:10,910 military testing capabilities to test 3818 02:22:10,910 --> 02:22:13,132 our weapons could have an impact on our 3819 02:22:13,132 --> 02:22:15,299 readiness . Yeah , cascading effect on 3820 02:22:15,299 --> 02:22:17,354 our readiness as a matter of fact is 3821 02:22:17,354 --> 02:22:19,354 what's happening at Eglin Air Force 3822 02:22:19,354 --> 02:22:19,140 Base . Now is that the live fire 3823 02:22:19,140 --> 02:22:21,170 testing is having to occur over the 3824 02:22:21,180 --> 02:22:23,090 land range which is impacting the 3825 02:22:23,090 --> 02:22:25,146 mission of Sixth Ranger Battalion of 3826 02:22:25,146 --> 02:22:27,312 seven Special Forces group of the Navy 3827 02:22:27,312 --> 02:22:29,580 E O D school . It will potentially lead 3828 02:22:29,580 --> 02:22:32,580 to evacuations of Several highways that 3829 02:22:32,580 --> 02:22:34,940 my constituents used by the thousands 3830 02:22:34,940 --> 02:22:37,150 every single day . And so what I'm 3831 02:22:37,150 --> 02:22:39,261 hoping to do is bring a little sanity 3832 02:22:39,261 --> 02:22:41,240 to this process because a serious 3833 02:22:41,240 --> 02:22:43,410 nation would not impair live fire 3834 02:22:43,410 --> 02:22:45,521 testing and other critical testing of 3835 02:22:45,521 --> 02:22:47,577 hypersonic component parts over this 3836 02:22:47,577 --> 02:22:49,743 range that this committee has invested 3837 02:22:49,743 --> 02:22:53,580 at $170 million 51 whales that we 3838 02:22:53,580 --> 02:22:57,180 didn't know existed before 2021 Because 3839 02:22:57,180 --> 02:23:00,070 we share a vision to ensure that we 3840 02:23:00,080 --> 02:23:02,302 have that high level readiness and that 3841 02:23:02,302 --> 02:23:04,820 we have the areas necessary to plan for 3842 02:23:04,820 --> 02:23:07,030 a China scenario . Will , will your 3843 02:23:07,030 --> 02:23:09,500 staff work with me to try to see how we 3844 02:23:09,500 --> 02:23:12,140 can supercharge the voice of the 3845 02:23:12,140 --> 02:23:13,980 Department of Defense in this 3846 02:23:13,990 --> 02:23:16,550 interagency process where some people 3847 02:23:16,550 --> 02:23:18,772 appear to be stopping critical military 3848 02:23:18,772 --> 02:23:21,840 mission . Over 51 Wales Congressman , 3849 02:23:21,840 --> 02:23:23,951 that's not what my staff would do . I 3850 02:23:23,951 --> 02:23:25,800 would say the Air Force and the 3851 02:23:25,800 --> 02:23:27,967 department should work with you on the 3852 02:23:27,967 --> 02:23:30,189 way forward on that . I'm a consumer of 3853 02:23:30,189 --> 02:23:32,356 that radius . I do have concerns about 3854 02:23:32,356 --> 02:23:34,522 ensuring our forces already , but that 3855 02:23:34,522 --> 02:23:36,522 would not be my responsibility as a 3856 02:23:36,522 --> 02:23:38,244 combatant commander . Will the 3857 02:23:38,244 --> 02:23:40,022 department work with me on that 3858 02:23:40,022 --> 02:23:41,578 congressman ? Thank you for 3859 02:23:41,578 --> 02:23:43,689 highlighting this issue . We're happy 3860 02:23:43,689 --> 02:23:45,967 to take that question back . Thank you . 3861 02:23:45,967 --> 02:23:45,560 I really appreciate cause I don't , I 3862 02:23:45,560 --> 02:23:47,560 don't think a serious country would 3863 02:23:47,560 --> 02:23:49,504 behave this way . And by the way , 3864 02:23:49,504 --> 02:23:51,560 we're not the only ones operating in 3865 02:23:51,560 --> 02:23:53,910 the Gulf of Mexico . China , China was 3866 02:23:53,910 --> 02:23:57,660 able to purchase from shell oil , an 3867 02:23:57,670 --> 02:24:00,330 oil rig where they have dual use 3868 02:24:00,330 --> 02:24:02,497 capabilities . A matter of fact , it's 3869 02:24:02,497 --> 02:24:04,608 called the Ram Powell unit platform . 