WEBVTT

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All right , committee come to order .

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Today we'll begin our fiscal year 27

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posture hearings with the US Northern

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and Southern Commands . During the last

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administration , failed open border

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policies allowed illegal immigrants to

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flood into our country and deadly

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narcotics to poison our people .

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Criminal cartels exploited that chaos ,

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profiting from drug and human

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trafficking and threatened our

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communities . At the same time ,

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reckless defund the police efforts

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weakened law enforcement and made

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America America's cities less safe .

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President Trump came into office

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pledging to fix those failures . One

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year later , we're seeing the results .

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We have finally achieved operational

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control of the southern border .

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Illegal crossings have dropped to the

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lowest levels on record . Violent

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criminals are being deported . Fentanyl

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trafficking into the United States is

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down by more than 50% . Overdose deaths

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are declining nationwide , and crime

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rates have plummeted , especially in

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cities where the National Guard is

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supporting local law enforcement . But

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defending the homeland does not stop at

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our borders . It also requires

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confronting threats at their source .

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The president's made it clear that

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narcotics , narcoterrorists and hostile

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foreign powers will find no sanctuary

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or foothold anywhere in our hemisphere .

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Southern Operation Southern Spear is

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dismantling cartel networks before

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their drugs cross our borders .

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Maritime narcotics trafficking has been

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substantially reduced . The historic

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mission that brought Nicolas Maduro to

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justice demonstrated that we will not

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tolerate threats in our backyard . Nor

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will regimes aligned with Beijing ,

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Moscow , or Tehran be allowed to

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undermine US interests just beyond our

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border , but the United States cannot

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confront these threats in the Western

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Hemisphere alone . That's why I commend

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the administration for establishing the

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America's Counter Cartel Coalition .

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This coalition of 17 countries will

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leverage capabilities to combat the

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cartels that profit from drug

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trafficking and illegal immigration . I

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look forward to hearing from General

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Donovan about how we are working with

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these regional partners to build their

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capacity to secure their borders and

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take the fight to the cartels . The

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partnerships also play a critical role

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in countering China's growing influence .

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For decades , Beijing expanded its

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presence across the region by embedding

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itself in ports , telecommunications

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networks , critical minerals processing ,

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and other strategic infrastructure .

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These investments are not benign . They

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are part of a deliberate strategy to

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expand Beijing's influence in our

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hemisphere and undermine US security .

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That is why this administration has

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acted decisively to push back .

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Successes like denying Chinese control

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of the Panama Canal demonstrate the

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results of that leadership . China's

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ambitions extend well beyond Latin

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America , reaching toward our northern

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approaches in the Arctic , where Russia

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is also testing our defenses . In the

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past 2 years we've seen Russian and

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Chinese bombers and warships operating

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jointly near Alaska . This is

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significant . This is a significant

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demonstration of military cooperation

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between our two most capable

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adversaries right off our shores .

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Moreover , the growing missile

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capabilities of our adversaries make

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the president's Golden Dome initiative

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essential to defending the homeland . I

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look forward to hearing from General

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Guillo on his efforts to secure our

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borders and improve our homeland

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defense . I want to thank our witnesses

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for being here today . I look forward

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to your testimony . With that , I yield

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to my friend and ranking member for any

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opening statement he may have . Thank

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you , Mr . Chairman . I thank our

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witnesses for being here today to kick

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off our posture hearing . Season , I

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think the chairman laid out the

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challenges and the connections between

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both SouthCom and NorthCO . So one of

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the things we're most interested in

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hearing about is the overall fight

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against drug traffickers and human

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traffickers is going right now . What

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are the challenges ? What are the plans

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going forward and certainly down in

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SouthCom . Attention has shifted

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obviously major war in the Middle East

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right now , but the boat strikes

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continue . The Venezuelan government is

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still an issue in terms of , you know ,

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their stability , how they're

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contributing to the region . This

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committee could really use an update on

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what's going on with that . What's the

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plan going forward , and specifically

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what , what results are we seeing in

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terms of the drug trafficking issue ?

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Drugs are still a major problem in the

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US . The drug cartels are still a major

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problem . Where does that fight go ?

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And then it connects obviously

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SouthHCOM and NCO with what's going on

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in Mexico , uh , assassination , sorry ,

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the killing of the drug cartel leader ,

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and then the violence that followed

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that . Really want to get an assessment

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from both of you , all three of you

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actually , on where that fight is going ,

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what you think the most crucial steps

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are going forward , and to the

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chairman's point about the coalition

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that's trying to be pulled together . I

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think that's absolutely a crucial part

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of this . um , we can't just come in

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and bend all of those countries to our

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will . We need to work in cooperation .

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I've always felt that the Planned

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Colombia model from over 20 years ago

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was a pretty good model of how to do

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that , how to partner and work with

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nations down there to try to combat a

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problem that affects them as well as us ,

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but we need more . Details on where

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that campaign is going as we move

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forward , uh , in NorthCO there's been

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a massive increase in the use of the

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Department of Defense for Border

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Security . Would like an update on that

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in terms of troops committed to it ,

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what their roles and missions are . I

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had a good conversation with General

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Guillo yesterday , laid out some of

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that . I think that would be really

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important to have a discussion about

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where we see that going and then other

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parts of that one , as the chairman

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alluded to , Golden Dome . Where is

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that headed ? We still don't have much

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in the way of detail on that . Now .

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Golden Dome contains a whole lot of

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very important technologies that we're

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going to work on one way or another ,

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you know , whether it's domestically to

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prepare us for whatever contingencies

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we might have overseas , counter drone ,

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counter missile . Technology is crucial .

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We want to make sure that money is

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being spent intelligently . I still

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worry that this mythical vision that

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somehow we're going to block every

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single thing that could possibly come

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into the US from a missile or a drone

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capability could lead to some very big

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mistakes in terms of what we spend

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money on . We need a defensive

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capability . We also need to be mindful

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of the fact that no matter what it is ,

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it's not going to be perfect , and we

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see that in the Middle East now .

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Israel has an incredibly effective

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counter drone , counter missile system .

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They have a much smaller area to worry

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about and still in a conflict with Iran ,

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some missiles do get through . How does

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that factor into our strategic planning

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as we move forward ? Two , well , I'll

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close with three sort of problems ,

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concerns . One is the use of the

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Department of Defense domestically that

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has calmed down recently as we shifted

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focus , as I said , to Iran . But the

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use of active duty troops in Los

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Angeles , the use of guard units in

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Chicago and Portland and other cities .

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is deeply troubling to me and many

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members of this committee . The role

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that our military plays in domestic law

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enforcement should be pretty close to

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nothing , so we're worried about where

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that's going . So curious to hear what

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the plans are in terms of using those

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domestic forces . And then we have the

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counter drone problem that we saw show

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up down in El Paso . It is just not

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good for the FAA to shut down a major

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domestic airport . They said they were

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going to shut it down for 10 days ,

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which caused all kinds of problems .

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Turns out just to be closer to 10 hours ,

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but the lack of coordination and

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communication between DOD , CBP , and

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FAA , to throw a bunch of initials at

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you , is a major problem . Yes , we

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need to be able to defend against the

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drone threat . We in this . And the NDA

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last year passed a significant piece of

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legislation to try and address that ,

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but that has to be coordinated with

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protecting domestic air travel . You

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know , we can't be taking random shots

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at what we think are drones and wind up

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disrupting domestic air travel . So I

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really want to know what's happening in

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terms of getting that straight and

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making sure that something like El Paso

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does not happen again . And the last

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point , what is all of this costing ?

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This is a major , major concern for me .

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The president plans to submit a $1.5

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trillion defense budget . That is a

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550% increase in the defense budget .

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At a time that we have a $38 trillion

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debt and at a time when just last year

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we cut taxes by some $4 trillion

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reducing revenue , massively increasing

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spending when we already had a debt and

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a deficit doesn't seem like a recipe

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for a very , very strong country going

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forward , so we need to figure that out .

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But specifically . Specifically we'd

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like to know what is it costing to do

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the boat strikes in Latin America .

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What is it costing for the massive

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increases in the use of our military on

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border patrol , and we still have not

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gotten clear numbers on that from the

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department . Uh , we'd like to get an

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update and get those specifics with

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that , I look forward to the testimony

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of our witnesses , and I yield back .

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Thank you , Mr . Chairman . I think the

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ranking member , first , a couple of ,

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uh , housekeeping announcements in

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consultation with the ranking member ,

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uh , we will be conducting our

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questioning today in a reverse

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seniority order . So for the staffs

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back in their office , if , if your

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member sits on the front row of the

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dice , you might want to have them get

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in here . Um , and after completion of

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the public portion of this hearing ,

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we'll immediately reconvene upstairs

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for the classified portion . And now

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I'd like to introduce our witnesses .

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We have first Mr . Joseph Humeyer , uh ,

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who is the performing , performing the

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duties of Assistant Secretary of

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Defense for Homeland Defense in the

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America's Security Affairs . We have ,

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uh , General Greg Geo . is the

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commander of US Northern Command and

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NORAD and General Francis Donovan is

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the commander of US Southern Command .

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Thank you for being here . Mr . Humeyer ,

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we'll start with you . You're

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recognized . Good morning Chairman

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Rogers , Ranking Member Smith , and

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distinguished members of the committee .

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Thank you for the opportunity to

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testify before you today . I have the

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honor and privilege to serve in

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President Trump's Department of War ,

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performing the duties of Assistant

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Secretary of War for Homeland Defense

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and America's Security Affairs . So I

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wanna begin by taking a moment to thank

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our men and women in uniform ,

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particularly those that serve in

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critical missions related to homeland

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and hemispheric defense , especially

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the National Guard service members that

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are helping protect America's cities

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and the military members securing our

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southern border , as well as the

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Marines , sailors and special

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operations units that were part of

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Operation Southern Spear . And

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Operation Absolute Resolve military

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members like Chief Warrant Officer 5

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Eric Slover and others from Joint

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Special Operations Command that through

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their actions in Venezuela exemplify

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the extraordinary bravery of our

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warfighters and the unmatched

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capability of the American military .

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We are in historic times in the United

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States under President Trump and

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Secretary Hea's leadership . We are

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doing something that has never been

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done before . In the past , previous US

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presidents prioritized every region in

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the world except the one in which we

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live . Today we have corrected that

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mistake . We are prioritizing the

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Western Hemisphere by making

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hemispheric defense integral to US

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homeland defense . And in just 14

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months we have achieved historic

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accomplishments that put America first .

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Americans first and the Americas first

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in US national security . In my written

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statement , I outlined several of these

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accomplishments in line with the 2025

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national security strategy and the 2025

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national defense strategy . For my

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opening statement , I'd like to provide

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a quick summary . And it begins with

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our southern border , as President

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Trump and Secretary Heckseth have said ,

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border security is national security .

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Which is why my first official trip

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last year was to Fort Huachuca in

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Arizona to visit Joint Task Force

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Southern Border . They took me to the

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front line of our southwest border in

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Nogales , where I was able to meet with

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soldiers of the 2nd Stryker Brigade

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combat Team . Seeing strikers on our

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southern border for some can seem

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surreal , but for our department , it

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illustrates how we've managed to seal

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the southwest border in record time by

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using deterrence and close partnership

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with federal law enforcement . Today

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the department maintains over 12,000

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service members along our southern

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border and has established six national

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defense areas covering 845 miles or 42%

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of the border across Arizona ,

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California , New Mexico , and Texas .

12:46.030 --> 12:48.141
The military innovation is matched by

12:48.141 --> 12:50.308
investments in cutting edge technology

12:50.308 --> 12:52.197
and infrastructure , including to

12:52.197 --> 12:54.197
counter unmanned aerial threats and

12:54.197 --> 12:56.252
additional miles of border barrier .

12:56.252 --> 12:58.308
The result is turning record illegal

12:58.308 --> 13:00.419
mass migration experienced during the

13:00.419 --> 13:02.474
Biden administration into the lowest

13:02.474 --> 13:02.440
recorded border encounters in history .

13:03.169 --> 13:05.002
This past January marked the 4th

13:05.002 --> 13:07.049
consecutive month decline in border

13:07.049 --> 13:10.289
apprehensions with figures 93% below

13:10.289 --> 13:13.030
the historic average . As we sealed our

13:13.030 --> 13:15.086
southern border and repelled illegal

13:15.086 --> 13:17.197
criminal aliens and others , we began

13:17.197 --> 13:19.252
to focus beyond the border . For the

13:19.252 --> 13:21.419
first time in history , the department

13:21.419 --> 13:23.586
is going on offense against designated

13:23.586 --> 13:25.808
terrorist organizations and other major

13:25.808 --> 13:27.919
cartels in our hemisphere . Operation

13:27.919 --> 13:30.086
Southern Spear is restoring deterrence

13:30.086 --> 13:32.252
against narco-terrorism threats in the

13:32.252 --> 13:34.252
Americas . And since this operation

13:34.252 --> 13:36.419
began , there has seen a 30% reduction

13:36.419 --> 13:38.197
of drug vessel movements in the

13:38.197 --> 13:40.252
Caribbean and a 25% reduction in the

13:40.252 --> 13:42.820
eastern Pacific . Combined border flows

13:42.820 --> 13:45.042
of fentanyl , which is a weapon of mass

13:45.042 --> 13:47.580
destruction , has dropped by 56% and

13:47.580 --> 13:50.270
cocaine flows by 20% . That means there

13:50.270 --> 13:52.510
are less Americans dying from deadly

13:52.510 --> 13:54.454
drugs that have been poisoning our

13:54.454 --> 13:56.732
communities and our children for years .

13:56.732 --> 13:58.732
In fact , overall inside the United

13:58.732 --> 14:00.843
States we've seen a 20% decline in US

14:00.843 --> 14:02.954
drug overdoses in the last year . The

14:02.954 --> 14:04.954
point is very simple . The point is

14:04.954 --> 14:06.899
Operation Southern Spear is saving

14:06.899 --> 14:09.010
American lives , and this is just the

14:09.010 --> 14:11.219
beginning . Early this month , as both

14:11.219 --> 14:13.219
the ranking member and the chairman

14:13.219 --> 14:15.386
have indicated , US Southern Command ,

14:15.386 --> 14:17.219
uh , hosted along with Secretary

14:17.219 --> 14:19.386
Hegseth ministers from 17 countries in

14:19.386 --> 14:21.608
Latin America and Caribbean to form the

14:21.608 --> 14:23.719
America's Countercartel Coalition , a

14:23.719 --> 14:25.441
coalition aimed at rooting out

14:25.441 --> 14:27.219
narco-terrorism threats through

14:27.219 --> 14:28.941
partner-led deterrence-focused

14:28.941 --> 14:31.052
operations . That same week , Ecuador

14:31.052 --> 14:33.052
became the first country to conduct

14:33.052 --> 14:35.052
joint land strikes in Latin America

14:35.052 --> 14:36.830
against cartel infrastructure .

14:36.830 --> 14:38.997
Bringing collective hard power against

14:38.997 --> 14:41.219
cartels and increasing burden sharing ,

14:41.219 --> 14:43.330
having announced as well as Chile has

14:43.330 --> 14:45.275
now become the 18th member of that

14:45.275 --> 14:47.497
coalition since last week . Our plan is

14:47.497 --> 14:47.250
to continue to transition to

14:47.250 --> 14:48.972
partner-led deterrence focused

14:48.972 --> 14:50.861
operation against narco-terrorist

14:50.861 --> 14:53.028
networks that threaten the US homeland

14:53.028 --> 14:55.139
while enhancing our posture to secure

14:55.139 --> 14:57.194
immediate security perimeter and key

14:57.194 --> 14:59.417
terrain from Alaska to Greenland in the

14:59.417 --> 15:01.528
Arctic to the Gulf of America and the

15:01.528 --> 15:03.806
Panama Canal and surrounding countries .

15:03.806 --> 15:06.028
The department is implementing what the

15:06.028 --> 15:07.750
NSS has described as the Trump

15:07.750 --> 15:09.972
corollary to the Monroe Doctrine , both

15:09.972 --> 15:12.139
to defend America's immediate security

15:12.139 --> 15:12.030
perimeter and to deny adversaries

15:12.469 --> 15:14.302
access to key terrain across the

15:14.302 --> 15:16.525
Western Hemisphere . None of this would

15:16.525 --> 15:18.580
be possible without the unparalleled

15:18.580 --> 15:20.691
efforts of US Northern Command and US

15:20.691 --> 15:22.858
Southern Command . Both General Guillo

15:22.858 --> 15:22.770
and General Donovan have shown

15:22.770 --> 15:24.714
extraordinary , uh , leadership in

15:24.714 --> 15:26.548
adapting their commands to these

15:26.548 --> 15:28.492
priority missions . So I'd like to

15:28.492 --> 15:30.270
conclude by thanking them , and

15:30.270 --> 15:32.437
together we stand ready to support our

15:32.437 --> 15:34.548
warfighters , defend our nation , and

15:34.548 --> 15:36.659
secure our neighborhood . Thank you ,

15:36.659 --> 15:38.492
uh , Chairman , Ranking Member ,

15:38.492 --> 15:40.659
members of the committee . Uh , I look

15:40.659 --> 15:40.400
forward to the conversation . Thank you ,

15:40.409 --> 15:42.353
Mr . Humeyer . Uh , General Gill ,

15:42.353 --> 15:44.619
you're recognized . Thank you Chairman

15:44.619 --> 15:46.841
Rogers , Ranking Member Smith , and the

15:46.841 --> 15:49.175
distinguished members of this committee ,

15:49.175 --> 15:51.230
and good morning . Thank you for the

15:51.230 --> 15:53.397
opportunity to appear today along with

15:53.397 --> 15:55.563
my teammates here on my right and left

15:55.563 --> 15:57.508
and to represent the dedicated and

15:57.508 --> 15:59.730
disciplined men and women of the United

15:59.730 --> 16:01.841
States Northern Command and the North

16:01.841 --> 16:01.630
American Aerospace Defense Command .

16:02.840 --> 16:04.784
NORAD and US NORTHCOM are distinct

16:04.784 --> 16:07.007
commands fundamentally committed to the

16:07.007 --> 16:08.840
defense of the homeland . As the

16:08.840 --> 16:10.896
strategic environment has grown more

16:10.896 --> 16:12.784
complex , NORAD and NORTHCOM have

16:12.784 --> 16:15.118
responded by transforming both commands .

16:15.359 --> 16:17.192
Having taken on new missions and

16:17.192 --> 16:18.970
rapidly implementing innovative

16:18.970 --> 16:21.192
approaches to safeguard North America .

16:21.609 --> 16:23.442
That active approach can be seen

16:23.442 --> 16:25.929
through the command's 24/7 campaign to

16:25.929 --> 16:27.985
deter adversaries and defend against

16:27.985 --> 16:30.289
all threats in all domains , from

16:30.289 --> 16:32.511
intercepting long-range bombers off the

16:32.511 --> 16:34.690
coasts of Alaska and Canada , tracking

16:34.690 --> 16:36.634
advanced maritime platforms in the

16:36.634 --> 16:38.468
approaches to North America , or

16:38.468 --> 16:40.301
standing ready to defend against

16:40.301 --> 16:42.468
long-range missile attacks , NORAD and

16:42.468 --> 16:44.523
NORTHCOM remain vigilant , capable ,

16:44.770 --> 16:47.159
and committed . That commitment is

16:47.159 --> 16:49.326
apparent by the operational units that

16:49.326 --> 16:51.492
have been activated over the past year

16:51.492 --> 16:53.603
to secure the US southern border . US

16:53.603 --> 16:55.715
NORTHCOM established Joint Task Force

16:55.715 --> 16:58.369
Southern Border in March of 2025 . Over

16:58.369 --> 17:01.440
the past year , JTFSB has supported

17:01.659 --> 17:03.826
Customs and Border Protection partners

17:03.826 --> 17:05.881
with unique military capabilities in

17:05.881 --> 17:07.881
all domains that have helped reduce

17:07.881 --> 17:09.992
illegal border activities to historic

17:09.992 --> 17:12.899
lows . To more effectively combat the

17:12.899 --> 17:14.955
criminal cartels responsible for the

17:14.955 --> 17:17.121
deaths of over 100,000 Americans every

17:17.121 --> 17:18.948
year , NHCOM established Joint

17:18.948 --> 17:21.269
Interagency Task Force Countercartel ,

17:21.649 --> 17:23.482
a whole of government enterprise

17:23.482 --> 17:25.619
dedicated to fusing intelligence used

17:25.619 --> 17:28.650
to help dismantle cartel networks . And

17:28.650 --> 17:30.706
to accelerate our integrated air and

17:30.706 --> 17:32.594
missile defense capabilities , US

17:32.594 --> 17:34.817
NORTHCOM stood up Joint Task Force Gold

17:34.817 --> 17:37.050
to serve as the operational arm for the

17:37.050 --> 17:39.217
future layered defense system provided

17:39.217 --> 17:41.750
by Golden Dome for America . To address

17:41.750 --> 17:44.079
the challenge to safety and security

17:44.079 --> 17:47.069
posed by unmanned aircraft systems or

17:47.069 --> 17:50.390
UASs , US NRTHCO is designated as the

17:50.390 --> 17:52.557
department's synchronizer for counterm

17:52.557 --> 17:55.030
UAS activities in the continental US

17:55.030 --> 17:58.650
and Alaska . US NCO has developed a

17:58.650 --> 18:01.770
rapidly deployable counter small UAS

18:01.770 --> 18:03.729
flyaway kit to defend critical

18:03.729 --> 18:05.729
installations and employ innovative

18:05.729 --> 18:07.989
technologies to protect US personnel ,

18:08.810 --> 18:10.849
including along the border . And

18:10.849 --> 18:13.071
through exercises like Falcon Peak , we

18:13.071 --> 18:15.182
are also accelerating the development

18:15.182 --> 18:17.182
of new counterm UAS technologies in

18:17.182 --> 18:19.890
partnership with Giata 401 and industry .

18:20.939 --> 18:23.106
Assuring our ability to operate in the

18:23.106 --> 18:25.217
high north is a strategic necessity .

18:25.217 --> 18:27.272
With the inclusion of Greenland into

18:27.272 --> 18:29.439
the USNORTHCO area of responsibility ,

18:29.439 --> 18:31.489
we are executing seamless defensive

18:31.489 --> 18:33.711
operations across North American Arctic

18:33.711 --> 18:35.767
in close cooperation with allies and

18:35.767 --> 18:38.290
partners . Through exercises like

18:38.290 --> 18:40.810
Arctic Edge and NORAD's Operation Noble

18:40.810 --> 18:42.921
Defender , we are enhancing our joint

18:42.921 --> 18:45.180
and allied interoperability , stressing

18:45.180 --> 18:47.770
our forces in harsh conditions , and

18:47.770 --> 18:49.826
ensuring that we are ready to defend

18:49.826 --> 18:52.530
the High North anytime under all

18:52.530 --> 18:55.410
conditions . NORAD and US NORTHCOM

18:55.410 --> 18:57.632
continue to pursue critical investments

18:57.632 --> 18:59.810
in modernized domain awareness systems

18:59.810 --> 19:01.977
and defensive capabilities to meet the

19:01.977 --> 19:04.199
challenges of tomorrow . These missions

19:04.199 --> 19:05.977
are reinforced by our steadfast

19:05.977 --> 19:07.699
partnerships . From our unique

19:07.699 --> 19:09.699
binational relationship with Canada

19:09.699 --> 19:11.866
through NORAD to our close cooperation

19:11.866 --> 19:13.866
with Mexico , the Bahamas , and now

19:13.866 --> 19:15.689
Denmark and Greenland , trusted

19:15.689 --> 19:17.633
relationships are a cornerstone of

19:17.633 --> 19:19.911
regional security and homeland defense .

19:20.280 --> 19:22.780
Domestically , US NORTHCOM's mission to

19:22.780 --> 19:24.613
provide defense support to civil

19:24.613 --> 19:26.336
authorities remains a critical

19:26.336 --> 19:28.502
responsibility , and we stand ready to

19:28.502 --> 19:30.558
support lead federal agencies during

19:30.558 --> 19:32.680
natural disasters and key events

19:32.680 --> 19:35.400
including America 250 celebrations and

19:35.400 --> 19:38.199
World Cup 2026 co-hosted by Canada ,

19:38.500 --> 19:41.410
Mexico , and the United States . The

19:41.410 --> 19:43.521
men and women of US NRTHCOM and NORAD

19:43.521 --> 19:45.688
have embraced these new challenges and

19:45.688 --> 19:47.910
are unwavering in their no fail mission

19:47.910 --> 19:50.132
to stay ahead of all adversaries in all

19:50.132 --> 19:52.243
domains . We appreciate the steadfast

19:52.243 --> 19:54.410
support of this committee , and I look

19:54.410 --> 19:56.632
forward to your questions . We have the

19:56.632 --> 19:58.799
watch . Thank you , General . Uh , Joe

19:58.799 --> 20:02.180
Donovan , you're recognized . Chairman

20:02.180 --> 20:04.180
Rogers , Ranking Member Smith , and

20:04.180 --> 20:06.513
distinguished members of this committee ,

20:06.513 --> 20:08.347
thank you for the opportunity to

20:08.347 --> 20:10.402
discuss the posture of United States

20:10.402 --> 20:12.624
Southern Command . On behalf of the men

20:12.624 --> 20:14.513
and women of SOUTHCOM , Sar Major

20:14.513 --> 20:16.291
Rodriguez and I appreciate your

20:16.291 --> 20:18.513
continued support . I'm joined today by

20:18.513 --> 20:20.513
good friends Mr . Joseph Hueyer and

20:20.513 --> 20:22.569
General Guillo . The three of us are

20:22.569 --> 20:24.736
aligned with the department's focus on

20:24.736 --> 20:26.513
the Western Hemisphere . We are

20:26.513 --> 20:28.624
dedicated to rebuilding US leadership

20:28.624 --> 20:30.736
and presence in this critical part of

20:30.736 --> 20:32.958
the world . Let me begin by saying I've

20:32.958 --> 20:35.180
learned a lot in the last 41 days about

20:35.180 --> 20:37.347
the dynamic region I'm responsible for

20:37.347 --> 20:39.402
and the incredible organization I am

20:39.402 --> 20:41.624
now leading . As this committee knows ,

20:41.624 --> 20:43.513
last year was a pivotal moment in

20:43.513 --> 20:45.347
SOUTHCOM's history . The command

20:45.347 --> 20:47.569
responsible for multiple party missions

20:47.569 --> 20:49.569
and operations , each with enormous

20:49.569 --> 20:52.109
national security implications . The

20:52.109 --> 20:54.449
SOUTHCOM team rose to the challenge

20:54.750 --> 20:56.861
while remaining true to its legacy of

20:56.861 --> 20:59.339
partnering in collaboration . I

20:59.339 --> 21:01.506
specifically want to thank the leaders

21:01.506 --> 21:03.783
of our Joint Task Force Southern Spear ,

21:03.783 --> 21:05.950
SOUTHCOM's war fighting headquarters ,

21:05.950 --> 21:07.950
who are leading our efforts against

21:07.950 --> 21:09.950
drug cartels and terrorist networks

21:09.950 --> 21:11.395
with incredible levels of

21:11.395 --> 21:13.530
professionalism and precision . Now

21:13.530 --> 21:15.697
we're ready to evolve for the future .

21:15.697 --> 21:17.919
The 2026 national defense strategy lays

21:17.919 --> 21:19.697
out the threats we face in this

21:19.697 --> 21:21.819
hemisphere and SASCO's role in

21:21.819 --> 21:23.986
addressing them . In response , I have

21:23.986 --> 21:26.219
developed four imperatives . First ,

21:26.380 --> 21:28.213
SOUTHCOM strengthens hemispheric

21:28.213 --> 21:30.540
command and control by redesigning and

21:30.540 --> 21:32.707
building the SOUTHCOM headquarters for

21:32.707 --> 21:35.020
strategic level operations at range ,

21:35.060 --> 21:37.890
speed , and scale . Second , SOUTHCO

21:37.890 --> 21:41.229
imposes total systemic friction on drug

21:41.229 --> 21:43.670
cartels and terrorist networks . This

21:43.670 --> 21:45.726
requires a hemispheric-wide approach

21:45.726 --> 21:48.349
led by SOUTHCOM and NTHCOM to help our

21:48.349 --> 21:50.405
partners degrade these organizations

21:50.405 --> 21:52.571
and reduce the threat they pose to our

21:52.571 --> 21:55.180
partners and our own nation . Third ,

21:55.369 --> 21:57.380
SOUTHCOM develops and feels cost

21:57.380 --> 21:59.699
effective modernized forces tailored

21:59.699 --> 22:01.755
for the mission in this hemisphere .

22:01.859 --> 22:04.081
These forces fully maximize operational

22:04.081 --> 22:06.630
maneuver , autonomous systems , and

22:06.630 --> 22:08.670
human-machine teaming to greatly

22:08.670 --> 22:10.448
increase lethality , all-domain

22:10.448 --> 22:13.270
awareness , and data sharing for US and

22:13.270 --> 22:15.979
partner forces . And finally , SOUTHCOM

22:15.979 --> 22:18.400
denies adversary footholds and undue

22:18.400 --> 22:20.739
influence in this hemisphere . That

22:20.739 --> 22:22.683
includes their ability to position

22:22.683 --> 22:24.572
forces or other capabilities that

22:24.572 --> 22:26.461
threaten our homeland or regional

22:26.461 --> 22:28.517
partners and challenge our access to

22:28.517 --> 22:30.628
key terrain like the Panama Canal and

22:30.628 --> 22:33.030
its approaches . These imperatives and

22:33.030 --> 22:35.030
the dynamic security environment we

22:35.030 --> 22:36.919
operate in will require the right

22:36.919 --> 22:39.030
structures , authorities , and forces

22:39.030 --> 22:41.089
to keep pace with mission needs .

22:41.699 --> 22:43.810
SOUTHCOM is moving out with speed and

22:43.810 --> 22:45.921
urgency and stands ready to work with

22:45.921 --> 22:48.143
Congress to defend our homeland and our

22:48.143 --> 22:50.366
hemisphere . I thank this committee for

22:50.366 --> 22:52.588
their unyielding support to US Southern

22:52.588 --> 22:52.040
Command and look forward to our

22:52.040 --> 22:54.096
discussions this morning . Thank you

22:54.096 --> 22:56.096
very much . Thank you , General . I

22:56.096 --> 22:58.262
recognize myself first for questions .

22:58.880 --> 23:00.880
Many have heard me complain from up

23:00.880 --> 23:03.209
here that both , uh , AFRICO and

23:03.209 --> 23:04.931
SouthCO have historically been

23:04.931 --> 23:07.400
under-resourced and overlooked . And

23:07.400 --> 23:09.511
with President Trump when it comes to

23:09.511 --> 23:11.622
Southern Command , that has changed .

23:11.849 --> 23:13.905
Uh , he has renewed the department's

23:13.905 --> 23:16.270
strategic focus , uh , of res on your

23:16.270 --> 23:18.520
area of responsibility . Given this

23:18.520 --> 23:21.199
refocus , uh , what is your strategy

23:21.199 --> 23:23.839
for South SouthCO and its way forward

23:23.839 --> 23:25.680
with regard to resourcing and

23:25.680 --> 23:29.670
capabilities ? Chairman , thank you .

23:30.349 --> 23:32.516
As I look in the past 41 days , I look

23:32.516 --> 23:34.738
at the capability of the headquarters I

23:34.738 --> 23:36.793
just mentioned that we have to build

23:36.793 --> 23:38.849
the headquarters to actually operate

23:38.849 --> 23:41.071
24/7 across our region . We have , it's

23:41.071 --> 23:42.905
the foundation . I consider it a

23:42.905 --> 23:45.127
two-layered cake . The foundation , the

23:45.127 --> 23:47.349
base foundation of security cooperation

23:47.349 --> 23:49.571
is pretty solid , but I also found that

23:49.571 --> 23:51.460
we have some authorities and some

23:51.460 --> 23:53.829
really personnel increases we need to

23:53.829 --> 23:55.829
ensure that we can actually execute

23:55.829 --> 23:57.940
that key mission of partnering across

23:57.940 --> 23:59.829
the nation . On top of that , the

23:59.829 --> 24:01.662
second layer of the cake that is

24:01.662 --> 24:03.829
nonexistent right now because Southcom

24:03.829 --> 24:05.996
has never been asked to play the roles

24:05.996 --> 24:05.910
of an operational strategic level

24:05.910 --> 24:08.132
headquarters , building that capability

24:08.132 --> 24:10.310
to better partner with the nations

24:10.310 --> 24:12.530
around the AOR while at the same time

24:12.530 --> 24:15.469
the chairman is to develop a campaign

24:15.469 --> 24:17.939
plan to actually get at these cartels ,

24:17.989 --> 24:21.430
these DTOs , in a systemic way , apply

24:21.430 --> 24:23.597
systemic friction across the network .

24:23.597 --> 24:25.263
I consider that from point of

24:25.263 --> 24:27.486
production . To point of distribution ,

24:27.619 --> 24:29.619
which would be in the plazas on the

24:29.619 --> 24:31.508
Mexican border or US border , and

24:31.508 --> 24:33.452
that's the approach we have moving

24:33.452 --> 24:35.563
forward . When do you think that plan

24:35.563 --> 24:38.020
will be finalized ? Right now , Mr .

24:38.140 --> 24:40.307
Chairman , we're going to build off of

24:40.307 --> 24:42.473
what is currently in place , Operation

24:42.473 --> 24:44.696
Southern Spear , and evolve that plan .

24:44.696 --> 24:46.696
We're in the planning process now .

24:46.696 --> 24:46.660
I've given the initial commander's

24:46.660 --> 24:49.140
guidance . We expect in the next 30

24:49.140 --> 24:51.251
days we'll have the framework of that

24:51.251 --> 24:53.362
plan in place . Well , the department

24:53.362 --> 24:55.530
has engaged and thwarted the cartels

24:55.530 --> 24:57.697
seeking to traffic deadly drugs in the

24:57.697 --> 25:01.010
US . How have they adapted to that , uh ,

25:01.020 --> 25:03.969
new approach by the United States , if

25:03.969 --> 25:04.969
or have they ?

25:08.109 --> 25:11.339
Chairman , I wouldn't provide exact

25:11.339 --> 25:13.380
percentages right now and this time

25:13.380 --> 25:16.079
I've had , I've watched our forces

25:16.699 --> 25:18.609
engage both from partnership and

25:20.300 --> 25:22.500
security cooperation and capability

25:22.500 --> 25:24.380
building all the way to kinetic

25:24.380 --> 25:26.699
operations . My initial assessment is I

25:26.699 --> 25:28.810
believe the enemy is adapting because

25:28.810 --> 25:30.866
enemies adapt to pressure . And with

25:30.866 --> 25:32.866
our goal of putting friction across

25:32.866 --> 25:34.866
this entire network , we are seeing

25:34.866 --> 25:36.532
some changes , whether that's

25:36.532 --> 25:38.588
additional flows further to the west

25:38.588 --> 25:40.989
into the Pacific or more air traffic or

25:40.989 --> 25:43.430
more in shipping containers as far as

25:43.430 --> 25:45.670
illicit drugs moving north . I can't

25:45.670 --> 25:47.837
give you percentages , but we know the

25:47.837 --> 25:50.003
enemy is adapting to our actions . Are

25:50.003 --> 25:52.310
you adapting to those new approaches ,

25:52.869 --> 25:54.980
Mr . Humeyer , I'm very encouraged by

25:54.980 --> 25:56.813
the formation of this American's

25:56.813 --> 25:59.459
counter cartel coalition . Uh , but

25:59.459 --> 26:01.515
what specifically are we looking for

26:01.515 --> 26:03.570
from those partner countries ? Is it

26:03.570 --> 26:07.000
intelligent sharing , um , Partner

26:07.000 --> 26:09.000
led operation . What , what are you

26:09.000 --> 26:11.000
looking for from those partners and

26:11.000 --> 26:13.000
what are they looking for from us ?

26:13.000 --> 26:15.056
Yeah , Chairman , I , uh , I believe

26:15.056 --> 26:14.420
it's a little bit of all of the above .

26:14.760 --> 26:16.760
Uh , fundamentally I've been , I've

26:16.760 --> 26:18.871
been able to visit about 16 countries

26:18.871 --> 26:18.349
in the last year in the Western

26:18.349 --> 26:20.405
Hemisphere , the majority of that in

26:20.405 --> 26:22.516
Latin America and the Caribbean , and

26:22.516 --> 26:24.682
the number one response I get from all

26:24.682 --> 26:24.359
our partners is how long , why did it

26:24.359 --> 26:26.470
take you so long ? So they're looking

26:26.470 --> 26:28.581
primarily at capacity building , uh ,

26:28.581 --> 26:30.692
they have capacity building on border

26:30.692 --> 26:32.803
security , on domain awareness , on ,

26:32.803 --> 26:34.859
uh , ISR , intelligence surveillance

26:34.859 --> 26:36.915
reconnaissance . So there's a lot of

26:36.915 --> 26:36.760
areas that we can help our partners ,

26:36.920 --> 26:38.976
but fundamentally what we're looking

26:38.976 --> 26:41.198
for them is a serious commitment to use

26:41.198 --> 26:43.142
not just interdiction but also use

26:43.142 --> 26:45.142
deterrent . To go after the cartels

26:45.142 --> 26:47.476
that are in their sovereign territories ,

26:47.476 --> 26:46.755
uh , this is going a little bit to what

26:46.755 --> 26:48.922
General Donovan is saying , you know ,

26:48.922 --> 26:51.144
on the successes of OSS , a lot of them

26:51.144 --> 26:53.255
have been inspired by the bold action

26:53.255 --> 26:53.145
by , by this administration to go after

26:53.145 --> 26:55.312
the cartel , combining deterrence with

26:55.312 --> 26:57.312
interdiction . We still do historic

26:57.312 --> 26:58.978
records of interdiction , but

26:58.978 --> 27:01.201
deterrence sends a stronger signal . So

27:01.201 --> 27:03.201
if you look at the , the , the drug

27:03.201 --> 27:02.364
flows that are going from south to

27:02.364 --> 27:04.586
north , it's like a four lane highway .

27:04.586 --> 27:07.030
So always has focused on looking at the

27:07.030 --> 27:09.141
eastern lane of the eastern Caribbean

27:09.141 --> 27:11.197
and the western lane and the eastern

27:11.197 --> 27:13.419
Pacific . We're looking at our partners

27:13.419 --> 27:13.000
to do more on the Central Caribbean and

27:13.000 --> 27:15.000
the Western Caribbean as well as on

27:15.000 --> 27:16.778
land . Uh , so when it comes to

27:16.778 --> 27:19.056
land-based strikes , Ecuador , I think ,

27:19.056 --> 27:21.000
has set the pace where they , with

27:21.000 --> 27:20.839
their , with their permission , with

27:20.839 --> 27:23.061
the permission of the government , uh ,

27:23.061 --> 27:25.228
we've been able to help , uh , Ecuador

27:25.228 --> 27:27.283
become much more aggressive at going

27:27.283 --> 27:27.280
after the cartel threats , providing

27:27.280 --> 27:29.391
them capabilities that they otherwise

27:29.391 --> 27:31.169
would not have . Do you get the

27:31.169 --> 27:32.947
impression that any of them are

27:32.947 --> 27:35.058
concerned about us intruding on their

27:35.058 --> 27:37.280
sovereignty as a part of this process ?

27:37.280 --> 27:39.391
Members of the coalition specifically

27:39.391 --> 27:39.390
signed a joint security declaration .

27:39.739 --> 27:41.683
Uh , mentioning that they want the

27:41.683 --> 27:43.906
support , uh , and most of them all are

27:43.906 --> 27:46.239
looking for this . They , they have the ,

27:46.239 --> 27:45.750
the , the threat of transnational

27:45.750 --> 27:47.694
organized crime is a threat that's

27:47.694 --> 27:49.861
permeated all countries in the Western

27:49.861 --> 27:52.028
Hemisphere , uh , for decades . So all

27:52.028 --> 27:54.139
of them have been looking to go after

27:54.139 --> 27:53.430
this . Some of them have limited

27:53.430 --> 27:55.597
capabilities . Some of them don't even

27:55.597 --> 27:57.652
really have a military , and they're

27:57.652 --> 27:59.486
looking to use the United States

27:59.486 --> 27:59.339
military to augment them . And that

27:59.339 --> 28:01.395
also includes non-kinetic effects on

28:01.395 --> 28:03.617
cyber , uh , information operations and

28:03.617 --> 28:05.839
others . OK , my time's expired . Chair

28:05.839 --> 28:07.895
recognizes the ranking member , uh ,

28:07.895 --> 28:10.117
for General Donovan , Mr . Humeyer . So

28:10.117 --> 28:12.339
how would you measure successes at this

28:12.339 --> 28:14.283
point ? Do you have any measurable

28:14.283 --> 28:17.619
facts that show fewer drugs , less

28:17.619 --> 28:19.675
drugs , however you would put that ,

28:19.675 --> 28:21.563
are getting into the US ? Is this

28:21.563 --> 28:23.730
something that we're measuring in some

28:23.730 --> 28:26.290
way ? I'm happy to take that ranking

28:26.290 --> 28:28.439
member . So , uh , as I mentioned on

28:28.439 --> 28:30.495
those four lanes of the drug flows ,

28:30.719 --> 28:32.886
the , the way that we're looking at at

28:32.886 --> 28:35.108
policy within the Pentagon is movements

28:35.108 --> 28:36.997
of vessels and then degrading the

28:36.997 --> 28:39.163
capability of the organizations . It's

28:39.163 --> 28:41.330
not so much focused on the commodity .

28:41.330 --> 28:43.163
Whether it's drugs , it could be

28:43.163 --> 28:45.386
weapons , sure , I get that , but , but

28:45.386 --> 28:47.386
ultimately , and , and I understand

28:47.386 --> 28:49.608
that you're trying to do the plot , but

28:49.608 --> 28:51.830
have you measured , I mean the ultimate

28:51.830 --> 28:51.349
impact , I mean you can guess at how

28:51.349 --> 28:53.571
well they're doing in those 4 in that 4

28:53.571 --> 28:55.793
lane highway . I guess you can look and

28:55.793 --> 28:58.071
see how many , you know , cars , boats ,

28:58.071 --> 29:00.293
whatever are on it , but ultimately the

29:00.293 --> 28:59.949
measurement of how many drugs are

28:59.949 --> 29:01.949
getting into the US , do we , do we

29:01.949 --> 29:03.838
have any measurement on , on that

29:03.838 --> 29:05.838
particular piece of it ? What we've

29:05.838 --> 29:07.949
measured , uh , ranking member is the

29:07.949 --> 29:09.782
decrease in the movements of the

29:09.782 --> 29:11.560
vessels . So there's been a 20%

29:11.560 --> 29:13.616
decrease in the Eastern Caribbean on

29:13.616 --> 29:13.290
the movement of those vessels , but

29:13.290 --> 29:15.530
that's a no in terms of the drugs

29:15.530 --> 29:17.752
actually getting into the US . I mean ,

29:17.752 --> 29:19.863
because , and then look , I , I don't

29:19.863 --> 29:22.086
disagree necessarily with the effort to

29:22.086 --> 29:24.141
stop this . I , I think figuring out

29:24.141 --> 29:26.363
whether or not this is working , bottom

29:26.363 --> 29:28.197
line is , are , you know , drugs

29:28.197 --> 29:28.089
getting into the US or aren't they ?

29:28.589 --> 29:30.811
Well , we went 45 days , ranking member

29:30.811 --> 29:33.033
without having a , a , a , a , a vessel

29:33.033 --> 29:35.200
move through the Eastern Caribbean . I

29:35.200 --> 29:35.140
think when you don't have any movement

29:35.140 --> 29:37.362
there's likely not gonna be any type of

29:37.362 --> 29:39.473
drugs or any other commodity , unless

29:39.473 --> 29:41.696
there's , there's 4 like that you , you

29:41.696 --> 29:41.150
just said there's 4 lanes on that

29:41.150 --> 29:43.339
highway . So , um , not necessarily ,

29:43.479 --> 29:45.701
um , is my point . And the true measure

29:45.701 --> 29:47.646
of this would be , you know , OK ,

29:47.646 --> 29:49.757
which 4 lanes and the true measure is

29:49.757 --> 29:52.035
how many drugs are getting into the US .

29:52.035 --> 29:53.812
So I think we need to , and you

29:53.812 --> 29:53.599
obviously , you know , work with

29:53.599 --> 29:55.920
domestic agencies that have more , more

29:55.920 --> 29:58.198
oversight on that than you do . That's .

29:58.198 --> 30:00.253
The measure of whether or not you're

30:00.253 --> 30:02.309
hitting those that 4 lane highway in

30:02.309 --> 30:01.859
the right way , isn't it ? Correct ,

30:01.939 --> 30:03.995
but it's also the measurement of how

30:03.995 --> 30:05.939
many drug overdoses deaths we have

30:05.939 --> 30:07.828
inside the United States and that

30:07.828 --> 30:06.900
obviously goes beyond to the

30:06.900 --> 30:09.099
interagency , uh , but we have seen

30:09.099 --> 30:11.439
record drops that that that's an answer ,

30:11.699 --> 30:14.209
um , now it's not necessarily

30:14.209 --> 30:16.265
controlling answer because there's a

30:16.265 --> 30:18.098
lot of different things that can

30:18.098 --> 30:20.153
contribute to overdose deaths , um ,

30:20.153 --> 30:19.660
but that's what we're sort of looking

30:19.660 --> 30:21.827
for and if you're really gonna measure

30:21.827 --> 30:23.938
this , that's where you , you need to

30:23.938 --> 30:25.993
focus and that's the next portion of

30:25.993 --> 30:28.216
the question is , so . You're doing the

30:28.216 --> 30:30.438
boat strikes primarily in international

30:30.438 --> 30:32.900
waters , Caribbean , Pacific . Is there

30:32.900 --> 30:34.789
a feeling that you're going to be

30:34.789 --> 30:36.622
moving to a lot more terrestrial

30:36.622 --> 30:39.229
strikes ? Sorry , land strikes ,

30:39.270 --> 30:41.214
however one would put that , yes ,

30:41.214 --> 30:43.381
ranking member . So , uh , the purpose

30:43.381 --> 30:45.750
of the coalition is to look at where

30:45.750 --> 30:47.989
our partners are looking at the primary

30:47.989 --> 30:50.267
threats that are facing narcoterrorism .

30:50.267 --> 30:52.378
In many cases it is on land . Uh , it

30:52.378 --> 30:54.545
is inside within the and many times on

30:54.545 --> 30:56.711
their borders , uh , but those efforts

30:56.711 --> 30:58.767
are doing in partnership with , uh ,

30:58.767 --> 31:00.933
these host nation governments and with

31:00.933 --> 31:00.829
their permission . So in the case of

31:00.829 --> 31:02.829
Ecuador for instance , they gave us

31:02.829 --> 31:04.773
both their consent . So you do not

31:04.773 --> 31:06.885
intend to take any unilateral strikes

31:06.885 --> 31:08.885
on the sovereign territory of other

31:08.885 --> 31:10.996
nations . Ricky Mayor , I reserve the

31:10.996 --> 31:13.107
right in the space of the White House

31:13.107 --> 31:12.969
and the president , uh , to make those

31:12.969 --> 31:15.191
decisions . I know at the Department of

31:15.191 --> 31:17.302
War , is that part of the plan at the

31:17.302 --> 31:19.525
moment ? At , at , at in the Department

31:19.525 --> 31:21.747
of War we are prepared to , to give all

31:21.747 --> 31:21.359
options to the president , but we're

31:21.359 --> 31:23.526
focused on an answer to the question .

31:23.526 --> 31:25.692
So is , is it part of , it's not , I ,

31:25.692 --> 31:27.859
I think you're saying it's not part of

31:27.859 --> 31:29.970
the plan at the moment , but it might

31:29.970 --> 31:29.680
be . Currently we are focused on

31:29.680 --> 31:31.902
partner led deterrence focus operations

31:31.902 --> 31:34.439
through this coalition and how many

31:34.439 --> 31:37.339
strikes are being made on land against ,

31:37.400 --> 31:40.760
um , the cartels and the nar narcotics

31:40.760 --> 31:42.680
groups right now either by in

31:42.680 --> 31:45.640
coordination or by uh one of the 17

31:45.640 --> 31:47.696
partner nations . So I don't have an

31:47.696 --> 31:49.807
exact number . I know Ecuador carried

31:49.807 --> 31:51.973
out a recent strike in the last , uh ,

31:51.973 --> 31:54.140
couple weeks , uh , and I know they're

31:54.140 --> 31:53.540
beginning an operation , uh , that

31:53.540 --> 31:55.707
began or two days ago now , and that's

31:55.707 --> 31:57.651
gonna carry out for 15 days inside

31:57.651 --> 31:59.873
their country , uh , but I don't have a

31:59.873 --> 32:02.040
specific on the number of strikes . Is

32:02.040 --> 32:04.262
there any particular end point that you

32:04.262 --> 32:06.910
see to you ? US kinetic action in this

32:06.910 --> 32:09.021
regard because as you point out we've

32:09.021 --> 32:11.243
been battling cartels for a long time .

32:11.243 --> 32:14.060
This seems like a forever conflict , is

32:14.060 --> 32:16.869
it not ? I mean , what would be the

32:16.869 --> 32:18.813
level of achievement that would be

32:18.813 --> 32:21.469
necessary for you to say , OK , we can

32:21.469 --> 32:23.790
stop kinetic action . So the center of

32:23.790 --> 32:26.189
gravity of the cartel threat or narco

32:26.189 --> 32:28.411
terrorist threat has always been border

32:28.411 --> 32:30.578
security . Uh , we kind of showed that

32:30.578 --> 32:32.633
with sealing our US Southwest border

32:32.633 --> 32:34.911
and the reduction of movements both of ,

32:34.911 --> 32:36.911
uh , drugs but also of all kinds of

32:36.911 --> 32:36.390
illicit activity , and , and that's

32:36.390 --> 32:38.168
good , but the boat strikes are

32:38.168 --> 32:40.334
continuing . No , correct , but what ,

32:40.334 --> 32:39.869
what I'm saying , ranking member , is

32:39.869 --> 32:41.869
that the extension of having border

32:41.869 --> 32:44.091
security throughout the hemisphere is a

32:44.091 --> 32:46.258
big focus and as we be able to advance

32:46.258 --> 32:48.425
on . Understood the border . I got one

32:48.425 --> 32:50.647
more thing I gotta get in here before I

32:50.647 --> 32:52.647
run out of time . So just quickly ,

32:52.647 --> 32:54.869
there is no particular endpoint to this

32:54.869 --> 32:54.869
campaign , and that's something we're

32:54.869 --> 32:56.980
gonna want to talk about . The second

32:56.980 --> 32:59.091
thing , and I'm sorry I took too long

32:59.091 --> 33:01.313
on that to not point out domestically ,

33:01.313 --> 33:03.480
um , General Guillo , figuring out how

33:03.480 --> 33:05.591
to coordinate properly , as I said in

33:05.591 --> 33:07.925
my opening statements with the FAA , we ,

33:07.925 --> 33:10.258
we can't be shutting down airports . So ,

33:10.258 --> 33:12.425
uh , if you just quick comment on , on

33:12.425 --> 33:14.591
what , what you're doing to get better

33:14.591 --> 33:16.758
coordination , I'm out of time , but .

33:16.949 --> 33:18.616
Yes , ranking member , we are

33:18.616 --> 33:20.782
coordinating very closely with the FAA

33:20.782 --> 33:23.030
on the use of all of our counter UAS

33:23.699 --> 33:26.390
systems , and we've established very

33:26.670 --> 33:28.614
solid coordination methods between

33:28.614 --> 33:30.670
those who fly UAVs . We will want to

33:30.670 --> 33:32.892
see the details on that and with that I

33:32.892 --> 33:35.170
yield back . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

33:35.170 --> 33:36.948
Thank the gentleman . Chair now

33:36.948 --> 33:39.059
recognizes a gentleman from Arizona ,

33:39.059 --> 33:41.226
Mr . Amade . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

33:41.226 --> 33:43.337
For the first time in recent memory ,

33:43.337 --> 33:45.559
we have a president who understands our

33:45.559 --> 33:47.726
national security starts with securing

33:47.726 --> 33:49.948
America's borders and defending our own

33:49.948 --> 33:51.948
backyard . It made zero sense to be

33:51.948 --> 33:54.059
waging endless wars on the other side

33:54.059 --> 33:56.281
of the globe while the narco terrorists

33:56.281 --> 33:58.281
and the cartels pushed their poison

33:58.281 --> 34:00.281
freely into our country . In just 1

34:00.281 --> 34:02.503
year we lost more Americans to fentanyl

34:02.503 --> 34:04.726
than during the entire Vietnam , Iraq ,

34:04.726 --> 34:06.948
and Afghanistan wars combined . Nothing

34:06.948 --> 34:09.059
is more important than having control

34:09.059 --> 34:08.820
of our borders and making sure our

34:08.820 --> 34:10.709
neighbors aren't bringing hostile

34:10.709 --> 34:12.931
foreign influence to our doorstep . Now

34:12.931 --> 34:15.030
Arizona is leading the America first

34:15.030 --> 34:17.370
fight on the border . We're home to the

34:17.370 --> 34:19.203
Joint Task Force Southern Border

34:19.203 --> 34:21.148
Headquarters at Fort Wachuca . The

34:21.148 --> 34:23.259
Department of War's Joint Interagency

34:23.259 --> 34:25.481
Task Force is taking on the cartels out

34:25.481 --> 34:27.899
of Tucson , and our 162nd fighter wing

34:27.899 --> 34:30.959
pilots deliver 24/7 air dominance

34:30.959 --> 34:33.290
across the Southwest . And now , on

34:33.290 --> 34:35.401
behalf of Arizona , thank you all for

34:35.401 --> 34:37.512
helping secure our borders and making

34:37.512 --> 34:39.959
sure America is safe again . Now ,

34:40.070 --> 34:43.429
General Guillo , uh , I understand with

34:43.429 --> 34:45.909
how is NORTHCON , NORTHCOM harnessing

34:45.909 --> 34:48.070
Arizona's cutting edge autonomous

34:48.070 --> 34:50.899
sensors and AI driven surveillance at

34:50.899 --> 34:52.677
our southern border to give our

34:52.677 --> 34:54.732
warfighters the , uh , the edge they

34:54.732 --> 34:58.349
need . Congressman , first I'd like

34:58.349 --> 35:00.589
to acknowledge the great contributions

35:00.589 --> 35:02.858
of Arizona , and not because I'm an

35:02.858 --> 35:05.439
Arizonan , but As you mentioned , the

35:05.439 --> 35:07.550
162nd , I've flown with them a couple

35:07.550 --> 35:09.661
of times . Outstanding air defense of

35:09.661 --> 35:12.320
the United States and all the other

35:12.320 --> 35:16.149
units , JAF counter cartel and the

35:16.149 --> 35:17.927
work that they're doing to fuse

35:17.927 --> 35:19.816
intelligence that can counter the

35:19.816 --> 35:21.982
cartels , and then JTF Southern Border

35:21.982 --> 35:24.320
running the full 1,954 miles of the

35:24.320 --> 35:27.000
border in the seal part of the seal and

35:27.000 --> 35:29.429
repel order that we have . As for the

35:29.429 --> 35:32.899
autonomous sensors , I'm a very , very

35:32.899 --> 35:35.899
strong proponent of those . And as the

35:35.899 --> 35:38.649
Customs and Border Protection fields

35:38.649 --> 35:40.816
more of those across the border , what

35:40.816 --> 35:42.705
that does is one , it reduces the

35:42.705 --> 35:45.610
reliance on soldiers and Marines to

35:45.610 --> 35:47.850
backfill that , and two is it allows

35:47.850 --> 35:49.850
for much faster response to illegal

35:49.850 --> 35:53.699
activity at the border . So as CBP

35:53.699 --> 35:55.810
is able to put more and more of those

35:55.810 --> 35:57.921
into place , it'll be integrated into

35:57.921 --> 35:59.977
the systems that we've moved down to

35:59.977 --> 36:03.489
the southern border as part of JTFSB to

36:03.500 --> 36:06.159
complete and hold that seal . Very good .

36:06.399 --> 36:08.566
And thank you again for helping secure

36:08.566 --> 36:10.621
our border , general , because , you

36:10.621 --> 36:12.843
know , my district is actually probably

36:12.843 --> 36:15.010
one of the most important districts in

36:15.010 --> 36:17.343
terms of the cutting edge of AI , right ?

36:17.343 --> 36:19.066
We have TSMC , we have all the

36:19.066 --> 36:21.121
semiconductors , and under the Biden

36:21.121 --> 36:22.899
administration , we had tens of

36:22.899 --> 36:24.955
thousands of Chinese nationals cross

36:24.955 --> 36:27.066
our southern border and now that it's

36:27.066 --> 36:29.399
sealed thanks to the US military's help ,

36:29.399 --> 36:31.455
uh , we're no longer gonna have that

36:31.455 --> 36:33.677
type of influence , uh , be exploited .

36:33.677 --> 36:35.510
And General , you testified that

36:35.510 --> 36:37.510
hundreds of drones are invading the

36:37.510 --> 36:39.732
airspace of our most sensitive military

36:39.732 --> 36:41.788
bases . I know we have many military

36:41.788 --> 36:43.955
bases at our southern border like Fort

36:43.955 --> 36:45.788
Huachuca . Now , what additional

36:45.788 --> 36:47.843
resources or authorities do you need

36:47.843 --> 36:49.899
from us to fully secure the southern

36:49.899 --> 36:52.010
border against drones , tunnels , and

36:52.010 --> 36:53.955
other threats , and especially our

36:53.955 --> 36:56.449
airspace on our bases ? Congressman ,

36:56.969 --> 36:58.858
you'll hear something from me you

36:58.858 --> 37:01.080
probably rarely hear , but last year we

37:01.080 --> 37:03.520
asked for 4 counter UAS authorities ,

37:03.530 --> 37:05.586
and all 4 have been granted over the

37:05.586 --> 37:08.070
past year . So we do not lack any

37:08.070 --> 37:10.237
authorities now . We just need to work

37:10.237 --> 37:12.348
with industry to field the systems at

37:12.348 --> 37:13.848
all the bases , such as at

37:13.848 --> 37:16.530
Davis-Monthan . To ensure that all of

37:16.530 --> 37:19.870
the bases have the systems they need to

37:19.870 --> 37:21.981
counter the drones , and we've worked

37:21.981 --> 37:24.037
very closely with Davis Monthin . In

37:24.037 --> 37:26.148
fact , did a validation exercise over

37:26.148 --> 37:28.314
this past year on how NorthCO can come

37:28.314 --> 37:30.314
in with a flyaway kit on a moment's

37:30.314 --> 37:32.537
notice to help them seal , and this was

37:32.537 --> 37:34.703
in an exercise , but we stand ready to

37:34.703 --> 37:36.926
do that at any time . Very good . Thank

37:36.926 --> 37:38.981
you . Now , Mr . Humeyer , I applaud

37:38.981 --> 37:41.148
your success in capturing Maduro , but

37:41.148 --> 37:43.540
a potential power vacuum might be open

37:43.540 --> 37:45.540
for our enemies . Now , how are you

37:45.540 --> 37:47.651
making sure enemies don't just buy or

37:47.651 --> 37:49.707
bully their way back into the region

37:49.707 --> 37:51.929
and how do you see the threats by China

37:51.929 --> 37:54.151
and Russia towards regional oil and gas

37:54.151 --> 37:56.373
and strategic minerals , ports and tech

37:56.373 --> 37:58.484
going ? Yes , thank you , Congressman

37:58.484 --> 38:00.707
for the question . Uh , Venezuela is an

38:00.707 --> 38:02.873
ongoing effort . It's an effort that's

38:02.873 --> 38:02.239
gonna require persistent engagement ,

38:02.320 --> 38:04.542
and what we're doing is we're trying to

38:04.542 --> 38:06.542
level that engagement across , uh ,

38:06.542 --> 38:08.709
across the interagency , frankly , but

38:08.709 --> 38:10.653
it went to the Department of War ,

38:10.653 --> 38:12.876
we're focused on the first phase of the

38:12.876 --> 38:12.399
three-phase plans that Secretary Rubio

38:12.520 --> 38:14.742
has outlined stabilization , recovery ,

38:14.760 --> 38:16.871
and transition . So the Department of

38:16.871 --> 38:18.982
War has focusing on the stabilization

38:18.982 --> 38:20.704
aspect of that plan , and that

38:20.704 --> 38:22.704
stabilization aspect requires us to

38:22.704 --> 38:24.704
have persistent engagement with the

38:24.704 --> 38:24.199
Venezuelan government and the

38:24.199 --> 38:26.366
Venezuelan armed forces . Uh , we have

38:26.366 --> 38:28.366
that engagement . Uh , both General

38:28.366 --> 38:30.477
Donovan and I have been able to visit

38:30.477 --> 38:32.421
Venezuela in in recent weeks , and

38:32.421 --> 38:32.159
we've had , uh , discussions with the

38:32.159 --> 38:34.381
Venezuelan government . And as of today

38:34.520 --> 38:36.742
they're continuing to comply with a lot

38:36.742 --> 38:38.687
of the security uh guarantees that

38:38.687 --> 38:40.798
we've been asking for , uh , both for

38:40.798 --> 38:42.853
our personnel and our embassy on the

38:42.853 --> 38:44.687
ground as well as uh any kind of

38:44.687 --> 38:44.419
presence of any threats , uh , external

38:44.419 --> 38:46.586
and internal , uh , to the country and

38:46.586 --> 38:49.020
stability of Venezuela . Thank you .

38:49.439 --> 38:51.606
Gentlemen's time's expired . Chair and

38:51.606 --> 38:54.800
I recognizes Doctor Conaway . Uh ,

38:54.840 --> 38:57.159
thank you , Mr . Chairman . Uh , Mr .

38:57.169 --> 39:00.379
Hume , uh . You address the continued

39:00.379 --> 39:02.979
threat of unmanned aircraft systems in

39:02.979 --> 39:05.500
your testimony . Do you believe that

39:05.500 --> 39:08.459
continued investments in UAS and

39:08.459 --> 39:11.060
counter US are essential to adapt to

39:11.060 --> 39:13.540
the modern battlefield ? I'm very

39:13.540 --> 39:15.651
interested in this question because I

39:15.651 --> 39:17.873
do believe we need to test , evaluate ,

39:17.873 --> 39:20.179
and demonstrate the integration of

39:20.179 --> 39:22.401
improved munition payloads and improved

39:22.459 --> 39:25.100
unmanned aircraft systems . Absolutely ,

39:25.340 --> 39:27.396
Congressman , I , I strongly believe

39:27.396 --> 39:29.396
that counter UES is going to be not

39:29.396 --> 39:31.451
just the next frontier , the current

39:31.451 --> 39:31.419
frontier of the battlefield . We're

39:31.419 --> 39:33.586
seeing that as far afield as in places

39:33.586 --> 39:35.752
like Ukraine and the Middle East , but

39:35.752 --> 39:35.580
obviously we're also seeing that on the

39:35.580 --> 39:37.691
southern border as General Guillo has

39:37.691 --> 39:39.802
attested to , and I can say that in ,

39:39.802 --> 39:41.858
in the Pentagon at the policy office

39:41.858 --> 39:43.747
we've been able to streamline the

39:43.747 --> 39:45.747
coordination process on counter UES

39:45.747 --> 39:45.219
authorities , statutory authorities

39:45.219 --> 39:47.889
from 130I to reduce that time frame for

39:47.889 --> 39:50.060
80% . We have more to go , uh , but we

39:50.060 --> 39:52.227
want to make it fast so that the , the

39:52.227 --> 39:54.227
battlefield commanders have all the

39:54.227 --> 39:53.979
authorities they need to engage the

39:53.979 --> 39:56.219
threat . Uh , thank you and uh sticking

39:56.219 --> 39:58.108
with you , uh , Mr . Humir , um .

39:59.500 --> 40:02.770
Recent events and actions of the

40:02.770 --> 40:04.881
administration are of great concern .

40:04.881 --> 40:06.992
In particular , I'm extremely worried

40:06.992 --> 40:08.992
about the cost of numerous military

40:08.992 --> 40:08.739
operations that the president has

40:08.739 --> 40:11.979
directed across multiple theaters . I'm

40:11.979 --> 40:14.201
concerned , of course , about the human

40:14.201 --> 40:15.979
cost . The most recent military

40:15.979 --> 40:18.201
operation in the Middle East has led to

40:18.201 --> 40:20.312
the tragic loss of 13 service members

40:20.312 --> 40:22.535
in that theater . These operations have

40:22.535 --> 40:24.757
also have a significant cost in dollars

40:24.757 --> 40:26.979
to taxpayers . And in terms of the wear

40:26.979 --> 40:29.035
and tear on our equipment and future

40:29.035 --> 40:31.149
readiness , the administration's

40:31.149 --> 40:33.469
national defense strategy explicitly

40:33.469 --> 40:35.525
states that we need to be clear-eyed

40:35.525 --> 40:37.580
about the threats we face as well as

40:37.580 --> 40:39.580
the resources available to confront

40:39.580 --> 40:41.580
them . But in order to do so , this

40:41.580 --> 40:43.802
committee needs to know the total costs

40:43.802 --> 40:45.858
of these operations . So what is the

40:45.858 --> 40:47.691
total cost of these operations ,

40:47.691 --> 40:49.691
specifically the Operation Southern

40:49.691 --> 40:52.870
Spear and Absolute resolve and dollars

40:52.870 --> 40:54.926
and wear and tear on our equipment ?