3870 02:24:04,608 --> 02:24:06,719 Are you familiar with that platform ? 3871 02:24:06,719 --> 02:24:08,774 General Van Herk ? I'm aware of what 3872 02:24:08,774 --> 02:24:10,774 you're saying with regards to China 3873 02:24:10,774 --> 02:24:12,886 purchasing uh Oelrich , I'm not aware 3874 02:24:12,886 --> 02:24:15,108 of that specific platform . Yeah , so I 3875 02:24:15,108 --> 02:24:17,163 mean , here's what happened . It was 3876 02:24:17,163 --> 02:24:19,386 astonishing to me that this could occur 3877 02:24:19,386 --> 02:24:21,552 in 2016 . Shell oil wanted to sell one 3878 02:24:21,552 --> 02:24:23,774 of their platforms out in the middle of 3879 02:24:23,774 --> 02:24:25,997 the Gulf of Mexico where we do all this 3880 02:24:25,997 --> 02:24:28,219 high end testing . And the 96 test wing 3881 02:24:28,219 --> 02:24:30,386 at my military installation objected . 3882 02:24:30,386 --> 02:24:33,670 They said please do not do not create a 3883 02:24:33,680 --> 02:24:37,080 secret Chinese intelligence 3884 02:24:37,080 --> 02:24:39,870 gathering platform masquerading as an 3885 02:24:39,880 --> 02:24:41,936 oil rig in the middle of the Gulf of 3886 02:24:41,936 --> 02:24:44,310 Mexico . And lo and behold in 2016 , 3887 02:24:44,320 --> 02:24:46,153 the Obama Administration , state 3888 02:24:46,153 --> 02:24:48,264 Department approved it anyway through 3889 02:24:48,264 --> 02:24:50,487 the city this process . And so like , I 3890 02:24:50,487 --> 02:24:52,709 just wonder how that happens . I wonder 3891 02:24:52,709 --> 02:24:54,931 how like when , when the 96 test wing , 3892 02:24:54,931 --> 02:24:57,153 when the Air Force is saying bad idea , 3893 02:24:57,153 --> 02:24:56,830 don't sell this oil rig in the middle 3894 02:24:56,830 --> 02:24:58,941 of the Gulf of Mexico to China . Then 3895 02:24:58,941 --> 02:25:01,052 the Obama administration Green lights 3896 02:25:01,052 --> 02:25:03,210 it . What advice can you give ? What 3897 02:25:03,210 --> 02:25:05,266 advice can you give me , Miss Dalton 3898 02:25:05,266 --> 02:25:06,988 about how to ensure that these 3899 02:25:06,988 --> 02:25:09,043 interagency workings don't lead to a 3900 02:25:09,043 --> 02:25:11,560 circumstance where Americans are 3901 02:25:11,560 --> 02:25:13,730 paralyzed in testing and operations in 3902 02:25:13,730 --> 02:25:15,952 the Gulf because of 51 whales we didn't 3903 02:25:15,952 --> 02:25:18,150 know existed until 2021 and yet the 3904 02:25:18,150 --> 02:25:20,890 Chinese are able to go and compromise a 3905 02:25:20,890 --> 02:25:23,160 platform to gather intelligence on our 3906 02:25:23,160 --> 02:25:27,160 exquisite testing congressman , as as 3907 02:25:27,160 --> 02:25:29,327 mentioned , happy to take the question 3908 02:25:29,327 --> 02:25:31,327 back on , on the whales . Certainly 3909 02:25:31,327 --> 02:25:33,493 when it comes to PRC activities in the 3910 02:25:33,493 --> 02:25:35,327 region . As the three of us have 3911 02:25:35,327 --> 02:25:37,160 testified today , we are closely 3912 02:25:37,160 --> 02:25:39,104 tracking their investments , their 3913 02:25:39,104 --> 02:25:41,327 activities , their , their operations , 3914 02:25:41,327 --> 02:25:43,382 including through third parties . Is 3915 02:25:43,382 --> 02:25:45,604 