40:55.560 --> 40:57.338
Congressman , I'm happy to take

40:57.338 --> 40:59.449
questions regarding costs back to the

40:59.449 --> 40:59.360
Office of the Comptroller to get you

40:59.360 --> 41:01.693
specific answers on the financial costs .

41:01.693 --> 41:03.860
Operation Southern Spirit is ongoing ,

41:03.860 --> 41:06.082
so that the costs are gonna continue to

41:06.082 --> 41:08.193
develop as we , uh , engage in that .

41:08.193 --> 41:10.304
But one of the purposes of the , uh ,

41:10.304 --> 41:12.416
America's Counterctel coalition is to

41:12.416 --> 41:11.840
share that border with our partners

41:11.840 --> 41:13.451
that are collectively have a

41:13.451 --> 41:15.729
responsibility for hemispheric defense .

41:15.729 --> 41:17.729
Uh , so happy to take that question

41:17.729 --> 41:19.840
back to the Comptroller and , and one

41:19.840 --> 41:22.062
point , Mr . Congressman . Um , I can't

41:22.062 --> 41:21.209
speak to other conflicts in other

41:21.209 --> 41:22.987
places , but I can speak to the

41:22.987 --> 41:25.209
commitment that this administration has

41:25.209 --> 41:27.153
to making sure that , uh , Western

41:27.153 --> 41:29.265
Hemisphere and Homeland Defense are a

41:29.265 --> 41:29.239
top priority mission . I think that's

41:29.239 --> 41:31.406
evidenced by the fact that even during

41:31.406 --> 41:33.572
the conflict in the Middle East , both

41:33.572 --> 41:33.570
President Trump and Secretary Hecket

41:33.770 --> 41:36.050
were present in in Florida , uh , for a

41:36.050 --> 41:38.161
coalition in the SHIELD Summit of the

41:38.161 --> 41:40.106
Americas . And so right now you're

41:40.106 --> 41:42.439
unable to give us any cost to date , uh ,

41:42.439 --> 41:44.661
uh , on these operations . No , I could

41:44.661 --> 41:43.850
take it back and talk to the

41:43.850 --> 41:47.310
comptroller . Um I'm moving on ,

41:47.429 --> 41:51.320
um . In January , after Operation

41:51.320 --> 41:53.360
Absolute Resolve , President Trump

41:53.360 --> 41:55.919
stated that he would run the United

41:55.919 --> 41:58.320
States rather , well , he would run

41:58.320 --> 42:00.360
Venezuela , and yesterday President

42:00.360 --> 42:02.193
Trump stated in reference to the

42:02.193 --> 42:04.659
current situation in Cuba , um , and I

42:04.659 --> 42:07.679
quote him , I think I can do anything I

42:07.679 --> 42:10.919
want with it pertaining to Cuba .

42:11.399 --> 42:13.566
Um , Mr . Hamer , I assume you've read

42:13.566 --> 42:15.899
the national defense strategy , correct ?

42:15.899 --> 42:17.843
Um , here's a quote from Secretary

42:17.843 --> 42:20.159
Heath's introduction regarding the

42:20.159 --> 42:22.489
national defense strategy . No longer

42:22.489 --> 42:24.545
will the department be distracted by

42:24.545 --> 42:26.560
interventionalism , endless wars ,

42:26.689 --> 42:28.800
regime change , and nation building .

42:30.290 --> 42:32.169
Given that statement and your

42:32.169 --> 42:34.280
understanding of the national defense

42:34.280 --> 42:36.113
strategy , I assume you remember

42:36.113 --> 42:39.010
reading this line . I would have to say

42:39.010 --> 42:41.232
that the President of the United States

42:41.370 --> 42:44.209
seems to think that he can do what he

42:44.209 --> 42:46.649
wants , not with one , but two or maybe

42:46.649 --> 42:49.889
more countries that fall directly under

42:49.889 --> 42:52.229
the very definition of regime change

42:52.229 --> 42:54.340
and intervention . In fact , it seems

42:54.340 --> 42:56.562
that this administration is , uh , that

42:56.562 --> 42:58.790
used to be America first , uh , it now

42:58.790 --> 43:00.679
seems they're rapidly engaging in

43:00.679 --> 43:02.846
conflicts around the world with little

43:02.846 --> 43:05.629
or no strategy . Um , can you comment

43:05.629 --> 43:09.250
on that ? Congressman , the fundamental

43:09.250 --> 43:12.409
pillar of both the NDSLOE1 , which is

43:12.409 --> 43:14.689
Homeland and hemispheric defense , is

43:14.689 --> 43:16.745
centered around providing collective

43:16.745 --> 43:18.633
security around the United States

43:18.633 --> 43:20.745
security perimeter . This is very far

43:20.745 --> 43:22.856
different from any other endless wars

43:22.856 --> 43:22.169
or forever wars that happened in the

43:22.169 --> 43:24.391
Middle East or any other theater that's

43:24.391 --> 43:26.391
far away from home . Uh , there's a

43:26.391 --> 43:28.613
responsibility that I think I'd say the

43:28.613 --> 43:28.560
top responsibility that the American

43:28.560 --> 43:30.338
president has is to protect the

43:30.338 --> 43:32.171
homeland and to protect American

43:32.171 --> 43:34.227
citizens that begins not just at the

43:34.227 --> 43:36.449
border , but it begins around borders .

43:36.449 --> 43:38.560
And , and so the president said , I'm

43:38.560 --> 43:38.300
sorry , but we're that we're at war ,

43:38.580 --> 43:40.691
uh , with these drug cartels . I mean

43:40.691 --> 43:42.995
he's used . This war , this term and

43:42.995 --> 43:45.051
that it's a threat to the homeland .

43:45.051 --> 43:47.217
And of course the issue with drugs has

43:47.217 --> 43:49.735
been going on for decades and so it

43:49.735 --> 43:51.875
sounds to me like that represents an

43:51.875 --> 43:54.675
endless engagement and according to his

43:54.675 --> 43:56.897
own definition , sort of an endless war

43:57.264 --> 43:59.625
in dealing with the situation in South

43:59.625 --> 44:01.458
America and these threats as the

44:01.458 --> 44:03.292
president has defined them . The

44:03.292 --> 44:05.347
gentleman's time has expired . Chair

44:05.347 --> 44:07.292
and I recognize the gentleman from

44:07.292 --> 44:09.810
Kansas , Mr . Schmidt . Chairman , I

44:09.810 --> 44:11.921
want to thank our witnesses for being

44:11.921 --> 44:13.921
here today . We're grateful for the

44:13.921 --> 44:16.143
opportunity to engage with you . Um I'd

44:16.143 --> 44:17.977
like to have a conversation with

44:17.977 --> 44:19.921
General Guillo on um some homeland

44:20.530 --> 44:23.580
security matters and uh we love and are

44:23.580 --> 44:25.636
grateful for all of our fighting men

44:25.636 --> 44:27.949
and women around the world . We love

44:27.949 --> 44:29.750
them all , but perhaps we are

44:29.750 --> 44:31.917
particularly grateful to you and those

44:31.917 --> 44:33.861
under your command for keeping our

44:33.861 --> 44:36.028
homeland safe . It is perhaps the most

44:36.028 --> 44:38.139
fundamental mission that our military

44:38.139 --> 44:40.306
has . The mission here is to make sure

44:40.306 --> 44:42.528
you have all of the tools that you need

44:42.528 --> 44:44.528
in order to accomplish that mission

44:44.528 --> 44:46.790
without fail each and every time . I

44:46.790 --> 44:49.389
represent a number of folks whose

44:49.750 --> 44:52.090
mission is to provide fuel to those who

44:52.090 --> 44:55.070
give us air superiority wherever we

44:55.070 --> 44:57.510
operate , and often we think of the

44:57.510 --> 44:59.870
tanker fleet in terms of our ability to

44:59.870 --> 45:02.709
project power around the world , but

45:02.709 --> 45:05.090
I'd like to get your thoughts on

45:05.090 --> 45:07.201
several things related to the tankers

45:07.201 --> 45:09.423
and their importance and where we might

45:09.423 --> 45:11.534
do a better job of providing you what

45:11.534 --> 45:13.423
you need in terms of the homeland

45:13.423 --> 45:15.146
security mission . Thank you ,

45:15.146 --> 45:17.146
Congressman , for acknowledging the

45:17.146 --> 45:19.469
great role of the tankers . Often when

45:19.469 --> 45:21.629
we look at the air defense of the

45:21.629 --> 45:23.851
United States , we focus on the fighter

45:23.851 --> 45:26.073
aircraft that are on alert and scramble

45:26.073 --> 45:28.018
to make the intercepts , but every

45:28.018 --> 45:29.962
single one of them is enabled by a

45:29.962 --> 45:33.270
series of tankers that are behind the

45:33.270 --> 45:35.669
scenes , keeping the fight going . In

45:35.669 --> 45:37.830
fact , just over the weekend , We had

45:37.830 --> 45:40.229
several noble Eagle scrambles , and the

45:40.229 --> 45:42.429
critical key to success for all of

45:42.429 --> 45:44.709
those was the fact that we not only had

45:44.709 --> 45:46.931
the tankers airborne , but we were able

45:46.931 --> 45:48.987
to scramble more tankers from across

45:48.987 --> 45:51.042
the country to get there to keep the

45:51.042 --> 45:52.876
fighter aircraft flowing for the

45:52.876 --> 45:55.149
duration of those . What I think that

45:55.149 --> 45:57.510
we could do is continue to modernize .

45:57.649 --> 45:59.760
You know , Obviously we're relying on

45:59.870 --> 46:03.840
KC-135s primarily for NORAD . They

46:03.840 --> 46:06.007
do a fantastic job , but they're all ,

46:06.159 --> 46:09.229
I think , at least 60 years old , and

46:10.280 --> 46:12.679
the reliability on them in the air is

46:12.679 --> 46:14.790
great , but I know it's a lot of work

46:14.790 --> 46:17.012
for the maintainers on the ground . For

46:17.012 --> 46:19.235
every hour that that aircraft is in the

46:19.235 --> 46:19.159
air , it's usually several hours on the

46:19.159 --> 46:21.437
ground to make sure that they're ready .

46:21.437 --> 46:24.379
So continuing to modernize the fleet

46:24.379 --> 46:26.879
with KC-46 and other aircraft would be

46:26.879 --> 46:28.823
essential for the homeland defense

46:28.823 --> 46:30.990
mission . Thank you , General . Let me

46:30.990 --> 46:33.157
unpack that last point a little more .

46:33.157 --> 46:35.379
I mean it's reasonable to think that in

46:35.379 --> 46:38.510
the event we had a near peer engagement

46:38.510 --> 46:40.909
that threatened our homeland , that is

46:40.909 --> 46:43.020
probably not limited to engagement in

46:43.020 --> 46:44.965
the homeland . There's going to be

46:44.965 --> 46:46.853
demand from your fellow combatant

46:46.853 --> 46:48.909
commanders all over the globe . They

46:48.909 --> 46:51.076
all need to refuel in order to do what

46:51.076 --> 46:50.830
must be done . Do we have enough

46:50.830 --> 46:53.790
tankers ? A related question in terms

46:53.790 --> 46:57.370
of your point on on upgrading . The

46:57.370 --> 47:00.489
135s are an old airframe . The

47:00.489 --> 47:02.489
forty-sixes have had their share of

47:02.489 --> 47:04.810
challenges . What do we need to be

47:04.810 --> 47:07.050
thinking about in terms of if we're

47:07.050 --> 47:09.161
adding more in the short term we have

47:09.161 --> 47:11.272
what we have , but in the long term ,

47:11.272 --> 47:13.494
where should we be thinking in terms of

47:13.494 --> 47:15.606
next generation purpose built tankers

47:15.606 --> 47:18.649
to support the mission ? Congressman ,

47:20.679 --> 47:22.735
for any single conflict we certainly

47:22.735 --> 47:24.846
have enough tankers . What we spent a

47:24.846 --> 47:27.729
lot of time planning for with Admiral

47:27.729 --> 47:30.889
Paparo for Endoacom , General Reed from

47:30.889 --> 47:32.778
Transom , and Admiral Correll for

47:32.778 --> 47:34.969
StratCom , and then myself for NORAD

47:34.969 --> 47:36.989
NorthCom is if we have simultaneous

47:37.969 --> 47:41.090
conflicts where the tanker distribution

47:41.090 --> 47:45.070
would become vital . Here in

47:45.070 --> 47:47.292
the United States we have the advantage

47:47.292 --> 47:49.348
of being able to land and refuel and

47:49.348 --> 47:51.348
get back up in the air quickly that

47:51.348 --> 47:53.403
some of my partners might not have .

47:53.403 --> 47:55.626
And so I think what I'm trying to do is

47:55.626 --> 47:57.626
make sure that we have those backup

47:57.626 --> 47:59.792
plans if there aren't enough tankers ,

47:59.792 --> 48:01.903
but everything that I see right now .

48:01.903 --> 48:04.070
That we would have a sufficient number

48:04.070 --> 48:06.292
of tankers to take care of the homeland

48:06.292 --> 48:08.126
defense mission as well as those

48:08.126 --> 48:10.292
required to get forces overseas and to

48:10.292 --> 48:12.514
keep them fueled overseas . Sir , could

48:12.514 --> 48:14.626
I ask on that , would that assessment

48:14.626 --> 48:14.114
be the same and your confidence level

48:14.114 --> 48:16.114
is high if we were talking about an

48:16.114 --> 48:18.336
extended engagement in the high north ,

48:18.336 --> 48:20.754
either either nuclear or conventional ?

48:21.139 --> 48:24.020
The high north does present a unique

48:24.020 --> 48:26.899
challenge . We have a lot of steady

48:26.899 --> 48:29.010
state tankers up there , but it would

48:29.010 --> 48:31.121
take more for us to be able to patrol

48:31.121 --> 48:33.288
that vast region . And there I look at

48:33.288 --> 48:35.889
our Canadian counterparts to continue

48:35.889 --> 48:38.199
their efforts to purchase tankers to

48:38.199 --> 48:40.199
help with the NORAD distribution of

48:40.199 --> 48:42.479
tankers . And what about a next gen

48:42.479 --> 48:44.479
tanker and your thoughts on what we

48:44.479 --> 48:46.535
should be planning to acquire over a

48:46.535 --> 48:48.479
time horizon ? Well , we certainly

48:48.479 --> 48:50.739
should look to continue to modernize

48:50.739 --> 48:54.000
that fleet , having a more low

48:54.000 --> 48:56.111
observable . Tanker is something that

48:56.111 --> 48:58.399
the Air Force is looking at that is not

48:58.399 --> 49:00.610
as important for the Homeland Defense

49:00.610 --> 49:02.666
mission . So I think if we get those

49:02.666 --> 49:04.554
new tankers that they should push

49:04.554 --> 49:06.777
forward to the overseas fights with the

49:06.777 --> 49:08.666
advanced capabilities because the

49:08.666 --> 49:11.409
tankers that we have now would be

49:11.409 --> 49:14.370
certainly sufficient for our role in

49:14.370 --> 49:16.259
the homeland . Gentlemen , time's

49:16.259 --> 49:18.259
expired . Chair and I recognize the

49:18.259 --> 49:18.169
gentleman from Missouri , Mr . Bale .

49:19.260 --> 49:21.593
Thank you , Mr . Chair , ranking member .

49:21.593 --> 49:23.699
Um , quickly , 11 thing that I will

49:23.699 --> 49:25.820
take exception with is , Mr . Chair ,

49:25.860 --> 49:27.971
you announced that you were reversing

49:27.971 --> 49:30.899
the order from junior to senior , and

49:30.899 --> 49:33.066
there are some in here that thought we

49:33.066 --> 49:34.788
were going first because we're

49:34.788 --> 49:36.843
important , but now they know . Um ,

49:39.320 --> 49:42.040
Um , and on a , and on a serious note ,

49:42.399 --> 49:45.250
this committee is and should be . One

49:45.250 --> 49:47.969
of the most bipartisan , if not the

49:47.969 --> 49:50.360
most bipartisan committees because

49:50.370 --> 49:52.350
national security should be above

49:53.050 --> 49:55.610
partisan politics , um , and Mr .

49:55.649 --> 49:58.010
Humeyer , you mentioned that for the

49:58.010 --> 50:00.239
first time in history there's an

50:00.239 --> 50:01.961
administration that is putting

50:01.961 --> 50:04.183
protection of this this hemisphere as a

50:04.183 --> 50:07.239
priority . And in my opinion , whether

50:07.239 --> 50:09.879
you intended or intended it or not , I

50:09.879 --> 50:12.101
think that is very disrespectful to the

50:12.101 --> 50:14.323
men and women who served this country ,

50:14.323 --> 50:16.490
lost their lives , paying the ultimate

50:16.490 --> 50:19.879
sacrifice , um , um , and it's OK to

50:19.879 --> 50:22.500
lift your guy , your administration ,

50:22.760 --> 50:24.871
but there's no need to disrespect the

50:24.871 --> 50:27.139
sacrifices of those who came before .

50:27.800 --> 50:30.709
General Guillo . A lot of attention has

50:30.709 --> 50:34.580
been placed on Greenland . Already the

50:34.580 --> 50:36.810
United States operates critical assets

50:36.810 --> 50:39.340
on the territory that support missile

50:39.340 --> 50:41.939
warning and space surveillance , and

50:41.939 --> 50:44.820
that presence exists because of decades

50:44.820 --> 50:47.669
of defense cooperation with Denmark and

50:47.669 --> 50:50.500
Greenland . Yet in recent months , we

50:50.500 --> 50:52.667
continue to hear deeply concerning and

50:52.667 --> 50:54.778
harmful rhetoric from the White House

50:54.778 --> 50:56.778
about the United States potentially

50:56.778 --> 50:59.060
taking control of Greenland , whether

50:59.060 --> 51:02.020
through acquisition or even potentially

51:02.020 --> 51:05.429
by force . Just the suggestion of

51:05.429 --> 51:07.879
invading a sovereign NATO ally

51:09.520 --> 51:11.742
has raised serious concerns amongst our

51:11.742 --> 51:14.429
partners . From a military standpoint ,

51:14.760 --> 51:16.840
isn't it our strongest strategic

51:16.840 --> 51:19.659
advantage in the Arctic ? The fact that

51:19.659 --> 51:22.179
we already have trusted allies who

51:22.179 --> 51:24.699
allow the United States to operate

51:24.699 --> 51:27.060
critical defense infrastructure on

51:27.060 --> 51:30.659
their soil . Congressman , I have

51:30.659 --> 51:33.340
a great appreciation and respect for

51:34.179 --> 51:36.500
the leadership of Greenland and also my

51:36.500 --> 51:40.290
counterpart in Denmark that allow us to

51:40.290 --> 51:42.457
operate out of Paufik Air Base , which

51:42.457 --> 51:44.512
is or Space Force Base , excuse me ,

51:44.512 --> 51:46.568
that you just mentioned . As well as

51:46.568 --> 51:48.629
other locations throughout Greenland

51:48.810 --> 51:51.129
that not only give the space capability

51:51.129 --> 51:53.185
that you described , but we can also

51:53.185 --> 51:55.240
operate the fighter aircraft and the

51:55.240 --> 51:57.462
tanker aircraft that give us that first

51:57.462 --> 51:59.649
line of defense against any adversary

51:59.649 --> 52:01.871
that might approach us from the north .

52:01.871 --> 52:03.927
Mr . Hugh Mir , I think I pronounced

52:03.927 --> 52:06.038
your name wrong . I apologize . Would

52:06.038 --> 52:08.149
you agree ? Yes , I agree , uh , Mr .

52:08.149 --> 52:10.371
Congressman , and , and just to say I'm

52:10.371 --> 52:12.649
gonna , I , I don't have a lot of time ,

52:12.649 --> 52:11.860
so I'm gonna keep Mr . Congressman ,

52:11.889 --> 52:13.945
just to say the point on Greenland ,

52:13.945 --> 52:16.000
just the , the fact that we have the

52:16.000 --> 52:17.945
1951 treaty has allowed us to give

52:17.945 --> 52:19.778
through partnership with Denmark

52:19.778 --> 52:21.889
capabilities to enhance and refurbish

52:21.889 --> 52:21.810
not just the Pacific Space Base but

52:21.810 --> 52:23.866
other locations that we used to have

52:23.866 --> 52:25.866
during World War Two to harden that

52:25.866 --> 52:28.320
security . But those , those strategies

52:28.320 --> 52:31.500
are those those partnerships are one of

52:31.500 --> 52:34.760
our greatest , um , um , strategic .

52:38.330 --> 52:40.610
Assets if you will , correct , correct ,

52:40.939 --> 52:43.106
Congressman , my understanding is that

52:43.106 --> 52:45.161
uh those conversations let me turn ,

52:45.161 --> 52:44.689
I'm gonna reclaim my time . Let me turn

52:44.689 --> 52:47.290
to another critical partner that this

52:47.290 --> 52:49.401
administration has repeatedly treated

52:49.401 --> 52:51.568
with hostility . The United States and

52:51.568 --> 52:53.889
Canada share one of the most integrated

52:53.889 --> 52:56.370
military partnerships in the world

52:56.370 --> 52:58.750
through NORAD , where two sovereign

52:58.750 --> 53:00.760
nations jointly defend the skies of

53:00.760 --> 53:03.540
North America . General Guillo , would

53:03.540 --> 53:05.719
you agree that the US-Canada

53:05.719 --> 53:07.899
partnership is the cornerstone of

53:07.899 --> 53:09.620
continental defense and that

53:09.620 --> 53:11.620
maintaining that level of trust and

53:11.620 --> 53:13.570
coordination is essential as we

53:13.570 --> 53:16.219
modernize NORAD to address threats like

53:16.219 --> 53:18.330
cruise missiles , hypersonics , and

53:18.330 --> 53:21.909
unmanned systems . Congressman , the

53:21.909 --> 53:24.076
relationship in the binational command

53:24.076 --> 53:26.020
has been the only one in the world

53:26.020 --> 53:29.000
since 1958 where , and in this case ,

53:29.510 --> 53:32.260
US and Canadian military members work

53:32.260 --> 53:34.229
side by side . The mil to mill

53:34.229 --> 53:37.209
relationship is outstanding and as you

53:37.209 --> 53:38.889
mentioned , we have some very

53:38.889 --> 53:42.669
challenging . Threats to address

53:42.669 --> 53:45.050
and the NORAD modernization program ,

53:45.300 --> 53:47.929
which is both a US and a Canadian

53:47.929 --> 53:50.090
program , are instrumental to making

53:50.090 --> 53:51.812
sure that we stay ahead of the

53:51.812 --> 53:55.629
adversary . Right And Mr . Hum

53:55.629 --> 53:58.100
Humir , would you agree ? I do agree .

53:58.149 --> 54:00.205
I think we've gotten , uh , historic

54:00.205 --> 54:02.482
increased commitments from Canada , uh ,

54:02.482 --> 54:04.538
at the Hague summit for 5% of GDP on

54:04.538 --> 54:06.538
national defense as well as 3.5% on

54:06.538 --> 54:08.649
core defense , and our department has

54:08.649 --> 54:08.389
been working very closely with the

54:08.389 --> 54:10.611
Canadian counterparts to , to review it

54:10.611 --> 54:12.611
at the technical level , uh , where

54:12.611 --> 54:14.833
those defense dollars are being spent ,

54:14.833 --> 54:14.739
uh , and Mr . Congressman , I'll just

54:14.739 --> 54:16.961
say to , to the broader question . Uh ,

54:16.961 --> 54:18.961
and I appreciate that you're saying

54:18.961 --> 54:18.669
that , uh , national security is a

54:18.669 --> 54:20.891
bipartisan issue . Absolutely , I agree

54:20.891 --> 54:23.002
100% . Also being one of those , uh ,

54:23.002 --> 54:25.225
individuals that have served in uniform

54:25.225 --> 54:27.391
for 8 years , uh , I think that , uh ,

54:27.391 --> 54:26.550
a lot of the issues that we're dealing

54:26.550 --> 54:28.661
with , uh , uh , transcend politics .

54:28.870 --> 54:31.037
But I will say that having gentleman's

54:31.037 --> 54:32.814
clowns are scarred here , and I

54:32.814 --> 54:32.389
recognize the gentleman from Virginia ,

54:32.469 --> 54:36.129
Mr . McGuire . Thank you , Mr .

54:36.139 --> 54:38.020
Chairman . And thank you to our

54:38.020 --> 54:40.076
witnesses for being here . Thank you

54:40.076 --> 54:42.187
for your service . You know , we have

54:42.187 --> 54:44.353
the best military in the world and the

54:44.353 --> 54:46.353
whole world has been watching our ,

54:46.353 --> 54:48.520
I've had former veterans I served with

54:48.520 --> 54:50.353
tell me they're just proud to be

54:50.353 --> 54:52.520
Americans watching the professionalism

54:52.520 --> 54:54.631
with Operation Midnight Hammer , uh ,

54:54.631 --> 54:56.464
Operation Absolute Resolve , and

54:56.464 --> 54:59.419
Operation Epic Fury . Most of my time

54:59.419 --> 55:02.540
in the SEAL teams was in SATHCOM . So I ,

55:02.669 --> 55:04.891
I guess , uh , General Donovan , I just

55:04.891 --> 55:06.725
got a message from some of those

55:06.725 --> 55:08.780
warfighters , and they had a message

55:08.780 --> 55:11.113
for you for the cartels , and they said ,

55:11.113 --> 55:11.060
give no rest for the cartels . Let's

55:11.060 --> 55:13.540
wear them out . No safe spaces . I'm

55:13.540 --> 55:16.250
sure you can concur with that . Um ,

55:16.280 --> 55:18.447
this question is for Mr . Humeyer . We

55:18.447 --> 55:20.502
talked earlier about Nagala's past ,

55:20.502 --> 55:22.724
went to go visit . When I was there , I

55:22.724 --> 55:24.780
talked to the 10th Mountain Division

55:24.780 --> 55:26.891
General in charge of our security . I

55:26.891 --> 55:26.810
talked with Tom Homan and everyone else ,

55:27.120 --> 55:29.342
and we talked about counter US policy ,

55:29.342 --> 55:31.398
and I understand that we in the last

55:31.398 --> 55:34.040
NDA gave 4 permissions . Um , one of

55:34.040 --> 55:36.840
the things we identified was a 2020 DOJ

55:36.840 --> 55:39.260
advisory . And we made a recommendation

55:39.260 --> 55:41.427
to this committee and entered into the

55:41.427 --> 55:43.538
record that advisory and an oversight

55:43.538 --> 55:45.593
committee that they rewrite it , and

55:45.593 --> 55:47.649
President Trump put out an executive

55:47.649 --> 55:49.871
order giving the DOJ 30 days to rewrite

55:49.871 --> 55:51.982
that . Do you know the status of that

55:51.982 --> 55:54.204
right now ? I don't , Congressman , but

55:54.204 --> 55:56.316
I'm happy to take that back and get a

55:56.316 --> 55:55.540
response for you . That sounds great .

55:55.659 --> 55:58.040
And uh talking about SOUTHCOM again ,

55:58.139 --> 56:00.439
Mr . Humeyer , should we expect changes

56:00.439 --> 56:02.328
in military presence and tempo in

56:02.328 --> 56:04.550
SOUTHCOM right now ? What I would defer

56:04.550 --> 56:06.495
to General Donovan on that , but I

56:06.495 --> 56:08.661
would say that we are , we are looking

56:08.661 --> 56:10.717
to engage SouthHCOM , and this is in

56:10.717 --> 56:12.772
reference to my previous response in

56:12.772 --> 56:14.883
ways that we haven't that theater has

56:14.883 --> 56:14.729
been neglected for many years . I've

56:14.729 --> 56:16.785
looked at Latin America for 20 years

56:16.785 --> 56:18.785
and the level of engagement that we

56:18.785 --> 56:20.896
have today . And this is by testament

56:20.896 --> 56:23.062
to the partners as unprecedented in in

56:23.062 --> 56:25.229
recent history . I'm so glad President

56:25.229 --> 56:27.451
Trump puts a priority on protecting the

56:27.451 --> 56:27.070
homeland and with the help of the

56:27.070 --> 56:29.389
military , we've secured our border in

56:29.389 --> 56:31.310
just a matter of weeks . Border

56:31.310 --> 56:33.477
crossings are down to pretty much zero

56:33.590 --> 56:35.812
and of course um . We are working , you

56:35.812 --> 56:37.979
guys are working really hard to secure

56:37.979 --> 56:40.034
and stop the Qatar cartels . General

56:40.034 --> 56:42.257
Donovan , given everything happening in

56:42.257 --> 56:44.368
the Middle East and the demands being

56:44.368 --> 56:46.534
placed on joint forces elsewhere , are

56:46.534 --> 56:48.701
you confident you will have the forces

56:48.701 --> 56:50.534
you need to successfully execute

56:50.534 --> 56:54.080
theater campaign plan ? Congressman ,

56:54.159 --> 56:56.760
thank you . Right now I believe we have

56:56.760 --> 56:58.704
the forces we need for the current

56:58.704 --> 57:00.482
Operation Southern Spear . As I

57:00.482 --> 57:02.482
mentioned in the opening comments ,

57:02.482 --> 57:04.482
we're going to look at creating the

57:04.482 --> 57:06.649
right force structure tailored for the

57:06.649 --> 57:08.871
mission sets and with your background ,

57:08.871 --> 57:07.959
I think you'd be aware of what I'm

57:07.959 --> 57:10.015
thinking about , Congressman , those

57:10.015 --> 57:12.015
light expeditionary forces that can

57:12.015 --> 57:13.903
maneuver very quickly through the

57:13.903 --> 57:16.126
operational space , specifically in the

57:16.126 --> 57:17.959
maritime domain where the sea is

57:17.959 --> 57:19.903
maneuver space . And Southcom is a

57:19.903 --> 57:22.015
maritime domain , so the right mix of

57:22.015 --> 57:23.903
land , air , and maritime surface

57:23.903 --> 57:25.959
assets to maneuver around that space

57:25.959 --> 57:28.219
and inject with partners , partner

57:28.219 --> 57:30.219
operations throughout the region is

57:30.219 --> 57:32.441
where we're going to find our success .

57:32.441 --> 57:34.497
Yeah , General Donovan , I talked to

57:34.497 --> 57:34.169
the commandant of the Marine Corps ,

57:34.179 --> 57:36.219
and he said , uh , I think 4 times

57:36.219 --> 57:38.330
amphibious ships , amphibious ships ,

57:38.540 --> 57:40.540
and I think you would concur to the

57:40.540 --> 57:42.484
benefit of that . I think you just

57:42.484 --> 57:44.707
alluded to that . So we're seeing China

57:44.707 --> 57:46.762
expand its footprint through ports ,

57:46.762 --> 57:48.873
space facilities , and other dual-use

57:48.873 --> 57:50.984
infrastructures across the hemisphere

57:50.984 --> 57:52.818
hemisphere . General Donovan and

57:52.818 --> 57:54.909
Gillett are NCO and SCO working

57:54.909 --> 57:56.853
together to track and counter that

57:56.853 --> 58:00.229
influence . I'll start off with

58:01.149 --> 58:03.870
we absolutely are . The chairman of the

58:03.870 --> 58:06.037
Joint Chiefs of Staff has led a series

58:06.037 --> 58:08.203
of exercises called League consolation

58:08.203 --> 58:10.350
where we're looking at the PRC , the

58:10.350 --> 58:12.590
Chinese threat throughout all the GCCs

58:12.590 --> 58:14.701
and through the exercise series we're

58:14.701 --> 58:16.757
able to come together with different

58:16.757 --> 58:19.034
options . Aligned in NRCO and Southcom ,

58:19.034 --> 58:20.979
how do we look at that threat more

58:20.979 --> 58:23.034
holistically , not just through that

58:23.034 --> 58:25.146
unified command plane boundary . So I

58:25.146 --> 58:27.201
believe these exercise series we are

58:27.201 --> 58:29.090
helping us look at this in a more

58:29.090 --> 58:31.146
holistic way . Congressman , I agree

58:31.146 --> 58:33.368
with General Donovan , and I would just

58:33.368 --> 58:35.534
add that the unified command plan that

58:35.534 --> 58:37.701
he mentioned puts lines on a map , and

58:37.701 --> 58:39.701
General Donovan and I know that the

58:39.701 --> 58:41.923
cartels do not adhere to those lines on

58:41.923 --> 58:43.979
a map , and so therefore he and I do

58:43.979 --> 58:46.146
not . Again , last question for anyone

58:46.146 --> 58:48.257
who wants to answer is what potential

58:48.257 --> 58:50.368
threat does Cuba pose in enabling our

58:50.368 --> 58:52.479
adversaries to have a foothold in the

58:52.479 --> 58:54.312
Western Hemisphere in our recent

58:54.312 --> 58:57.370
developments changing that ? Happy to

58:57.370 --> 58:59.259
take that congressman , uh , Cuba

58:59.259 --> 59:01.092
historically has been one of the

59:01.092 --> 59:03.314
strongest intelligence adversaries that

59:03.314 --> 59:05.426
we've had in the United States . Uh ,

59:05.426 --> 59:05.169
they not just have penetrated our

59:05.169 --> 59:07.113
government , they penetrated other

59:07.113 --> 59:08.891
governments partner governments

59:08.891 --> 59:08.489
throughout Latin America and the

59:08.489 --> 59:10.545
Caribbean , and I think that's uh uh

59:10.545 --> 59:12.267
attested to the fact that when

59:12.267 --> 59:14.433
Operation Absolute Resolve was carried

59:14.433 --> 59:16.378
out , it was mainly Cuban military

59:16.378 --> 59:16.010
officials that were defending Nicolas

59:16.010 --> 59:18.121
Maduro inside Fortetuna in Caracas in

59:18.121 --> 59:20.066
the compound . What you , what you

59:20.066 --> 59:22.288
gentlemen are doing is very important .