there anyone who doesn't agree with the 3916 02:25:45,604 --> 02:25:47,771 statement that we're all better off if 3917 02:25:47,771 --> 02:25:49,660 the Chinese Communist Party isn't 3918 02:25:49,660 --> 02:25:52,090 operating dual purpose oil rigs in the 3919 02:25:52,090 --> 02:25:54,910 Gulf of Mexico ? We all agree with that , 3920 02:25:54,910 --> 02:25:57,021 right . No one , no one is like , you 3921 02:25:57,021 --> 02:25:59,077 know what we need to think twice and 3922 02:25:59,077 --> 02:26:01,021 maybe be more accommodating to the 3923 02:26:01,021 --> 02:26:00,940 Chinese . Well , I would say let's not 3924 02:26:00,940 --> 02:26:03,162 be so accommodating the Chinese . Let's 3925 02:26:03,162 --> 02:26:05,384 not be so accommodating to the whales . 3926 02:26:05,384 --> 02:26:07,607 And let's get back to the great mission 3927 02:26:07,607 --> 02:26:06,750 that I know you all believe in . Thank 3928 02:26:06,750 --> 02:26:08,750 you , Mr Chairman . You're back . I 3929 02:26:08,750 --> 02:26:10,972 think the gentleman chair now yields to 3930 02:26:10,972 --> 02:26:12,750 the gentleman from Tennessee Dr 3931 02:26:12,750 --> 02:26:14,806 Desjarlais for any questions you may 3932 02:26:14,806 --> 02:26:17,028 have . Thank you , Chairman General Van 3933 02:26:17,028 --> 02:26:19,139 Herk . How concerned are you by North 3934 02:26:19,139 --> 02:26:21,250 Korea's continued missile development 3935 02:26:21,250 --> 02:26:23,250 and production ? And do you believe 3936 02:26:23,250 --> 02:26:25,194 they presently have the capability 3937 02:26:25,194 --> 02:26:27,306 overwhelm our missile defenses of the 3938 02:26:27,306 --> 02:26:29,639 homeland or are they nearing that point ? 3939 02:26:29,639 --> 02:26:31,710 Yeah , so I'm incredibly concerned 3940 02:26:31,710 --> 02:26:33,870 about their ability to potentially um 3941 02:26:33,880 --> 02:26:37,230 overwhelm my capacity to defend . I'd 3942 02:26:37,230 --> 02:26:39,230 rather talk in a classified session 3943 02:26:39,230 --> 02:26:41,110 about the details of that , but 3944 02:26:41,110 --> 02:26:43,530 absolutely , I'm concerned . Okay . Can 3945 02:26:43,530 --> 02:26:45,697 you describe the benefit that the next 3946 02:26:45,697 --> 02:26:47,919 generation interceptor could provide in 3947 02:26:47,919 --> 02:26:49,697 defending against this threat ? 3948 02:26:49,697 --> 02:26:51,697 Absolutely . So the next generation 3949 02:26:51,697 --> 02:26:53,863 interceptor gives 20 additional ground 3950 02:26:53,863 --> 02:26:55,974 based interceptors which will help me 3951 02:26:55,974 --> 02:26:58,141 with the capacity that you're alluding 3952 02:26:58,141 --> 02:27:00,308 to . Uh so it give us a total of about 3953 02:27:00,308 --> 02:27:02,419 64 or more interceptors , which gives 3954 02:27:02,419 --> 02:27:04,860 me more opportunities and capacity . In 3955 02:27:04,860 --> 02:27:07,530 addition to that uh the next generation 3956 02:27:07,530 --> 02:27:09,530 interceptor , when coupled with the 3957 02:27:09,530 --> 02:27:11,586 long range discriminating radar will 3958 02:27:11,586 --> 02:27:13,308 help me against the additional 3959 02:27:13,308 --> 02:27:15,308 capabilities are developing such as 3960 02:27:15,308 --> 02:27:17,363 decoys uh to be able to discriminate 3961 02:27:17,363 --> 02:27:19,197 that that's really crucial going 3962 02:27:19,197 --> 02:27:21,030 forward . How about placement of 3963 02:27:21,030 --> 02:27:23,030 additional interceptors in Alaska , 3964 02:27:23,030 --> 02:27:25,252 would that be useful uh capacity wise ? 