59:22.288 --> 59:24.399
We're very supportive , and we'd like

59:24.399 --> 59:26.566
to know how we , especially as we work

59:26.566 --> 59:28.621
on the next NDAA , what can we do to

59:28.621 --> 59:30.843
help you better do your job to keep the

59:30.843 --> 59:30.790
homeland and American citizens and

59:30.790 --> 59:32.790
military personnel safe at home and

59:32.790 --> 59:35.012
abroad . Thank you . Gentleman's time's

59:35.012 --> 59:37.012
expired . Chair , and I recognize a

59:37.012 --> 59:39.234
gentleman from Virginia , Mr . Benman .

59:39.234 --> 59:39.120
Thank you , Chair . Thank you , ranking

59:39.120 --> 59:42.669
member . So in your testimony and the

59:42.669 --> 59:44.836
statements provided , um , there are a

59:44.836 --> 59:46.590
number of terms that have been

59:47.350 --> 59:49.590
mentioned . There's uh FTO , Foreign

59:49.590 --> 59:52.510
Terrorist Organization . DTO designated

59:52.510 --> 59:54.350
terrorist organization , narco

59:54.350 --> 59:56.770
terrorists , narco traffickers ,

59:58.070 --> 01:00:00.237
transnational criminal organizations ,

01:00:00.439 --> 01:00:02.750
and so this is , this is complicated

01:00:02.750 --> 01:00:05.100
even for somebody like myself that

01:00:05.110 --> 01:00:07.270
spent 25 years in the army and a

01:00:07.270 --> 01:00:09.850
JAGCorps advisor . What criteria does

01:00:09.850 --> 01:00:11.683
SOUTHCOM use to determine when a

01:00:11.683 --> 01:00:13.461
criminal organization or vessel

01:00:13.461 --> 01:00:15.628
qualifies as a terrorist rather than a

01:00:15.628 --> 01:00:17.949
law enforcement target ? And how do you

01:00:17.949 --> 01:00:20.100
ensure that this expanding definition

01:00:20.100 --> 01:00:21.878
does not blur the lines between

01:00:21.878 --> 01:00:23.878
military operations and traditional

01:00:24.020 --> 01:00:25.699
counter narcotics policing ?

01:00:28.870 --> 01:00:31.037
Congressman , thank you for that , and

01:00:31.037 --> 01:00:32.926
I appreciate you highlighting the

01:00:32.926 --> 01:00:35.148
number of definitions . This is 41 days

01:00:35.148 --> 01:00:37.259
and I have my cheat sheet because I'm

01:00:37.259 --> 01:00:36.870
learning the definitions and

01:00:36.870 --> 01:00:38.703
specifically my authorities as a

01:00:38.703 --> 01:00:40.814
combatant commander . I can designate

01:00:40.814 --> 01:00:43.949
OTOs and we have designated a number of

01:00:43.949 --> 01:00:46.189
the other terrorist organizations

01:00:46.189 --> 01:00:49.110
inside the SOCOM area of responsibility .

01:00:49.479 --> 01:00:51.479
And then once they're designated as

01:00:51.479 --> 01:00:53.590
OTOs , I have the ability to use what

01:00:53.590 --> 01:00:55.701
we call the CT , the counterterrorism

01:00:55.701 --> 01:00:57.312
exsword , to apply different

01:00:57.312 --> 01:00:59.479
authorities and different capabilities

01:00:59.479 --> 01:01:01.701
against those threats . So that's where

01:01:01.701 --> 01:01:01.520
it starts for me as a combatant

01:01:01.520 --> 01:01:05.330
commander is OTOs . So you have the

01:01:05.330 --> 01:01:07.530
authority to designate terrorist

01:01:07.530 --> 01:01:09.697
organizations that have been delegated

01:01:09.697 --> 01:01:13.620
down to you from the SEC . Per our

01:01:13.620 --> 01:01:15.780
current sword get delegated by the

01:01:15.780 --> 01:01:18.002
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,

01:01:18.002 --> 01:01:20.169
the CTX or . I can then I go through a

01:01:20.169 --> 01:01:22.002
process and the process includes

01:01:22.002 --> 01:01:24.224
submitting that request up for approval

01:01:24.224 --> 01:01:26.336
all the way to the 2nd ward and above

01:01:26.336 --> 01:01:28.224
and then back down if I choose to

01:01:28.224 --> 01:01:30.224
designate him OTOs . OK , got you .

01:01:30.224 --> 01:01:32.790
Please proceed . So at the same time ,

01:01:32.830 --> 01:01:35.709
the term DTOs identified by the

01:01:35.709 --> 01:01:38.129
President of the States . a term we're

01:01:38.129 --> 01:01:41.370
using now against cartels , non-state

01:01:41.370 --> 01:01:44.159
armed groups are now designated as DTOs .

01:01:44.649 --> 01:01:46.538
Their actions constitute an armed

01:01:46.538 --> 01:01:48.705
attack against the United States , and

01:01:48.705 --> 01:01:50.871
the US is in a non-international armed

01:01:50.871 --> 01:01:52.969
conflict with these DTOs . And any

01:01:52.969 --> 01:01:54.747
action we take , whether that's

01:01:54.747 --> 01:01:56.525
enhanced counter-narcotics or a

01:01:56.525 --> 01:01:58.636
maritime strike , are tied to the DTO

01:01:58.636 --> 01:02:01.050
definition . Is that tied to their

01:02:01.050 --> 01:02:03.010
activity ? Like are they directly

01:02:03.010 --> 01:02:05.689
participating in hostilities or just on

01:02:05.689 --> 01:02:09.250
their status ? We base that on the

01:02:09.250 --> 01:02:11.260
actual definition of a terrorist

01:02:11.260 --> 01:02:13.371
organization and we have , you know ,

01:02:13.371 --> 01:02:15.427
it's those armed groups that are are

01:02:15.427 --> 01:02:18.370
impacting a threat to US personnel , a

01:02:18.370 --> 01:02:21.889
threat to our , our partners that's a

01:02:21.889 --> 01:02:24.000
hostile act , hostile intent , that's

01:02:24.000 --> 01:02:25.833
status-based targeting . Is this

01:02:25.833 --> 01:02:28.111
status-based targeting or is this , uh ,

01:02:28.209 --> 01:02:30.399
uh , sorry , that's action-based

01:02:30.399 --> 01:02:32.232
targeting . Is this status-based

01:02:32.232 --> 01:02:34.343
targeting or action-based targeting ?

01:02:35.300 --> 01:02:37.467
Congressman , I make sure I understand

01:02:37.467 --> 01:02:39.578
the question because in the targeting

01:02:39.578 --> 01:02:41.800
process that we execute right now under

01:02:41.800 --> 01:02:41.540
the law of armed conflict , we have a

01:02:41.540 --> 01:02:43.707
certain criteria we go through for the

01:02:43.707 --> 01:02:45.762
actual targeting process itself . Is

01:02:45.762 --> 01:02:48.040
that the question , Congressman ? Yeah ,

01:02:48.040 --> 01:02:49.984
let me , let me , um , because I'm

01:02:49.984 --> 01:02:49.530
running out of time here . Do you , you

01:02:49.530 --> 01:02:51.830
have lawyers that are advising

01:02:52.169 --> 01:02:54.113
throughout the targeting process ,

01:02:54.113 --> 01:02:57.649
correct ? Absolutely , Congressman . So ,

01:02:57.739 --> 01:02:59.795
um , and this is from Mr . Humeyer's

01:02:59.795 --> 01:03:02.389
testimony . There are 45 total kinetic

01:03:02.389 --> 01:03:05.449
attacks , killing 157 members ,

01:03:05.889 --> 01:03:09.750
um , and , um , 47

01:03:09.750 --> 01:03:12.590
narco trafficking vessels . How many

01:03:12.590 --> 01:03:14.620
survivors in those strikes ?

01:03:17.379 --> 01:03:19.601
Congressman , so for just to clarify on

01:03:19.601 --> 01:03:21.879
the designated terrorist organizations ,

01:03:21.879 --> 01:03:24.046
that's illegal boat strikes , how many

01:03:24.046 --> 01:03:25.990
survivors out of the , I defer the

01:03:25.990 --> 01:03:28.157
operational aspects to the SOCOM , but

01:03:28.157 --> 01:03:28.020
just if you want me to clarify a little

01:03:28.020 --> 01:03:30.187
bit , the designated terrorists . No ,

01:03:30.187 --> 01:03:32.242
I just wanna know the number . Any ,

01:03:32.242 --> 01:03:34.719
any sense ? Congressman , I , I'm , I'm

01:03:34.719 --> 01:03:37.052
tracking the numbers you've offered and ,

01:03:37.052 --> 01:03:38.997
uh , uh , what I'm focused on ever

01:03:38.997 --> 01:03:41.280
since I took command 41 days ago , that

01:03:41.280 --> 01:03:43.447
I would have to get back to you in the

01:03:43.447 --> 01:03:45.558
number of survivors . Congressman , I

01:03:45.558 --> 01:03:47.724
don't let me . Two is my understanding

01:03:47.830 --> 01:03:50.070
and so my question is this , um , we

01:03:50.070 --> 01:03:53.790
heard , uh , Secretary of Defense this

01:03:53.790 --> 01:03:56.590
weekend , uh , talk about , um , no

01:03:56.590 --> 01:03:59.129
quarter , no survivors . Has an order ,

01:03:59.709 --> 01:04:02.770
uh , been issued to you

01:04:03.110 --> 01:04:05.010
on no quarter , no survivors ?

01:04:07.550 --> 01:04:09.929
General Donovan . Congressman , that is

01:04:09.929 --> 01:04:13.080
no , no . And uh would you consider

01:04:13.080 --> 01:04:15.909
such an order lawful ? Congressman ,

01:04:16.169 --> 01:04:17.891
I'm personally responsible for

01:04:17.891 --> 01:04:19.725
upholding the core principles of

01:04:19.725 --> 01:04:21.947
necessity , distinction , personality ,

01:04:21.947 --> 01:04:24.010
and humanity , and that's part of I

01:04:24.010 --> 01:04:26.429
mean this is a sort of basic question

01:04:26.689 --> 01:04:29.889
Is a no quarter , no mercy order lawful

01:04:29.889 --> 01:04:32.820
or unlawful ? Congressman , I would not

01:04:32.820 --> 01:04:36.280
follow an unlawful order . OK . That's

01:04:36.280 --> 01:04:39.800
an unlawful order . Gentleman's time's

01:04:39.800 --> 01:04:41.633
expired here , and I recognize a

01:04:41.633 --> 01:04:43.689
gentleman from Texas , Mr . Gooden .

01:04:43.689 --> 01:04:45.411
Thank you . Uh , gentlemen , I

01:04:45.411 --> 01:04:47.522
appreciate you all being here . Thank

01:04:47.522 --> 01:04:49.744
you , General Gellet , uh , what is the

01:04:49.744 --> 01:04:51.800
feasibility of deploying space-based

01:04:51.800 --> 01:04:53.689
interceptors and what operational

01:04:53.689 --> 01:04:55.689
advantages and risks are associated

01:04:55.689 --> 01:04:57.911
with deploying space-based interceptors

01:04:57.911 --> 01:04:59.522
as part of the Golden Dome ?

01:04:59.620 --> 01:05:01.629
Congressman , I would have to defer

01:05:01.629 --> 01:05:03.740
part of that to General Gutlein , who

01:05:03.740 --> 01:05:06.510
is actually developing the architecture

01:05:06.510 --> 01:05:09.310
for Golden Dome . As I understand it ,

01:05:10.620 --> 01:05:14.070
it is feasible , and we're well on the

01:05:14.070 --> 01:05:16.292
way to developing those . The advantage

01:05:16.292 --> 01:05:19.590
though would be it allows us to shoot

01:05:19.590 --> 01:05:22.560
down threatening ICBMs at a different

01:05:22.560 --> 01:05:25.389
phase of flight than the mid-course

01:05:25.389 --> 01:05:28.270
system that we rely on today . And so

01:05:28.270 --> 01:05:30.270
what Golden Dome will have is it'll

01:05:30.270 --> 01:05:32.590
have a space base to get it earlier ,

01:05:32.629 --> 01:05:34.796
mid-course in the middle , and then an

01:05:34.796 --> 01:05:36.796
underlayer to get it in more of the

01:05:36.796 --> 01:05:38.518
terminal phase to give us more

01:05:38.518 --> 01:05:40.790
opportunities to catch any ICBM that

01:05:40.790 --> 01:05:42.846
would be threatening North America .

01:05:42.846 --> 01:05:44.846
Thank you . I appreciate that and .

01:05:44.846 --> 01:05:46.734
Donovan , I've got just two quick

01:05:46.734 --> 01:05:46.715
questions for you . The Chinese

01:05:47.235 --> 01:05:49.457
Communist Party has invested in ports ,

01:05:49.457 --> 01:05:52.014
including a $1.3 billion investment in

01:05:52.014 --> 01:05:54.574
Peru , as well as cyber infrastructure

01:05:54.574 --> 01:05:56.463
and space facilities across Latin

01:05:56.463 --> 01:05:58.614
America . How concerned should we as

01:05:58.614 --> 01:06:00.574
this committee in Congress be that

01:06:00.574 --> 01:06:02.574
these so-called commercial projects

01:06:02.574 --> 01:06:04.407
could become dual-use facilities

01:06:04.407 --> 01:06:06.574
supporting Chinese military operations

01:06:06.574 --> 01:06:08.685
in our own hemisphere ? Congressman ,

01:06:08.685 --> 01:06:10.741
thank you for highlighting that . We

01:06:10.741 --> 01:06:12.796
are very concerned . I consider them

01:06:12.796 --> 01:06:14.796
all to use and specifically whether

01:06:14.796 --> 01:06:14.669
they're built with a military

01:06:14.669 --> 01:06:16.725
infrastructure background or they're

01:06:16.725 --> 01:06:18.891
just a functional device that could be

01:06:18.891 --> 01:06:21.550
used to support Chinese actions . I

01:06:21.550 --> 01:06:23.494
consider them all to use and we're

01:06:23.494 --> 01:06:25.429
tracking 23 port projects and 12

01:06:25.429 --> 01:06:28.639
space-based enabling . Projects . I'll

01:06:28.639 --> 01:06:31.879
also ask , our defense systems rely on

01:06:31.879 --> 01:06:34.046
critical , not criminal minerals , but

01:06:34.046 --> 01:06:35.990
it's criminal how much they cost .

01:06:35.990 --> 01:06:37.990
Critical minerals for electronics ,

01:06:37.990 --> 01:06:40.101
batteries , and advanced weapons . Do

01:06:40.101 --> 01:06:42.101
you believe China's growing role in

01:06:42.101 --> 01:06:44.212
mining and processing those resources

01:06:44.212 --> 01:06:46.379
in Latin America pose a long term risk

01:06:46.379 --> 01:06:48.212
to our defense industrial base ,

01:06:48.239 --> 01:06:50.370
Congressman , yes . Do you have

01:06:50.370 --> 01:06:52.679
anything to comment , just kind of a

01:06:52.679 --> 01:06:54.889
vague throw it out there with respect

01:06:54.889 --> 01:06:58.129
to Brazil and their seemingly close

01:06:58.129 --> 01:07:00.129
proximity to China . It seems as if

01:07:00.129 --> 01:07:02.520
China has quite a bit of a presence in

01:07:02.520 --> 01:07:04.687
Brazil . They've got some of the heads

01:07:04.687 --> 01:07:06.909
of their southern hemisphere operations

01:07:06.909 --> 01:07:08.909
that are camped out in Brazil . The

01:07:08.909 --> 01:07:11.020
former president is living in China ,

01:07:11.129 --> 01:07:14.010
heading up a bank . What's the thinking

01:07:14.010 --> 01:07:16.066
with respect to China's relationship

01:07:16.066 --> 01:07:19.040
with Brazil ? Congressman ,

01:07:19.959 --> 01:07:22.070
I'll focus on the military aspects of

01:07:22.070 --> 01:07:24.070
our relationship with the Brazilian

01:07:24.070 --> 01:07:26.399
military , and I believe we have at the

01:07:26.399 --> 01:07:28.566
lower levels very good relationships .

01:07:28.566 --> 01:07:30.677
As a matter of fact , we've seen some

01:07:30.677 --> 01:07:32.899
positive actions . Last year Brazil was

01:07:32.899 --> 01:07:35.066
going to put on an amphibious ex-cross

01:07:35.066 --> 01:07:37.121
called Formosa , inviting the United

01:07:37.121 --> 01:07:39.288
States . We did not attend because the

01:07:39.288 --> 01:07:41.288
Chinese were participating . And so

01:07:41.288 --> 01:07:43.066
this year , the Chinese are not

01:07:43.066 --> 01:07:45.288
participating and we are attending . So

01:07:45.288 --> 01:07:47.288
there's movement there that . Those

01:07:47.288 --> 01:07:47.000
relationships , a lot of those

01:07:47.000 --> 01:07:49.222
relationships with Chinese military are

01:07:49.222 --> 01:07:51.444
built over years , generational , years

01:07:51.444 --> 01:07:53.667
of relationship with military leaders ,

01:07:53.667 --> 01:07:55.556
and so we believe that's our path

01:07:55.556 --> 01:07:57.611
forward , and I would defer anything

01:07:57.611 --> 01:07:59.833
else as far as the overall strategic or

01:07:59.833 --> 01:08:02.111
diplomatic approaches to the Secretary .

01:08:02.111 --> 01:08:04.333
Well , that's that's promising . I hope

01:08:04.333 --> 01:08:06.389
the progress continues and thank you

01:08:06.389 --> 01:08:08.500
all for your service to the country .

01:08:08.500 --> 01:08:08.179
We appreciate you very much . Beck .

01:08:09.540 --> 01:08:11.596
Gentleman , Gill's back here , and I

01:08:11.596 --> 01:08:13.929
recognize the gentleman from California ,

01:08:13.929 --> 01:08:13.399
Mr . Whiteside . Thank you , Mr .

01:08:13.520 --> 01:08:15.742
Chairman . Um , thank you all for being

01:08:15.742 --> 01:08:17.742
here today . It's good to see you ,

01:08:17.742 --> 01:08:20.560
General Gil . Um , uh , I want to start

01:08:20.560 --> 01:08:22.393
by recognizing the extraordinary

01:08:22.393 --> 01:08:24.338
bravery and professionalism of our

01:08:24.338 --> 01:08:27.359
armed services , uh , servicing both in

01:08:27.359 --> 01:08:29.526
the Middle East and around the world ,

01:08:29.526 --> 01:08:31.526
and I join with all of those on the

01:08:31.526 --> 01:08:33.859
committee who are mourning the families .

01:08:34.350 --> 01:08:36.580
of those who have been lost in the

01:08:36.580 --> 01:08:39.689
conflict in the Middle East . Mr .

01:08:39.810 --> 01:08:41.588
Humir , 2 weeks ago I asked the

01:08:41.588 --> 01:08:43.754
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy ,

01:08:43.754 --> 01:08:45.921
who I believe is your boss , correct .

01:08:45.921 --> 01:08:48.143
Whether the department had forecast how

01:08:48.143 --> 01:08:50.628
high gas prices could get during the

01:08:50.628 --> 01:08:53.139
Iran conflict . He said he didn't know ,

01:08:53.758 --> 01:08:55.591
but he said he'd check back . We

01:08:55.591 --> 01:08:57.758
haven't heard anything . Have you done

01:08:57.758 --> 01:08:59.925
any analysis ? Are you aware of anyone

01:08:59.925 --> 01:09:02.147
in the department who has looked at how

01:09:02.147 --> 01:09:04.509
high ? Gas prices could get . I have

01:09:04.509 --> 01:09:06.565
not , Congressman , but I'm happy to

01:09:06.565 --> 01:09:08.065
take that question back to

01:09:08.065 --> 01:09:10.120
Undersecretary Colby . OK , we heard

01:09:10.120 --> 01:09:12.342
that two weeks ago and we haven't heard

01:09:12.342 --> 01:09:12.149
anything , and the American public , I

01:09:12.149 --> 01:09:14.205
think , rightfully needs to know how

01:09:14.205 --> 01:09:16.427
high gas prices are going to get during

01:09:16.427 --> 01:09:18.538
this conflict . So I hope you can get

01:09:18.538 --> 01:09:20.649
back to us soon . Can you commit to a

01:09:20.649 --> 01:09:20.310
date by which you can get back to us ?

01:09:20.669 --> 01:09:22.836
No , Congressman , because . The first

01:09:22.836 --> 01:09:24.780
time I'm hearing about it , so I'm

01:09:24.780 --> 01:09:24.049
happy to take that back and get back to

01:09:24.049 --> 01:09:26.271
your office . Recently , the department

01:09:26.271 --> 01:09:27.938
labeled a leading provider of

01:09:27.938 --> 01:09:30.109
artificial intelligence tools , uh ,

01:09:30.569 --> 01:09:32.458
tools which have been used in the

01:09:32.458 --> 01:09:34.347
administration's own high profile

01:09:34.347 --> 01:09:36.458
military deployments , a supply chain

01:09:36.458 --> 01:09:38.625
risk in large part simply because they

01:09:38.625 --> 01:09:40.513
did not commit to making the tool

01:09:40.513 --> 01:09:42.291
capable of mass surveillance of

01:09:42.291 --> 01:09:44.180
Americans . Mr . Humira , is mass

01:09:44.180 --> 01:09:46.402
surveillance of law abiding Americans a

01:09:46.402 --> 01:09:48.569
capability that you have identified as

01:09:48.569 --> 01:09:50.736
necessary for ensuring the security of

01:09:50.736 --> 01:09:52.680
Americans ? No , it's not . Is the

01:09:52.680 --> 01:09:52.290
Department of Defense currently

01:09:52.290 --> 01:09:54.346
targeting American communications in

01:09:54.346 --> 01:09:56.290
bulk , whether through the Defense

01:09:56.290 --> 01:09:58.457
Intelligence Agency or otherwise ? Not

01:09:58.457 --> 01:10:00.623
that I'm aware of . You would be aware

01:10:00.623 --> 01:10:02.679
of it , I imagine so , but I'm , I'm

01:10:02.679 --> 01:10:05.012
not aware of any program of that nature .

01:10:05.012 --> 01:10:07.179
Are you aware of recent reports that a

01:10:07.179 --> 01:10:09.290
Doge employee allegedly made off with

01:10:09.290 --> 01:10:11.346
millions of American Social Security

01:10:11.346 --> 01:10:13.500
records in a USB key ? No . The

01:10:13.500 --> 01:10:15.389
databases called Numident and the

01:10:15.389 --> 01:10:17.500
Master Death File include records for

01:10:17.500 --> 01:10:20.220
more than 500 million living and dead

01:10:20.220 --> 01:10:22.331
Americans , including Social Security

01:10:22.331 --> 01:10:24.442
numbers , places and dates of birth ,

01:10:24.442 --> 01:10:26.609
citizenship , race and ethnicity , and

01:10:26.609 --> 01:10:28.831
parents' names . Does the Department of

01:10:28.831 --> 01:10:30.776
Defense think it helps US national

01:10:30.776 --> 01:10:32.553
security to seek to destroy the

01:10:32.553 --> 01:10:34.387
American company that is now the

01:10:34.387 --> 01:10:36.498
leading US provider for enterprise AI

01:10:36.498 --> 01:10:38.553
and AI guided coding ? Congressman ,

01:10:38.553 --> 01:10:38.500
I'm , this is the first time I'm

01:10:38.500 --> 01:10:40.556
hearing about this issue . Uh , I'll

01:10:40.556 --> 01:10:42.667
consult with the team . I don't , I ,

01:10:42.667 --> 01:10:42.649
this is the first time I've been , uh ,

01:10:42.660 --> 01:10:44.771
brought to my attention , so I , uh ,

01:10:44.771 --> 01:10:47.104
lack the specifics on the specific case .

01:10:47.104 --> 01:10:49.689
OK , uh , General Gillo or General

01:10:49.689 --> 01:10:51.911
Donovan , do you work with the National

01:10:51.911 --> 01:10:54.078
Counterterrorism Center in your work ?

01:10:56.060 --> 01:10:58.116
Yes , sir , uh , we do at NorthCom .

01:10:58.919 --> 01:11:00.810
You're aware that the NCTC is the

01:11:00.810 --> 01:11:02.532
primary organization in the US

01:11:02.532 --> 01:11:04.143
government for analyzing and

01:11:04.143 --> 01:11:06.310
integrating all intelligence possessed

01:11:06.310 --> 01:11:07.977
or acquired by the government

01:11:07.977 --> 01:11:09.977
pertaining to terrorism ? Yes sir .

01:11:09.977 --> 01:11:11.977
You're aware that unlike many other

01:11:11.977 --> 01:11:14.032
intelligence agencies , the NCTC has

01:11:14.032 --> 01:11:16.143
the unique authority to draw upon and

01:11:16.143 --> 01:11:18.143
analyze intelligence collected both

01:11:18.143 --> 01:11:20.310
inside and outside the United States .

01:11:20.859 --> 01:11:22.803
Uh , I was not aware of the latter

01:11:22.803 --> 01:11:26.259
point . Are you aware that

01:11:26.259 --> 01:11:29.540
um the director of the

01:11:29.540 --> 01:11:33.430
NCTC who would have access to Basically

01:11:33.430 --> 01:11:37.209
all data related to terrorists or other

01:11:37.209 --> 01:11:39.620
threats to the United States . Just

01:11:40.600 --> 01:11:43.810
resigned , saying that Iran posed no

01:11:43.810 --> 01:11:45.588
imminent threat to our nation .

01:11:47.040 --> 01:11:49.151
Congressman , I was not aware that he

01:11:49.151 --> 01:11:51.109
resigned . Just have a couple of

01:11:51.109 --> 01:11:54.370
minutes left , um . After the

01:11:54.370 --> 01:11:56.537
administration mobilized 4000 National

01:11:56.537 --> 01:11:58.537
Guard troops and 700 Marines to Los

01:11:58.537 --> 01:12:00.648
Angeles , I joined my LA delegation ,

01:12:00.660 --> 01:12:02.549
Hask colleagues in demanding full

01:12:02.549 --> 01:12:04.919
transparency from Secretary of Defense

01:12:04.919 --> 01:12:06.975
Hegseth on the constitutionality and

01:12:06.975 --> 01:12:09.020
execution of the deployment . In

01:12:09.020 --> 01:12:11.242
December , the Supreme Court ruled that

01:12:11.242 --> 01:12:12.798
the president cannot bypass

01:12:12.798 --> 01:12:14.964
congressional approvement or the Posse

01:12:14.964 --> 01:12:17.131
Comitatus Act simply by labeling it as

01:12:17.131 --> 01:12:19.187
enforcing federal law . Mr . Humir ,

01:12:19.187 --> 01:12:21.076
will the administration commit to

01:12:21.076 --> 01:12:23.242
following the Supreme Court's order in

01:12:23.242 --> 01:12:25.353
this case and not to send troops into

01:12:25.353 --> 01:12:27.464
our own cities under unconstitutional

01:12:27.464 --> 01:12:29.353
grounds ? Uh , my understanding ,

01:12:29.353 --> 01:12:29.109
Congressman , is that the

01:12:29.109 --> 01:12:30.887
constitutional grounds that the

01:12:30.887 --> 01:12:32.998
department has used are both Title 10

01:12:32.998 --> 01:12:34.942
or Title Title 32 authorities that

01:12:34.942 --> 01:12:37.053
allow the , the department to be able

01:12:37.053 --> 01:12:38.776
to deploy forces , uh , at the

01:12:38.776 --> 01:12:38.620
discretion of the governors under Title

01:12:38.620 --> 01:12:40.676
32 or discretion of the president of

01:12:40.676 --> 01:12:42.810
Title 10 . Yeah , I think the Supreme

01:12:42.810 --> 01:12:46.080
Court disagrees with you . Um , but I

01:12:46.080 --> 01:12:47.858
appreciate your service , and I

01:12:47.858 --> 01:12:50.024
appreciate all of your service , and I

01:12:50.024 --> 01:12:52.080
yield back . Thank you . Gentlemen ,

01:12:52.080 --> 01:12:54.136
yells back , Chair , and I recognize

01:12:54.136 --> 01:12:53.700
gentle lady from Virginia , Miss

01:12:53.700 --> 01:12:55.867
Keegans . Thank you , Mr . Chair , and

01:12:55.867 --> 01:12:57.922
thank you to our panelists for being

01:12:57.922 --> 01:13:00.089
here and for your service to our great

01:13:00.089 --> 01:13:01.978
country . I have the privilege of

01:13:01.978 --> 01:13:01.939
representing Virginia's 2nd District ,

01:13:02.049 --> 01:13:04.220
so Hampton Roads , home to our East

01:13:04.220 --> 01:13:06.939
Coast Navy . Uh , but this past week we

01:13:06.939 --> 01:13:08.828
had a tragedy occur at one of our

01:13:08.828 --> 01:13:11.050
college campuses . We had a shooter who

01:13:13.509 --> 01:13:15.676
Who walked into Old Ami University and

01:13:15.676 --> 01:13:17.898
targeted our Army ROTC students there ,

01:13:17.898 --> 01:13:20.065
and we know that the shooter had known

01:13:20.065 --> 01:13:22.065
terrorist ties to ISIS and the fact

01:13:22.065 --> 01:13:24.120
that he was walking around openly on

01:13:24.120 --> 01:13:26.287
the streets of , of our city , uh , is

01:13:26.287 --> 01:13:28.490
very infuriating to me . Uh , part of

01:13:28.490 --> 01:13:30.490
the problem is state law we have in

01:13:30.490 --> 01:13:32.379
Virginia that , uh , colleges and

01:13:32.379 --> 01:13:34.212
universities cannot vet criminal

01:13:34.212 --> 01:13:37.250
histories of . Of , uh , people who are

01:13:37.250 --> 01:13:39.330
admitted to their campuses , but the

01:13:39.330 --> 01:13:41.441
reason I bring this up is because I'm

01:13:41.441 --> 01:13:43.608
worried about the terrorist cells that

01:13:43.608 --> 01:13:45.830
are in this country . We saw 14 million

01:13:45.830 --> 01:13:48.052
people walk across that southern border

01:13:48.052 --> 01:13:50.052
during the last administration . We

01:13:50.052 --> 01:13:51.941
know that , that , uh , there are

01:13:51.941 --> 01:13:51.810
people in this country that want to do

01:13:51.810 --> 01:13:54.032
our country harm , and that was on full

01:13:54.032 --> 01:13:56.254
display in , uh , in Virginia this past

01:13:56.254 --> 01:13:58.366
week . So , I , I'd like to hear from

01:13:58.366 --> 01:14:00.477
you . I know we've talked a lot about

01:14:00.477 --> 01:14:02.643
drug trafficking and cartel activity .

01:14:02.643 --> 01:14:04.810
And , and how that activity has , uh ,

01:14:04.810 --> 01:14:06.977
has changed , uh , you know , with the

01:14:06.977 --> 01:14:06.834
change of , of administration here in

01:14:06.834 --> 01:14:08.890
Washington . So what about terrorist

01:14:08.890 --> 01:14:11.112
activity ? Are , you know , do you feel

01:14:11.112 --> 01:14:13.278
like that is , is that , uh , has that

01:14:13.278 --> 01:14:15.390
gotten , gotten any better or worse ?

01:14:15.390 --> 01:14:17.556
Are we charting that as well ? Because

01:14:17.556 --> 01:14:17.384
I still have those same concerns that

01:14:17.604 --> 01:14:19.493
not only are they here , but they

01:14:19.493 --> 01:14:21.548
continue to be in , in places to the

01:14:21.548 --> 01:14:23.660
north and to , you know , Central and

01:14:23.660 --> 01:14:25.715
South America as well . So , so if I

01:14:25.715 --> 01:14:25.365
could hear from General Guillo and then

01:14:25.365 --> 01:14:27.970
General Donovan . Congresswoman , I

01:14:27.970 --> 01:14:30.410
share your concern . One of the

01:14:30.410 --> 01:14:32.577
important roles I think that I have as

01:14:32.577 --> 01:14:34.577
the NORTHCOM commander is to ensure

01:14:34.577 --> 01:14:36.410
that there is not a seam between

01:14:36.410 --> 01:14:38.688
Homeland Defense and Homeland Security .

01:14:38.688 --> 01:14:41.021
That could be exploited by an adversary .

01:14:41.021 --> 01:14:43.750
Therefore , that in cooperation with

01:14:43.750 --> 01:14:45.669
the intel agencies , federal law

01:14:45.669 --> 01:14:48.270
enforcement , and also Special

01:14:48.270 --> 01:14:51.759
Operations Command SOCOM , we host a

01:14:52.069 --> 01:14:55.850
CT summit every year where we look at

01:14:56.109 --> 01:14:58.649
that scene to make sure that anything

01:14:58.649 --> 01:15:00.593
that the law enforcement community

01:15:00.593 --> 01:15:02.427
knows , the military knows , and

01:15:02.427 --> 01:15:04.540
anything that Primarily CEO and SOCOM

01:15:04.540 --> 01:15:07.700
know from overseas on operations that

01:15:07.700 --> 01:15:09.811
could come into the homeland is known

01:15:09.811 --> 01:15:13.140
by all of us . The result of

01:15:13.140 --> 01:15:16.569
that last summit that both Admiral

01:15:16.569 --> 01:15:19.339
Bradley and I co-hosted was that the

01:15:19.339 --> 01:15:23.100
homegrown terrorist is probably our

01:15:23.100 --> 01:15:25.322
biggest threat because there are so few

01:15:25.322 --> 01:15:27.500
indicators of those individuals until

01:15:27.500 --> 01:15:30.049
they actually take action . On those

01:15:30.049 --> 01:15:33.890
that are actually directed by another

01:15:33.890 --> 01:15:36.168
terrorist agency , we usually see that ,

01:15:36.220 --> 01:15:38.442
you know , for instance , an ISIS or an

01:15:38.442 --> 01:15:40.930
al Qaeda directed , but the homegrown ,

01:15:41.370 --> 01:15:43.537
we don't . And so we work very closely

01:15:43.537 --> 01:15:45.703
with the FBI and others to try to find

01:15:45.703 --> 01:15:47.814
any indications that we can of that .

01:15:48.129 --> 01:15:50.370
And again , to close , I share your

01:15:50.370 --> 01:15:52.370
concern because I think that is our

01:15:52.370 --> 01:15:54.426
biggest threat . Great , thank you .

01:15:55.709 --> 01:15:58.009
Congresswoman , thank you . I believe

01:15:58.009 --> 01:16:00.750
the SouthTHCO role is to be that kind

01:16:00.750 --> 01:16:03.509
of forward area defense for the United

01:16:03.509 --> 01:16:05.620
States of America . So we participate

01:16:05.620 --> 01:16:07.453
in the same types of forums that

01:16:07.453 --> 01:16:10.339
General Guillo mentioned . We submit in

01:16:10.339 --> 01:16:13.919
conjunction with US Special Operations

01:16:13.919 --> 01:16:16.030
Command a CT risk assessment where we

01:16:16.030 --> 01:16:18.197
look at the global risk and then where

01:16:18.197 --> 01:16:20.252
does that global risk reside . Those

01:16:20.252 --> 01:16:22.197
entities reside in South America ,

01:16:22.197 --> 01:16:24.141
Central America , the Caribbean to

01:16:24.141 --> 01:16:26.141
ensure that we're part of that same

01:16:26.141 --> 01:16:28.308
discussion and when capable . Um , and

01:16:28.308 --> 01:16:27.970
with the right authorities we can act

01:16:27.970 --> 01:16:30.081
on those threats before they actually

01:16:30.081 --> 01:16:32.081
make it into the homeland . So very

01:16:32.081 --> 01:16:33.803
much linked through US Special

01:16:33.803 --> 01:16:36.026
Operations Command . Thank you . Well ,

01:16:36.026 --> 01:16:38.248
thank you for paying close attention to

01:16:38.248 --> 01:16:40.026
that issue . In addition to the

01:16:40.026 --> 01:16:41.914
constant , you know , increase of

01:16:41.914 --> 01:16:43.970
terrorist threats and , and , and to

01:16:43.970 --> 01:16:46.026
the north and to the south , we know

01:16:46.026 --> 01:16:48.192
that China continues to make inroads ,

01:16:48.192 --> 01:16:47.700
and we saw their Belt and Roads

01:16:47.700 --> 01:16:49.589
Initiative that's , that's really

01:16:49.589 --> 01:16:51.700
spread to Central and South America ,

01:16:51.700 --> 01:16:53.867
especially in And it was interesting ,

01:16:53.867 --> 01:16:55.922
we visited New Zealand last year and

01:16:55.922 --> 01:16:58.144
listening to them talk about that where

01:16:58.144 --> 01:17:00.256
China goes in and tries to make these

01:17:00.256 --> 01:16:59.310
improvements in the communities , but

01:16:59.310 --> 01:17:01.421
they turn out to be , uh , you know ,

01:17:01.709 --> 01:17:03.876
cheap improvements and they are , uh ,

01:17:03.910 --> 01:17:06.021
not well respected kind of at the end

01:17:06.021 --> 01:17:08.132
of the , uh , at the end of the , the

01:17:08.132 --> 01:17:10.243
work that they're doing . So I'm just

01:17:10.243 --> 01:17:12.410
curious if the , the progress that the

01:17:12.410 --> 01:17:12.020
Chinese have made , especially Central

01:17:12.020 --> 01:17:14.076
and South America , we heard they're

01:17:14.076 --> 01:17:16.076
trying to Uh , to , you know , come

01:17:16.076 --> 01:17:18.131
into those communities . Is it , are

01:17:18.131 --> 01:17:20.298
they , are those communities welcoming

01:17:20.298 --> 01:17:22.353
or are they a little more suspicious

01:17:22.353 --> 01:17:24.520
now of that kind of Chinese , uh , you

01:17:24.520 --> 01:17:24.319
know , integration into , into their

01:17:24.319 --> 01:17:27.609
space ? Congressman , thank you for

01:17:27.609 --> 01:17:30.169
highlighting that . As mentioned in the

01:17:30.169 --> 01:17:32.113
opening statement , very concerned

01:17:32.113 --> 01:17:34.299
about their Chinese ability to get in

01:17:34.299 --> 01:17:36.521
and create infrastructure projects that

01:17:36.521 --> 01:17:38.688
are clearly dual use . We mentioned we

01:17:38.688 --> 01:17:40.743
have 23 port projects we're watching

01:17:40.743 --> 01:17:43.379
right now and 2012 space sites we call

01:17:43.379 --> 01:17:45.500
them space enabling capabilities that

01:17:45.500 --> 01:17:47.700
are especially in the southern cone ,

01:17:47.779 --> 01:17:50.001
the southern portion of South America .

01:17:50.189 --> 01:17:52.356
I think you hit the nail on the head ,

01:17:52.356 --> 01:17:54.467
Congresswoman , that often , as we've

01:17:54.467 --> 01:17:56.411
seen in places I've heard before ,

01:17:56.411 --> 01:17:56.209
especially in Djibouti , I've watched

01:17:56.209 --> 01:17:58.509
the Chinese influence in Djibouti , and

01:17:58.509 --> 01:18:01.370
then you see 10 years later that

01:18:02.770 --> 01:18:04.826
time has expired and I recognize the

01:18:04.826 --> 01:18:06.937
gentle lady from Virginia , Ilfrith .

01:18:09.279 --> 01:18:11.446
Thank you , Mr . Chair . Very proud to

01:18:11.446 --> 01:18:13.557
represent Maryland , but always proud

01:18:13.557 --> 01:18:15.723
to follow my colleague from Virginia .

01:18:15.723 --> 01:18:15.490
It's OK . We have very similar

01:18:15.490 --> 01:18:17.890
interests . Very similar interests .

01:18:17.930 --> 01:18:20.097
Thank you . Thank you to our gentlemen

01:18:20.097 --> 01:18:22.319
for being here . I'm gonna take us back

01:18:22.319 --> 01:18:24.486
a couple of years to 2019 when three ,

01:18:24.486 --> 01:18:26.319
US Navy sailors were killed in a

01:18:26.319 --> 01:18:28.208
terrorist attack at Naval Station

01:18:28.208 --> 01:18:30.649
Pensacola by a Saudi trainee . One of

01:18:30.649 --> 01:18:32.927
them , uh , Navy officer Joshua Watson ,

01:18:32.927 --> 01:18:34.982
just 20 . 3 was a recent graduate of

01:18:34.982 --> 01:18:37.149
the United States Naval Academy that I

01:18:37.149 --> 01:18:39.371
proudly represent . Two others , Airman

01:18:39.371 --> 01:18:41.205
Mohammad Hatham , just 19 , from

01:18:41.205 --> 01:18:43.316
Florida , Airman Apprentice , Cameron

01:18:43.316 --> 01:18:45.427
Walters , 21 of Georgia , were killed

01:18:45.427 --> 01:18:47.427
in the attack . The families of the

01:18:47.427 --> 01:18:49.538
victims deserve answers and some type

01:18:49.538 --> 01:18:51.705
of resolution , um , for the fact that

01:18:51.705 --> 01:18:53.705
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not

01:18:53.705 --> 01:18:55.879
properly vet , uh , the trainee that

01:18:55.879 --> 01:18:58.212
committed these horrible acts . Can you ,

01:18:58.212 --> 01:19:00.379
anybody give me kind of a status check

01:19:00.379 --> 01:19:03.120
on the litigation ? And whether the

01:19:03.120 --> 01:19:05.342
families have received compensation for

01:19:05.342 --> 01:19:09.330
their loss . I'm , I'm happy

01:19:09.330 --> 01:19:11.497
to get you a status check , uh , and ,

01:19:11.497 --> 01:19:13.719
and after I go back to the office , but

01:19:13.719 --> 01:19:15.774
I will say vetting is something that

01:19:15.774 --> 01:19:15.529
we're particularly focused on as , as

01:19:15.529 --> 01:19:17.696
particularly as it applies to military

01:19:17.696 --> 01:19:19.862
installations . This is something that

01:19:19.862 --> 01:19:19.729
we looked at specifically when we

01:19:19.729 --> 01:19:21.840
started creating the national defense

01:19:21.840 --> 01:19:24.062
areas on the southwest border , and now

01:19:24.062 --> 01:19:23.890
we start to look at protocols that we

01:19:23.890 --> 01:19:26.057
can apply throughout the all US , uh ,

01:19:26.057 --> 01:19:27.890
federal installations as well as

01:19:27.890 --> 01:19:29.946
military . Could I get that response

01:19:29.946 --> 01:19:29.669
maybe in a week's time ? Is that

01:19:29.839 --> 01:19:31.895
appropriate ? I'm happy to respond .

01:19:31.895 --> 01:19:34.061
Thank you . Going to move on to Cuba .

01:19:34.061 --> 01:19:36.061
Yesterday afternoon , the president

01:19:36.061 --> 01:19:38.283
told reporters , I do believe I'll have

01:19:38.283 --> 01:19:38.220
the honor of taking Cuba . When he was

01:19:38.220 --> 01:19:40.442
asked what he meant by this , he said ,

01:19:40.442 --> 01:19:42.498
Taking Cuba in some form , whether I

01:19:42.498 --> 01:19:44.553
free it , take it . I think I can do

01:19:44.553 --> 01:19:46.664
anything I want with it . If you want

01:19:46.664 --> 01:19:48.609
to know the truth , they're a very

01:19:48.609 --> 01:19:48.470
weakened nation right now . General

01:19:48.470 --> 01:19:50.526
Donovan's prepared statements do not

01:19:50.526 --> 01:19:52.581
mention Cuba , nor does the national

01:19:52.581 --> 01:19:54.581
defense strategy identify Cuba as a

01:19:54.581 --> 01:19:56.803
threat . Can , can anybody identify for

01:19:56.803 --> 01:19:59.100
me or , or explain or define what take

01:19:59.100 --> 01:20:01.339
it could mean and then further what

01:20:01.339 --> 01:20:03.506
imminent threat the government of Cuba

01:20:03.506 --> 01:20:07.399
is , is placing on . Americans right

01:20:07.399 --> 01:20:11.350
now As I mentioned before , uh ,

01:20:11.379 --> 01:20:13.546
Congressman , Congresswoman , the Cuba

01:20:13.546 --> 01:20:15.910
has been involved in pretty much every

01:20:15.910 --> 01:20:18.132
threat that the United States has faced

01:20:18.132 --> 01:20:18.000
from the Western Hemisphere , whether

01:20:18.000 --> 01:20:19.833
it's intelligence , whether it's

01:20:19.833 --> 01:20:22.056
aligning with criminal groups , whether

01:20:22.056 --> 01:20:24.389
it's working with external state actors ,

01:20:24.389 --> 01:20:24.189
uh , the Cuban government has been

01:20:24.189 --> 01:20:26.133
intricately involved in a lot of .

01:20:26.133 --> 01:20:28.245
These threats and fundamentally we're

01:20:28.245 --> 01:20:30.411
involved inside Venezuela and imminent

01:20:30.411 --> 01:20:32.633
threat from the Cuban government to the

01:20:32.633 --> 01:20:34.522
American people right now through

01:20:34.522 --> 01:20:34.205
networks uh working with adversaries of

01:20:34.205 --> 01:20:36.372
the United States . So as you probably

01:20:36.372 --> 01:20:38.261
know , the prolonged blockade has

01:20:38.261 --> 01:20:40.316
caused as of yesterday , Cuba to its

01:20:40.316 --> 01:20:42.372
power grid to go down . Um , can you

01:20:42.372 --> 01:20:44.316
please help me understand , are we

01:20:44.316 --> 01:20:47.549
preparing to go and invade Cuba ? So

01:20:47.549 --> 01:20:49.549
the , the , uh , shortages that are

01:20:49.549 --> 01:20:51.660
happening in Cuba on both electricity

01:20:51.660 --> 01:20:53.882
and power have to do with the fact that

01:20:53.882 --> 01:20:56.105
Venezuela was subsidizing oil shipments

01:20:56.105 --> 01:20:55.819
to Cuba at pretty much a fraction of

01:20:55.819 --> 01:20:57.708
the cost in exchange for security

01:20:57.708 --> 01:20:59.819
personnel that was identified when we

01:20:59.819 --> 01:21:01.930
conducted Operation Absolute Result .

01:21:01.930 --> 01:21:04.263
Are we preparing to invade Cuba ? Ma'am ,

01:21:04.263 --> 01:21:06.486
I , I , I , I'm not familiar with any ,

01:21:06.486 --> 01:21:08.375
uh , plans on Cuba . What I , I'm

01:21:08.375 --> 01:21:08.189
saying is that fundamentally Cuba's

01:21:08.189 --> 01:21:10.411
prevented provided a significant threat

01:21:10.411 --> 01:21:12.578
to the United States' uh , hemispheric

01:21:12.578 --> 01:21:14.745
security for decades and close to half

01:21:14.745 --> 01:21:16.856
a century . OK , I'm gonna keep going

01:21:16.856 --> 01:21:19.078
with this kind of theme of a disconnect

01:21:19.078 --> 01:21:21.133
between the president's rhetoric and

01:21:21.133 --> 01:21:20.959
what I think what we're actually seeing

01:21:20.959 --> 01:21:23.015
imminent threats on the ground . I'm

01:21:23.015 --> 01:21:25.070
going to take us back to Greenland ,

01:21:25.070 --> 01:21:27.181
which feels like a decade ago but was

01:21:27.181 --> 01:21:29.348
only a short few months ago . There is

01:21:29.348 --> 01:21:31.570
no doubt from anybody on this committee

01:21:31.570 --> 01:21:33.237
that China . And Russia posed

01:21:33.237 --> 01:21:35.515
significant threats to Arctic security ,

01:21:35.515 --> 01:21:34.850
particularly because they've outpaced

01:21:34.850 --> 01:21:36.794
us on icebreakers and are far more

01:21:36.794 --> 01:21:39.089
aggressive , but we can all agree , I

01:21:39.089 --> 01:21:41.256
hope that it is too broad of a terrain

01:21:41.419 --> 01:21:43.580
to monitor and protect on our own .

01:21:43.660 --> 01:21:45.827
That's why we have allies . That's why

01:21:45.827 --> 01:21:48.104
we have , particularly our NATO allies .

01:21:48.104 --> 01:21:50.271
Yet again , the president's rhetoric ,

01:21:50.271 --> 01:21:52.216
um , I'll just quote . Hi , we are

01:21:52.216 --> 01:21:54.438
going to do something about Greenland .

01:21:54.438 --> 01:21:54.325
If we don't do it the easy way , we'll

01:21:54.325 --> 01:21:56.547
do it the hard way . General Guillo , I

01:21:56.547 --> 01:21:58.103
imagine that makes your job

01:21:58.103 --> 01:21:59.825
particularly difficult . I was

01:21:59.825 --> 01:22:01.714
heartened to hear in your opening

01:22:01.714 --> 01:22:03.825
statements , respect for our allies ,

01:22:03.825 --> 01:22:03.754
our NATO allies , how important Denmark

01:22:03.754 --> 01:22:05.921
and Greenland are to Arctic security .

01:22:05.921 --> 01:22:08.254
I guess my fundamental question here is ,

01:22:08.254 --> 01:22:10.476
what do you want to do or what does the

01:22:10.476 --> 01:22:12.476
president want to do with Greenland

01:22:12.476 --> 01:22:14.587
that the 1951 treaty doesn't allow us

01:22:14.587 --> 01:22:17.709
to do ? Congresswoman , we are working

01:22:17.709 --> 01:22:19.876
with Denmark through the Department of

01:22:19.876 --> 01:22:23.830
State to expand some of the authorities

01:22:23.830 --> 01:22:26.169
that are in the 1951 treaty to give

01:22:27.089 --> 01:22:29.229
increased access to different bases

01:22:29.229 --> 01:22:32.439
across Greenland as we look at the

01:22:32.484 --> 01:22:34.645
Increasing threat and the strategic

01:22:34.645 --> 01:22:37.004
importance of Greenland , but

01:22:37.004 --> 01:22:39.004
everything that we're doing through

01:22:39.004 --> 01:22:40.837
NorthCO is through Greenland and

01:22:40.837 --> 01:22:40.805
through Denmark . So I'm hearing we

01:22:40.805 --> 01:22:42.583
could have achieved all of this

01:22:42.583 --> 01:22:44.361
diplomatically through our NATO

01:22:44.361 --> 01:22:46.845
alliance without threatening to take or

01:22:46.845 --> 01:22:50.259
to invade Greenland by force . Well , I

01:22:50.259 --> 01:22:52.426
can speak to the mil to mill portion ,

01:22:52.426 --> 01:22:54.592
and we have a very strong relationship

01:22:54.592 --> 01:22:56.648
with Denmark , and I want to commend

01:22:56.648 --> 01:22:58.759
you for maintaining that relationship

01:22:58.759 --> 01:23:00.870
despite what some of the news or what

01:23:00.870 --> 01:23:03.092
the president may say . I think the mil

01:23:03.092 --> 01:23:05.259
to mill relationship is essential here

01:23:05.259 --> 01:23:07.370
despite that rhetoric . With that , I

01:23:07.370 --> 01:23:06.740
yield back . Thank you , Mr . Chair .

01:23:07.020 --> 01:23:09.020
Gentle lady from the great state of

01:23:09.020 --> 01:23:12.109
Maryland yields back . Chair and I

01:23:12.109 --> 01:23:14.276
recognize the gentleman from Indiana ,

01:23:14.276 --> 01:23:16.609
Mr . Mesmer . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

01:23:16.609 --> 01:23:18.553
and thank you to the witnesses for

01:23:18.553 --> 01:23:20.776
being here today . Uh , General Geo , I

01:23:20.776 --> 01:23:22.887
know you've been heavily engaged with

01:23:22.887 --> 01:23:22.790
General Gutlein and his team on the

01:23:22.790 --> 01:23:24.512
development of the Golden Dome

01:23:24.512 --> 01:23:26.568
architecture . What systems are most

01:23:26.568 --> 01:23:28.734
important requirements for Golden Dome

01:23:28.734 --> 01:23:30.790
to focus on to fulfill its strategic

01:23:30.790 --> 01:23:34.419
mission ? Congressman , uh , I view

01:23:34.419 --> 01:23:37.439
Golden Dome as a layered series of

01:23:37.439 --> 01:23:39.979
systems , and to me the most important

01:23:40.040 --> 01:23:42.569
layer is the domain awareness layer

01:23:43.040 --> 01:23:46.060
because regardless of how sophisticated

01:23:46.200 --> 01:23:48.439
and capable the interceptors are , if

01:23:48.439 --> 01:23:50.879
they're not the threat is not first

01:23:50.879 --> 01:23:52.823
detected , tracked , and queued to

01:23:52.823 --> 01:23:54.990
those interceptors , we have no chance

01:23:54.990 --> 01:23:57.046
of hitting them . So I would say the

01:23:57.046 --> 01:23:59.379
domain awareness layer . OK , thank you .

01:23:59.379 --> 01:24:01.268
You've previously stated that you

01:24:01.268 --> 01:24:03.379
predict capability will arrive sooner

01:24:03.379 --> 01:24:05.268
rather than later . Are you still

01:24:05.268 --> 01:24:07.490
confident that that will happen ? Yes ,

01:24:07.490 --> 01:24:09.768
Congressman , I'm still very confident .

01:24:09.768 --> 01:24:11.657
OK , thank you , General Geo , as

01:24:11.657 --> 01:24:13.657
threats to the homeland continue to

01:24:13.657 --> 01:24:15.740
evolve , how is NORCO adapting to

01:24:15.740 --> 01:24:17.907
emerging challenges such as hypersonic

01:24:17.907 --> 01:24:19.962
weapons systems of our adversaries ?

01:24:21.250 --> 01:24:23.319
Congressman , through Gold Dome of

01:24:23.319 --> 01:24:27.160
America primarily with space-based and

01:24:27.160 --> 01:24:29.104
ground-based systems to detect and

01:24:29.104 --> 01:24:31.271
track the hypersonics which present us

01:24:31.271 --> 01:24:33.439
challenges that ballistic missiles

01:24:33.439 --> 01:24:35.550
don't , and then the defeat mechanism

01:24:35.550 --> 01:24:37.383
because they can be engaged as a

01:24:37.383 --> 01:24:39.495
traditional ballistic missile or more

01:24:39.495 --> 01:24:42.000
in a terminal phase . It's the most

01:24:42.000 --> 01:24:44.167
destabilizing and challenging . Threat

01:24:45.160 --> 01:24:47.919
that we see and it's through our work

01:24:47.919 --> 01:24:49.919
with General Gutlein , I think it's

01:24:49.919 --> 01:24:51.975
very well integrated into the Golden

01:24:51.975 --> 01:24:53.975
Dome for America plan . Thank you ,

01:24:53.975 --> 01:24:56.379
General Gulein . Reports also indicate

01:24:56.379 --> 01:24:57.990
Russian submarines have been

01:24:57.990 --> 01:24:59.935
increasingly active in out of area

01:24:59.935 --> 01:25:02.046
patrols near the US coast , including

01:25:02.279 --> 01:25:04.446
the deployment of submarine in January

01:25:04.446 --> 01:25:07.479
to a sanctioned oil tanker , Marinara ,

01:25:07.750 --> 01:25:10.120
across the Atlantic amid US enforcement

01:25:10.120 --> 01:25:12.049
efforts . What are the specific

01:25:12.470 --> 01:25:14.470
requirements for NCO to effectively

01:25:14.470 --> 01:25:16.470
track these advanced submarines and

01:25:16.470 --> 01:25:18.526
hold them at risk ? Congressman , we

01:25:18.526 --> 01:25:22.160
have a series of capabilities that I

01:25:22.160 --> 01:25:24.439
call part of our maritime homeland

01:25:24.439 --> 01:25:28.100
defense package . That looks

01:25:28.100 --> 01:25:30.930
under the sea , so subsurface , surface ,

01:25:30.939 --> 01:25:33.859
and through the air to detect and track

01:25:33.859 --> 01:25:37.459
all submarines that would be considered

01:25:37.459 --> 01:25:39.870
a potential threat to the United States .

01:25:40.819 --> 01:25:42.819
To do this though , we have to have

01:25:42.819 --> 01:25:44.763
strong partnership with UCO , with

01:25:44.763 --> 01:25:46.597
SouthTHCOM , and with Indopaycom

01:25:46.700 --> 01:25:48.899
because the adversaries don't

01:25:48.899 --> 01:25:51.010
necessarily follow the lines on a map

01:25:51.010 --> 01:25:53.177
that we do . And so we traditionally ,

01:25:53.177 --> 01:25:55.343
what will happen is we'll One of those

01:25:55.343 --> 01:25:57.455
commands will activate the forces and

01:25:57.455 --> 01:25:59.677
then we'll transfer command and control

01:25:59.677 --> 01:26:02.634
of those forces as they prosecute

01:26:03.854 --> 01:26:06.015
the potential adversaries across the

01:26:06.015 --> 01:26:08.126
water and then that way we don't have

01:26:08.126 --> 01:26:10.126
to put more ships on them . We just

01:26:10.126 --> 01:26:11.959
keep the same ships and then the

01:26:11.959 --> 01:26:14.182
command and control will go from YCO to

01:26:14.182 --> 01:26:16.293
NorthCO to SouthCom and back , and we

01:26:16.293 --> 01:26:18.237
find that to be very effective and

01:26:18.237 --> 01:26:20.404
efficient . OK , thank you . How might

01:26:20.404 --> 01:26:22.626
the new STARTS Treaty end , enable more

01:26:22.626 --> 01:26:24.848
aggressive nuclear signaling ? And what

01:26:24.848 --> 01:26:24.540
role could slick them in play in that

01:26:24.540 --> 01:26:28.439
deterrence ? Congressman , I ,

01:26:28.560 --> 01:26:30.782
I , I have to tell you , I , uh , would

01:26:30.782 --> 01:26:33.390
have to defer to StratCom on that . OK ,

01:26:33.509 --> 01:26:35.731
thank you . Uh , General Donovan , uh ,

01:26:35.830 --> 01:26:37.608
multiple sources have mentioned

01:26:37.608 --> 01:26:39.552
containerized musicians as they're

01:26:39.552 --> 01:26:41.910
growing into Pacific threat , but media

01:26:41.910 --> 01:26:43.743
reports also suggest Russian and

01:26:43.743 --> 01:26:45.577
Chinese influence in the Western

01:26:45.577 --> 01:26:47.799
Hemisphere could enable similar tactics

01:26:47.799 --> 01:26:49.966
here . Uh , how can SouthCO adopt this

01:26:49.966 --> 01:26:51.950
force posture to counter these ?

01:26:54.529 --> 01:26:56.307
Congressman , the containerized

01:26:56.307 --> 01:26:58.196
munitions , I'm not tracking that

01:26:58.196 --> 01:27:00.307
threat directly in SOUTHCOM , but did

01:27:00.307 --> 01:27:02.473
make me think of our relationship with

01:27:02.473 --> 01:27:04.529
many of our partners , I think Costa

01:27:04.529 --> 01:27:06.751
Rica . The advances Costa Rica has made

01:27:06.751 --> 01:27:08.918
in advanced scanning systems for their

01:27:08.918 --> 01:27:10.807
ports that are obviously used for

01:27:10.807 --> 01:27:12.640
scanning for narcotics and other

01:27:12.640 --> 01:27:12.490
illicit acts , the same kind of

01:27:12.490 --> 01:27:14.601
scanners we would be able to identify

01:27:14.601 --> 01:27:16.768
those containers , but it is a problem

01:27:16.768 --> 01:27:18.990
because of just the ease in which those

01:27:18.990 --> 01:27:21.046
containers move around the theater .

01:27:21.046 --> 01:27:23.101
Thank you . Also , General Donovan ,

01:27:23.101 --> 01:27:25.157
transnational criminal organizations

01:27:25.157 --> 01:27:27.101
remain a major driver of narcotics

01:27:27.101 --> 01:27:28.712
trafficking , violence , and

01:27:28.712 --> 01:27:30.768
instability across the region . What

01:27:30.768 --> 01:27:32.990
authorities does SouthCom need the most

01:27:32.990 --> 01:27:34.879
from Congress to more effectively

01:27:34.879 --> 01:27:37.189
counter these networks ? Congressman ,

01:27:37.240 --> 01:27:39.018
currently I believe we have the

01:27:39.018 --> 01:27:41.073
authorities we need to counter these

01:27:41.073 --> 01:27:43.240
networks , and I believe we are moving

01:27:43.240 --> 01:27:45.351
forward with Operation Southern Spear

01:27:45.351 --> 01:27:47.351
to do just that thing . Thank you .

01:27:47.351 --> 01:27:49.462
Would expanding cyber operational and

01:27:49.462 --> 01:27:52.100
assistance authorities to cover

01:27:52.520 --> 01:27:54.742
transnational criminal organizations be

01:27:54.742 --> 01:27:57.979
of use ? Congressman , absolutely . OK ,

01:27:58.490 --> 01:28:00.434
uh , thank you . And with that , I

01:28:00.434 --> 01:28:02.546
yield back the remainder of my time .

01:28:02.546 --> 01:28:04.546
Gentlemen yields back . Chair and I

01:28:04.546 --> 01:28:04.319
recognize a gentleman from Illinois ,

01:28:04.439 --> 01:28:06.772
Mr . Sorenson . Thank you Mr . Chairman .

01:28:06.772 --> 01:28:09.050
I would like to welcome General Guillo ,

01:28:09.259 --> 01:28:11.592
um , General Donovan , and Mr . Humeyer .