3965 02:27:25,252 --> 02:27:27,419 Absolutely . As long as they came with 3966 02:27:27,419 --> 02:27:29,697 the capabilities were described ? Okay . 3967 02:27:29,697 --> 02:27:31,752 And finally , earlier in this area , 3968 02:27:31,752 --> 02:27:33,974 you briefly mentioned , concerned about 3969 02:27:33,974 --> 02:27:36,030 us defense funding and strategies in 3970 02:27:36,030 --> 02:27:38,197 the Arctic . I wanted to give you some 3971 02:27:38,197 --> 02:27:38,080 more time if you needed to elaborate on 3972 02:27:38,080 --> 02:27:40,247 your concerns in this area , where are 3973 02:27:40,247 --> 02:27:42,247 the gaps in our Arctic strategy and 3974 02:27:42,247 --> 02:27:44,413 capabilities and what do we need to be 3975 02:27:44,413 --> 02:27:46,580 doing better to compete with China and 3976 02:27:46,580 --> 02:27:48,858 Russia in this critical regions ? Yeah , 3977 02:27:48,858 --> 02:27:50,691 I would point to last year , the 3978 02:27:50,691 --> 02:27:52,636 National Defense Authorization Act 3979 02:27:52,636 --> 02:27:54,691 directed me to do Arctic studies . I 3980 02:27:54,691 --> 02:27:56,858 completed that and turned it in uh and 3981 02:27:56,858 --> 02:27:58,969 it was given to Congress in September 3982 02:27:58,969 --> 02:27:58,390 that will give you a classified look at 3983 02:27:58,390 --> 02:28:00,557 the capabilities we're talking about . 3984 02:28:00,557 --> 02:28:02,668 But in general , I need persistence . 3985 02:28:02,668 --> 02:28:04,779 That means fuel north of Dutch Harbor 3986 02:28:04,779 --> 02:28:07,270 Alaska infrastructure to operate uh day 3987 02:28:07,270 --> 02:28:09,270 to day in campaigning , but also in 3988 02:28:09,270 --> 02:28:11,670 crisis and communication capabilities 3989 02:28:11,670 --> 02:28:13,670 as well . So we can communicate not 3990 02:28:13,670 --> 02:28:15,614 only voice but data as well in the 3991 02:28:15,614 --> 02:28:17,559 Arctic . Thank you . You're back . 3992 02:28:20,120 --> 02:28:22,176 Cheering out . Recognize gentlemen , 3993 02:28:22,176 --> 02:28:24,509 Louisiana , Mr Johnson for five minutes . 3994 02:28:24,670 --> 02:28:26,770 Thank you , Mr Chairman General 3995 02:28:26,770 --> 02:28:28,548 Richardson . Thank you for your 3996 02:28:28,548 --> 02:28:30,714 testimony today . Thank all of you for 3997 02:28:30,714 --> 02:28:32,770 your time . I'm very concerned about 3998 02:28:32,770 --> 02:28:34,992 China's influence in our own hemisphere 3999 02:28:34,992 --> 02:28:37,103 in South America and it's been widely 4000 02:28:37,103 --> 02:28:39,326 reported that uh they've been trying to 4001 02:28:39,326 --> 02:28:41,548 buy favor through the Belt and Road and 4002 02:28:41,548 --> 02:28:43,437 other means and you noted in your 4003 02:28:43,437 --> 02:28:45,659 testimony that China's trade with Latin 4004 02:28:45,659 --> 02:28:47,881 America and the Caribbean has increased 4005 02:28:47,881 --> 02:28:50,530 by 24,000% over the last 20 years . So 4006 02:28:50,530 --> 02:28:53,130 I'm curious about your assessment of 4007 02:28:53,130 --> 02:28:55,352 how successful they've been using those 4008 02:28:55,352 --> 02:28:57,520 trade relationships to exert uh 4009 02:28:57,530 --> 02:28:59,641 influence in South America . And what 4010 02:28:59,641 --> 02:29:01,586 are some of the indicators that we 4011 02:29:01,586 --> 02:29:03,808 should be looking at and measuring that 4012 02:29:03,808 --> 02:29:05,974 success ? So I think that is uh when , 4013 02:29:05,974 --> 02:29:09,100 when that enormous amount of trade over 4014 02:29:09,110 --> 02:29:11,980 a short period of time , um then that's 4015 02:29:11,980 --> 02:29:14,740 building uh trust with the partner 4016 02:29:14,740 --> 02:29:16,518 nations . I would say it's also 4017 02:29:16,518 --> 02:29:19,340 building um uh partnering that they are 4018 02:29:19,340 --> 02:29:21,570 doing with our partner nations . And , 4019 02:29:21,580 --> 02:29:24,780 and that further um makes our partners 4020 02:29:24,780 --> 02:29:27,630 think twice about partnering , you know , 4021 02:29:27,630 --> 02:29:29,890 with us or , or continuing to look that 4022 02:29:29,890 --> 02:29:32,530 direction towards them . And so I think 4023 02:29:32,530 --> 02:29:35,250 that plays quite a bit into the 4024 02:29:35,260 --> 02:29:38,350 relationship dynamics . What are some 4025 02:29:38,350 --> 02:29:40,294 of the things that we're currently 4026 02:29:40,294 --> 02:29:42,517 doing to respond to those attempts from 4027 02:29:42,517 --> 02:29:44,517 China to exert influence in our own 4028 02:29:44,517 --> 02:29:46,683 hemisphere ? And , and then moreover , 4029 02:29:46,683 --> 02:29:48,572 in a perfect world , if you could 4030 02:29:48,572 --> 02:29:50,794 design a perfect plan , what more would 4031 02:29:50,794 --> 02:29:52,906 we or should we be doing to push back 4032 02:29:52,906 --> 02:29:55,770 what's really to um to highlight what 4033 02:29:55,780 --> 02:29:58,590 we offer and what we're able to do that 4034 02:29:58,590 --> 02:30:00,646 we're on the field and being able to 4035 02:30:00,646 --> 02:30:02,646 give something counter , you know , 4036 02:30:02,646 --> 02:30:04,868 that there's a counter argument to what 4037 02:30:04,868 --> 02:30:06,923 the Chinese is offering . And that's 4038 02:30:06,923 --> 02:30:10,180 why I just um I wanna talk about loudly 4039 02:30:10,180 --> 02:30:12,236 were on the ground , on the military 4040 02:30:12,236 --> 02:30:14,124 side of the house , but we can do 4041 02:30:14,124 --> 02:30:16,236 better um talk , talking about and uh 4042 02:30:16,236 --> 02:30:18,710 and advertising the other investments 4043 02:30:18,710 --> 02:30:20,877 that we have going on in the region as 4044 02:30:20,877 --> 02:30:22,877 a whole of government approach from 4045 02:30:22,877 --> 02:30:25,043 team USA . And I heard you earlier and 4046 02:30:25,043 --> 02:30:27,099 I wish you'd elaborate or explain it 4047 02:30:27,099 --> 02:30:29,266 one more time what you mean by putting 4048 02:30:29,266 --> 02:30:31,377 the flag on more things . I mean , we 4049 02:30:31,377 --> 02:30:33,543 want to project peace through strength 4050 02:30:33,543 --> 02:30:33,260 and part of that is a big part of that 4051 02:30:33,260 --> 02:30:35,427 is perception , right ? Our strength , 4052 02:30:35,427 --> 02:30:37,482 our resolve is that what you mean by 4053 02:30:37,482 --> 02:30:40,600 that ? It is . Um and the the private 4054 02:30:40,600 --> 02:30:42,600 sector is a very important piece of 4055 02:30:42,600 --> 02:30:45,440 this and they're busy at work investing . 