01:28:11.649 --> 01:28:13.705
Um , Mr . Humeyer , I just wanted to

01:28:13.705 --> 01:28:15.529
give you another chance to be

01:28:15.529 --> 01:28:17.689
completely truthful to this committee

01:28:17.689 --> 01:28:19.729
concerning Congresswoman Alfred's

01:28:19.729 --> 01:28:21.951
question . You're saying that there are

01:28:21.951 --> 01:28:24.118
no plans to invade Cuba at this time ,

01:28:24.118 --> 01:28:27.049
March 17 , 2026 , correct ? I'm not

01:28:27.049 --> 01:28:29.216
aware of any plans , Congressman , and

01:28:29.216 --> 01:28:31.216
I defer to the White House on those

01:28:31.216 --> 01:28:33.382
decisions . Thank you very much . Uh ,

01:28:33.382 --> 01:28:33.129
when we talk about what is necessary

01:28:33.129 --> 01:28:35.390
for our war fighter and their mission ,

01:28:35.669 --> 01:28:38.069
uh , we often focus on munitions , on

01:28:38.069 --> 01:28:40.750
strategy , and on capability . But as

01:28:40.750 --> 01:28:42.528
we've seen earlier this year in

01:28:42.528 --> 01:28:45.029
Operation , uh , Absolute Resolve , the

01:28:45.029 --> 01:28:47.830
weather played a significant role in

01:28:47.830 --> 01:28:50.580
the capture of Maduro , while allowing

01:28:50.580 --> 01:28:52.950
every service member to come home to

01:28:52.950 --> 01:28:54.939
their family . As the only

01:28:54.939 --> 01:28:56.828
meteorologist serving here in the

01:28:56.828 --> 01:28:58.606
United States Congress , I know

01:28:58.606 --> 01:29:00.772
firsthand how accurate weather data is

01:29:00.772 --> 01:29:03.050
essential to keeping our military safe ,

01:29:03.050 --> 01:29:05.383
as well as our neighbors back home . Um ,

01:29:05.383 --> 01:29:07.717
so , to both of the generals here today ,

01:29:07.717 --> 01:29:09.495
could you discuss how important

01:29:09.495 --> 01:29:11.272
accurate weather data is to the

01:29:11.272 --> 01:29:13.161
effectiveness of our missions and

01:29:13.161 --> 01:29:16.870
keeping our homeland safe ? Congressman ,

01:29:17.080 --> 01:29:19.024
I'll start if it's OK with General

01:29:19.024 --> 01:29:21.247
Donovan . It's it's the opening part of

01:29:21.247 --> 01:29:23.660
any one of our mission briefs I was

01:29:23.660 --> 01:29:25.771
going to bring that up . It certainly

01:29:25.771 --> 01:29:28.080
is , and every time we do a mission

01:29:28.080 --> 01:29:30.580
brief , we have contingencies , and the

01:29:30.580 --> 01:29:32.747
first contingency we talk about is the

01:29:32.747 --> 01:29:34.858
weather . And I'll point out over the

01:29:34.858 --> 01:29:37.629
weekend there was a an airliner with a

01:29:37.629 --> 01:29:39.796
bomb threat that was flying in towards

01:29:39.796 --> 01:29:41.962
the United States in the most , and we

01:29:41.962 --> 01:29:44.240
talk about three dimensions , you know ,

01:29:44.240 --> 01:29:46.073
the two dimensions laterally and

01:29:46.073 --> 01:29:48.296
altitude , but the fourth dimension was

01:29:48.296 --> 01:29:50.518
the weather that was affecting us to be

01:29:50.518 --> 01:29:52.629
able or tried to affect us to go make

01:29:52.629 --> 01:29:54.573
that intercept . So the weather is

01:29:54.573 --> 01:29:56.740
central to everything that we plan for

01:29:56.740 --> 01:29:59.073
and execute . Great , sir . Congressman ,

01:29:59.080 --> 01:30:01.024
thanks for being a geography major

01:30:01.024 --> 01:30:04.560
talking to a meteorologist type person ,

01:30:05.399 --> 01:30:07.919
I really enjoyed hearing your comments ,

01:30:07.959 --> 01:30:09.810
and I think from an aviation

01:30:09.810 --> 01:30:11.810
perspective to a ground or maritime

01:30:11.810 --> 01:30:13.977
perspective , I think of the impact of

01:30:13.977 --> 01:30:16.199
the weather not only when we plan , but

01:30:16.199 --> 01:30:18.310
actually through execution . We track

01:30:18.310 --> 01:30:20.254
very distinct weather data through

01:30:20.254 --> 01:30:22.254
execution . If I'm returning a ship

01:30:22.254 --> 01:30:24.310
back to an aircraft carrier aircraft

01:30:24.310 --> 01:30:26.366
carrier . Inbound , the ship , if we

01:30:26.366 --> 01:30:29.950
increase 10 knots of wind , 2 ft of sea

01:30:29.950 --> 01:30:31.950
height , we end up having a problem

01:30:31.950 --> 01:30:34.006
recovering our aircraft . And so the

01:30:34.006 --> 01:30:36.228
key is that it plays into everything we

01:30:36.228 --> 01:30:38.228
do , and no amount of technology is

01:30:38.228 --> 01:30:40.450
going to diminish the weather . We have

01:30:40.450 --> 01:30:42.561
to be able to predict it and act with

01:30:42.561 --> 01:30:44.728
it every single day . My grandfather ,

01:30:44.728 --> 01:30:46.950
when I was a kid , he was in the United

01:30:46.950 --> 01:30:49.117
States Navy in World War II , and he ,

01:30:49.117 --> 01:30:51.339
my grandpa Sorenson , is the reason why

01:30:51.339 --> 01:30:51.140
I'm a meteorologist today , and if he

01:30:51.140 --> 01:30:53.500
was living today , he could understand

01:30:53.500 --> 01:30:55.500
how important it would be to sit in

01:30:55.500 --> 01:30:57.722
this chair and talk about how important

01:30:57.722 --> 01:30:59.500
it is that cutting NOAA and the

01:30:59.500 --> 01:31:01.500
National Weather Service , not only

01:31:01.500 --> 01:31:03.722
does that impede accurate forecasts for

01:31:03.722 --> 01:31:03.529
meteorologists during times of severe

01:31:03.529 --> 01:31:05.696
weather , but I believe the Navy , the

01:31:05.696 --> 01:31:07.862
Air Force , the Space Force will be at

01:31:07.862 --> 01:31:09.973
greater risk as our country loses its

01:31:09.973 --> 01:31:12.196
meteorological supremacy . Uh , to Mr .

01:31:12.196 --> 01:31:14.418
Humeyer , could you please tell me your

01:31:14.418 --> 01:31:16.585
understanding of weather forecasts and

01:31:16.585 --> 01:31:16.370
how they keep our service members safe ?

01:31:17.160 --> 01:31:19.438
I think that's an operational question ,

01:31:19.438 --> 01:31:21.604
but fundamentally , I mean the weather

01:31:21.604 --> 01:31:21.200
is in all kinds of operations , uh ,

01:31:21.319 --> 01:31:23.279
whether it's , uh , related to

01:31:23.279 --> 01:31:25.501
inclement weather and we have hurricane

01:31:25.501 --> 01:31:27.668
season that often hits the Caribbean ,

01:31:27.668 --> 01:31:29.557
and a lot of our partners ask for

01:31:29.557 --> 01:31:31.890
humanitarian assistance disaster relief ,

01:31:31.890 --> 01:31:31.390
so weather's a critical component . Are

01:31:31.390 --> 01:31:33.446
you aware of the lifted condensation

01:31:33.446 --> 01:31:35.612
level ? I'm not . OK , that's the base

01:31:35.612 --> 01:31:38.009
of any cloud . OK , so anyone flying

01:31:38.009 --> 01:31:40.231
with the Navy or the Air Force , it has

01:31:40.231 --> 01:31:42.342
an essential understanding of keeping

01:31:42.490 --> 01:31:44.546
aircraft away from a line of sight .

01:31:44.546 --> 01:31:46.768
Every , as you've mentioned , General ,

01:31:46.768 --> 01:31:48.712
every ops briefing begins with the

01:31:48.712 --> 01:31:50.601
weather , and maybe it's not just

01:31:50.601 --> 01:31:52.879
meteorological understanding . Um , Mr .

01:31:52.879 --> 01:31:52.529
Humeyer , do you understand what

01:31:52.529 --> 01:31:54.970
happens when we cut funding to an

01:31:54.970 --> 01:31:58.089
already lean , NOAA ? You know , why

01:31:58.089 --> 01:32:00.311
would you believe that we could ever be

01:32:00.311 --> 01:32:02.770
in a better situation today with less

01:32:02.770 --> 01:32:05.620
accurate data ? I'm not aware of that

01:32:05.620 --> 01:32:08.370
uh funding cut . Well , this

01:32:08.370 --> 01:32:10.370
administration clearly wants to cut

01:32:10.370 --> 01:32:12.592
NOAA and the National Weather Service .

01:32:12.592 --> 01:32:14.481
They put it through the Doge meat

01:32:14.481 --> 01:32:16.703
wringer in the last year , and I saw so

01:32:16.703 --> 01:32:18.703
many of my former colleagues in the

01:32:18.703 --> 01:32:20.759
meteorological enterprise get thrown

01:32:20.759 --> 01:32:22.370
out to the curb . We've seen

01:32:22.370 --> 01:32:24.740
degradation of weather models . Um , I

01:32:24.740 --> 01:32:26.979
was talking with leaders at the Weather

01:32:26.979 --> 01:32:28.757
Channel today , and they said ,

01:32:28.899 --> 01:32:30.899
Congressman , can you protect . The

01:32:30.899 --> 01:32:33.010
data , but let's also understand it's

01:32:33.010 --> 01:32:34.899
not just the data that is used in

01:32:34.899 --> 01:32:36.899
weather forecasting , it's the data

01:32:36.899 --> 01:32:39.066
that we're using for warfighters . And

01:32:39.066 --> 01:32:41.288
so it concerns me that you're not aware

01:32:41.288 --> 01:32:43.343
that weather data is being impeded .

01:32:43.343 --> 01:32:45.455
Well , I would differ actually on the

01:32:45.455 --> 01:32:44.973
operational aspects , as , as both

01:32:44.973 --> 01:32:46.751
General Gar and General Donovan

01:32:46.751 --> 01:32:48.751
mentioned , you know , weather is a

01:32:48.751 --> 01:32:48.413
critical component of operational

01:32:48.413 --> 01:32:50.580
planning for all kinds of operations ,

01:32:50.580 --> 01:32:52.246
whether they're , uh , combat

01:32:52.246 --> 01:32:54.191
operations or they're uh . Support

01:32:54.191 --> 01:32:54.085
operations during peace environments .

01:32:54.405 --> 01:32:56.405
So if they have the authorities and

01:32:56.405 --> 01:32:58.461
they have the capabilities and tools

01:32:58.461 --> 01:33:00.516
that they need , then , then I think

01:33:00.516 --> 01:33:02.016
that's where our , my , my

01:33:02.016 --> 01:33:04.016
responsibility lies . Uh , I , as I

01:33:04.016 --> 01:33:03.965
said , I wasn't aware of the cuts are

01:33:03.965 --> 01:33:05.965
going to NOAA , but if they tell me

01:33:05.965 --> 01:33:07.687
that they don't have the , the

01:33:07.687 --> 01:33:07.625
authorities or the res , uh , um ,

01:33:07.715 --> 01:33:09.806
resourcing that they need to conduct

01:33:09.806 --> 01:33:12.139
operations , then we would elevate that ,

01:33:12.139 --> 01:33:14.195
gentleman's time's expired . Chair ,

01:33:14.195 --> 01:33:13.235
and I recognize gentleman from

01:33:13.235 --> 01:33:15.759
Minnesota , Mr . Penstead . Thank you ,

01:33:15.799 --> 01:33:17.855
Chairman Rob , uh , Rogers , Ranking

01:33:17.855 --> 01:33:19.966
Member Smith . Uh , thank you for our

01:33:19.966 --> 01:33:22.077
testifiers for being here . Thank you

01:33:22.077 --> 01:33:21.819
for your service . Uh , General Donovan ,

01:33:21.910 --> 01:33:24.060
good job wearing green today . Might

01:33:24.060 --> 01:33:26.282
have to pinch , might have to pinch the

01:33:26.282 --> 01:33:28.227
other two guys because I don't see

01:33:28.227 --> 01:33:29.729
green on them . Uh

01:33:32.470 --> 01:33:35.990
Yeah . Throughout your testimony today

01:33:35.990 --> 01:33:37.934
and throughout your answers to the

01:33:37.934 --> 01:33:40.157
questions of of many of my colleagues ,

01:33:40.157 --> 01:33:42.268
we've we've heard much about the many

01:33:42.268 --> 01:33:44.212
ways which NRHCOM and SOCOM ensure

01:33:44.212 --> 01:33:43.629
global security and help maintain

01:33:43.629 --> 01:33:45.462
stability throughout the Western

01:33:45.462 --> 01:33:47.685
Hemisphere . The importance of a strong

01:33:47.685 --> 01:33:49.629
NORTHCOM and SOTHCOM has been made

01:33:49.629 --> 01:33:52.319
abundantly clear . Uh , General Guillo ,

01:33:52.520 --> 01:33:54.750
uh , as you know , effective operations

01:33:54.750 --> 01:33:56.639
in the Arctic require specialized

01:33:56.639 --> 01:33:58.750
training and equipment under the best

01:33:58.750 --> 01:34:00.472
of conditions , and there's no

01:34:00.472 --> 01:34:02.528
substitute for real world experience

01:34:02.528 --> 01:34:04.417
and training in the region . It's

01:34:04.417 --> 01:34:06.361
critical to have designated Arctic

01:34:06.361 --> 01:34:06.200
units that are specifically trained and

01:34:06.200 --> 01:34:08.144
equipped to execute their assigned

01:34:08.144 --> 01:34:10.439
missions in missions . For example , my

01:34:10.439 --> 01:34:12.606
home state of Minnesota , we , uh , we

01:34:12.606 --> 01:34:14.495
experience it all . We're , we're

01:34:14.495 --> 01:34:16.495
hearty folks . Uh , unfortunately ,

01:34:16.495 --> 01:34:18.439
we're known for a few other things

01:34:18.439 --> 01:34:20.606
right now , but we , we definitely are

01:34:20.606 --> 01:34:19.790
known for our weather and we're

01:34:19.790 --> 01:34:22.109
experiencing that right now . Uh ,

01:34:22.310 --> 01:34:24.310
Minnesota offers this unique , uh ,

01:34:24.310 --> 01:34:25.977
environment for testing these

01:34:25.977 --> 01:34:28.143
capabilities with the cold climate and

01:34:28.143 --> 01:34:30.143
the presence of Lake Superior . The

01:34:30.143 --> 01:34:32.199
lake's vast expanse , uh , deep cold

01:34:32.199 --> 01:34:34.254
waters and extreme winter conditions

01:34:34.254 --> 01:34:36.477
closely mimic harsh environments of the

01:34:36.477 --> 01:34:38.643
Arctic . There's only so many places ,

01:34:38.643 --> 01:34:40.810
uh , in the homeland that offer that ,

01:34:40.810 --> 01:34:42.921
and we're proud to , to have that and

01:34:42.921 --> 01:34:44.977
be that in Minnesota . So General uh

01:34:45.009 --> 01:34:47.120
Geo , what are the primary challenges

01:34:47.120 --> 01:34:49.390
NORTHCOM faces in conducting military

01:34:49.390 --> 01:34:51.580
operations and testings in the Arctic

01:34:51.580 --> 01:34:55.459
environment ? Congressman , I would

01:34:55.459 --> 01:34:57.839
focus on 21 of them you just mentioned ,

01:34:57.959 --> 01:35:00.070
which is the , uh , ensuring that all

01:35:00.070 --> 01:35:03.910
the forces are trained and equipped

01:35:03.910 --> 01:35:06.319
with the equipment that it it it takes

01:35:06.319 --> 01:35:08.597
to operate in those harsh environments .

01:35:09.839 --> 01:35:11.990
The other is we have to actually do

01:35:11.990 --> 01:35:14.490
that training and so we just completed

01:35:14.490 --> 01:35:16.839
Arctic Edge , which is an exercise in

01:35:16.839 --> 01:35:18.979
Alaska which is traditionally held

01:35:18.979 --> 01:35:21.209
during the period of the year with good

01:35:21.209 --> 01:35:23.490
weather , and I intentionally moved it

01:35:23.490 --> 01:35:26.970
back into February , March so

01:35:26.970 --> 01:35:29.930
we would have the aircrew . And the

01:35:29.930 --> 01:35:32.879
maintainers operating and preparing

01:35:32.879 --> 01:35:35.509
aircraft to work in those harsh

01:35:35.509 --> 01:35:37.731
environments and we're learning a lot .

01:35:37.731 --> 01:35:39.898
The second part is the forces that are

01:35:39.898 --> 01:35:43.319
in Alaska , in Minnesota , in Michigan ,

01:35:43.799 --> 01:35:45.799
upper New York are all very good at

01:35:45.799 --> 01:35:47.966
operating in that environment , but if

01:35:47.966 --> 01:35:49.910
they push forward in a conflict to

01:35:49.910 --> 01:35:51.855
another region . Their backfill is

01:35:51.855 --> 01:35:53.855
probably a unit that is not used to

01:35:53.855 --> 01:35:55.743
that . And so I'm , I'm trying to

01:35:55.743 --> 01:35:57.688
identify within the services , the

01:35:57.688 --> 01:35:59.799
specific units that require that type

01:35:59.799 --> 01:36:02.021
of training so they can do that . And ,

01:36:02.021 --> 01:36:04.188
and the last thing I'll point out very

01:36:04.188 --> 01:36:06.188
quickly is I'm working very closely

01:36:06.188 --> 01:36:08.410
with General Steve Nordhaus , who's the

01:36:08.410 --> 01:36:10.632
chief of the National Guard Bureau , on

01:36:10.632 --> 01:36:12.521
increasing in the US our training

01:36:12.521 --> 01:36:14.743
opportunities , so we don't always have

01:36:14.743 --> 01:36:16.966
to do it in Alaska , so we can do it in

01:36:16.966 --> 01:36:19.200
Minnesota , Michigan . In New York and

01:36:19.200 --> 01:36:21.839
expand the opportunities for stateside

01:36:21.839 --> 01:36:24.117
units to get that Arctic type training .

01:36:24.669 --> 01:36:26.947
I'm great to , uh , great to hear that .

01:36:26.947 --> 01:36:29.350
Uh , so , uh , a little bit more depth

01:36:29.350 --> 01:36:31.517
on this . So how do , how do you , how

01:36:31.517 --> 01:36:33.739
does NOTHCO assess the effectiveness of

01:36:33.739 --> 01:36:35.906
its current Arctic training ? Uh , and

01:36:35.906 --> 01:36:38.128
testing programs , can you describe the

01:36:38.128 --> 01:36:39.794
importance of improving these

01:36:39.794 --> 01:36:39.569
capabilities ? You , you alluded to it

01:36:39.569 --> 01:36:41.680
a little bit , but you know , we , we

01:36:41.680 --> 01:36:43.791
in Minnesota are looking forward to ,

01:36:43.791 --> 01:36:45.958
uh , continuing to grow and , and work

01:36:45.958 --> 01:36:48.000
with increasing capabilities , uh ,

01:36:48.250 --> 01:36:50.729
testing range . Uh , we have the

01:36:50.729 --> 01:36:52.673
resources , we have the , the deep

01:36:52.673 --> 01:36:54.896
water , we have , uh , I mean , it's on

01:36:54.896 --> 01:36:54.890
the homeland , right ? So this is

01:36:54.890 --> 01:36:57.169
something that we can control and so

01:36:57.169 --> 01:36:59.225
just maybe a little bit more about ,

01:36:59.225 --> 01:37:01.336
you know , kind of what are the , the

01:37:01.336 --> 01:37:03.225
metrics that you use to to , uh ,

01:37:03.225 --> 01:37:05.558
measure the effectiveness . Congressman ,

01:37:05.558 --> 01:37:07.640
what I use is their ability to come

01:37:07.640 --> 01:37:09.696
quickly and operate inside of one of

01:37:09.696 --> 01:37:12.330
our operational plans , and I would say

01:37:13.919 --> 01:37:15.759
the best we have is our special

01:37:15.759 --> 01:37:19.500
operations forces . We have identified

01:37:20.120 --> 01:37:21.953
units that go up there and train

01:37:21.953 --> 01:37:24.319
regularly and expand their mission not

01:37:24.319 --> 01:37:26.640
only in Alaska or in the northern part

01:37:26.640 --> 01:37:28.751
of the US , but also into Greenland .

01:37:29.020 --> 01:37:31.430
And I don't mean this as a criticism ,

01:37:31.470 --> 01:37:33.637
but the Air Force is probably the most

01:37:33.637 --> 01:37:35.859
challenged because most of , you know ,

01:37:35.859 --> 01:37:37.637
so many of the bases are in the

01:37:37.637 --> 01:37:39.803
southern part of the US and so many of

01:37:39.803 --> 01:37:41.830
the US Air Force units have been on

01:37:41.830 --> 01:37:43.941
rotation in the Middle East for years

01:37:43.941 --> 01:37:46.108
and years , and that's the environment

01:37:46.108 --> 01:37:46.029
where they've gotten their most

01:37:46.029 --> 01:37:47.973
training . And so I'm working very

01:37:47.973 --> 01:37:50.085
closely with General Wilsbach and his

01:37:50.085 --> 01:37:52.196
staff to get more of the Air National

01:37:52.196 --> 01:37:54.620
Guard and regular Air Force units

01:37:55.069 --> 01:37:57.520
trained in the Arctic environment . Uh ,

01:37:57.549 --> 01:38:00.549
it's great to hear . Uh , Minnesota is ,

01:38:00.600 --> 01:38:02.822
is open for business . We welcome you .

01:38:02.822 --> 01:38:04.933
Uh , you bring the jets , we'll bring

01:38:04.933 --> 01:38:07.156
the cold weather and the , uh , climate

01:38:07.156 --> 01:38:08.767
that , that will provide our

01:38:08.767 --> 01:38:10.989
warfighters the awesome opportunity and

01:38:10.989 --> 01:38:10.799
training . Uh , thank you again for

01:38:10.799 --> 01:38:13.132
being here . Thank you for your service ,

01:38:13.132 --> 01:38:15.243
and Mr . Chair , I yield back . Thank

01:38:15.243 --> 01:38:17.243
you . The chair now recognizes Mr .

01:38:17.243 --> 01:38:19.466
Vasquez from New Mexico for 5 minutes .

01:38:19.479 --> 01:38:21.368
Thank you Mr . Chairman . General

01:38:21.368 --> 01:38:23.090
Guillo , General Donovan , and

01:38:23.090 --> 01:38:25.257
Assistant Secretary Hugh Meyer , thank

01:38:25.257 --> 01:38:24.970
you for being here today . Over the

01:38:24.970 --> 01:38:27.026
past month , there have been several

01:38:27.026 --> 01:38:29.137
incidents that have caused myself and

01:38:29.137 --> 01:38:31.248
other members of Congress to question

01:38:31.248 --> 01:38:31.089
the Department of Defense's ability to

01:38:31.089 --> 01:38:33.145
coordinate effectively with other US

01:38:33.145 --> 01:38:35.370
agencies . On February 11 , the FAA

01:38:35.370 --> 01:38:37.259
shut down the El Paso airport and

01:38:37.259 --> 01:38:39.148
airspace with no warning to local

01:38:39.148 --> 01:38:41.203
officials , residents , or lawmakers

01:38:41.203 --> 01:38:43.092
such as myself . The FAA said the

01:38:43.092 --> 01:38:45.148
airport and airspace would be closed

01:38:45.148 --> 01:38:47.259
for 10 days , citing special security

01:38:47.259 --> 01:38:49.426
reasons . As the Southern New Mexicans

01:38:49.426 --> 01:38:51.648
that I represent woke up to this sudden

01:38:51.648 --> 01:38:53.648
news , absolute chaos and confusion

01:38:53.648 --> 01:38:55.592
ensued . The public , myself , and

01:38:55.592 --> 01:38:57.759
other members of Congress were left in

01:38:57.759 --> 01:38:59.926
the dark wondering if there was a more

01:38:59.926 --> 01:39:02.203
serious threat that we were unaware of ,

01:39:02.203 --> 01:39:04.426
as was originally indicated , which led

01:39:04.426 --> 01:39:06.481
to widespread widespread speculation

01:39:06.481 --> 01:39:07.981
and misinformation . After

01:39:07.981 --> 01:39:10.203
Representative Escobar and I launched a

01:39:10.203 --> 01:39:12.203
congressional inquiry , the airport

01:39:12.203 --> 01:39:14.203
quickly reopened , but for multiple

01:39:14.203 --> 01:39:15.814
days we received conflicting

01:39:15.814 --> 01:39:15.569
information from the Department of

01:39:15.569 --> 01:39:17.930
Defense , Fort Bliss officials , DHS ,

01:39:18.049 --> 01:39:20.089
and the FAA as to exactly what had

01:39:20.089 --> 01:39:22.970
happened . FAA staff told my office the

01:39:22.970 --> 01:39:24.803
temporary flight restriction was

01:39:24.803 --> 01:39:27.109
preplanned , but the FAA administrator

01:39:27.490 --> 01:39:29.379
instead tweeted that there was an

01:39:29.379 --> 01:39:31.546
active threat . Then we learned it was

01:39:31.546 --> 01:39:33.712
related to DOD technology in the hands

01:39:33.712 --> 01:39:35.934
of Border Patrol . After an explanation

01:39:35.934 --> 01:39:37.879
of shooting down a party balloon ,

01:39:38.040 --> 01:39:40.207
meanwhile , nearly half of the flights

01:39:40.207 --> 01:39:42.429
out of El Paso that day were canceled ,

01:39:42.429 --> 01:39:44.484
with thousands of people affected by

01:39:44.484 --> 01:39:46.707
this incompetence . Overnight , medevac

01:39:46.707 --> 01:39:48.651
flights were suspended . A similar

01:39:48.651 --> 01:39:50.707
incident happened only 2 weeks later

01:39:50.707 --> 01:39:52.818
when the DOD accidentally shot down a

01:39:52.818 --> 01:39:54.873
CBP drone after CBP failed to notify

01:39:54.873 --> 01:39:57.096
the department of an ongoing exercise .

01:39:57.096 --> 01:39:59.318
This led to the FAA issuing a temporary

01:39:59.318 --> 01:40:01.373
flight restriction over Fort Hancock

01:40:01.373 --> 01:40:03.373
that still remains in place today .

01:40:03.373 --> 01:40:05.484
Assistant Secretary Humeyer , can you

01:40:05.484 --> 01:40:07.651
explain where exactly the breakdown of

01:40:07.651 --> 01:40:07.299
communication was between the

01:40:07.299 --> 01:40:09.299
Department of Defense and the FAA ?

01:40:09.459 --> 01:40:11.348
Thank you , Congressman , for the

01:40:11.348 --> 01:40:13.681
question . Um , over the last 14 months ,

01:40:13.681 --> 01:40:15.792
the department has had , uh , several

01:40:15.792 --> 01:40:15.500
iterations of communications and

01:40:15.500 --> 01:40:17.060
coordination with the FAA ,

01:40:17.180 --> 01:40:19.347
specifically on the , the capabilities

01:40:19.347 --> 01:40:21.513
that you're referencing . Uh , those ,

01:40:21.513 --> 01:40:23.680
uh , consultations have to do with the

01:40:23.680 --> 01:40:25.402
capabilities , the risks , the

01:40:25.402 --> 01:40:27.569
associated , uh , vulnerabilities that

01:40:27.569 --> 01:40:27.339
can be associated with that , with that

01:40:27.339 --> 01:40:29.859
system . Um , in respect to the

01:40:29.859 --> 01:40:31.692
specific incidents that happened

01:40:31.692 --> 01:40:33.915
recently , a lot of that was in lack of

01:40:33.915 --> 01:40:33.740
coordination with , uh , the Department

01:40:33.740 --> 01:40:35.907
of Homeland Security . Now I'm , I'm ,

01:40:35.907 --> 01:40:37.962
I'm , I'm happy to report that since

01:40:37.962 --> 01:40:39.796
that incident we've been able to

01:40:39.796 --> 01:40:39.500
streamline a lot more of that

01:40:39.500 --> 01:40:41.278
coordination . Three agencies ,

01:40:41.278 --> 01:40:43.167
Department of Homeland Security ,

01:40:43.167 --> 01:40:45.444
Department of War , as well as the FAA .

01:40:45.444 --> 01:40:45.120
And looking to improve on that process

01:40:45.120 --> 01:40:47.342
as we move forward . Well , thank you ,

01:40:47.342 --> 01:40:49.453
Mr . Schumeyer , but let's zone in on

01:40:49.453 --> 01:40:49.240
that lack of coordination with the

01:40:49.240 --> 01:40:51.129
Department of Homeland Security .

01:40:51.129 --> 01:40:53.184
That's what I was looking for . Uh ,

01:40:53.184 --> 01:40:55.129
what failed ? What was the lack of

01:40:55.129 --> 01:40:57.240
coordination ? Well , I , I'd have to

01:40:57.240 --> 01:40:56.149
defer to the Department of Homeland

01:40:56.149 --> 01:40:57.816
Security because that's their

01:40:57.816 --> 01:40:59.982
coordination with the FAA , not ours .

01:40:59.982 --> 01:41:02.205
OK , I want to move briefly now to talk

01:41:02.205 --> 01:41:03.871
about some of the counter UAS

01:41:03.871 --> 01:41:06.038
technology that is being tested . Both

01:41:06.038 --> 01:41:05.799
these incidents involved counter drone

01:41:05.799 --> 01:41:07.466
high energy lasers , which is

01:41:07.466 --> 01:41:09.521
technology whose effects on people ,

01:41:09.521 --> 01:41:11.632
the environment , and other US assets

01:41:11.632 --> 01:41:13.855
aren't completely known yet . I believe

01:41:13.855 --> 01:41:13.839
this is what the FAA was concerned

01:41:13.839 --> 01:41:15.895
about and what likely contributed to

01:41:15.895 --> 01:41:18.117
them issuing these shutdowns and flight

01:41:18.117 --> 01:41:20.283
restrictions . Reporting suggests that

01:41:20.283 --> 01:41:22.506
these tests are some of the first known

01:41:22.506 --> 01:41:24.617
domestic use of a counter drone laser

01:41:24.617 --> 01:41:24.160
system conducted outside of a

01:41:24.160 --> 01:41:26.104
controlled environment . Assistant

01:41:26.104 --> 01:41:27.938
Secretary Hugmeyer , how has the

01:41:27.938 --> 01:41:30.104
department determined that these types

01:41:30.104 --> 01:41:32.271
of drones were ready at the time to be

01:41:32.271 --> 01:41:33.993
tested outside of a controlled

01:41:33.993 --> 01:41:33.839
environment , and what are the possible

01:41:33.839 --> 01:41:36.117
risks to civilians and other US assets ?

01:41:36.117 --> 01:41:38.283
So the high energy laser system , uh ,

01:41:38.283 --> 01:41:40.450
congressman , that you're referring to

01:41:40.450 --> 01:41:42.561
is something that detects at a , at a

01:41:42.561 --> 01:41:44.672
very meticulous level whatever aerial

01:41:44.672 --> 01:41:43.819
threats that can be presented ,

01:41:44.149 --> 01:41:46.371
particularly as they relate to unmanned

01:41:46.371 --> 01:41:48.427
aircraft systems . So in the case of

01:41:48.427 --> 01:41:48.220
the incidents that you're . You're

01:41:48.220 --> 01:41:50.387
talking about that happening in recent

01:41:50.387 --> 01:41:52.609
weeks . The system worked . It actually

01:41:52.609 --> 01:41:54.664
took out what it detected could be a

01:41:54.664 --> 01:41:56.776
potential threat , not mitigating any

01:41:56.776 --> 01:41:58.887
vulnerabilities or not mitigating any

01:41:58.887 --> 01:42:00.998
vulnerabilities that would be present

01:42:00.998 --> 01:42:03.164
to a larger aircraft for civilian uses

01:42:03.164 --> 01:42:03.100
of other . Thank you , Assistant

01:42:03.100 --> 01:42:05.211
Secretary , and I think that's that's

01:42:05.211 --> 01:42:06.878
the important thing where the

01:42:06.878 --> 01:42:08.933
coordination has to be in place with

01:42:08.933 --> 01:42:10.989
the respective agencies with DHS and

01:42:10.989 --> 01:42:13.156
FAA just . You mentioned that if there

01:42:13.156 --> 01:42:12.930
is no imminent threat , especially to

01:42:12.930 --> 01:42:15.097
commercial airliners , um , that needs

01:42:15.097 --> 01:42:16.763
to happen before we shut down

01:42:16.763 --> 01:42:18.986
international airspace . Um , it's been

01:42:18.986 --> 01:42:20.486
about a month since , uh ,

01:42:20.486 --> 01:42:22.486
Representative Escobar and I sent a

01:42:22.486 --> 01:42:24.597
letter requesting a specific briefing

01:42:24.597 --> 01:42:26.486
on this issue and what led to the

01:42:26.486 --> 01:42:28.708
sudden closure of the El Paso airport .

01:42:28.708 --> 01:42:30.986
Uh , we have not received any response .

01:42:30.986 --> 01:42:33.097
Is this something you can commit to a

01:42:33.097 --> 01:42:32.720
briefing for myself and Congresswoman

01:42:32.720 --> 01:42:34.831
Escobar ? Uh , Congressman , happy to

01:42:34.831 --> 01:42:36.942
take that back and get back with your

01:42:36.942 --> 01:42:38.998
office with an appropriate time . Is

01:42:38.998 --> 01:42:41.276
that a yes ? Yes . OK , thank you . Um ,

01:42:41.276 --> 01:42:43.331
lastly , I'd like you to pay special

01:42:43.331 --> 01:42:45.442
attention to recent letters submitted

01:42:45.442 --> 01:42:47.664
to state and federal offices by 5 Texas

01:42:47.664 --> 01:42:49.831
sheriffs , uh , regarding the proposed

01:42:49.831 --> 01:42:51.609
border wall project in Big Bend

01:42:51.609 --> 01:42:53.720
National Park . Uh , please take heed

01:42:53.720 --> 01:42:55.942
from local law enforcement and consider

01:42:55.942 --> 01:42:58.164
their advice . Uh , Mr . Humeyer , does

01:42:58.164 --> 01:43:00.430
the Department of Defense or the

01:43:00.430 --> 01:43:02.374
administration plan to dignify the

01:43:02.374 --> 01:43:04.597
sheriffs with a response ? Uh , again ,

01:43:04.597 --> 01:43:06.708
I'm happy to take that back . This is

01:43:06.708 --> 01:43:06.140
the first time I'm hearing about it ,

01:43:06.259 --> 01:43:08.370
so , uh , I'd have to coordinate with

01:43:08.370 --> 01:43:10.481
my office and and have a response for

01:43:10.481 --> 01:43:12.648
you in a short time . Thank you , Mr .