4056 02:30:45,440 --> 02:30:48,200 But um I would say we could , we could , 4057 02:30:48,210 --> 02:30:50,340 we shouldn't be so modest that we 4058 02:30:50,340 --> 02:30:52,740 should advertise what team usa is doing 4059 02:30:52,750 --> 02:30:54,972 through all the instruments of national 4060 02:30:54,972 --> 02:30:57,350 power . We should be advertising what 4061 02:30:57,350 --> 02:30:59,670 team usa is doing because we are much 4062 02:30:59,670 --> 02:31:01,892 more prevalent in the region than we're 4063 02:31:01,892 --> 02:31:03,948 given credit for . I love that , you 4064 02:31:03,948 --> 02:31:06,114 know , Ronald Reagan used to remind us 4065 02:31:06,114 --> 02:31:08,170 we should paint with bold colors and 4066 02:31:08,170 --> 02:31:10,059 not pale pastels because weakness 4067 02:31:10,059 --> 02:31:09,640 invites aggression . And that's what in 4068 02:31:09,640 --> 02:31:11,862 our view , what what is happening right 4069 02:31:11,862 --> 02:31:14,029 now . General Van Herk testified a few 4070 02:31:14,029 --> 02:31:16,251 moments ago to Mr Banks questions about 4071 02:31:16,251 --> 02:31:18,410 uh the very limited support obviously 4072 02:31:18,410 --> 02:31:20,299 that the Department of Defense is 4073 02:31:20,299 --> 02:31:22,521 provided at the southern border . And I 4074 02:31:22,521 --> 02:31:24,577 wanted to ask Secretary Dalton about 4075 02:31:24,577 --> 02:31:26,521 that . Just a little bit more . My 4076 02:31:26,521 --> 02:31:28,632 understanding is that D O D has fewer 4077 02:31:28,632 --> 02:31:30,577 than 2000 National Guard personnel 4078 02:31:30,577 --> 02:31:32,521 entitled 10 status deployed to the 4079 02:31:32,521 --> 02:31:34,743 southern border in support of CBP . And 4080 02:31:34,743 --> 02:31:36,743 the department is providing you a V 4081 02:31:36,743 --> 02:31:38,743 support and , and , and some of the 4082 02:31:38,743 --> 02:31:41,680 intel assessment I think , but um the 4083 02:31:41,680 --> 02:31:43,458 Department of Homeland Security 4084 02:31:43,458 --> 02:31:45,791 requested the current levels of support . 4085 02:31:45,791 --> 02:31:48,013 Is that right ? Congressman ? Thank you 4086 02:31:48,013 --> 02:31:49,791 for the question . Um So we are 4087 02:31:49,791 --> 02:31:51,902 actually providing approximately 2500 4088 02:31:52,160 --> 02:31:54,630 ground and air personnel entitled 10 4089 02:31:54,630 --> 02:31:56,910 status um to support DHS in the 4090 02:31:56,910 --> 02:31:59,210 Southwest Border mission as well as 4091 02:31:59,210 --> 02:32:02,950 12,100 flight hours . Um On 4092 02:32:02,950 --> 02:32:06,310 top of that , um also aerostat uh 4093 02:32:06,320 --> 02:32:09,960 support um and also have um the 4094 02:32:09,960 --> 02:32:11,849 secretary has approved contracted 4095 02:32:11,849 --> 02:32:14,790 reimbursable support for additional air 4096 02:32:14,790 --> 02:32:18,010 ground land building and medical 4097 02:32:18,010 --> 02:32:20,580 support for a surge at the border if 4098 02:32:20,580 --> 02:32:22,524 that's anticipated in the next few 4099 02:32:22,524 --> 02:32:24,747 months . Okay . But all the things that 4100 02:32:24,747 --> 02:32:26,747 have been described is not enough . 4101 02:32:26,747 --> 02:32:26,210 Clearly , we have a catastrophe at the 4102 02:32:26,210 --> 02:32:28,432 border from our perspective and I think 4103 02:32:28,432 --> 02:32:30,654 the evidence speaks for itself . So why 4104 02:32:30,654 --> 02:32:32,710 hasn't D H S requested more ? That's 4105 02:32:32,710 --> 02:32:34,988 the question . Thank you , Congressman . 4106 02:32:34,988 --> 02:32:38,810 Um We are continuing to engage DHS and 4107 02:32:38,810 --> 02:32:40,977 our other interagency partners on what 4108 02:32:40,977 --> 02:32:43,430 is an unprecedented challenge at , at 4109 02:32:43,430 --> 02:32:46,070 the border ? Um As noted , the numbers 4110 02:32:46,070 --> 02:32:48,360 are skyrocketing . Um We are all very 4111 02:32:48,360 --> 02:32:51,310 conscientious of the likely lifting of 4112 02:32:51,310 --> 02:32:54,050 title 42 in , in May and there are 4113 02:32:54,050 --> 02:32:56,780 concerted inter agency efforts to get 4114 02:32:56,780 --> 02:32:58,947 after this , this challenge as General 4115 02:32:58,947 --> 02:33:00,724 Van Herk mentioned , um this is 4116 02:33:00,724 --> 02:33:03,390 principally a law enforcement function . 4117 02:33:03,710 --> 02:33:06,780 Um And so we are strong advocates for 4118 02:33:06,780 --> 02:33:08,780 fully re sourcing the Department of 4119 02:33:08,780 --> 02:33:12,680 Homeland Security Technologies 4120 02:33:12,680 --> 02:33:14,569 that are important , it's the law 4121 02:33:14,569 --> 02:33:16,458 enforcement function . But if law 4122 02:33:16,458 --> 02:33:18,624 enforcement is overwhelmed because the 4123 02:33:18,624 --> 02:33:20,736 policy choices or otherwise D O D has 4124 02:33:20,736 --> 02:33:22,624 to step up , we have to close the 4125 02:33:22,624 --> 02:33:22,140 border . If we don't have a secure 4126 02:33:22,140 --> 02:33:24,362 border , we don't have sovereignty , we 4127 02:33:24,362 --> 02:33:26,418 don't have a nation amount of time . 4128 02:33:26,418 --> 02:33:25,990 Gentlemen , time , Mr Chair now 4129 02:33:25,990 --> 02:33:28,157 recognizes the gentleman from Guam and 4130 02:33:28,157 --> 02:33:30,323 before he starts , I do want everybody 4131 02:33:30,323 --> 02:33:32,490 to know , tell all the M L M L A s for 4132 02:33:32,490 --> 02:33:34,601 members back in their offices . After 4133 02:33:34,601 --> 02:33:36,768 Mr Moylan , we will recess and move to 4134 02:33:36,768 --> 02:33:38,712 the to the classified area for the 4135 02:33:38,712 --> 02:33:40,768 second portion of this hearing . But 4136 02:33:40,768 --> 02:33:40,350 gentlemen , recognized for five minutes . 4137 02:33:40,360 --> 02:33:42,980 Thank you , Mr Chairman . Thank you for 4138 02:33:42,980 --> 02:33:46,480 our witnesses . Uh General Van hurt . 4139 02:33:46,490 --> 02:33:49,670 Yeah , 2022 missile defense review 4140 02:33:49,670 --> 02:33:53,200 states an attack on Guam or any other U 4141 02:33:53,200 --> 02:33:56,880 S territory by any adversary will be 4142 02:33:56,880 --> 02:33:58,910 considered a direct attack on the 4143 02:33:58,910 --> 02:34:02,060 United States and goes on to recognize 4144 02:34:02,060 --> 02:34:05,510 that Guam and unequivocal part of the 4145 02:34:05,510 --> 02:34:08,030 United States . And given that Guam is 4146 02:34:08,030 --> 02:34:10,520 part of the U S homeland in your 4147 02:34:10,520 --> 02:34:13,940 personal military assessment general is 4148 02:34:13,940 --> 02:34:17,030 Guam defended to an acceptable standard , 4149 02:34:17,040 --> 02:34:18,900 especially considering that the 4150 02:34:18,900 --> 02:34:21,300 territory does not fall under the 4151 02:34:21,300 --> 02:34:24,490 umbrella of NORAD General . That 4152 02:34:24,490 --> 02:34:26,546 question is best answered by Admiral 4153 02:34:26,546 --> 02:34:28,657 Aquilino . What I can tell you is the 4154 02:34:28,657 --> 02:34:30,657 department's moving forward with an 4155 02:34:30,657 --> 02:34:32,490 aggressive plan to defend Guam . 