01:43:12.648 --> 01:43:14.648
Humeyer , Chairman , of your back .

01:43:14.648 --> 01:43:16.981
Thank you . The chair now recognizes Mr .

01:43:16.981 --> 01:43:19.092
Whitman from Virginia for 5 minutes .

01:43:19.092 --> 01:43:21.092
Uh , Chairman Whitman , gentlemen ,

01:43:21.092 --> 01:43:20.879
thank you so much for joining us today .

01:43:21.000 --> 01:43:23.167
Uh , General Guillo , I want to , uh ,

01:43:23.167 --> 01:43:25.167
start with you . Last year when you

01:43:25.167 --> 01:43:27.278
were here we talked a lot about drone

01:43:27.278 --> 01:43:29.444
incursions there at Joint Base Langley

01:43:29.444 --> 01:43:31.167
Eustace , and you talked about

01:43:31.167 --> 01:43:33.389
coordination between . NorthCom and DOW

01:43:33.389 --> 01:43:35.279
and making sure joint agency

01:43:35.279 --> 01:43:37.279
responsibility was clear and making

01:43:37.279 --> 01:43:39.279
sure that things could happen . You

01:43:39.279 --> 01:43:41.335
also talked about purchasing flyaway

01:43:41.335 --> 01:43:43.557
kits to make sure that they were mobile

01:43:43.557 --> 01:43:45.612
and they could go to places where we

01:43:45.612 --> 01:43:47.557
had these issues as well as having

01:43:47.557 --> 01:43:49.779
resident capability at some of our most

01:43:49.779 --> 01:43:51.723
important bases . I want to get an

01:43:51.723 --> 01:43:53.946
update from you on that and I also want

01:43:53.946 --> 01:43:56.112
to ask you too about the importance of

01:43:56.112 --> 01:43:58.279
proliferated sensor networks . In last

01:43:58.279 --> 01:44:00.501
year's NDA was able to get a section in

01:44:00.501 --> 01:44:02.501
there that talked about using . The

01:44:02.501 --> 01:44:04.723
sensor networks that are already at our

01:44:04.723 --> 01:44:06.890
civilian airports and making sure that

01:44:06.890 --> 01:44:09.112
we integrate them into DOD data systems

01:44:09.112 --> 01:44:11.223
so we have a much broader perspective

01:44:11.223 --> 01:44:13.390
about what's happening , especially in

01:44:13.390 --> 01:44:15.557
our efforts to counter unmanned aerial

01:44:15.557 --> 01:44:17.723
systems . Can you give us an update on

01:44:17.723 --> 01:44:19.835
where NORTHCOM and NORAD are in using

01:44:19.835 --> 01:44:21.890
that sensor data that comes from our

01:44:21.890 --> 01:44:23.946
civilian airports through the FAA in

01:44:23.946 --> 01:44:26.479
order to get a more complete picture of

01:44:26.479 --> 01:44:29.740
counter UAS efforts and UAS threats ?

01:44:31.310 --> 01:44:34.029
Yes , Congressman , on the sensors , I

01:44:34.029 --> 01:44:35.918
would point out also in El Paso ,

01:44:35.990 --> 01:44:38.029
they're the leaders , I think that

01:44:38.029 --> 01:44:41.089
we've seen in taking a variety of

01:44:41.089 --> 01:44:43.256
sensors and tying them together into a

01:44:43.256 --> 01:44:45.422
comprehensive picture . And so I think

01:44:45.422 --> 01:44:47.645
it's through the University of Texas El

01:44:47.645 --> 01:44:49.811
Paso . They have a really great system

01:44:49.811 --> 01:44:52.580
that we are using as a baseline to get

01:44:52.580 --> 01:44:54.747
us first in the southern border area ,

01:44:54.747 --> 01:44:57.549
the 1,954 miles that constitute the

01:44:57.549 --> 01:44:59.771
southern border and tying that together

01:44:59.771 --> 01:45:02.049
for the first time . Obviously with

01:45:02.049 --> 01:45:04.779
radar and manned aircraft we have that

01:45:04.779 --> 01:45:07.930
of course all over the world , but for

01:45:07.930 --> 01:45:09.930
UAS along the border , and so we'll

01:45:09.930 --> 01:45:12.152
continue to work with that . We've made

01:45:12.152 --> 01:45:14.319
a lot of progress in the last year and

01:45:14.319 --> 01:45:16.097
I would expect that to continue

01:45:16.097 --> 01:45:18.319
exponentially in the future . Regarding

01:45:18.319 --> 01:45:20.580
the flyaway kit , thanks to this body

01:45:20.580 --> 01:45:24.149
and others in Congress .

01:45:25.240 --> 01:45:27.779
We have a flyaway kit . I won't say

01:45:27.779 --> 01:45:29.946
where , but it's currently deployed in

01:45:29.946 --> 01:45:32.660
the US to defeat threats

01:45:32.660 --> 01:45:35.899
to department installation that are

01:45:35.899 --> 01:45:38.066
seeing incursions , and it's operating

01:45:38.066 --> 01:45:40.500
very effectively . Also last year I

01:45:40.500 --> 01:45:44.259
asked for 4 improvements to counter UAS

01:45:44.259 --> 01:45:46.481
authorities , all of which were granted

01:45:46.481 --> 01:45:48.481
over the year . So at this point in

01:45:48.481 --> 01:45:50.592
time I have 0 requests for additional

01:45:50.592 --> 01:45:52.815
authorities and we should get 2 more of

01:45:52.815 --> 01:45:54.870
the flyaway kits in the next month .

01:45:54.870 --> 01:45:57.854
Thank you , General Donovan . We know

01:45:57.854 --> 01:46:00.495
how important ours are , that's

01:46:00.495 --> 01:46:03.654
presence around the world for emergency

01:46:03.654 --> 01:46:07.495
response , for human

01:46:07.495 --> 01:46:10.165
needs , you name it , disasters , we're

01:46:10.165 --> 01:46:13.095
there on station , and we know that the

01:46:13.379 --> 01:46:16.640
The ARGMU 3.0 requirement that is being

01:46:16.640 --> 01:46:20.080
able to generate 3 ARMU is incredibly

01:46:20.080 --> 01:46:22.302
important . Our amphibious ready groups

01:46:22.302 --> 01:46:24.413
marine expeditionary units are key to

01:46:24.413 --> 01:46:26.636
our ability to project power around the

01:46:26.636 --> 01:46:28.747
world . We've seen that happening now

01:46:28.747 --> 01:46:31.899
there in SouthHCOM . We see there with

01:46:31.899 --> 01:46:34.640
the 22nd . Iwo Jima

01:46:38.620 --> 01:46:41.000
how important that presence is . I

01:46:41.000 --> 01:46:43.120
wanted to get your perspective on how

01:46:43.120 --> 01:46:46.919
things are underway there with

01:46:46.919 --> 01:46:49.390
this ARMU . We know that ARMU

01:46:49.390 --> 01:46:51.446
deployments , like everything else ,

01:46:51.446 --> 01:46:53.557
are limited , so there's only so long

01:46:53.557 --> 01:46:55.668
they can stay before we have to bring

01:46:55.668 --> 01:46:55.459
those marines and sailors back home .

01:46:56.080 --> 01:46:59.040
The challenge is needing that presence

01:46:59.040 --> 01:47:02.279
there . What's going to happen when the

01:47:02.279 --> 01:47:05.160
22nd MU comes back home and the Iwo

01:47:05.160 --> 01:47:07.799
Jima Arc comes back home ? Will there

01:47:07.799 --> 01:47:10.919
be another AGMU to replace that ? How

01:47:10.919 --> 01:47:13.141
important it is for that replacement to

01:47:13.141 --> 01:47:15.252
take place and what will happen if we

01:47:15.252 --> 01:47:17.475
don't have an AGMU that can replace the

01:47:17.475 --> 01:47:19.759
current on station Iwo Jima and the

01:47:19.759 --> 01:47:23.430
22nd ? Thank you

01:47:23.430 --> 01:47:25.486
for highlighting and recognizing the

01:47:25.486 --> 01:47:28.029
importance of that ARGU team . Really ,

01:47:28.109 --> 01:47:30.109
if you think about off the coast of

01:47:30.109 --> 01:47:32.165
Venezuela 12 nautical miles out like

01:47:32.165 --> 01:47:34.220
you mentioned the Iwo Jima , I think

01:47:34.220 --> 01:47:36.498
about the capabilities we all focus on .

01:47:36.498 --> 01:47:38.720
It could be strike aircraft or it could

01:47:38.720 --> 01:47:40.887
be that quick reaction force . I think

01:47:40.887 --> 01:47:42.998
about a Roll 2 surgical suite that is

01:47:42.998 --> 01:47:44.553
available to respond to the

01:47:44.553 --> 01:47:46.776
ambassador's needs at any time . That's

01:47:46.776 --> 01:47:48.831
unique . So as we look at the end of

01:47:48.831 --> 01:47:50.887
time , if we extend that RMU , which

01:47:50.887 --> 01:47:50.689
I've asked to extend the RMU for a

01:47:50.689 --> 01:47:52.856
couple more months , after that , what

01:47:52.856 --> 01:47:55.022
are the creative tailored solutions we

01:47:55.022 --> 01:47:57.022
can make to make up for a lack of ,

01:47:57.022 --> 01:47:59.209
like you said , that 3.0MU presence we

01:47:59.209 --> 01:48:01.376
call heel to toe . When one goes out ,

01:48:01.376 --> 01:48:03.376
one comes in . Until we get to that

01:48:03.376 --> 01:48:05.598
point , we'll have gaps , and those are

01:48:05.598 --> 01:48:07.653
significant gaps because the AGMU is

01:48:07.653 --> 01:48:09.709
the true Swiss Army knife inside the

01:48:09.709 --> 01:48:11.987
department . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

01:48:11.987 --> 01:48:14.153
With that I yield back . Domino's back

01:48:14.153 --> 01:48:16.265
here and I recognize a gentleman from

01:48:16.265 --> 01:48:18.431
California , Mr . Cisneros . Thank you

01:48:18.431 --> 01:48:20.598
Mr . Chairman . Um , thank you all for

01:48:20.598 --> 01:48:22.320
being here today to answer our

01:48:22.320 --> 01:48:24.542
questions . Uh , General Donovan , um ,

01:48:24.620 --> 01:48:26.898
look , I've always been a proponent of ,

01:48:26.898 --> 01:48:28.842
of , uh , showing the flag , and I

01:48:28.842 --> 01:48:30.787
always thought we should send more

01:48:30.787 --> 01:48:33.120
ships down into the Southcom area there ,

01:48:33.120 --> 01:48:34.842
you know , to kind of build up

01:48:34.842 --> 01:48:37.064
relations , kind of similar things that

01:48:37.064 --> 01:48:36.979
we've done around in different parts of

01:48:36.979 --> 01:48:39.339
the world including Asia . Um , you

01:48:39.339 --> 01:48:41.395
know , I think we do need more ships

01:48:41.395 --> 01:48:43.450
down there . We do need to have more

01:48:43.450 --> 01:48:45.439
visits , uh , into our , our Latin

01:48:45.439 --> 01:48:47.550
American countries there to make sure

01:48:47.550 --> 01:48:49.661
that we keep up good relations . It's

01:48:49.661 --> 01:48:51.606
always important to do that , um ,

01:48:51.606 --> 01:48:53.828
although I'm not sure that we need them

01:48:53.828 --> 01:48:55.550
to kind of be carrying out law

01:48:55.550 --> 01:48:57.772
enforcement missions as , uh , what has

01:48:57.772 --> 01:48:59.717
been doing , especially with these

01:48:59.717 --> 01:49:02.050
kinetic strikes , uh , which , you know ,

01:49:02.050 --> 01:49:04.050
is varying legal issues attached to

01:49:04.050 --> 01:49:06.910
them . Um , at the same time using , uh ,

01:49:06.919 --> 01:49:08.919
very expensive munitions to kind of

01:49:08.919 --> 01:49:10.919
carry and take them out , uh , when

01:49:10.919 --> 01:49:13.141
there are other alternatives I think we

01:49:13.141 --> 01:49:14.975
could be doing , um , so General

01:49:14.975 --> 01:49:18.970
Donovan , how . How much would a

01:49:18.970 --> 01:49:20.970
larger Coast Guard presence there

01:49:20.970 --> 01:49:23.649
actually in the area help benefit and

01:49:23.649 --> 01:49:25.705
kind of work towards that mission of

01:49:25.705 --> 01:49:27.871
actually which is their probably their

01:49:27.871 --> 01:49:29.982
duties carrying out law enforcement ,

01:49:30.089 --> 01:49:33.250
um , how could that serve to deter , um ,

01:49:33.450 --> 01:49:35.394
the , the drug problem that we are

01:49:35.490 --> 01:49:37.546
trying to solve here of drugs coming

01:49:37.546 --> 01:49:39.379
into the United States would you

01:49:39.379 --> 01:49:41.490
support a larger Coast Guard presence

01:49:41.490 --> 01:49:43.810
there ? Congressman , absolutely , and

01:49:43.810 --> 01:49:46.032
the Coast Guard command and I have been

01:49:46.032 --> 01:49:48.143
talking about that very thing because

01:49:48.143 --> 01:49:50.032
the Coast Guard , such a powerful

01:49:50.189 --> 01:49:52.410
capability with both law enforcement

01:49:52.410 --> 01:49:54.577
capability and an operational tactical

01:49:54.930 --> 01:49:58.009
that we can bring in partners really

01:49:58.009 --> 01:50:00.009
want to have that Coast Guard touch

01:50:00.009 --> 01:50:02.231
point . So we're in active conversation

01:50:02.231 --> 01:50:04.342
with the Coast Guard to do so . Thank

01:50:04.342 --> 01:50:06.676
you for doing that . And so Mr . Humiri ,

01:50:06.850 --> 01:50:10.620
hopefully I said that right . You know ,

01:50:11.160 --> 01:50:13.200
Secretary Rubio , uh , Secretary of

01:50:13.200 --> 01:50:15.144
State Rubio had said that a lot of

01:50:15.144 --> 01:50:16.978
these kinetic strikes are really

01:50:16.978 --> 01:50:18.922
they're a deterrent . It's helping

01:50:18.922 --> 01:50:21.089
propel the , uh , the drug trafficking

01:50:21.089 --> 01:50:23.033
coming into the United States from

01:50:23.033 --> 01:50:25.256
these Latin American countries by doing

01:50:25.256 --> 01:50:26.978
so . Now look , we could shoot

01:50:26.978 --> 01:50:29.200
suspected criminals dead on the streets

01:50:29.200 --> 01:50:31.144
here in the United States and that

01:50:31.144 --> 01:50:33.256
would be a deterrent to , uh , reduce

01:50:33.256 --> 01:50:35.367
crime here in the United States , but

01:50:35.367 --> 01:50:37.422
it doesn't necessarily make sure may

01:50:37.422 --> 01:50:37.319
mean that it's legal in order to do

01:50:37.319 --> 01:50:40.560
that neither are these strikes . So

01:50:41.470 --> 01:50:43.581
How's the department justifying these

01:50:43.581 --> 01:50:45.910
kinetic strikes , um , at a time when

01:50:45.910 --> 01:50:47.966
we should be using the Coast Guard ,

01:50:47.966 --> 01:50:50.270
who has the authority to kind of do law

01:50:50.270 --> 01:50:52.990
enforcement , uh , to do investigations ,

01:50:53.069 --> 01:50:55.830
could seize , uh , you know , could

01:50:55.830 --> 01:50:58.108
seize the phones , could seize ledgers ,

01:50:58.108 --> 01:51:00.163
could seize , you know , look at GPS

01:51:00.163 --> 01:51:02.529
data . Um , could get the drugs that

01:51:02.529 --> 01:51:04.640
are actually there , right , and take

01:51:04.640 --> 01:51:06.473
this as evidence in to prosecute

01:51:06.473 --> 01:51:08.529
individuals later on down the road .

01:51:08.529 --> 01:51:10.696
Why are we not or why have we not been

01:51:10.696 --> 01:51:12.973
using the Coast Guard more in order to ,

01:51:12.973 --> 01:51:15.196
to do this mission ? Well , thank you ,

01:51:15.196 --> 01:51:17.307
Congressman , for the question . Uh ,

01:51:17.307 --> 01:51:17.169
we have been using the Coast Guard

01:51:17.169 --> 01:51:19.002
Interdiction's been going on for

01:51:19.002 --> 01:51:21.225
decades inside Latin America . The last

01:51:21.225 --> 01:51:23.447
physical year we had record seizures on

01:51:23.447 --> 01:51:22.930
interdiction , but interdiction is , I

01:51:22.930 --> 01:51:25.097
know , but we chose , we've we've made

01:51:25.097 --> 01:51:27.208
a decision to blow these vessels up ,

01:51:27.208 --> 01:51:29.374
boats up rather than to kind of pursue

01:51:29.374 --> 01:51:31.560
the legal . You know , Coast Guard ,

01:51:32.229 --> 01:51:34.062
correct , and I can explain that

01:51:34.062 --> 01:51:35.729
interdiction is necessary but

01:51:35.729 --> 01:51:37.562
insufficient . Deterrence has an

01:51:37.562 --> 01:51:39.729
additional effect , a signaling effect

01:51:39.729 --> 01:51:41.896
on narco-terrorists to raise the risks

01:51:41.896 --> 01:51:41.729
associated with movements , and we've

01:51:41.729 --> 01:51:43.951
seen 20% reduction in the Caribbean and

01:51:43.951 --> 01:51:46.007
a 25% reduction in the Pacific . You

01:51:46.007 --> 01:51:48.062
can make the argument for deterrence

01:51:48.062 --> 01:51:50.229
this whole time about like , oh yeah ,

01:51:50.229 --> 01:51:52.285
we're deterring them , but that does

01:51:52.285 --> 01:51:54.451
not make it legal . So I think this is

01:51:54.451 --> 01:51:56.396
something we need to go back . The

01:51:56.396 --> 01:51:58.673
department needs to reevaluate , right ?

01:51:58.673 --> 01:52:00.729
Just because we can deter a crime by

01:52:00.729 --> 01:52:00.370
doing a certain thing and blowing up a

01:52:00.370 --> 01:52:02.770
vessel , that does not necessarily make

01:52:02.770 --> 01:52:05.370
it mean that , OK , it's a legal way of

01:52:05.370 --> 01:52:07.689
action that we can pursue and so that

01:52:07.689 --> 01:52:09.689
needs to be kind of continued to be

01:52:09.689 --> 01:52:11.911
reevaluated , which is why we need this

01:52:11.911 --> 01:52:13.578
larger Coast Guard presence .

01:52:13.578 --> 01:52:15.300
Congressman , we've been using

01:52:15.300 --> 01:52:17.300
interdiction for the last I'm 20-30

01:52:17.300 --> 01:52:19.300
years and they haven't had the same

01:52:19.300 --> 01:52:21.300
results as we have my questions are

01:52:21.300 --> 01:52:23.633
done . I'm reclaiming my time here . um ,

01:52:24.270 --> 01:52:26.492
I asked this question last year and I'm

01:52:26.492 --> 01:52:28.548
gonna ask it again , um , you know ,

01:52:28.548 --> 01:52:30.603
the , the , the Russians continue to

01:52:30.603 --> 01:52:32.709
kind of test the ability of kind of

01:52:32.709 --> 01:52:35.310
flying into the Alaskan airspace there .

01:52:35.589 --> 01:52:37.811
Uh , they're , they're continuing , you

01:52:37.811 --> 01:52:39.867
know , trying to push us to , to see

01:52:39.867 --> 01:52:42.089
what we can do and how far they'll go .

01:52:42.089 --> 01:52:44.560
And at the same time , the , the , the ,

01:52:44.720 --> 01:52:47.759
the ice melting , the opening of sea

01:52:47.759 --> 01:52:49.959
lanes in the , in the northern polar

01:52:49.959 --> 01:52:52.240
regions there are continuing to

01:52:52.240 --> 01:52:55.299
increase traffic into that area . So ,

01:52:55.359 --> 01:52:58.270
over the last year , what has the

01:52:58.270 --> 01:53:01.450
increased um What's the increased

01:53:01.450 --> 01:53:03.672
threat in that area with the increasing

01:53:03.672 --> 01:53:05.783
of the opening of the sea lanes , the

01:53:05.783 --> 01:53:08.006
Russians continuing to push this , um ,

01:53:08.006 --> 01:53:10.970
how are we deterring that ? Congressman ,

01:53:11.250 --> 01:53:13.350
uh , you're right , the number of

01:53:13.569 --> 01:53:16.310
incursions by Russian aircraft into the

01:53:16.310 --> 01:53:18.810
80s has increased over the last year .

01:53:18.850 --> 01:53:20.906
It's on a trend . Gentleman's time's

01:53:20.906 --> 01:53:22.906
expired . I recognize the gentleman

01:53:22.906 --> 01:53:25.128
from New York , Mr . Ryan . Thank you .

01:53:26.259 --> 01:53:28.315
Thank you Mr . Chair . Thank you all

01:53:28.315 --> 01:53:30.481
for being here . Uh , General Guillo ,

01:53:30.481 --> 01:53:32.703
uh , I wanna thank you for following up

01:53:32.703 --> 01:53:34.592
aggressively with our team , uh ,

01:53:34.592 --> 01:53:36.759
specifically around , uh , issues that

01:53:36.759 --> 01:53:38.926
I know have been brought up on a drone

01:53:38.926 --> 01:53:41.148
and , and UAS . Um , your team has been

01:53:41.148 --> 01:53:43.037
phenomenal working with us on the

01:53:43.037 --> 01:53:45.148
incident that happened at Stewart Air

01:53:45.148 --> 01:53:47.203
National Guard Base in my district .

01:53:47.203 --> 01:53:49.148
Your testimony last year we talked

01:53:49.148 --> 01:53:51.370
about the 130I and I just wanna commend

01:53:51.370 --> 01:53:53.537
you and your team and everybody on the

01:53:53.537 --> 01:53:55.648
committee , um , all working together

01:53:55.648 --> 01:53:57.759
to address that issue and , uh , we ,

01:53:57.759 --> 01:53:57.629
we appreciate that . I wanna thank you

01:53:57.629 --> 01:53:59.685
for that , sir . Obviously there's a

01:53:59.685 --> 01:54:01.907
lot more to do , but let us know what ,

01:54:01.907 --> 01:54:04.185
what you continue to need on that . Um ,

01:54:04.185 --> 01:54:06.407
I wanna use the remainder of my time to

01:54:06.407 --> 01:54:06.209
talk about something that a few

01:54:06.209 --> 01:54:08.320
colleagues have hit on but I think is

01:54:08.320 --> 01:54:10.265
deeply concerning to , to a lot of

01:54:10.265 --> 01:54:11.987
folks , which is the continued

01:54:11.987 --> 01:54:15.129
deployment . Uh , of US troops , both

01:54:15.129 --> 01:54:17.129
federalized guard troops and active

01:54:17.129 --> 01:54:20.410
duty troops domestically , uh , which I

01:54:20.410 --> 01:54:22.577
think we all know if we're honest with

01:54:22.577 --> 01:54:24.688
ourselves , is not only legally wrong

01:54:24.688 --> 01:54:27.120
but just wrong in our guts . Uh ,

01:54:27.160 --> 01:54:29.709
Assistant Secretary , since June 2025 ,

01:54:30.040 --> 01:54:32.096
the administration has deployed over

01:54:32.096 --> 01:54:34.299
10,000 federalized guard troops and

01:54:34.299 --> 01:54:36.720
active duty Marines to six American

01:54:36.720 --> 01:54:40.479
cities , LA , DC , Memphis , Portland ,

01:54:40.600 --> 01:54:43.359
Chicago , and New Orleans . I would

01:54:43.359 --> 01:54:46.080
note that half of them were directly

01:54:46.080 --> 01:54:47.858
over the objection of local law

01:54:47.858 --> 01:54:49.950
enforcement . Elected officials ,

01:54:50.310 --> 01:54:52.790
governors in those areas . I would also

01:54:52.790 --> 01:54:55.250
note that the CBO puts the total cost

01:54:55.750 --> 01:54:57.861
through December 2025 , I'm sure it's

01:54:57.861 --> 01:55:01.509
higher now , at $496 million half a

01:55:01.509 --> 01:55:03.731
billion dollars of hard-earned American

01:55:03.731 --> 01:55:05.870
taxpayer dollars . A Senate committee

01:55:05.870 --> 01:55:08.470
report estimates the DC deployment

01:55:08.470 --> 01:55:12.189
alone will cost $332 million through

01:55:12.189 --> 01:55:16.129
February of this year 2026 . In in

01:55:16.129 --> 01:55:19.149
LA and I think this merits special note ,

01:55:19.160 --> 01:55:21.493
and I know Mr . Whiteside's hit on this .

01:55:21.493 --> 01:55:23.327
This wasn't just the guard . The

01:55:23.327 --> 01:55:25.438
administration made a very deliberate

01:55:25.438 --> 01:55:27.438
decision to deploy about 700 active

01:55:27.438 --> 01:55:31.020
duty Marines into an American city . To

01:55:31.020 --> 01:55:34.399
repeat deploying US troops . Against US

01:55:34.399 --> 01:55:36.640
citizens on American streets .

01:55:38.229 --> 01:55:40.007
Then building on that , despite

01:55:40.007 --> 01:55:43.669
multiple courts at every level blocking

01:55:43.669 --> 01:55:45.836
and saying that those deployments were

01:55:45.836 --> 01:55:48.002
not lawful , the president released an

01:55:48.002 --> 01:55:50.002
executive order 14339 that directed

01:55:50.002 --> 01:55:52.629
every state to form a quick reaction

01:55:52.629 --> 01:55:54.870
force with the express intention of

01:55:55.020 --> 01:55:57.729
quelling civil disturbances . The

01:55:57.729 --> 01:55:59.729
Washington Post reported these QRFs

01:55:59.729 --> 01:56:01.896
would be composed of hundreds of guard

01:56:01.896 --> 01:56:03.951
troops tasked with rapidly deploying

01:56:03.951 --> 01:56:06.118
into American cities , facing protests

01:56:06.118 --> 01:56:08.173
or other unrest , with 600 troops on

01:56:08.173 --> 01:56:10.118
standby at all times so they could

01:56:10.118 --> 01:56:12.285
deploy in as little as 1 hour . As I'm

01:56:12.285 --> 01:56:14.451
sure you know , DC actually just stood

01:56:14.451 --> 01:56:16.285
up this unit , the 260th Special

01:56:16.285 --> 01:56:18.507
Purpose Brigade , specifically designed

01:56:19.569 --> 01:56:21.689
to deploy these troops domestically .

01:56:24.229 --> 01:56:26.396
Again , I want to note throughout each

01:56:26.396 --> 01:56:28.830
of these steps . The third branch of

01:56:28.830 --> 01:56:30.552
our government outlined in our

01:56:30.552 --> 01:56:32.552
Constitution over and over has said

01:56:33.120 --> 01:56:35.640
These are not lawful deployments in

01:56:35.640 --> 01:56:37.770
many cases . Despite that , on

01:56:37.770 --> 01:56:39.826
September 30th at Quantico , and I'm

01:56:39.826 --> 01:56:41.826
sure at least one of the two of the

01:56:41.826 --> 01:56:44.048
senior military leaders were here , the

01:56:44.048 --> 01:56:46.103
president told a room full of senior

01:56:46.103 --> 01:56:48.326
military commanders , quote , We should

01:56:48.326 --> 01:56:50.437
use some of these dangerous cities as

01:56:50.437 --> 01:56:52.890
training grounds for our military . And

01:56:52.890 --> 01:56:55.049
described America as facing quote an

01:56:55.049 --> 01:56:58.970
invasion from within . Thankfully ,

01:56:59.049 --> 01:57:02.250
on December 23rd , the Supreme Court by

01:57:02.250 --> 01:57:05.290
a wide margin of 6 to 3 , upheld the

01:57:05.290 --> 01:57:07.457
lower court ruling specifically in the

01:57:07.457 --> 01:57:09.179
Trump versus Illinois case and

01:57:09.179 --> 01:57:11.234
specifically said the administration

01:57:11.234 --> 01:57:13.290
lacked legal authority to federalize

01:57:13.290 --> 01:57:16.209
the guard under Section 12406 . 3

01:57:16.209 --> 01:57:18.320
conservative justices , including the

01:57:18.320 --> 01:57:20.320
Chief Justice , as well as Justices

01:57:20.320 --> 01:57:22.209
Barrett and Kavanaugh joined that

01:57:22.209 --> 01:57:24.431
majority . Did the right thing and said

01:57:24.431 --> 01:57:26.653
the administration failed to identify a

01:57:26.653 --> 01:57:28.931
source of authority for the deployment .

01:57:28.931 --> 01:57:31.042
I wanna ask you , starting with you ,

01:57:31.042 --> 01:57:33.209
Assistant Secretary , and then each of

01:57:33.209 --> 01:57:35.431
you generals , especially you , General

01:57:35.431 --> 01:57:37.542
Guillotte , do you recognize , yes or

01:57:37.542 --> 01:57:39.765
no , the validity of that Supreme Court

01:57:39.765 --> 01:57:38.979
ruling as it relates to domestic

01:57:38.979 --> 01:57:41.549
deployment of troops ? Congressman , uh ,

01:57:41.660 --> 01:57:43.938
yes or no , please , sir . Congressman ,

01:57:43.938 --> 01:57:45.716
I recognize the validity of the

01:57:45.716 --> 01:57:47.993
operations under Title 10 and Title 32 .

01:57:47.993 --> 01:57:50.160
Congressman , uh , we do recognize and

01:57:50.160 --> 01:57:52.216
we followed all court orders . Thank

01:57:52.216 --> 01:57:55.450
you , General Donovan . I concur with

01:57:55.450 --> 01:57:58.250
General Gil . Thank you . In February

01:57:58.250 --> 01:58:01.169
2026 , President Trump said Republicans

01:58:01.169 --> 01:58:04.209
should nationalize the voting , at

01:58:04.209 --> 01:58:07.490
least many 15 places in , in as many as

01:58:07.490 --> 01:58:09.434
15 places arguing some states were

01:58:09.434 --> 01:58:11.601
running crooked elections , which is a

01:58:11.601 --> 01:58:13.729
lie . With midterm elections , I'm

01:58:13.729 --> 01:58:15.896
running out of time , but with midterm

01:58:15.896 --> 01:58:17.896
elections approaching in November ,

01:58:17.896 --> 01:58:19.951
will you commit on the record to not

01:58:19.951 --> 01:58:22.330
deploy US troops at polling sites in

01:58:22.330 --> 01:58:24.441
the United States of America in these

01:58:24.441 --> 01:58:26.719
elections ? Gentlemen's time's expired .

01:58:26.719 --> 01:58:28.886
Chair and I recognize gentle lady from

01:58:28.886 --> 01:58:28.669
California , Ms . Jacobs . Thank you ,

01:58:29.009 --> 01:58:31.231
Chairman . Um , thank you all for being

01:58:31.231 --> 01:58:34.120
here . Uh , in December of 2025 , the

01:58:34.120 --> 01:58:36.064
Department of Interior transferred

01:58:36.064 --> 01:58:38.319
jurisdiction of roughly 760 acres of

01:58:38.319 --> 01:58:40.541
public land along the California-Mexico

01:58:40.541 --> 01:58:42.375
border in San Diego and Imperial

01:58:42.375 --> 01:58:44.652
Counties to the Department of the Navy .

01:58:44.652 --> 01:58:46.486
This land is now designated as a

01:58:46.486 --> 01:58:48.430
National Defense Area and NDA . My

01:58:48.430 --> 01:58:50.541
staff recently conducted an oversight

01:58:50.541 --> 01:58:52.541
tour of this new NDA , and I'm left

01:58:52.541 --> 01:58:54.652
with many concerns . First , we heard

01:58:54.652 --> 01:58:56.763
that cartel activity along the border

01:58:56.763 --> 01:58:58.930
has increased following the killing of

01:58:58.930 --> 01:59:00.819
El Mencho in Mexico . And service

01:59:00.819 --> 01:59:00.714
members are being targeted . Their

01:59:00.714 --> 01:59:02.658
phones are being hacked . They are

01:59:02.658 --> 01:59:04.492
receiving personally threatening

01:59:04.492 --> 01:59:06.603
messages . Second , the terrain these

01:59:06.603 --> 01:59:08.825
Marines are traversing is treacherous .