4156 02:34:32,490 --> 02:34:34,657 Missile Defense Agency is working that 4157 02:34:34,657 --> 02:34:36,768 right now , I look forward to working 4158 02:34:36,768 --> 02:34:38,879 with the missile defense agency as we 4159 02:34:38,879 --> 02:34:38,820 build capabilities out to defend the 4160 02:34:38,820 --> 02:34:42,700 Conus as well . And thank 4161 02:34:42,700 --> 02:34:45,050 you , General and then just in your , 4162 02:34:45,060 --> 02:34:47,004 in your opinion , could you please 4163 02:34:47,004 --> 02:34:49,227 highlight some resources that you would 4164 02:34:49,227 --> 02:34:51,282 feel important to have defending the 4165 02:34:51,282 --> 02:34:53,338 entire U S homeland , including Guam 4166 02:34:53,338 --> 02:34:55,730 such as the over the horizon radars ? 4167 02:34:56,650 --> 02:34:58,761 Yeah , so the over the horizon radars 4168 02:34:58,761 --> 02:35:01,660 are crucial for Domain Awareness uh and 4169 02:35:01,670 --> 02:35:04,000 applaud Congress and the department for 4170 02:35:04,000 --> 02:35:06,750 funding those in fy 23 . As we go 4171 02:35:06,750 --> 02:35:08,917 forward , we'll need a little bit more 4172 02:35:08,917 --> 02:35:11,083 funding . I look forward to seeing the 4173 02:35:11,083 --> 02:35:13,306 the budget in 24 as it comes out here , 4174 02:35:13,306 --> 02:35:15,306 additional capability though , it's 4175 02:35:15,306 --> 02:35:17,139 really access to forces that are 4176 02:35:17,139 --> 02:35:16,930 organized , trained and equipped to 4177 02:35:16,930 --> 02:35:18,819 operate throughout my A O R which 4178 02:35:18,819 --> 02:35:20,930 includes the Arctic as well , but not 4179 02:35:20,930 --> 02:35:22,986 only in the Arctic , but here in the 4180 02:35:22,986 --> 02:35:24,874 homeland , I'm the only combatant 4181 02:35:24,874 --> 02:35:27,097 commander that has to go ask for forces 4182 02:35:27,097 --> 02:35:29,152 that has an area in a time of crisis 4183 02:35:29,152 --> 02:35:31,263 that I don't have the uh the assigned 4184 02:35:31,263 --> 02:35:31,090 or allocated forces and I don't need 4185 02:35:31,090 --> 02:35:33,312 them assigned or allocated as long as I 4186 02:35:33,312 --> 02:35:35,257 have access to those to defend the 4187 02:35:35,257 --> 02:35:37,257 homeland . I need additional Domain 4188 02:35:37,257 --> 02:35:39,368 Awareness for undersea capabilities , 4189 02:35:39,368 --> 02:35:41,534 the Russians as you're probably likely 4190 02:35:41,534 --> 02:35:43,590 aware , not only have now their most 4191 02:35:43,590 --> 02:35:45,646 capable submarines in the Atlantic , 4192 02:35:45,646 --> 02:35:47,646 they'll have them in the Pacific as 4193 02:35:47,646 --> 02:35:47,140 well and that's going to present 4194 02:35:47,140 --> 02:35:50,640 challenges and the PRC is about 8 to 10 4195 02:35:50,640 --> 02:35:52,751 years behind them . So the problem is 4196 02:35:52,751 --> 02:35:54,696 only going to grow from a Homeland 4197 02:35:54,696 --> 02:35:56,918 Domain awareness perspective . And also 4198 02:35:56,918 --> 02:35:58,862 in the cyber domain , we need more 4199 02:35:58,862 --> 02:35:58,500 capabilities to understand where we're 4200 02:35:58,500 --> 02:36:01,000 vulnerable across , not only D O D and 4201 02:36:01,000 --> 02:36:03,111 our federal entities , but across the 4202 02:36:03,111 --> 02:36:05,333 nation as a whole in the cyber domain . 4203 02:36:07,130 --> 02:36:09,297 Thank you General for all you do . And 4204 02:36:09,297 --> 02:36:11,074 thank you to the witnesses , Mr 4205 02:36:11,074 --> 02:36:13,297 Chairman . Thank you . Are you back ? I 4206 02:36:13,297 --> 02:36:15,400 think the gentleman chair will Be 4207 02:36:15,410 --> 02:36:18,830 reconvening in 20-12 at 4208 02:36:18,840 --> 02:36:21,450 12:45 . This hearing is adjourned .