01:59:08.825 --> 01:59:10.770
I'm grateful no Marine has died in

01:59:10.770 --> 01:59:12.825
these mountains , but I am genuinely

01:59:12.825 --> 01:59:14.770
terrified of that happening in the

01:59:14.770 --> 01:59:16.658
future . General Guillo , are you

01:59:16.658 --> 01:59:18.825
tracking and concerned about these two

01:59:18.825 --> 01:59:18.115
threats to the safety of service

01:59:18.115 --> 01:59:20.337
members operating in the NDA , and what

01:59:20.337 --> 01:59:22.504
are you doing as commander of NORTHCOM

01:59:22.504 --> 01:59:24.671
to work with Joint Task Force Southern

01:59:24.671 --> 01:59:26.448
Border to ensure their safety ?

01:59:26.448 --> 01:59:28.615
Congresswoman , yes , I'm aware of the

01:59:28.615 --> 01:59:30.726
threats , and of course any threat to

01:59:30.726 --> 01:59:32.948
any of our forces is something that not

01:59:32.948 --> 01:59:35.171
only concerns me but takes a great deal

01:59:35.171 --> 01:59:37.226
of attention to make sure that we're

01:59:37.226 --> 01:59:39.004
addressing it properly . As you

01:59:39.004 --> 01:59:40.948
mentioned , we worked this through

01:59:40.948 --> 01:59:43.004
JTF's southern border , and I'm very

01:59:43.004 --> 01:59:45.115
pleased with not only the initiatives

01:59:45.115 --> 01:59:47.059
that General Gardner has taken and

01:59:47.059 --> 01:59:49.059
General Allen before him , but also

01:59:49.059 --> 01:59:51.500
down to the echelon levels , the

01:59:51.500 --> 01:59:53.389
commanders on the ground that are

01:59:53.389 --> 01:59:55.779
working with the border patrol agents

01:59:55.779 --> 01:59:58.720
there . We try to use more unmanned

01:59:58.720 --> 02:00:00.942
aerial vehicles to do the patrolling as

02:00:00.942 --> 02:00:03.279
opposed to on foot like we do in other

02:00:03.279 --> 02:00:05.279
parts of the border because of that

02:00:05.279 --> 02:00:08.520
treacherous territory . But as you

02:00:08.520 --> 02:00:10.687
probably learned when you were there ,

02:00:10.687 --> 02:00:12.798
that there are still illegal activity

02:00:12.798 --> 02:00:14.853
coming across . So having that right

02:00:14.853 --> 02:00:16.742
posture is extremely important to

02:00:16.742 --> 02:00:18.909
ensure that we can maintain the seal .

02:00:18.909 --> 02:00:21.131
All right , um , well , I , I just want

02:00:21.131 --> 02:00:23.242
to state for the record that I'm very

02:00:23.242 --> 02:00:22.779
concerned about this operation and the

02:00:22.779 --> 02:00:24.779
safety of our Marines . Our service

02:00:24.779 --> 02:00:27.001
members did not sign up for immigration

02:00:27.001 --> 02:00:29.168
enforcement , and this political stunt

02:00:29.168 --> 02:00:31.279
is putting their lives at risk . Um ,

02:00:31.279 --> 02:00:33.223
now I want to talk about Operation

02:00:33.223 --> 02:00:35.446
Southern Spear . Um , by SouthHCO's own

02:00:35.446 --> 02:00:35.339
count , the United States has killed

02:00:35.339 --> 02:00:38.660
157 people in 45 strikes on boats in

02:00:38.660 --> 02:00:40.882
the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific since

02:00:40.882 --> 02:00:43.049
September . General Donovan , how many

02:00:43.049 --> 02:00:45.216
of those 157 people has the department

02:00:45.216 --> 02:00:46.882
publicly identified by name ?

02:00:48.850 --> 02:00:51.072
Congresswoman , I do not have an answer

02:00:51.072 --> 02:00:54.990
for that . OK , um . Do you have an

02:00:54.990 --> 02:00:56.712
answer on whether SouthHCO has

02:00:56.712 --> 02:00:58.850
conducted a single post-strike

02:00:58.939 --> 02:01:01.050
investigation into whether any of the

02:01:01.050 --> 02:01:03.272
157 people killed were in fact carrying

02:01:03.272 --> 02:01:05.328
drugs at the time they were struck ,

02:01:05.328 --> 02:01:07.106
not before , not based on route

02:01:07.106 --> 02:01:09.272
patterns , but actually carrying drugs

02:01:09.272 --> 02:01:09.089
at the time they were struck .

02:01:10.100 --> 02:01:12.044
Congressman , thank you . And then

02:01:12.044 --> 02:01:14.100
actually in front of me is your note

02:01:14.100 --> 02:01:13.350
you sent to the command , which I've

02:01:13.350 --> 02:01:15.406
actually used . And not only to prep

02:01:15.406 --> 02:01:17.461
for this testimony , but actually to

02:01:17.461 --> 02:01:19.517
understand our timor program and how

02:01:19.517 --> 02:01:21.572
we're going about this . I will hold

02:01:21.572 --> 02:01:23.689
that we mitigate all harm through our

02:01:23.689 --> 02:01:25.911
targeting and planning process , but as

02:01:25.911 --> 02:01:29.569
far as names , specifics , released , I

02:01:29.569 --> 02:01:31.791
can't tell you right now . I'm learning

02:01:31.791 --> 02:01:33.791
the process , but I will tell you .

02:01:33.791 --> 02:01:35.958
That I have I have reviewed and that's

02:01:35.958 --> 02:01:37.680
why the question back to you ,

02:01:37.680 --> 02:01:39.791
Congressman , are you speaking OSS or

02:01:39.791 --> 02:01:41.791
OAR , the number of casualties , is

02:01:41.791 --> 02:01:43.958
that combined or are you parsing those

02:01:43.958 --> 02:01:46.509
out ? I'm parsing them out . So what I

02:01:46.509 --> 02:01:48.509
can tell you is that after actually

02:01:48.509 --> 02:01:50.620
receiving your letter , I looked back

02:01:50.620 --> 02:01:52.509
at the OAR specifically because I

02:01:52.509 --> 02:01:54.565
wanted to read , I read every single

02:01:54.565 --> 02:01:56.731
one of the actual quick looks that the

02:01:56.731 --> 02:01:59.189
JTF did . And know that we have 2 15 6

02:01:59.189 --> 02:02:01.300
investigations underway . So that's ,

02:02:01.300 --> 02:02:03.467
that's what I know about those , those

02:02:03.467 --> 02:02:05.800
operations specifically . OK , well , I ,

02:02:05.800 --> 02:02:05.580
I appreciate you doing your work on it .

02:02:05.689 --> 02:02:07.967
I look forward to getting your answers .

02:02:07.967 --> 02:02:10.189
I will just say , um , pre-strike legal

02:02:10.189 --> 02:02:12.300
review is not the same as post-strike

02:02:12.300 --> 02:02:14.356
accountability , and , and we expect

02:02:14.356 --> 02:02:16.078
there to be , um , post-strike

02:02:16.078 --> 02:02:15.930
accountability . Uh , I wanted to

02:02:15.930 --> 02:02:17.652
follow up on my colleague Mr .

02:02:17.652 --> 02:02:19.819
Vinneman's exchange with you , General

02:02:19.819 --> 02:02:21.930
Donovan , about the targeting process

02:02:21.930 --> 02:02:24.097
for Southern Spear . Mr . Vinman asked

02:02:24.097 --> 02:02:26.263
how you distinguish between a criminal

02:02:26.263 --> 02:02:28.430
organization from a terrorist target .

02:02:28.430 --> 02:02:30.652
Um , what I didn't hear you clarify and

02:02:30.652 --> 02:02:32.763
is the most important , uh , question

02:02:32.763 --> 02:02:34.874
in this entire operation is , are you

02:02:34.874 --> 02:02:37.097
conducting status-based or action-based

02:02:37.097 --> 02:02:39.430
targeting ? Congresswoman , I

02:02:39.430 --> 02:02:41.652
appreciate you asking that . The status

02:02:41.652 --> 02:02:43.708
base , and this is , I'm not pushing

02:02:43.708 --> 02:02:45.486
back in any way , but those two

02:02:45.486 --> 02:02:47.374
definitions are not definitions I

02:02:47.374 --> 02:02:49.430
technically use in our own targeting

02:02:49.430 --> 02:02:51.430
process . If you could give me your

02:02:51.430 --> 02:02:50.770
definition , I can pivot off that .

02:02:50.950 --> 02:02:52.950
Sure . Are you striking these boats

02:02:52.950 --> 02:02:55.172
because The people on board are members

02:02:55.172 --> 02:02:57.339
of a designated terrorist organization

02:02:57.339 --> 02:02:59.172
or because they are engaged in a

02:02:59.172 --> 02:03:01.283
specific hostile act at the moment of

02:03:01.283 --> 02:03:03.450
the strike . I would say at this point

02:03:03.475 --> 02:03:05.586
Operation Southern Spear for enhanced

02:03:05.586 --> 02:03:07.475
card narcotics and these maritime

02:03:07.475 --> 02:03:10.620
strikes both apply . OK , um , well ,

02:03:10.879 --> 02:03:13.479
um , either you're in an armed conflict

02:03:13.479 --> 02:03:15.646
and you're targeting based on status ,

02:03:15.646 --> 02:03:17.812
which there is unanimous support among

02:03:17.812 --> 02:03:19.979
the international legal community that

02:03:19.979 --> 02:03:22.090
you're not , or you're conducting law

02:03:22.090 --> 02:03:21.879
enforcement with lethal force against

02:03:21.879 --> 02:03:23.823
people who pose an imminent threat

02:03:23.823 --> 02:03:26.180
which violates human rights law . So ,

02:03:26.240 --> 02:03:28.240
um , uh , you know , I'm a little

02:03:28.240 --> 02:03:30.351
concerned , uh , that , you know , we

02:03:30.351 --> 02:03:32.351
don't have a clear understanding of

02:03:32.351 --> 02:03:34.629
exactly how the targeting has happened ,

02:03:34.629 --> 02:03:36.573
and as has been emphasized , these

02:03:36.573 --> 02:03:36.109
strikes are illegal lady from

02:03:36.109 --> 02:03:37.831
Pennsylvania , Miss Houlihan .

02:03:40.810 --> 02:03:42.977
Wow , didn't expect that . Thank you ,

02:03:42.977 --> 02:03:45.199
Mr . Chair . Um , I'd like to follow up

02:03:45.199 --> 02:03:47.310
on Mr . Ryan's , uh , question this ,

02:03:47.310 --> 02:03:49.477
and he specifically was , as you might

02:03:49.477 --> 02:03:51.810
recall , recalling the fact that the

02:03:51.810 --> 02:03:54.140
president said that if the states can't

02:03:54.140 --> 02:03:56.029
run elections properly , that the

02:03:56.029 --> 02:03:58.251
federal government should intervene and

02:03:58.251 --> 02:04:00.029
potentially take over . He also

02:04:00.029 --> 02:04:01.918
mentioned that Republicans should

02:04:01.918 --> 02:04:04.140
nationalize voting , at least in many .

02:04:04.140 --> 02:04:06.307
Of the as many as 15 places because he

02:04:06.307 --> 02:04:08.196
believes that that we are running

02:04:08.196 --> 02:04:10.418
crooked elections in various places . I

02:04:10.418 --> 02:04:12.140
want to remind everybody who's

02:04:12.140 --> 02:04:15.752
listening to this that US Section 592

02:04:15.752 --> 02:04:18.833
and 593 criminalize both having troops

02:04:18.833 --> 02:04:21.112
at the polls and military interference

02:04:21.112 --> 02:04:23.632
with voting , conducting elections or

02:04:23.632 --> 02:04:25.799
election officers , and so I'd like to

02:04:25.799 --> 02:04:27.910
ask . The question that he didn't get

02:04:27.910 --> 02:04:29.965
an answer to , which is the midterms

02:04:29.965 --> 02:04:32.456
are in November . Will you collectively

02:04:32.775 --> 02:04:34.719
representing the people who helped

02:04:34.719 --> 02:04:36.886
decide where our troops are from North

02:04:36.886 --> 02:04:39.053
and South America , will you commit on

02:04:39.053 --> 02:04:41.164
the record before this committee that

02:04:41.164 --> 02:04:43.108
the Department of Defense will not

02:04:43.108 --> 02:04:45.275
deploy military personnel within sight

02:04:45.275 --> 02:04:47.331
of any polling places in November of

02:04:47.331 --> 02:04:50.339
2026 , Mr . Hugh Meyer . I'm not aware

02:04:50.339 --> 02:04:52.450
of any such direction that's coming ,

02:04:52.620 --> 02:04:54.676
but I reserve the decisions based on

02:04:54.676 --> 02:04:56.509
the president . But sir , if the

02:04:56.509 --> 02:04:58.620
president , if the president told you

02:04:58.620 --> 02:05:00.787
to send troops to the polling places ,

02:05:00.787 --> 02:05:02.787
would you do that unlawful act ? It

02:05:02.787 --> 02:05:04.620
would go through the same review

02:05:04.620 --> 02:05:06.787
process that we get from every request

02:05:06.787 --> 02:05:05.779
that comes from the White House . We

02:05:05.779 --> 02:05:08.112
have legal compliance . We have lawyers ,

02:05:08.112 --> 02:05:10.057
we have but there is a law already

02:05:10.057 --> 02:05:12.279
established and court history that says

02:05:12.279 --> 02:05:14.335
that it is not legal to do this . So

02:05:14.335 --> 02:05:16.501
you're speculate on you're not willing

02:05:16.501 --> 02:05:18.668
to say . And I can't speculate on what

02:05:18.668 --> 02:05:18.259
can happen and General , would , uh ,

02:05:18.399 --> 02:05:20.455
get , I'm , I keep hearing your name

02:05:20.455 --> 02:05:22.979
pronounced differently . Gio Gio , I

02:05:22.979 --> 02:05:25.189
think . Would you commit that you will

02:05:25.189 --> 02:05:27.259
not send military troops to , to

02:05:27.259 --> 02:05:29.000
polling places in November ,

02:05:29.640 --> 02:05:31.862
Congresswoman , I'm aware that doing so

02:05:31.862 --> 02:05:33.973
is against the law , and I will not ,

02:05:33.973 --> 02:05:36.084
uh , follow an unlawful order . Thank

02:05:36.084 --> 02:05:38.084
you . I appreciate your honesty and

02:05:38.084 --> 02:05:41.629
your lawfulness , General Donovan . I

02:05:41.629 --> 02:05:43.573
commit to the same , Congressman .

02:05:43.589 --> 02:05:45.533
Thank you . I very much appreciate

02:05:45.533 --> 02:05:47.533
those straightforward and forthwith

02:05:47.533 --> 02:05:49.533
answers , and I hope Mr . Humeyer ,

02:05:49.533 --> 02:05:51.700
that you take a look at the law , uh ,

02:05:51.700 --> 02:05:53.867
and follow it , a lawful order . I , I

02:05:53.867 --> 02:05:56.000
will , uh , pivot right now to , uh ,

02:05:56.069 --> 02:05:58.589
General Gio , uh , to talk to you a

02:05:58.589 --> 02:06:00.589
little bit about some of the assets

02:06:00.589 --> 02:06:02.478
that you have . You have a lot of

02:06:02.478 --> 02:06:04.422
assets that I would consider to be

02:06:04.422 --> 02:06:06.422
pretty exquisite , um , in terms of

02:06:06.422 --> 02:06:09.450
airborne ISR , uh , very , very , uh .

02:06:10.490 --> 02:06:12.850
Important things like P8s as well as

02:06:12.850 --> 02:06:15.850
U-2s and RQ4s are things that are

02:06:15.850 --> 02:06:17.961
available to you , and these are very

02:06:17.961 --> 02:06:20.183
scarce resources that are , I'm sure in

02:06:20.183 --> 02:06:22.239
demand in other parts of the world .

02:06:22.239 --> 02:06:24.239
And so many of these resources have

02:06:24.239 --> 02:06:26.589
been used recently in your command , uh ,

02:06:27.009 --> 02:06:29.231
about the border , on the border rather

02:06:29.231 --> 02:06:30.953
than being used perhaps in the

02:06:30.953 --> 02:06:32.898
Indo-Pacific or the Middle East or

02:06:32.898 --> 02:06:34.898
Europe . As much as every commander

02:06:34.898 --> 02:06:37.120
would want more of these resources , do

02:06:37.120 --> 02:06:39.342
you think that this is sort of overkill

02:06:39.342 --> 02:06:41.398
at this point in time , and do these

02:06:41.398 --> 02:06:43.620
resources perhaps need to be redeployed

02:06:43.620 --> 02:06:45.565
to other areas ? Congresswoman , I

02:06:45.565 --> 02:06:47.398
agree with the importance of the

02:06:47.398 --> 02:06:49.565
airborne ISR , and I do not think it's

02:06:49.565 --> 02:06:51.787
overkill for our mission . In fact , we

02:06:51.787 --> 02:06:53.842
could use more , but I would like to

02:06:53.842 --> 02:06:55.953
point out that within the authorities

02:06:55.953 --> 02:06:58.189
that I have under the under the GFM . I

02:06:58.189 --> 02:07:01.629
have shared those assets with Centcom ,

02:07:02.040 --> 02:07:05.390
with Southern Command , Indoacom , and

02:07:05.390 --> 02:07:08.069
with UCO , making sure that they're

02:07:08.069 --> 02:07:10.236
used in the place where they're needed

02:07:10.236 --> 02:07:12.291
most at the time while I continue to

02:07:12.291 --> 02:07:14.291
conduct the missions that have been

02:07:14.291 --> 02:07:16.513
tasked with me to ensure that we have a

02:07:16.513 --> 02:07:18.458
seal of the border and can counter

02:07:18.458 --> 02:07:20.950
cartels . I totally appreciate that and

02:07:20.950 --> 02:07:22.783
in fact have heard about that as

02:07:22.783 --> 02:07:24.839
recently as a trip that I took up to

02:07:24.839 --> 02:07:26.839
Iceland where I know some P-8s have

02:07:26.839 --> 02:07:29.006
been deployed to . Other places , uh ,

02:07:29.006 --> 02:07:31.061
most recently , and I appreciate the

02:07:31.061 --> 02:07:33.172
sharing . It does feel a little bit ,

02:07:33.172 --> 02:07:35.117
uh , that you must feel conflicted

02:07:35.117 --> 02:07:37.006
though when you have missions and

02:07:37.006 --> 02:07:39.061
things to accomplish within your own

02:07:39.061 --> 02:07:41.394
AOR and you're being asked to send , uh ,

02:07:41.394 --> 02:07:43.450
your assets to other places . How do

02:07:43.450 --> 02:07:45.506
you reconcile that when , when those

02:07:45.506 --> 02:07:47.672
things are heating up as as much as in

02:07:47.672 --> 02:07:49.450
for instance Cuba will or could

02:07:49.450 --> 02:07:51.617
Congresswoman , uh , first I , I share

02:07:51.617 --> 02:07:53.672
your , uh , admiration for the P-8 .

02:07:53.672 --> 02:07:55.617
It's a fantastic aircraft that has

02:07:55.617 --> 02:07:57.959
helped us , uh , quite a bit . Um , I ,

02:07:58.029 --> 02:08:00.307
I just try to take a global picture of ,

02:08:00.307 --> 02:08:02.810
of the environment and see what

02:08:03.140 --> 02:08:05.950
homeland implications are tied to the

02:08:05.950 --> 02:08:09.939
other . AORs and sometimes

02:08:09.939 --> 02:08:12.339
using those assets forward is actually

02:08:12.339 --> 02:08:14.500
the best defense to address them

02:08:14.500 --> 02:08:16.979
further away from the continental US ,

02:08:17.060 --> 02:08:19.609
which is why I'm willing to share when

02:08:19.609 --> 02:08:21.498
necessary . And then with my last

02:08:21.498 --> 02:08:23.442
seconds , these , these particular

02:08:23.442 --> 02:08:25.665
assets have the ability to collect , as

02:08:25.665 --> 02:08:27.942
I've mentioned , exquisite information .

02:08:27.942 --> 02:08:30.109
How do you make sure you don't collect

02:08:30.109 --> 02:08:29.700
it on US citizens when you're at the

02:08:29.700 --> 02:08:31.922
border , Congresswoman , I'm very aware

02:08:31.922 --> 02:08:34.033
of the intel oversight requirements ,

02:08:34.033 --> 02:08:36.367
and we follow them very , very strictly .

02:08:36.419 --> 02:08:38.509
Thank you . I yield . Gently yields

02:08:38.509 --> 02:08:40.453
back . Chair , and I recognize the

02:08:40.453 --> 02:08:42.565
gentle lady from New Hampshire , Ms .

02:08:42.565 --> 02:08:44.842
Goodlander . Thank you , Mr . Chairman ,

02:08:44.842 --> 02:08:46.787
and thank you to our witnesses for

02:08:46.787 --> 02:08:48.953
being here today . General , General ,

02:08:48.953 --> 02:08:50.842
thank you for your service to our

02:08:50.842 --> 02:08:52.842
country and thank you for your very

02:08:52.842 --> 02:08:55.009
clear commitment to uphold the law and

02:08:55.009 --> 02:08:57.287
to honor your oath to our Constitution .

02:08:57.709 --> 02:09:00.399
I hear concerns from my constituents

02:09:00.399 --> 02:09:03.000
every single day about domestic

02:09:03.000 --> 02:09:04.667
deployments of the military ,

02:09:04.799 --> 02:09:06.759
particularly in the lead up to the

02:09:06.759 --> 02:09:09.080
November election , and I appreciate

02:09:09.080 --> 02:09:11.379
your commitment to upholding the law .

02:09:11.640 --> 02:09:13.919
Um , we have no more solemn

02:09:13.919 --> 02:09:17.279
responsibility . I , I wanna ask you ,

02:09:17.520 --> 02:09:19.576
begin by asking you , General , uh .

02:09:20.339 --> 02:09:22.506
About Operation Absolute Resolve . Can

02:09:22.506 --> 02:09:24.819
you explain the rationale and

02:09:24.819 --> 02:09:26.700
objectives of Operation Absolute

02:09:26.700 --> 02:09:30.419
Resolve ? Congresswoman , I'm gonna ,

02:09:30.459 --> 02:09:32.620
um , move to Mr . Humeyer to walk

02:09:32.620 --> 02:09:34.787
through that . I was not in command at

02:09:34.787 --> 02:09:37.064
the time . I was in a different billet ,

02:09:37.064 --> 02:09:36.740
so I wouldn't want to look back and

02:09:36.740 --> 02:09:38.740
give you false , um , information .

02:09:38.740 --> 02:09:40.907
Understood . Well , Mr . Humeyer , I ,

02:09:40.907 --> 02:09:43.018
I've read in your written testimony ,

02:09:43.018 --> 02:09:45.073
you've described , you characterized

02:09:45.073 --> 02:09:47.073
Operation Absolute Resolve as a law

02:09:47.073 --> 02:09:49.359
enforcement support operation . Um ,

02:09:49.899 --> 02:09:52.819
the Justice Department unsealed the

02:09:52.819 --> 02:09:55.041
superseding indictment . Is this , this

02:09:55.041 --> 02:09:57.740
indictment , uh , the , the basic legal

02:09:57.740 --> 02:10:01.410
basis . And Objective set . This is

02:10:01.410 --> 02:10:03.632
what drove the objectives and rationale

02:10:03.632 --> 02:10:05.799
for for the operation . The Department

02:10:05.799 --> 02:10:07.966
of Justice Bam , uh , released a legal

02:10:07.966 --> 02:10:10.132
opinion . I'm not sure if it's in that

02:10:10.132 --> 02:10:12.188
indictment prior to the operation to

02:10:12.188 --> 02:10:14.354
the White House that characterized the

02:10:14.354 --> 02:10:16.410
threat that was posed and that there

02:10:16.410 --> 02:10:18.577
were warrants that were being actioned

02:10:18.577 --> 02:10:20.799
on by the Department of Justice against

02:10:20.799 --> 02:10:20.450
indicted criminals which included

02:10:20.450 --> 02:10:22.339
Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia

02:10:22.339 --> 02:10:24.506
Forrest . Yes , so what is the current

02:10:24.506 --> 02:10:26.930
status of the four Venezuelan nationals

02:10:26.930 --> 02:10:29.899
who are listed in this indictment ? So

02:10:30.319 --> 02:10:32.486
I haven't been directed to any actions

02:10:32.486 --> 02:10:34.763
that can be taken on those individuals .

02:10:34.763 --> 02:10:36.430
Are they still serving in the

02:10:36.430 --> 02:10:38.541
Venezuelan government ? I'm not clear

02:10:38.541 --> 02:10:38.240
of all of them , but I know at least ,

02:10:38.279 --> 02:10:40.223
uh , one or one or two of them are

02:10:40.223 --> 02:10:42.557
continuing in the Venezuelan government .

02:10:42.557 --> 02:10:44.557
Can you get back to us with a clear

02:10:44.557 --> 02:10:46.779
status update ? Yes , I know , I know ,

02:10:46.779 --> 02:10:46.560
ma'am , that at least 2 of them are

02:10:46.560 --> 02:10:48.560
currently serving in the Venezuelan

02:10:48.560 --> 02:10:48.350
government . I could get back to you

02:10:48.350 --> 02:10:50.517
with a , uh , termination , all 4 . So

02:10:50.517 --> 02:10:53.290
is , is the operation ongoing ? Well ,

02:10:53.439 --> 02:10:55.495
Operation Absolute Resolve was a law

02:10:55.495 --> 02:10:57.717
enforcement mission that the Department

02:10:57.717 --> 02:10:59.939
of War supported . Is it ongoing ? No .

02:10:59.939 --> 02:10:59.490
What's ongoing is our engagement with

02:10:59.490 --> 02:11:01.657
the Venezuelan government to stabilize

02:11:01.657 --> 02:11:03.712
the country so that these threats no

02:11:03.712 --> 02:11:05.879
longer emanate in is the United States

02:11:05.879 --> 02:11:08.101
running Venezuela ? No , the Venezuelan

02:11:08.101 --> 02:11:10.157
government's working with the United

02:11:10.157 --> 02:11:12.212
States to to stabilize the country ,

02:11:12.212 --> 02:11:11.850
and evidenced by the fact that there

02:11:11.850 --> 02:11:13.850
hasn't been an economic or societal

02:11:13.850 --> 02:11:15.961
collapse after the operation , things

02:11:15.961 --> 02:11:17.961
are moving into a steady state , so

02:11:17.961 --> 02:11:20.569
indicted . Indicted individuals in , in

02:11:20.569 --> 02:11:23.930
this indictment right here , this

02:11:23.930 --> 02:11:26.290
indictment , which was the basis of our

02:11:26.290 --> 02:11:28.759
military operation , are still serving

02:11:28.759 --> 02:11:30.926
in the Venezuelan government . Ma'am ,

02:11:30.926 --> 02:11:32.815
I'm not , I'm not looking at that

02:11:32.815 --> 02:11:31.890
indictment , so I don't know what

02:11:31.890 --> 02:11:34.001
individuals we're talking about , but

02:11:34.001 --> 02:11:36.223
what I , what I will say is that that's

02:11:36.223 --> 02:11:36.049
a law enforcement decision , not a

02:11:36.049 --> 02:11:38.105
Department of War decision . We were

02:11:38.105 --> 02:11:40.327
asked to support the law enforcement up

02:11:40.327 --> 02:11:42.382
to going specific individuals that ,

02:11:42.382 --> 02:11:44.605
that were indicted , uh , under the our

02:11:44.605 --> 02:11:46.716
laws . General , do you know the cost

02:11:46.716 --> 02:11:48.993
of , of this operation ? Congresswoman ,

02:11:48.993 --> 02:11:50.938
I do not . The cost , um , being a

02:11:50.938 --> 02:11:53.160
geographic command , our costs absorbed

02:11:53.160 --> 02:11:55.327
by the services , and so we don't have

02:11:55.327 --> 02:11:57.549
our own budget to attract those costs .

02:11:57.549 --> 02:11:59.771
Can , can you get back to , can you get

02:11:59.771 --> 02:11:59.770
back to us with the cost of the

02:11:59.770 --> 02:12:01.992
operation ? Yesterday is that Operation

02:12:01.992 --> 02:12:04.729
Absolute resolve or yes . Yesterday the

02:12:04.729 --> 02:12:06.930
president floated the idea that

02:12:06.930 --> 02:12:09.649
Venezuela should become the fifty-first

02:12:09.649 --> 02:12:11.729
state of the United States . This is

02:12:11.729 --> 02:12:13.785
not the first time the president has

02:12:13.785 --> 02:12:16.007
made a suggestion about another country

02:12:16.007 --> 02:12:18.062
becoming the fifty-first state . Are

02:12:18.062 --> 02:12:20.770
there any plans to annex Venezuela ? No ,

02:12:20.850 --> 02:12:23.017
ma'am , I'm not aware of any plans . I

02:12:23.017 --> 02:12:25.183
could say that we , we are very moving

02:12:25.183 --> 02:12:27.183
very far along on the stabilization

02:12:27.183 --> 02:12:29.294
efforts with Venezuela in conjunction

02:12:29.294 --> 02:12:31.572
with the interim Venezuelan government .

02:12:31.572 --> 02:12:33.739
Um , General Guillo , I'm sorry I have

02:12:33.739 --> 02:12:33.410
to ask this question , but are there

02:12:33.410 --> 02:12:37.270
any military plans to annex Canada ? No ,

02:12:37.580 --> 02:12:39.636
Congresswoman , I'm not aware of any

02:12:39.636 --> 02:12:41.802
plans to annex Canada . Well , that is

02:12:41.802 --> 02:12:43.913
a relief because as I shared with you

02:12:43.913 --> 02:12:45.747
last year , my home state of New

02:12:45.747 --> 02:12:47.913
Hampshire shares a 58 mile border with

02:12:47.913 --> 02:12:50.209
Canada , and I think we all agree that

02:12:50.430 --> 02:12:53.220
this is a border , uh , that matters

02:12:53.220 --> 02:12:55.498
enormously to us . Last year , General ,

02:12:55.509 --> 02:12:57.676
when you came before our committee , I

02:12:57.676 --> 02:13:00.270
asked you , um , what the consequences

02:13:00.270 --> 02:13:02.669
would be for , for our country if NORAD

02:13:02.669 --> 02:13:04.299
didn't exist anymore or was

02:13:04.299 --> 02:13:06.850
fundamentally altered . Um , the

02:13:06.850 --> 02:13:09.810
president's appointed US ambassador in

02:13:09.810 --> 02:13:12.959
Canada suggested in January that NORAD

02:13:12.959 --> 02:13:15.049
may have to be altered , which has

02:13:15.049 --> 02:13:17.370
caused some consternation . In what

02:13:17.370 --> 02:13:19.481
ways would NORAD need to be altered ?

02:13:19.481 --> 02:13:21.609
Would there be any justification for

02:13:21.609 --> 02:13:23.165
fundamentally altering this

02:13:23.165 --> 02:13:24.887
relationship , which is you've

02:13:24.887 --> 02:13:27.109
testified powerfully is so important to

02:13:27.109 --> 02:13:29.331
our national security ? Congresswoman ,

02:13:29.331 --> 02:13:31.276
I think the ambassador was talking

02:13:31.276 --> 02:13:34.919
about having to alter how we employ if

02:13:34.919 --> 02:13:37.141
they had fighter aircraft that were not

02:13:37.141 --> 02:13:39.475
interoperable with our fighter aircraft ,

02:13:39.475 --> 02:13:41.697
which we have now . They can share data

02:13:41.697 --> 02:13:43.752
links , mission planning , execution

02:13:43.752 --> 02:13:45.586
capability . If they were to buy

02:13:45.586 --> 02:13:47.752
aircraft that were not interoperable ,

02:13:47.752 --> 02:13:50.086
we'd have to our operational procedures ,

02:13:50.086 --> 02:13:51.863
but at this point they're still

02:13:51.863 --> 02:13:54.399
interoperable . Thank you , General . I

02:13:54.399 --> 02:13:56.677
yield back . Thank you , Mr . Chairman .

02:13:56.677 --> 02:13:58.621
That concludes the open portion of

02:13:58.621 --> 02:14:01.399
today's hearing . We will now recess

02:14:01.399 --> 02:14:04.680
for 5 minutes and reconvene in 2212 for

02:14:04.680 --> 02:14:06.500
the classified portion of the hearing .